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April 8, 2016 | Will Edwards
Check the most recent RT (Russian TV) news coverage from Syria and you will see Moscow’s latest military hardware on display. Russia’s top of the line attack helicopters—the Ka-52 and MI 28N—remain a fixture on the battlefield even after President Vladimir Putin’s nominal declaration of a Russian pullout. Beneath the ostentatious display of shiny new hardware there are questions U.S. policymakers want answers to in order to understand Russian intent. How has the price of oil affected Putin’s string of 16 years of military budget increases? What is the state of Russia’s conventional and nuclear forces in light of recently announced military budget cuts?
The recent drop in oil prices and the subsequent affect on Russia’s state revenue suggests a reexamination of Moscow’s modernization ambitions. Dmitry Orenburg, a senior research scientist at CNA, told the Cipher Brief that the Kremlin has largely insulated the military from deep budget cuts. The recently announced five percent cut to the military’s budget is expected to affect procurement of new weapons and systems rather than Russia’s ability to conduct foreign operations or military exercises. However, the Kremlin has set strict deficit restrictions on how much debt it is willing to incur. The fat left to trim has its limits, therefore, any further decrease in oil prices could force the military to start making capability cuts rather than just ones to procurement.
Not all consequences from the recession are negative. Orenburg points out an interesting side effect of the Russian recession: recruitment rates for the military have increased dramatically as the economy continues to shed jobs.
The budget cuts have yet to put serious restrictions on Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. New ballistic missile submarines are entering service and a replacement strategic bomber is on the drawing table. While both have suffered budget-related delays, other platforms will step in to take up the slack. A new order for updated Tu-160 Black Jacks, a supersonic bomber capable of carrying nuclear missiles, will pick up the slack until the replacement bomber becomes a reality. Russia is replacing nuclear weapons in these systems, some with multiple warheads known as MIRVs. Strategically, MIRVs are most useful as a first strike weapon than as a deterrent. Strategists contend that the concentration of several warheads on one missile fosters a “use it or lose it” mentality in the event of nuclear war. While the U.S. has removed MIRVs from all of its land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), Russia has not.
Included in the Russian modernization plan (and the U.S.’s) are upgrades to tactical nuclear weapons, that is shorter range, lower yield, battlefield weapons. These devices blur the line between conventional and nuclear armed forces, and could diminish the symbolic power of nuclear weapons as an existential last resort. Further complications stem from the fact that the U.S. is not clear about how Russia intends to use these weapons or even how many they may have.
These nuclear modernization efforts raise important questions about the fate of New START and subsequent arms reduction regimes on one hand and the need for each country to maintain a nuclear deterrent. Stephen Pilfer, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, told the Cipher Brief that there is no cause for alarm as long as Russia continues to abide by the New START treaty, and the U.S maintains and modernizes its nuclear triad of ICBMs, bombers, and submarines.
For President Barack Obama, the simultaneous goals of nuclear nonproliferation and force modernization pose a difficult dilemma. While he has embraced both agendas throughout his presidency, his preference is clearly to cut nuclear arsenals. However, the strategic reality has compelled the president and Capitol Hill to authorize $350 million over the next eight years for the comprehensive modernization of U.S strategic nuclear forces in order to maintain a deterrent against Russia.
At this moment, it would be alarmist to make comparisons between the current modernization efforts of both countries and the Cold War arms race. The lesson to remember when recalling the 45-year stand off is that dialogue has been an avenue to de-escalation, and that the onus of using nuclear weapons should remain unimpeachable.
Will Edwards is an International Producer with The Cipher Brief.
April 8, 2016 | Will Edwards
Check the most recent RT (Russian TV) news coverage from Syria and you will see Moscow’s latest military hardware on display. Russia’s top of the line attack helicopters—the Ka-52 and MI 28N—remain a fixture on the battlefield even after President Vladimir Putin’s nominal declaration of a Russian pullout. Beneath the ostentatious display of shiny new hardware there are questions U.S. policymakers want answers to in order to understand Russian intent. How has the price of oil affected Putin’s string of 16 years of military budget increases? What is the state of Russia’s conventional and nuclear forces in light of recently announced military budget cuts?
The recent drop in oil prices and the subsequent affect on Russia’s state revenue suggests a reexamination of Moscow’s modernization ambitions. Dmitry Orenburg, a senior research scientist at CNA, told the Cipher Brief that the Kremlin has largely insulated the military from deep budget cuts. The recently announced five percent cut to the military’s budget is expected to affect procurement of new weapons and systems rather than Russia’s ability to conduct foreign operations or military exercises. However, the Kremlin has set strict deficit restrictions on how much debt it is willing to incur. The fat left to trim has its limits, therefore, any further decrease in oil prices could force the military to start making capability cuts rather than just ones to procurement.
Not all consequences from the recession are negative. Orenburg points out an interesting side effect of the Russian recession: recruitment rates for the military have increased dramatically as the economy continues to shed jobs.
The budget cuts have yet to put serious restrictions on Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. New ballistic missile submarines are entering service and a replacement strategic bomber is on the drawing table. While both have suffered budget-related delays, other platforms will step in to take up the slack. A new order for updated Tu-160 Black Jacks, a supersonic bomber capable of carrying nuclear missiles, will pick up the slack until the replacement bomber becomes a reality. Russia is replacing nuclear weapons in these systems, some with multiple warheads known as MIRVs. Strategically, MIRVs are most useful as a first strike weapon than as a deterrent. Strategists contend that the concentration of several warheads on one missile fosters a “use it or lose it” mentality in the event of nuclear war. While the U.S. has removed MIRVs from all of its land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), Russia has not.
Included in the Russian modernization plan (and the U.S.’s) are upgrades to tactical nuclear weapons, that is shorter range, lower yield, battlefield weapons. These devices blur the line between conventional and nuclear armed forces, and could diminish the symbolic power of nuclear weapons as an existential last resort. Further complications stem from the fact that the U.S. is not clear about how Russia intends to use these weapons or even how many they may have.
These nuclear modernization efforts raise important questions about the fate of New START and subsequent arms reduction regimes on one hand and the need for each country to maintain a nuclear deterrent. Stephen Pilfer, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, told the Cipher Brief that there is no cause for alarm as long as Russia continues to abide by the New START treaty, and the U.S maintains and modernizes its nuclear triad of ICBMs, bombers, and submarines.
For President Barack Obama, the simultaneous goals of nuclear nonproliferation and force modernization pose a difficult dilemma. While he has embraced both agendas throughout his presidency, his preference is clearly to cut nuclear arsenals. However, the strategic reality has compelled the president and Capitol Hill to authorize $350 million over the next eight years for the comprehensive modernization of U.S strategic nuclear forces in order to maintain a deterrent against Russia.
At this moment, it would be alarmist to make comparisons between the current modernization efforts of both countries and the Cold War arms race. The lesson to remember when recalling the 45-year stand off is that dialogue has been an avenue to de-escalation, and that the onus of using nuclear weapons should remain unimpeachable.
Will Edwards is an International Producer with The Cipher Brief.
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