RUSSIA’S QUIET MILITARY REVOLUTION, AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR EUROPE

Gustav Gressel

March 28, 2016 

An October 2015 report from the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). The 18 page report can be downloaded at this link. http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ Russias_Quiet_Military_ Revolution.pdf

Russia’s Quiet Military Revolution, And What It Means For Europe 

* Russia has implemented far-reaching military reforms to create a more professional and combat-ready armed forces that can swiftly deploy abroad, backed by expertise in non-conventional warfare tactics such as subversion and propaganda.

* The West has misunderstood these reforms – focusing on shortcomings in equipment – and, as a result, has dangerously underestimated Russia’s military capacity, as shown by its response to the Ukraine crisis.

* Russia could now overwhelm any of the countries in the post-Soviet sphere if they were isolated from the West, but it lacks the capacity for effective long-term military action further afield, such as in Syria.

* Europe’s military advantage over Russia is undermined by low combat-readiness, under-staffing, and the need to coordinate between countries.

* Europe should develop a united political response to Russian expansionism, including a coordinated position on nuclear deterrence, while preparing for hybrid scenarios. It will need the support of the US, but EU crisis response agencies would be key in a hybrid war.

Unconventional Warfare

Western – especially US – critiques that the Russian armed forces are not fit for the twenty-first century argue that Russia still adheres to outdated concepts of mid-twentieth century industrial warfare and to an outdated threat perception.17 While these critics were mostly silenced by Russia’s swift occupation and annexation of Crimea, and subsequent war against Ukraine, it is still accurate to observe that Russia prepares for war in an entirely different way than the West.

Russia’s military efforts are embedded in a multi-pronged drive to overwhelm, subvert, and subdue the opposing society that is much more ruthless and effective than the West’s “comprehensive approach” – the coordination of civilian and military efforts in conflicts and crises. Russia has analysed twenty-first century conflicts,18 and one of its conclusions is that contemporary warfare is embedded in deep societal struggle. As leading Russian analysts stated at the 2012 Valdai Discussion Club: “The distinction between ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ segments of society is disappearing. The aim of a military campaign is to impact not only the enemy army, but also its society, understood in terms of its cultural as well as its physical aspects. This trend makes it necessary to conduct joint ‘civilian-military’ operations, rather than purely military ones.”19 Russia uses the regime’s access to almost all societal spheres in the country to harness them for its war efforts.

These efforts are aided by Russia’s paramilitary and nonmilitary forces. In the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Interior has about 170,000 men in ready-formed and trained paramilitary units at its disposal to tackle domestic unrest, terrorism, and border violations.20 There is no need for the armed forces to supplement them in case of an emergency. Similarly, natural disasters and humanitarian aid are taken care of by the Ministry for Emergency Situations, which also has its own troops. The railway and pipeline engineers of the Soviet army were incorporated into this ministry to deal with natural or man-made disasters, disruption of infrastructure, or humanitarian emergencies, and regularly deploy abroad to provide humanitarian assistance. Therefore the Russian armed forces do not prepare for “soft threats” or “post-modern threats” such as domestic terrorism or natural disasters because they don’t have to.

These paramilitary and non-military forces would play an important role if Russia carried out a full invasion of one of its neighbors. Both services were mobilized in April 2014 when the Russian military was preparing its assault on Ukraine.21 If there had been a full invasion of that country, it is likely that they would have provided internal security, established an occupation regime, repaired damaged infrastructure, and provided services, among other things. Though no such invasion took place, their mobilization clearly indicates that the Russian military planners have a much broader picture in mind than just the military situation.

As Russia was too weak to act conventionally in its neighborhood in the early 1990s, it built up enormous expertise in supporting and organizing proxies and quasi-state structures. Now it is using these to supplement its conventional military might, both in terms of the non-military dimension of foreign intervention, and to bolster certain military capabilities. On strategic reconnaissance, the US has developed a powerful array of technical intelligence and surveillance instruments. Russia lagged behind in those assets, but tried to overcome this by embedding human intelligence assets and penetrating the adversary’s command structures. In the “near abroad”, Russia can also make use of civilian communications infrastructure and services as well as its land-based intelligence installations to intercept enemy communications.

In Ukraine, Russia is engaged not only in a conventional war but also in wars of subversion and propaganda, and in multiple disinformation campaigns at home and abroad. There is a trade and financial war going on, in which Russia tries to weaken the Ukrainian economy by cutting off imports, selectively harming entrepreneurs that support the new government, and corrupting others; as well as a multi-pronged campaign by political representatives, intelligence services, and Russian businesses to undermine European support for Ukraine. In Russian armed forces chief General Valeri Gerasimov’s analysis of unconventional warfare,22 the armed intervention is only the climax of a campaign of intensive preparation through political, social, media, and economic means, fostering unrest and influencing sub-state actors.

Russia had prepared for the military campaign in Ukraine proper since at least 2008 by creating or connecting pro-Russian nationalist circles and fifth-column organisations, and by infiltrating local intelligence, military, economic, and administrative structures.23 The creation of parallel structures and clandestine support bases was instrumental to this effort. The emergence of such organisations in other theaters is an indication of Russian military aspirations. Besides Ukraine, pro-Russian political, economic, and civil organisations are mushrooming in Georgia and Moldova.24