http://www.eurasiareview.com/15032016-international-amnesia-and-case-of-lost-freedom-tibet-and-chinese-occupation-oped/
Guest post written by Arwin Rahi
Mr. Rahi is a former adviser to the Parwan governor in Afghanistan. He is currently an independent researcher and writer.
There has been a growing sense of optimism among Afghans about the New Silk Road, a key part of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s One Belt, One Road initiative. The multi-billion dollar project, financed by the Chinese government, aims to build as well as connect roads, railways and seaports across three continents: Africa, Asia and Europe. It should also expand and improve current oil and gas pipeline infrastructure.
The New Silk Road’s land route would most benefit Afghanistan, a landlocked country that relies on Pakistan and Iran for access to seaports: If the proposed land route passed through Afghanistan, it would directly connect the country to Europe and the Far East.
Unfortunately, present plans bypass the country.
Afghanistan’s serious security challenges
There are legitimate reasons why this is the case, starting with Afghanistan’s serious security challenges. Kidnapping and robbery, for instance, are commonplace on the Kabul-Kandahar highway. Insurgent attacks on the army and police are frequent as well, leaving passengers to wait for several hours until the fighting ends—and often risking their lives in the process.
This danger is not limited to highways. Afghan and foreign workers, including Chinese, have been taken hostage time and time again.
In the wake of growing concerns, the Afghan government has deployed 1,500 policemen to guard Mes Aynak where the Chinese are expected to finally start work in the Aynak mine (it contains an estimated $100 billion worth of copper) after the China Metallurgical Group Corp (MCC) won a contract to extract the metal back in 2007. But is that enough? The Taliban’s presence in provincial Afghanistan is only growing.
China’s growing interest in Central Asia
There are other areas of greater interest to China—ones it is already connected to. Take Central Asia, Afghanistan’s next door neighbor, which already shares 10 border crossings with the country (seven with Kazakhstan, two with Kyrgyzstan and one with Tajikistan).
The Asian giant imports 55 billion cubic meters of natural gas from the region through a 1,830 km pipeline with three lines. Work on a fourth line, with a capacity of 30 million cubic meters per year, is in progress. In 2014, China imported 2% of its crude oil from Kazakhstan. Given China’s demand for energy and Central Asia’s untapped natural resources, increased cooperation between the two is anticipated—and would leave out Afghanistan.
Promised investments in Pakistan
Likewise, China and Pakistan have been directly linked by the Karakoram Highway (KKH) since 1986. This past April, China unveiled its intention to invest $46 billion in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which, along with expanding the current KKH, would create new railways and pipelines. The CPEC would cut the current 12-day journey from the Middle East to China to just 36 hours.
Another investment: China has secured a “40-year management right” of the deep-water seaport it is building at Gwadar in southwestern Pakistan. There’s a chance China will build a naval base there, giving the country direct access to the Indian Ocean and the strategic Strait of Hormuz which sees about 20% of global crude oil every day.
Earlier efforts have failed
The fact that Afghanistan is the big loser here shouldn’t come as a surprise. The country has been pushing for a road project with China for years now. Back in 2009, both governments “agreed to study opening the 76-km (47-mile) border between the two countries.” Then in late 2014, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani tried endorsing a trilateral agreement to directly connect the country with China and Tajikistan. Yet there’s nothing to show from either effort.
Trade between Afghanistan and China is also a non-starter. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, China isn’t among Afghanistan’s top four import or export partners. In fact, Afghanistan imports more goods from either Russia or the U.S. than from China. In six years, from 2008 to 2014, bilateral trade between Afghanistan and China only increased by $100 million to less than $700 million per year.
Realistic options for Afghanistan
Having said all this, there are some realistic options available to the Afghan government.
First, KKH’s south end begins in Hassan Abdal, Pakistan, less than 200 km from the Afghan border. Hassan Abdal is connected to Afghanistan via the Kabul-Torkham highway, but also note a railway running from Peshawar to Torkham—a major bordering crossing between the two countries.
Afghanistan should look to link the Kabul-Torkham highway to the KKH in order to connect to the New Silk Road’s Southern Corridor. The responsibility of upgrading, expanding, and properly maintaining the road might seem great for Afghanistan, but it is more likely than expecting China to build a new road from scratch.
Though there is a chance China may build a railway. Afghanistan can make the case that a new route from Mes Aynak (where the Aynak copper mine is) to Torkham would be beneficial to China: It would be the shortest route to ship the copper back to the Asian dominion, and could easily connect to existing railway infrastructure in Pakistan. Once the railway is there, Afghanistan would be able to use it as well.
Afghanistan also has an opportunity to connect to the New Silk Road’s Central Corridor. Part of the Central Corridor runs from Tashkent, Uzbekistan to Mashhad, Iran—and Afghanistan is already linked to both cities via road.
Afghanistan’s railway situation is a bit trickier, as it only connects to Central Asia’s railway network through the city of Mazar-e-Sharif. But there is a project underway aiming to connect another Afghan city, Heart, to Iran’s railway network.
Low-risk opportunity
Neither option presents much risk. Because it is landlocked, Afghanistan has long been dependent on its neighbors for access to open waters. Connecting to the New Silk Road through bordering countries wouldn’t be much different. In fact, both opportunities would allow Afghanistan to further integrate with its neighbors, which should play a role in stabilizing the volatile region.
At the end of the day, it has to be up to Afghanistan to prove it really wants to be in the New Silk Road. By taking to the step to improve security conditions, upgrade its roads and work on building new railways (at least from its major cities to the closest neighboring countries), Afghanistan would do just that.
Guest post written by Arwin Rahi
Mr. Rahi is a former adviser to the Parwan governor in Afghanistan. He is currently an independent researcher and writer.
There has been a growing sense of optimism among Afghans about the New Silk Road, a key part of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s One Belt, One Road initiative. The multi-billion dollar project, financed by the Chinese government, aims to build as well as connect roads, railways and seaports across three continents: Africa, Asia and Europe. It should also expand and improve current oil and gas pipeline infrastructure.
The New Silk Road’s land route would most benefit Afghanistan, a landlocked country that relies on Pakistan and Iran for access to seaports: If the proposed land route passed through Afghanistan, it would directly connect the country to Europe and the Far East.
Unfortunately, present plans bypass the country.
Afghanistan’s serious security challenges
There are legitimate reasons why this is the case, starting with Afghanistan’s serious security challenges. Kidnapping and robbery, for instance, are commonplace on the Kabul-Kandahar highway. Insurgent attacks on the army and police are frequent as well, leaving passengers to wait for several hours until the fighting ends—and often risking their lives in the process.
This danger is not limited to highways. Afghan and foreign workers, including Chinese, have been taken hostage time and time again.
In the wake of growing concerns, the Afghan government has deployed 1,500 policemen to guard Mes Aynak where the Chinese are expected to finally start work in the Aynak mine (it contains an estimated $100 billion worth of copper) after the China Metallurgical Group Corp (MCC) won a contract to extract the metal back in 2007. But is that enough? The Taliban’s presence in provincial Afghanistan is only growing.
China’s growing interest in Central Asia
There are other areas of greater interest to China—ones it is already connected to. Take Central Asia, Afghanistan’s next door neighbor, which already shares 10 border crossings with the country (seven with Kazakhstan, two with Kyrgyzstan and one with Tajikistan).
The Asian giant imports 55 billion cubic meters of natural gas from the region through a 1,830 km pipeline with three lines. Work on a fourth line, with a capacity of 30 million cubic meters per year, is in progress. In 2014, China imported 2% of its crude oil from Kazakhstan. Given China’s demand for energy and Central Asia’s untapped natural resources, increased cooperation between the two is anticipated—and would leave out Afghanistan.
Promised investments in Pakistan
Likewise, China and Pakistan have been directly linked by the Karakoram Highway (KKH) since 1986. This past April, China unveiled its intention to invest $46 billion in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which, along with expanding the current KKH, would create new railways and pipelines. The CPEC would cut the current 12-day journey from the Middle East to China to just 36 hours.
Another investment: China has secured a “40-year management right” of the deep-water seaport it is building at Gwadar in southwestern Pakistan. There’s a chance China will build a naval base there, giving the country direct access to the Indian Ocean and the strategic Strait of Hormuz which sees about 20% of global crude oil every day.
Earlier efforts have failed
The fact that Afghanistan is the big loser here shouldn’t come as a surprise. The country has been pushing for a road project with China for years now. Back in 2009, both governments “agreed to study opening the 76-km (47-mile) border between the two countries.” Then in late 2014, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani tried endorsing a trilateral agreement to directly connect the country with China and Tajikistan. Yet there’s nothing to show from either effort.
Trade between Afghanistan and China is also a non-starter. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, China isn’t among Afghanistan’s top four import or export partners. In fact, Afghanistan imports more goods from either Russia or the U.S. than from China. In six years, from 2008 to 2014, bilateral trade between Afghanistan and China only increased by $100 million to less than $700 million per year.
Realistic options for Afghanistan
Having said all this, there are some realistic options available to the Afghan government.
First, KKH’s south end begins in Hassan Abdal, Pakistan, less than 200 km from the Afghan border. Hassan Abdal is connected to Afghanistan via the Kabul-Torkham highway, but also note a railway running from Peshawar to Torkham—a major bordering crossing between the two countries.
Afghanistan should look to link the Kabul-Torkham highway to the KKH in order to connect to the New Silk Road’s Southern Corridor. The responsibility of upgrading, expanding, and properly maintaining the road might seem great for Afghanistan, but it is more likely than expecting China to build a new road from scratch.
Though there is a chance China may build a railway. Afghanistan can make the case that a new route from Mes Aynak (where the Aynak copper mine is) to Torkham would be beneficial to China: It would be the shortest route to ship the copper back to the Asian dominion, and could easily connect to existing railway infrastructure in Pakistan. Once the railway is there, Afghanistan would be able to use it as well.
Afghanistan also has an opportunity to connect to the New Silk Road’s Central Corridor. Part of the Central Corridor runs from Tashkent, Uzbekistan to Mashhad, Iran—and Afghanistan is already linked to both cities via road.
Afghanistan’s railway situation is a bit trickier, as it only connects to Central Asia’s railway network through the city of Mazar-e-Sharif. But there is a project underway aiming to connect another Afghan city, Heart, to Iran’s railway network.
Low-risk opportunity
Neither option presents much risk. Because it is landlocked, Afghanistan has long been dependent on its neighbors for access to open waters. Connecting to the New Silk Road through bordering countries wouldn’t be much different. In fact, both opportunities would allow Afghanistan to further integrate with its neighbors, which should play a role in stabilizing the volatile region.
At the end of the day, it has to be up to Afghanistan to prove it really wants to be in the New Silk Road. By taking to the step to improve security conditions, upgrade its roads and work on building new railways (at least from its major cities to the closest neighboring countries), Afghanistan would do just that.
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