March 7, 2016 ·
BOOK REVIEW
Excerpts:
His analysis offers personal insight and anecdote together with a virtuoso, extensive knowledge of operational detail. This is to be expected as the author, who began his military career as a simple Australian infantry officer before researching (well before the attack on the World Trade Centre) Islamic insurgency in Indonesia, has a long and close acquaintance with his subject. He’s worked as a senior counterinsurgency adviser with US military commander David Petraeus in Iraq and later Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Washington. He’s written books on this subject already (these feature on staff college reading lists). As such, it’s no surprise to discover that Kilcullen brings his research together cogently and effectively. It also seems fair to ask, “what’s new, and why should I bother buying yet another book?” What does this work add that isn’t already available elsewhere? The answer depends on how desperately the reader wants to understand the subject.
The book does offer a definitive snapshot of where the so-called “war on terror” has us left us stranded today. By focusing relentlessly on the operational level of the conflict, Kilcullen fashions a key that can be used to unlock a deeper understanding of not just Islamic State, but why this insurgency is ripping across the world. The reader becomes quickly convinced the author is a sure guide, capable of not merely charting a path through this amorphous war but also of drawing credible conclusions about exactly why things have turned out the way they have. What he won’t do, however, is sheet home the blame for the current failure. Perhaps this is because he’s been a participant in much of the strategic decision-making. This provides both the great strength, and weakness, of the book.
For those prepared to think things through his strategic snapshot provides an implicit and devastating critique of current policy. A reader doesn’t need to be particularly astute to discern exactly where things went wrong. Kilcullen’s analysis is, however, rarely explicit. A journalist might be far more ready to share out blame and identify the culprits and those who are responsible for the blunders than Kilcullen: then again, a journalist would lack the inside knowledge and understanding he possesses. His restraint contributes significantly to making each chapter a precise, easy to understand contribution to understanding why the war developed as it has.
Book review: Blood Year, by David Kilcullen
by Nicholas Stuart
March 1, 2016
BLOOD YEAR: ISLAMIC STATE AND THE FAILURES OF THE WAR ON TERROR.
By David Kilcullen.
Black Inc. $29.99.
Blood Year, by David Kilcullen.
David Kilcullen’s Blood Year offers far more than just a simple reworking of his Quarterly Essay of the same name. Lying at the heart of that earlier piece was a simple, albeit unwritten, accusation: President Obama had thrown away all of the good accomplished by the surge of US troops into Iraq in his rush for a precipitate withdrawal. Now, Kilcullen has extended his range of focus to examine the most recent developments in the war in detail. This is an up-to-the-minute analysis, right up to the most recent insertion of Russian troops in the Middle East together with detail of the the slow, grinding battles to retake the cities of Iraq from the insurgents. In doing so, Kilcullen has not so much grabbed at the chance to serve up a counter-narrative of what should have been done, as pointed out the missed opportunities and flaws in execution that have bedevilled and complicated the fight against ISIS.
His analysis offers personal insight and anecdote together with a virtuoso, extensive knowledge of operational detail. This is to be expected as the author, who began his military career as a simple Australian infantry officer before researching (well before the attack on the World Trade Centre) Islamic insurgency in Indonesia, has a long and close acquaintance with his subject. He’s worked as a senior counterinsurgency adviser with US military commander David Petraeus in Iraq and later Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Washington. He’s written books on this subject already (these feature on staff college reading lists). As such, it’s no surprise to discover that Kilcullen brings his research together cogently and effectively. It also seems fair to ask, “what’s new, and why should I bother buying yet another book?” What does this work add that isn’t already available elsewhere? The answer depends on how desperately the reader wants to understand the subject.
The book does offer a definitive snapshot of where the so-called “war on terror” has us left us stranded today. By focusing relentlessly on the operational level of the conflict, Kilcullen fashions a key that can be used to unlock a deeper understanding of not just Islamic State, but why this insurgency is ripping across the world. The reader becomes quickly convinced the author is a sure guide, capable of not merely charting a path through this amorphous war but also of drawing credible conclusions about exactly why things have turned out the way they have. What he won’t do, however, is sheet home the blame for the current failure. Perhaps this is because he’s been a participant in much of the strategic decision-making. This provides both the great strength, and weakness, of the book.
For those prepared to think things through his strategic snapshot provides an implicit and devastating critique of current policy. A reader doesn’t need to be particularly astute to discern exactly where things went wrong. Kilcullen’s analysis is, however, rarely explicit. A journalist might be far more ready to share out blame and identify the culprits and those who are responsible for the blunders than Kilcullen: then again, a journalist would lack the inside knowledge and understanding he possesses. His restraint contributes significantly to making each chapter a precise, easy to understand contribution to understanding why the war developed as it has.
Although he describes how a real chance of victory in Iraq was thrown away in 2008, Kilcullen eschews attributing blame. He pulls his punches. This is a detailed and factual analysis, rather than a soaring polemic of what might have been and chances missed. His thesis is strong, cogent, and tightly worked. In other hands this might be used to make a Republican political point. But that’s not Kilcullen’s aim, and he resists the opportunity to posit simplistic solutions. Even strategists need to work, and for as long as a Democrat administration remains in office I suspect Kilcullen’s indictment will remain implicit rather than spelt out overtly. Nevertheless, for both those wanting a straightforward account of how we’ve reached this point today and those prepared to read between the lines, this book offers a remarkably detailed guide to the current prosecution of the so-called “war on terror”.
By concentrating on the diaphanous shape-changing nature of this threat to civilised society and examining the specific reasons that have led to the conflict taking the shape it has, Kilcullen demonstrates there is no simple path to success. Indeed, the very notion of “victory” itself becomes problematised, and perhaps this is the biggest contribution the book makes to our understanding of the broader theme of counter-insurgency.
Victory in this fight will not be imposed from outside. Even in Afghanistan, creating a genuine peace will depend on engaging civilians and sharing power. Unfortunately this book suggests such an end-state is as far away as ever.
Nicholas Stuart is a Canberra journalist who has spent time in the Middle East both independently and embedded with Australian forces.
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