“Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort.”
Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D Eisenhower after the end of Second World War
More
than 70 years have passed since the end of second World War. Who does
not know in modern times without jointness no war can be fought. Every
modern armed forces of the world have changed accordingly. Even the
Chinese is going in for integrated commands in a big way. The most
honourable exception is Indian Armed forces. Second largest Army, fourth
largest Air Force and sixth largest Navy of the world refuse to change!
They still want to fight the war service wise from their own service
centric Operations Rooms. Led by a Committee. In 21st century. All
Command HQs of all the three services are located at different places!
Not a single one is co located. For example in a conflict with China
Eastern Army will fight from Kolkata, Eastern Navy from Vizag and
Eastern Air Force from Shillong.
Post
Kargil, Group Of Ministers Report recommended jointness. HQ Integrated
Defence Staff (IDS) was established. It is at best a half baked interim
measure without any teeth. How can a service Chief go against his own
service HQ view as Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee. One Commandant of
US Marine Corps very succinctly summed up the problem of chairman of
such committee : "Being loyal to your own service as well as the joint
services is like being loyal to your wife and mistress at the same
time." In 2002-3 when I was undergoing LDMC Course at College of Defence
Management in a seminar on Jointness ( a very popular subject, plethora
of such seminars happen every year) I asked a question quoting this. A
former Naval C in C who was chairing the session tongue in check told me
that in hoi polloi of Delhi some of them manage to do both! That was
two yug,14 years back. I wonder they can still do it. If you don't
believe ask Gen Petraeus! It will continue to remain so till some
“shove” comes from political masters. This is the reason any major
decision cannot be taken where any of the services HQ has some
reservations. Can you tell me which are the critical operational issues
where the three services HQs will be unanimous. It is not that HQ IDS
does not do much. In fact, in spite of many systematic problems it has
slowly made its presence felt and taken a number of initiatives which
would have never been done without its existence. At least purple colour
has been propagated to all and sundry.
Whenever
the issue of lack of jointness comes up at the highest levels, one
often hears, it has to come from top meaning political leadership. I
have never heard more ‘daft’ reasoning. You know the problem, you know
the solution. But won’t do anything, pass the buck to political leaders,
sit back, relax and play golf. Typical of No Action Talk Only (NATO)
forces. I often wonder is it too much for the political leadership to
kick the butt of some people responsible and get a road map moving. Of
course, they have to be clear in mind what they want to do with
jointness.
How Does Reorganisation Happen, Some Examples
Future of the Army
In
recent times two key issues which were bugging Pentagon on US Army. US
Congress ordered a study to answer these questions: What should the size
of the future Army be? And how should the Amy apportion its aviation
fleet between the regular Army and the Army National Guard? National
Commission on the Future of the Army came out with a report in one year
flat. The hyper link would get you the report of 9 MB. Since I have been
blocked by US Army to access any document I requested my Naval chela to
send me the document which he sent me pronto with his comments. I have a
fair idea how many in Indian Army's Think Tank are reading these
reports. Of course there are observation / criticism. Conrad C Crane has
raised the following seven Issues the Future of the Army Commission
should Have Spent More Time On :
a) Once cut, the Army is not easily expansible
b) Deeper analysis on options to better integrate the active and reserve components
c) A more thorough discussion of deficiencies in force structure and capabilities
d) Expanded discussion of stability operations and counterinsurgency
e) Explicit analysis of force size and structure recommendations
f) A real discussion of risk
g) Contractors on the battlefield
Maj Gen Robert H. Scales (Retd) ex Commandant Army War College writes :
And
I was pleasantly surprised. The document is good. The commission
members were faithful to their congressional charter. Fifteen years of
continuous warfare have changed the Army’s culture. Decades of
regular–National Guard mutual commitment have co-joined the services
into a joint fighting force unparalleled on the planet. One cannot find a
serving senior soldier who fails to appreciate the amplifying power of
“jointness.” Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has compelled the Army
to discover new dimensions of war by embracing the role of the
interagency, so called “whole-of-government” contributions to wars
fought in the gray regions of conflict.... Virtually hidden in the
report are a few additional jewels that should raise awareness among our
political leaders. The commissioners write about capability “gaps” and
the consequences for “risk.” In essence, the commission is warning that
the fighting abilities of the nation are being impeded by several very
serious shortcomings that have grown and festered during our recent
wars. The first is air defense. In Ukraine and Syria, the Russians have
clearly shown that they understand our “gaps” in air defense and have
worked effectively to exploit them. In both places, the Russians have
created an enormously complex, layered array of integrated air defenses
that, in the hands of a Russian or Russian surrogate force, might deny
our air forces access to the close fight. If the air forces are late to
the battle, the Army will be unable to shoot down attacking aircraft and
drones because it has virtually no low- and medium-altitude air
defenses. This is a serious shortcoming. The Army must field a robust
air defense capability immediately. ..... The second critical commission
observation deals with a painful self-inflicted wound: neglect of our
artillery force. The Russians have rediscovered artillery. In 2014,
Russian multi-battalion artillery “fire strikes” virtually destroyed a
Ukrainian tank unit within minutes. The “Little Green Men” employed
sophisticated electronic means to locate the Ukrainians and followed
their movements using layers of orbiting drones.
My
most serious concern with the commission report is its apparent failure
to pay close attention to the lessons we have learned during the past
14 years of war (or, for that matter, the last 70 years of ground
conflict since the end of World War II). Such ahistoricism manifests
itself in the commission’s recommendation to reduce the Army by two
light infantry brigades. This decision is, in a way, understandable
given that the commission followed contemporary rules governing fiscal
and human apportionment within the Department of Defense. They recommend
reapportioning these light infantry spaces to meet obvious shortfalls
in artillery, air defense and military police units.But the Gods of War
apportion differently. Like it or not our enemies are overwhelmingly
light infantry. They are growing, not diminishing. The shortage of light
infantry in Iraq and Afghanistan came close to collapsing our Army in
2006 and 2007. Too many close combat tours for our young infantry
soldiers and leaders came close to breaking the Army. Too few soldiers
for too many close combat missions has left scars that will torment them
for generations. The Army can make up for artillery, air defense, and
MP increases without affecting close combat BCTs. It just needs to take a
sharp pencil to the issue and reduce logistics, higher level staffs,
and acquisition officers with no detriment on the fighting capability of
the Total Force.Another painfully learned fact from our history is that
a volunteer Army tends to fight with the forces they first take to war.
It took almost five years for former Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld
to be persuaded to increase Army forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
same tragic scenario played out in Korea and Vietnam. So my personal
plea would be for the Army to increase not decrease its close combat
(principally infantry) forces.
There is no ideal solution fulfilling everybody's requirement. But some optimum solution can be arrived at.
“Force of the Future”
This is Ash Carter's pet programme ( https://t.co/pckyujee6s).
He said, " The military is a profession of arms, It’s not a business.
The key to doing this successfully is to leverage both tradition and
change.” The 200+ page “Force of the Future” report included
recommendations to better balance work and family demands, such as
expanding parental leave and removing the “up and out” approach to force
management. Some of the Force of the Future report initiatives are :
Replace “Up or Out” with “Perform and Out.”
The services lose members at around 40-45 years of age -- when they are
performing at their highest level. Carson said careers need to last
longer while retaining quality; if the military is to keep field grades
officers longer, for example, they must be quality field grade officers
contributing in an important fashion.
Develop and Employ Talent Management System (TMS).
These types of systems are currently being used in the private sector
for recruitment, performance management, learning and development, and
compensation management.
Establish Technical Career Tracks. The
need for technical skills is increasing and service members should be
able to stay in those career tracks without a negative impact on career
progression and promotions.
Align Compensations to a Talent Management Paradigm.
This will require establishing new metrics for evaluating talent versus
solely job performance. Services need to be able to measure and
identify high-potential talent as these individuals tend to grow into
leadership positions. Highly talented people want to be challenged and
see results, which is not often achieved in a bureaucratic environment.
Increase Gender and Racial Diversity.
The Navy believes women are an underused talent pool and are evaluating
opening jobs previously closed to women. (One could argue the Army and
Air Force are on board with this sentiment!) The current personnel
systems, in place from the 1940s when women were not a major presence in
the work force, must be updated. The services will try to be more
reflective of the civilian population. This year’s incoming West Point
class is the most diverse group the school has ever admitted.
Expand Parental Leave.
This will include using parental leave for adoptions. It will be
available to men and women. The Navy is out front with its new extended
maternal leave policy.
Improve Quality of Life for Military Families.
This would include expanding gyms and adapting military service fitness
tests to age and medical status. The services are also piloting child
care hours by staying open 24/7 to include Naval Station Norfolk.
Expand Fertility Treatment.
This has become more of an issue for the military as a result of
injuries received from IEDs. Congress recently tried to help with “ . . .
expanded fertility services offered by the Defense Department, through
Tricare, to severely injured troops, including those with fertility
issues related to traumatic brain injury, and also would have lifted the
ban on in vitro fertilization at VA medical centers.”
Improve Recruiting and Accession Efficiency.
This recommendation was the most enthusiastically embraced by all of
the services. It can increase the quality of the force by saving $1
billion each year. For example, 20 percent of recruits completing basic
training do not show up for their first duty station, resulting in loss
of the training investment when they are discharged.
Increase Permeability between Components.
The thought here is to integrate personnel and pay systems. The recent
change recommended by the Military Compensation and Retirement
Modernization Commission to reduce Guard and Reserve duty statuses from
over 30 to just six is an example of the types of changes that will be
needed. The services will be offering more 2-3 year limited active duty
tours for Guard and Reserve members as a way to augment active forces
without increasing their end strength. The services would prefer to do
this by merging the RC MPA funds into the active duty account.
Expand In-Service Civil Schooling Opportunities.
The Navy has increased quotas next year in their pilot for service
members to complete graduate education in civilian institutions.
Expand Partnerships with Industry and Local Government. DoD believes more service members should train with industry, using 1-2 year assignments.
Modernize Joint Professional Development.
The Army wants to “set the table” for future leaders by establishing
the right mix of senior service school, joint qualifications and
enterprise experience. Right now 50 percent of their captains are
leaving the service.
Al the above issues are equally applicable to us. What we do with these issues? Well.....
USA 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act 2.0
We
are very fond of quoting USA 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. That time also
there was lot of reservation about jointness from the different
services HQs. They were firmly told either fall in line or get out.
Nobody got out. If you want to read the act itself please click onhttp://history.defense.gov/…
USA
after 30 years experience of war fighting is now planning to proceed to
Gold Water Nichols Act 2.0. Sen. John McCain, the Chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee opened the first of what he said would
be a series of hearings on Defense organization with a favorable nod to
the 1986 legislation, saying it did exactly what it was supposed to:
breaking down parochial barriers between the military services and
building jointness into the culture of the U.S. military. But he said
the nature of warfare and technology have changed a lot in the
intervening years, and the scale of the Pentagon’s bureaucracy has
ballooned without much to show for it.
“Our Defense spending, in constant dollars, is nearly the same as it
was 30 years ago. But we’re getting 35 percent fewer combat brigades, 53
percent fewer ships and 63 percent fewer combat air squadrons. More and
more of our people and money are in overhead functions, not operating
forces,” McCain said.
The
committee heard from several experts on Defense organization, including
two former Congressional staffers who stewarded Goldwater-Nichols
through Congress. Each counseled that another round of reforms is long
overdue, but urged lawmakers against knee-jerk legislation. The 1980s
reforms were preceded by five years of Congressional study; the next
overhaul deserves that amount of attention too, they said.
Nevertheless,
some issues keep coming up for discussion. It’s worthwhile, then, to
take a look at these issues to see whether they are ready for decision.
The Combatant Commands (COCOMs) are bloated and should be refocused on warfighting.
The
pendulum has swung too far towards joint organizations and away from
the services. Gen. Tommy Franks, when preparing for the invasion of Iraq
in 2002, made it clear that he did not want to hear from the “Title 10
motherfuckers,” as he called the service chiefs. The service chiefs,
with their expertise in organizing, training, and equipping the forces,
could be brought back into operational planning.
The
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff have too
much overlap. Over the years, OSD and the Joint Staff have both built
organizations that cover the entire spectrum of activities, from
budgeting to acquisition to strategy development to operational
planning. Today OSD numbers about 3,300 and the Joint Staff about 2,700.
Pentagon overhead is bloated, inhibits rapid decision-making, and needs to be reduced.
Many
senior decision-makers, former Secretary Robert Gates prominent among
them, have complained about the highly centralized decision-making of
the Obama White House. Indeed, the National Security Council staff has
grown to a record size of 400 people. However, the interagency process
is at the fault line between Congress and the executive branch.
Presidents get the interagency process that fits their decision-making
style. It’s not something that Congress can legislate.
The next step would be to take a few quick wins this year. What follows is not a comprehensive list but a start.
Authorize
another round of base closure (BRAC), increase workforce flexibility by
allowing outsourcing (through OMB Circular A–76), and begin a process
for easing some of the restrictive civilian personnel rules. These are
hard because they contravene powerful parochial interests, but there is
widespread agreement that Department of Defense needs these authorities
to operate more efficiently. Congress can always override individual
decisions that it doesn’t like.
Upgrade Cyber Command to a combatant command, but require that the total number of its personnel not change. These new domains would thus receive increased attention, hopefully without increasing total overhead.
Allow service chiefs to participate in some phases of operational planning. This would not put them into the chain of command but would provide a mechanism to give their advice and keep them informed.
Increase to four years the terms for the Chairman and Vice Chairman so they are comparable to the service chiefs. Although both are routinely given a second two-year term, this would eliminate any perception that they have less room to take risks.
Increase education in strategy formulation for both military and civilian personnel. This would improve the strategy formulation process without requiring controversial organizational changes.
Upgrade Cyber Command to a combatant command, but require that the total number of its personnel not change. These new domains would thus receive increased attention, hopefully without increasing total overhead.
Allow service chiefs to participate in some phases of operational planning. This would not put them into the chain of command but would provide a mechanism to give their advice and keep them informed.
Increase to four years the terms for the Chairman and Vice Chairman so they are comparable to the service chiefs. Although both are routinely given a second two-year term, this would eliminate any perception that they have less room to take risks.
Increase education in strategy formulation for both military and civilian personnel. This would improve the strategy formulation process without requiring controversial organizational changes.
Finally,
Congress should put in place the mechanics for the next step. The first
task is to identify the specific areas of interest. As noted above,
COCOM function, COCOM consolidation, OSD/Joint Staff overlap,
organizational delayering, and strategy formulation are candidates. Then
Congress needs to establish a mechanism for assessing these questions.
Although the Department of Defense needs to be consulted, it cannot
objectively assess these questions on its own.
Recently
Ash Carter in CSIS said : “This year, as Goldwater-Nichols turns 30, we
can see that the world has changed,Instead of the Cold War and one
clear threat, we face a security environment that’s dramatically
different from the last quarter-century. It’s time that we consider
practical updates to this critical organizational framework, while still
preserving its spirit and intent.” The first reform is clarifying the
role of the Chairman, currently Marine Gen. Joe Dunford, while still
keeping him outside the chain of command. Essentially, it codifies the
Chairman's role as the top military adviser. “We need someone in uniform
who can look across the services and combatant commands and make
objective recommendations to the department’s civilian leadership about
where to allocate forces throughout the world and where to apportion
risk to achieve maximum benefit to our nation,” Carter said. “And the
person best postured to do that is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.”
Carter
acknowledged the Chairman is supposed to be the military advisor for
the President and secretary, but said in today's world, the role goes
beyond that narrow definition. "It doesn't say [the Chairman is] also
the one who supposed to be, everyday and periodically as we move forces
around, giving me that advice on where things ought to be and how they
ought to be used," Carter said after his speech. "That is self-evidently
required in today's world and it wasn’t part of the original
conception. As a practical matter everyone know I look to Gen. Dunford
to do that, but I think it's worth writing it down."
The
second change focuses on how the Pentagon buys equipment. Congress
delivered acquisition reform directives to the Pentagon last year, which
Carter said the building would follow, with an emphasis on increasing
the acquisition powers held by the individual service chiefs. This will
include evaluating – “and where appropriate reducing” – members of the
Defense Acquisition Board, which currently is comprised of 35 principals
and advisers. “Reducing these layers will both free up staff time and
focus decision-making energy on overcoming real obstacles to program
success rather than bureaucratic hurdles,” Carter said.
Sometimes
reform can come from not making big changes, something Carter indicated
is the right path with the geographic combatant commands, his third
area of focus. Merging several COCOMS, as has been publicly debated
around Washington, doesn’t make sense in a world with unique conflicts
in many different regions. “Instead of combining these commands to the
detriment of our friends, our allies, and in fact our own command and
control capabilities, we intend to be more efficient by integrating
functions like logistics, intelligence, and plans across the Joint
Staff, the combatant commands, and subordinate commands, eliminating
redundancies wherever we find them without losing capability,” he said.
Carter
also indicated that the number of four-stars may be winnowed in the
future, noting he will “look to simplify and improve command and control
where the number of four-star positions have made headquarters either
top-heavy, or less efficient than they could be.”
Perhaps
most interesting, Carter seemed to leave the door open for a change in
status for US Cyber Command, saying “we should consider changes to
cyber’s role in DoD’s Unified Command Plan.” That could be a hint that
he would consider making Cyber Command a full combatant command. "We
have a cyber command today, and i have given cyber command in the
counter-ISIL [the common name for the Islamic State group] fight,
really, its first wartime assignment. and we're seeing how that works
out," Carter said during a question and answer session after his speech.
"
“Where
we see potential to be more efficient and effective, billets currently
filled by four-star generals and admirals will be filled by three-stars
in the future,” Carter added.
Finally,
Carter proposes to change the requirement that officers service in
joint roles as they progress in their career, calling the current
requirements “more narrow and rigid than they need to be.” Instead,
Carter envisions a situation where officers can receive joint duty
credit for operational functions, “such as intelligence, fires,
transportation and maneuver, protection, and sustainment, including
joint acquisition.” The secretary also wants to shorten the joint duty
requirement time, going from three years to two.
How are they going about it.
The
entire national security community has responded. The Department of
Defense has its own group working on the problem and will provide its
proposals in about six weeks. Many think tanks (including, in the spirit
of full disclosure, the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) where I work) are doing their own analysis and providing
opinions. While it is true that many weaknesses in defense management
have been identified, there is no clear consensus about what to do. An
alternative approach, then, might be to take some quick wins now and put
in place a process for identifying and building consensus for bigger
changes later.
In
order to help the process of identifying problems and potential
solutions, CSIS analyzed the testimony given to the Senate Armed
Services Committee and arranged the recommendations into nine
categories. The CSIS team then looked for common themes in the
recommendations where a consensus might be emerging. One of the themes
was management weaknesses in the Defense Department’s organization and
decision-making processes. There was little consensus, however, about
how to fix these weaknesses. This was in contrast to the situation in
the 1980s when the original Goldwater-Nichols legislation was developed.
At that time there was a clear consensus that the services needed to
work together more effectively and thus make operations more joint. I am
attaching the excel sheet.
Center
for Strategic & International Studies’ established A Defense 360
micro website. A survey on Defence Reforms was conducted results of
which were made available at :http://defense360.csis.org/
State
Department felt that their authority has been reduced by the 1986 Act
and wanted Foreign Policy makers to have more say and their voice was
published by Brookings at http://www.brookings.edu/~/
All these are available at my blog. I wonder how many of my brethren have read those.
All these are available at my blog. I wonder how many of my brethren have read those.
Defence
Reform is a major issue with lot of complications and major financial
effects. Number of Armed Forces in the world have undertaken reforms
with mixed results. We need to have a look at all those examples and try
to learn from others mistakes and don't be a fool to learn from own
mistakes.
We
do have some similarities with Israel. Like us they fought three major
wars in 48, 67 and 73, Air War at Becca Valley and is in continuous
conflicts with Hizbollas and Hamas. Before the 2006 First Lebanon War
Israel Defence Force went gaga over all the technological superiority
displayed in First Gulf War, got seduced by NCW and EBO and all those
fancy concepts some of them enunciated by Israeli's themselves. IDF was
headed for the first time by an Air Force Ofiicer, Gen Halutz . After
the disaster the Government of Israel appointed a governmental
commission called The Winograd Commission. More than 600 page report is
available. The classified interim report is available at : http://online.wsj.com/
We
must also see how some of the other armed forces of the world are
evolving as the character of warfare is changing continuously. For
example Russia is changing.The 2008 Georgian War revealed many of the
Russian military’s shortcomings. Orders were slow to travel down the
chain of command, a lack of coor-dination between the air force and
troops on the ground led to higher casualties, and a breakdown in
intelligence and planning resulted in the Russian air force losing
several aircraft to Georgia’s anti-aircraft missile batteries. Russian
troops were able to overwhelm the overmatched Georgian army, but the
after action review left little doubt that changes were badly needed.
Shortly
after the Georgian war Russia’s Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov
launched a sweeping reorganization of the army. Although Serdyukov’s
(2008–12) reorganization is only one component of a broader, ongoing
three-stage plan of rearming and modernizing Russia’s military by 2020,
the reorganization has been by far the most controversial aspect of the
modernization. In the span of four years, the Russian military did away
with many of its long-held practices. Russia significantly reduced the
size of its officer corps; the military moved away from a Soviet
divisional model of organization to a NATO-like brigade structure.
Supply and logistics jobs were outsourced to private contractors; and
the military education system was radically altered.
Proponents
of the reform argue that the changes improved the combat readiness and
professionalism of the army. Opponents counter that while reform was
necessary, Serdyukov’s initiatives were poorly thought out and resulted
in widespread chaos and demoralization. Serdyukov’s reforms were met
with fierce opposition from Russia’s military establishment and remain a
source of derision. And while Western analysts dismissed the criticism
as personal resentment over losing coveted sinecures, there is anecdotal
evidence that the transition to private contractors led to serious
service and supply disruptions . Moreover, even defenders of the reforms
have admitted that the army continues to lack the promised high-tech
and high-precision weaponry . The controversy surrounding the changes
ultimately proved to be Ser-dyukov’s undoing; he was sacked in 2012 and
tried for corruption. Serdyukov’s dismissal and trial seem to have
placated critics of the reforms; his successor, Sergei Shoigu, has
managed to keep most of the changes made by his predecessor.
Following
Russia’s sudden annexation of Crimea and the ongoing campaign in Syria,
pundits have been quick to declare the Russian military to be a
revamped, modern fighting machine—seemingly vindicating Serdyukov.
Indian Scene
Indian Armed Forces have some peculiarities compared to other armed forces of the world. Some of these are :
The
ratio of services are skewed. Normally the ratio of Army, Navy and Air
Force in major armed forces of the world is 4:3:3 or thereabouts. In our
case strength of Indian Army is 1.2 million, Indian Navy around 60,000
and IAF 1.4 Lakhs. Talking of availability of aircrafts.Take example of
US Pacific Command. In PACOM Pacific Fleet has 600 aircrafts, Army
Pacific 309, Marine Corps Force Pacific 640, and Pacific Air force 300+.
Compare this with ours. In these issues we have similarity with Chinese
Armed Forces. They are also predominantly PLA Army dominated. But the
Chinese are giving the ultimate compliment to the Americans by following
the concept of joint commands in their recent modernisation of Armed
Forces.
Present Situation
Recent
news reports suggest that the Government is on the verge of appointing a
permanent Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee in four star rank. Some
sort of watered down version of Naresh Chandra Committee is being
implemented.
I
don't understand why there is so much of confidentiality with such
committee reports. I have given examples how informed debates take
place, how experts give their opinion, 360 degree feedback is obtained
and then only a major decision like reforms is taken. If there is a
portion of reports which need confidentiality same need not be
published. Surely the complete report is not confidential. The Kargil
Review Committee Report is an example. The classified portion was not
published but the rest was quickly put in open domain. Keeping these
reports classified serves no purpose. Ultimately Henderson Brooks
report, was put in open domain by Neville Maxwell. Only people in the
know of things take undue advantage. Idea is to have some lively debate
for informed decision making.
How
is appointing a permanent Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee is
going to help vis a vis present system of CISC. Is he going to have
power to override recommendations of Service Chiefs. What is his role in
operational planning and operational issues vis a vis Service Chiefs.
The command and control issues of strategic forces command are never
discussed. What is the relationship between strategic forces command, HQ
IDS and service HQS, remember we have Nuc Triads now.
The
best that should have happened was to integrate HQ IDS with MoD.
Unfortunately that did not happen. What is the domain knowledge
expertise that is available with MoD. Bureaucrats, may come from Animal
Husbandry Department and go to Agriculture department. Defence today is
highly specialised subject. MoD could use IDSA for expert advice.
Unfortunately IDSA has hardly any military expertise, IDSA has one
retired Brig as DDG and a few Col level officers most of them on
sabbatical as study leave for two years. Not that MoD cares though they
fund IDSA lavishly.
How
will be the new appointment give single point advice. Probably he can
do on issues dealt by HQ IDS exclusively like HA/ DR, Cyber, Space,
acquisition, management of funds. But operational matters? No service HQ
will leave that, nor HQ IDS have that capability at present form. Will
the MoD stop asking for information from all the three services and only
ask from HQ IDS? MoD does not have domain knowledge. They only play
with inputs given by all the three services and HQ IDS.
Let
me give an example. Close Air Support for the Army is always a very
touchy issue. In a recent seminar at USI I found a retired Air Marshal
reacting aggressively to the use of the word CAS. For IAF use of the
word CAS is sacrilege. They have picked up the USAF jargon Counter
Surface Force Operations (CSFO). No matter the US JOINT PUBLICATION
3-09.3 on Close Air Support OF 25 November 2014 available at :https://fas.org/irp/doddir/
U.S.
Air Force A-10 Warthog is a formidable weapon of cold war vintage
having put in 40-plus years in service. While facing budget constraints
first thing USAF does is to retire A10 Warthog in favour of F-35s. There
was a huge uproar . Lo and behold The Defense Department plans to test
the fifth-generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter jet against the Cold
War-era A-10 attack aircraft in close air support tests! (http://www.dodbuzz.com/2015/
And
look at the audacity of that gentleman Ashley Tellis. He is
recommending 40 year old A110 Warthogs to be procured by India as part
of modernisation of IAF. Some of our defence experts are quoting him,
thankfully not with their own recommendations, but the indications are
clear. I am not finding experts from IAF giving comments on this issue
These
issues will always be there in every armed forces of the world. We have
to remember that USAF has not fought a dog fight after Korean War. Same
is not the case with others. Point is, if there is a problem we have to
address the issue head on. I am sure when IAF says you pongos don't
have to worry, we will look after you, they know their job. At the same
time when national strike corps offensive goes the poor Corps Commander
will like to get some assurance on number of quantifiable sorties
available to him. Independent observers will like to think we have
sorted out the type of problem we faced when Army Chief wanted air
support in the initial phase of Kargil and the Air Chief refused. Surely
IAF will have some valid points to make. But the issue has to be
resolved and cannot be left hanging.
Why
am I writing all these. Please tell me by appointing a four star
General at the helm as Permanent Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee
will he be able to sort out this sample issue. If yes, by all means go
ahead. If NO, then possibly we are not in the right track.
I have the following suggestions for Shri Manohar Parrikar, RM, Govt of India.
-
Please see the issue of Joitmanship holistically. The short term
measures are no good, do not serve the purpose. A major reorganisation
is needed. Please catch the bull by the horn. Remember the Armed Forces
have to be under political control and NOT bureaucratic control. Please
don't go by all the recommendations of service chiefs with the prism of
Defence Secretary. Experienced as they are in bureaucratic shenanigans,
how is it that services never think they are part of them. This is not a
sign of a good organisation. Civil Military Relations is at his nadir.
Both the services and bureaucracy need to be pulled up. This can only be
done by a firm political leadership.
·
Please take out Committee of Defence Expenditure Report popularly known
as Arun Singh Committee Report, dust it off and read. MoD in a written
reply to a RTI application has said that the Report is missing from MoD.
I am sure if the RM wields the stick, somebody will use the magic wand
to get the report. If need be, RM may like to meet the recluse Arun
Singh. There are not many knowledgeable people like him in India. Make
use of his wisdom. There was only another person I know of : Shri
Jaswant Singh.
·
Order IDSA to carry out some sort of study as is being done by CSIS. I
am aware of the Task Force IDSA has formed. This may become an academic
exercise. It has to be made implementable action points. If the feathers
are ruffled, let it be. If mistakes are made, they can be course
corrected later. But something must be done. And done now.
RM
does not have much time. Two years have passed, last year not much
major is expected to be done. That makes only availability of two years
for the RM to make a major change. Make no mistake, this is a major
change, somebody has to do it. Present RM has the great opportunity to
make this most wanted reform happen.
It
is his call. He has to decide whether he will go down the path of St
Anthony and many of his predecessors or carve out a separate path. Does
he have it in him.
We will wait and see.
-- Maj Gen PK Mallick, VSM (Retd)
PS.
There
is one more school of thought. Why I am using US examples. Show me
where has US won a war. We are much better off. We will have Indian
solution. We have JUGAAD. I say AMEN to that.
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