Military reforms in China

Apr 20, 2016,
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/military-reforms-in-china/224646.html
Gen V P Malik (retd)
India’s leadership needs to draw right lessons
All supreme leaders of China have either been generals or political entities in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). But unlike his predecessors, Xi Jinping has taken much greater interest in matters military. Within days of taking over, Xi made high-profile visits to many army, air force, space programme and missile command facilities. Speaking to sailors on board the Haikou, a guided-missile destroyer, he said that his dream was of China to become a strong nation, and added, “To achieve the great revival of the Chinese nation, we must ensure there is unison between a prosperous country and a strong military.” Xi unveiled his plans to transform the PLA in the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on November 12, 2013. The first phase has been completed. The remaining changes are expected to be completed by 2021. 

 

The military reforms on the one hand are to transform the land-focused PLA into a well-trained, technologically capable, specialised force to meet the demands of the future battlefield. That would “lead to effective integration of the civil-military leadership, restructuring the military and its force level, and the teeth-to-tail ratio”. On the other hand, it involves some reshuffle of authority, aimed at enforcing discipline and getting a firmer grip on the military. In recent years, several instances of corruption in the PLA have been reported in the Chinese media: the worst hit being the system of promotion. Two former vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, were arrested and imprisoned. According to reports, 47 PLA generals were investigated in 2015. As one military expert noted, “If you have a military where you can buy positions, it doesn't matter if you have the best weapons in the world.” The anti-corruption campaign needed to focus on the issues of military discipline, inspections, audit and an independent judicial supervision. A new Commission for Discipline Inspection is being set up under the CMC to ensure strict discipline within the PLA. Xi has ordered the PLA to change its culture and adopt a style of frugality and austerity because ostentatious habits kill professionalism! “Ten Regulations on Improving the Work Style of the PLA” have formally banned liquor at PLA functions, forbade holding of big banquets and called on the PLA brass to adopt a simple style in their inspection tours. Senior officers have been told to spend two weeks on the frontline as enlisted soldiers. Regiment and brigade commanders will do this once in three years, the division and corps commanders once in four years, and higher leaders from higher headquarters once in five years. 

 

More important changes are those related to the PLA command and control organisation, its employment and doctrine. In China, the CMC is the highest military body which exercises command and control over the PLA forces through four general departments-General Staff, Politics, Logistics, and Armament. These departments are now to be replaced by 15 new departments, signalling a more direct control. Earlier, the General Staff Department (GSD) was the number one organ of the armed forces, in charge of operations as well as intelligence. It commanded the army, through which it controlled seven military regions across the country. The GSD has now become the Joint General Staff Department, to function purely as a staff organisation, similar to the joint chiefs of staff system of the USA. The PLA ground forces will now become a separate service. This marks the reduction of the power of the ground forces but some improvement of command and control within the army. The erstwhile Second Artillery Corps in its new avatar will become the Rocket Force and will control all short, medium and long range ballistic missiles. The General Political Department has transferred control of the military legal system to the new Law Commission. The General Armaments Department was responsible for developing military equipment and managing aviation units. The responsibility for development of new military equipment has now been distributed to the four armed forces. A new Strategic Support Force (SSF) has been created to work on integrated air and aerospace developments and strategy. The SSF will be responsible for satellite positioning, communication, and remote sensing. The precise delineation of responsibilities between the SSF and the PLA Air Force is yet to be seen. The existing Chinese command system involves seven Military Regions, headquartered in Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu and Lanzhou. The Military Region structure is being redrawn. Instead, Integrated Battle Zone commands with increased focus on combat will be established through joint operations command and ability. For a combat mission to be effectively executed, the commander of a battle zone has to be entrusted with the authority and discretion to mobilise troops within his area of responsibility. This will enhance overall joint operations capability of the forces involved and also improve development of joint as well as cross-region air and naval operations when required. In the new set-up, the CMC will take direct charge of the administration of the PLA. The 'CMC-battle zone-troops' system will ensure closer, more effective political leadership of the armed forces. The service headquarters of the army, air force, navy and the rocket force will be detached. Their task will be to provision and train their respective forces. The reforms envisage a cut of 300,000 personnel in the 2.3 million PLA forces. The idea is to 'remake the PLA from a man-power intensive force to a smaller, technologically able and mobile force capable of combat beyond its geographical borders'. The proportion and force structure of different forces will be streamlined ‘to suit new security needs and operations.’ The PLA transformation is in line with the current security concepts and trends. It reflects mission-oriented operational thinking, enhanced deterrence capability, and preparedness to play a role beyond geographic frontiers, when required. In India, we had discussed such issues in the Group of Ministers (2002) and the Naresh Chandra Committee (2011-12), though not as comprehensively. But our political leadership, civil bureaucracy in the Ministry of Defence and the Service headquarters have managed to stall recommended reforms due to lack of military education and/or parochial interests. The over-riding lesson that the Chinese process offers is the important role of political leadership in the military reform process. No transformative change can take place in the military of any society — democratic or authoritarian-without the direct involvement of the political class. As this important task can no longer be postponed in India, I hope that Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, who began his three-day visit to China on April 18, 2016, will find time to learn from the Chinese example. — The writer is a former Army Chief