By Gp Capt TP Srivastava
18 Feb , 2016
An objective analysis would indicate that India is truly not an aerospace power. We have as yet, not become a substantive aerospace power primarily because of two reasons. Firstly, the lopsided and flawed Defence Procurement Policy and secondly, near total absence of any worthwhile R&D from the 1960s to the 1980s. Merely establishing defence laboratories and ordnance factories was not enough. Had we continued with the HF-24 programme and taken it to higher levels, we might have had indigenous force multipliers, fighter aircraft, heavy lift helicopters, transport aircraft, radars and Surface to Air Missiles of proven operational capability matching in performance with the best systems available.
The Indian subcontinent witnessed exponential growth in the acquisition and/or development of conventional aeroplanes as early as the 1950s. Immediately after independence in 1947, both India and Pakistan began acquiring aeroplanes from the Western nations such as France, UK and USA. China too was busy acquiring vintage but still airworthy variants of the MiG family from the erstwhile USSR.
Moment of Glory
India took a giant leap in the design and development of fighter aircraft when the first indigenously produced HF-24 flew on June 24, 1961. The HF-24 was a twin-engine, swept-wing design fighter with powered controls that could fly at speeds in excess of 900 kmph despite being somewhat under-powered vis-à-vis its overall weight. Notwithstanding the numerous shortcomings, the HF-24 raised quite a few eyebrows in the developed and militarily advanced nations such as USA and USSR. These nations considered entry of a third world country in the exclusive domain of production of state-of-the-art fighter aircraft as a threat to their continued primacy, not only in the sphere of military aviation but also in the economic arena. After the end of World War II, sale of military hardware had been and continues to remain the most prominent money churner for the advanced nations of the world.
Military and political leadership led by less-than informed bureaucrats opted for acquisition of military aircraft from foreign sources…
By any standards, it was a crowning achievement of scientists and engineers of a fledgling nation within 14 years of getting independence. India was well on its way to becoming a formidable air power in South Asia. Three successive wars in 1962, 1965 and 1971 changed the scenario of indigenous development of aeroplanes. Military and political leadership led by less-than informed bureaucrats opted for acquisition of military aircraft from foreign sources. On the face of it, such an option might not appear to be wrong because the nation needed military hardware including aircraft in large numbers almost immediately. The domestic aerospace industry was in no position to meet the demands. But what is incomprehensible is the fact that we deliberately opted to slow down and finally stop indigenous development, which is what we did by consigning the HF-24 to museums in the late seventies/early eighties.
An Opportunity Squandered
Closure of the HF-24 programme would perhaps rank as the worst ever decision taken collectively by the Indian Air Force (IAF), the bureaucracy and the political leadership, a decision that was clearly against national security interests. Without doubt, foreign vendors must have popped the champagne to celebrate their unbridled primacy in the field of aeroplane manufacturing. Had we continued development of further variants of the HF-24, we would indeed have become an aerospace power in the 1980s itself.
Perhaps our decision to discontinue the HF-24 programme was also influenced by an equally myopic decision by the UK in opting to discontinue the TSR-2 development programme around the same time. Duncan Sandys, a British Member of Parliament (MP), was instrumental in discontinuance of TSR-2 development programme. The learned but ill-informed MP argued that due to the advent of Heat Seeking Air-to-Air Missiles, the days of manned fighters were over. Rest is history.
Ballistic missile threat has become the most feared situation in the event of hostilities…
India – An Aerospace Power?
An objective analysis would indicate that India is truly not an aerospace power. We have as yet, not become a substantive aerospace power primarily because of two reasons. Firstly, the lopsided and flawed Defence Procurement Policy and secondly, near total absence of any worthwhile R&D from the 1960s to the 1980s. Merely establishing defence laboratories and ordnance factories was not enough. Had we continued with the HF-24 programme and taken it to higher levels, we might have had indigenous force multipliers, fighter aircraft, heavy lift helicopters, transport aircraft, radars and Surface-to-Air Missiles of proven operational capability matching in performance with the best systems available.
A nation does not become an aerospace power on imported hardware. Over the years, the nation’s defence establishment, consisting of defence ministers, defence secretaries and the service chiefs, has not exerted itself as it should have. The euphoric victory of 1971 and the almost self-defeating decision by the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to keep the Defence portfolio with herself led to the ‘Prime Minister as Defence Minister’ becoming inaccessible to the executives of the defence establishment. Everything related to defence affairs slowed down. Her autocratic style of functioning made matters even worse. Service Chiefs could hardly find the ears of the Prime Minister as the Defence Minister.
Most of the Ordnance Factories have merely attained the status of money guzzlers with hardly anything to show for such massive infra-structure and investment in place. The Ordnance Factory Board, the controlling apex organisation has been worthless and has done immense disservice to the nation. Most of these factories deserve to be shut down and an entirely new techno-management organisation should be created. The Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) is yet another bureaucratic behemoth with nothing spectacular to its credit. All projects, without exception, have never met the declared timelines. Even the quality of the finished product continues to be questionable.
Indeed, there has been a silver lining in an otherwise bleak military hardware development programme. The Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM) programme under civilian control led by our erstwhile President Dr APJ Abdul Kalam has become a world class SSM programme. We have already perfected technology to mass produce SSMs of 5,000 km range. However, we still have to perfect cryogenic engine technology.
Possibility of an armed conflict between nations is slowly but surely receding…
Satellite fabrication technology has also achieved many landmarks. Our scientists have manufactured sensors installed on satellites for multi-dimensional uses such as weather monitoring, education, TV transmission and agricultural information. At the same time, few of these could even monitor ballistic missile launch. It might appear to be irony of sorts; the SSM and satellite development programmes have been totally civilian with hardly any military control. Indian military leadership, past and present, may like to ponder over this.
Our capability to produce force multipliers such as the Airborne Early Warning/Airborne Warning and Control System (AEW/AWACS) platforms, Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA), Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) Systems, reliable Cryogenic Engines and Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) remains woefully inadequate. What is worse is that it is not likely to be any better in the foreseeable future.
Air Power and Aerospace Power
Before entering into the domain of what constitutes an aerospace power, the difference between air power and aerospace power must be understood. Except in the case of the erstwhile super powers, USA and USSR, almost all other nations have acquired air power components based on regional threat. Conventional air power consists of three elements – the strike element (fighter aircraft and attack helicopters), the logistics element (transport aeroplanes and utility helicopters) and ground-based elements such as radars.
A fourth element has been added in recent years in the form of force multipliers such Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA), Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems (AEW/AWACS), Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Surface to Surface Missiles (SSMs). Relatively more expensive component of air power, the strike element, has little or no use for the nation during peace time. Indeed it remains as the most effective deterrent as a ‘Force in Being’ that must remain operational so that if the need arises it can be brought to bear upon the adversary almost instantaneously. The logistics element of air power is the most important component during peacetime. Aid to civil authority becomes a major commitment during peacetime and in times of natural calamities and civil disturbances.
The strike element of Indian air power has been used only twice during peacetime – once during the Nagaland crisis led by Phizo when Mystere aircraft were used for strafing the hideouts of Naga rebels and the second occasion was during Goa operations, when Canberras were used for bombing.
Aerospace power, on the other hand, has numerous other functions to support national requirements related directly to economic development and is constituted keeping in view the global scenario. Other than support to the military, aerospace power contributes to the following areas, which cannot be taken care of by conventional air power:
Telecommunications
Academics
Tele-medicine
Cartography
Weather Monitoring
Monitoring Bio-diversity
Soil Conservation
Forestry Management
Land Cover for Wild Life Sanctuaries
Agricultural Produce Estimates
Flood Inundation Mapping
Thus, air power is actually a constituent of aerospace power. Global militarisation on a very large scale, induction of sophisticated weapons has led to an uneasy state of peace. The situation is almost akin to the Cold War period when the two superpowers could not risk escalation of tensions and wage a nuclear war. Consequences of such miscalculation were bound to be disastrous for the entire world. “Mutually Assured Destruction”, a term coined during the height of the Cold War is applicable in modern times more than ever before. Even with the use of conventional weapons, conflict of any kind can result in crippling damage.
Rapidly changing global world order has moved from conflict between nations to conflict-based on ideology and religion coupled with misplaced/irrational beliefs of a few nations about their right to interfere in governance in the contiguous region. For instance, the birth of ISIS, Russia’s unilateral action in Ukraine and China’s continued attempts at throwing the gauntlet in South China Sea emerging as one of the foremost maritime challenges after World War II. It is in this context that it becomes imperative that India move towards becoming a substantive aerospace power. But for that to translate into action, the Indian political and military leadership must adopt a doctrinal approach.
Hence in order to maintain primacy in the comity of nations in the international arena, nations have taken a conscious decision to become an aerospace power rather than remain content from being a formidable air power. The primary constituents/capability of an aerospace power could be broadly termed as:
Proven Launch Vehicle/s.
Outstanding expertise in Satellite Fabrication.
Development of Electro-optical Sensors.
Sustainable and Consistent rate of Satellite Production.
Development of Reusable Launch Vehicles.
Miniature Warheads: Conventional and Nuclear.
Advanced Metallurgy.
Ground Infra-structure such as monitoring/tracking stations.
Advanced Ground Testing Facilities.
Launch Pads.
Suitable Parking Slot/s for Geo-stationary Satellites.
Operationally Deployed BMEWS/BMD Systems.
Anti-satellite (ASAT) Weapons.
At this stage, it would be pertinent to clarify that possession of launch vehicles, indigenous or imported and warheads alone does not qualify a nation to become an aerospace power. Indeed, the launch vehicle and warheads are two of the prime constituents of an aerospace power, but merely their presence not supported by capabilities listed above, does not make them an aerospace power. Pakistan and North Korea would then be termed as aerospace powers.
Anti-missile weapon systems will require extensive and highly advanced tracking infra-structure spread all over the world…
Defence Against Missile Attack
Ballistic missile threat has become the most feared situation in the event of hostilities. Thus along with the development of strike capability by using ballistic missiles, nations have embarked on systems that would protect against a ballistic missile threat. Hence nations have concentrated on developing Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems (BMEWS) and a protective shield, the Ballistic Missile Defence Systems (BMDS). Efficacy of each of these will now be highlighted.
The famous US project codenamed ‘Star Wars’ was developed during the height of the Cold War. Operational capability/effectiveness of this system can at best be a matter of conjecture even as on date. The proposed European Ballistic Missile Shield to protect against Ballistic Missile attacks is the latest system under development at a cost of billions of dollars. BMEWS and BMDS, irrespective of their origin, have never been tested under operational conditions. Hence the degree of reliability claimed by systems manufacturers cannot be trusted.
What should ring alarm bells amongst the protagonists of BMEW/BMD is a recent update by Pentagon, wherein operational efficacy of THAAD, Aegis and Patriot Systems has been questioned. All tests involving destruction of an incoming ballistic missile threat by different nations have been conducted in highly controlled environment, in which vital parameters of the ‘enemy’ ballistic missile such as launch window and likely trajectory, were already known. This will not be the case in an actual war scenario. To elaborate further without going into technological details, a ballistic missile threat can be neutralised only and only if the exact launch window, trajectory and probable target, are known. In an actual war scenario, the launch window will never be known.
Suffice it to say that neither the existing BMEW/BMD systems nor the systems likely to be developed in the foreseeable future could be termed as foolproof that would provide assured protection against an incoming ballistic missile. Lessons learnt from anti-aircraft missiles (Air-to-Air and Surface to Air Missiles) is that the kill capability would suffice to prove the likely effectiveness of the BMD system/s for a successful intercept of an incoming ballistic missile with extremely small radar signature. Guaranteed protection is a far cry.
A key component of aerospace power is the development of drone technology, both for surveillance and attack purposes…
ICBMs deployed all over the world carry multiple warheads along with dummies that behave in exactly the same manner as a live warhead. There is no technology available to differentiate between the two. Further it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to guarantee intercept during the ballistic phase, when radar signatures are feeble. A ballistic missile has most prominent heat signature during launch phase; but the window of intercept during this phase is extremely narrow. Even if it was to be assumed that the missile shield will provide 100 per cent guarantee of successful intercept, the fact remains that the warhead will explode and cause radioactivity to spread not necessarily over the intended target. Exo-atmospheric interception would remain a better option as compared with endo-atmospheric intercept either during launch or re-entry phase.
Utopian thoughts of making the world free of nuclear weapons will remain a distant dream. Nuclear tipped missiles will continue to remain on top of the list of most devastating weapon systems against which there is and will be no assured protection. The launch vehicle capability will decide the distance to which the warhead could be hurled.
The Need to Reevaluate Policy Imperatives
Possibility of an armed conflict between nations is slowly but surely receding. Unfortunately, however, there is no cause for mankind to rejoice because a far more dangerous and unpredictable power in form of radicals is emerging all over the world. These groups have no international boundaries as exists between nations. Alignment of such extremist groups with rogue nations can translate into violence of gigantic proportions. If such extremist elements/organisations could get hold of a nuclear tipped ballistic missile system and/or sufficient quantities of fissile material from rogue nations having launch platforms and warheads, threat of nuclear tipped missile launch cannot be ruled out. No military strategist can even hazard a guess or predict the intended time and target for such cases. An organisation like the ISIS, which burns and beheads human beings with impunity, can or will resort to such actions without doubt.
In the prevailing geo-political scenario, India as an aerospace power should not only develop the above stated capabilities but also may have to re-examine the “No First Use” policy with respect to the use of nuclear weapons against a rogue nation/group. A rogue nation and/or group must be conveyed that should our national interests be threatened, we will not hesitate in carrying out a pre-emptive nuclear strike. Such a resolve or policy would be a far better deterrent and protect our national interests rather than a ballistic missile shield. The age-old principle of “threat in being” neutralised by “forces in being” is not applicable in the case of rogue nations/groups.
R&D has been our weakest link in overall national development…
Our stated policy of non-alignment has kept us out of any military alliance such as NATO and Warsaw Pact. However, in reality, we have had to concede ground to nations from which we import military hardware. In order to remain truly non-aligned, a nation must be nearly self sufficient with respect to security issues. Unfortunately, our myopic leadership and flawed acquisition and indigenous manufacturing policies over the years have made the Indian military entirely dependent on imported hardware. Nearly 80 per cent of our military hardware is of Russian origin. Even the ammunition/missiles/bombs/PGMs are re-imported. In the recent years, our shift to other nations such as France, Israel and USA has not been taken very kindly by the Russians. India continues to occupy the top position as the biggest importer of military hardware.
In the strictest sense, our non-aligned status remains on paper. The truth and harsh fact is that for our security needs, we are and will continue to remain dependent on nations from which military hardware is imported such as Russia, USA, France and Israel. Selling of arms is the top money earner for any nation. Our position as arms exporter is perhaps at the bottom of the list, primarily because our inefficient and poorly managed defence industry. Fortunately, our diplomacy has been able to sustain our military posturing in the region. We, however, continue to remain at the “mercy” of military hardware exporting nations because of long term dependence on the exporting nation. In spite of being an import oriented air power, a recent study published places the IAF seventh amongst top ten air powers in the world.
The Way Forward
Creating, maintaining, sustaining and finally deploying the military assets define national power. The overall power of a nation can be sub-divided/classified as under:
Military Power
Economic Power
Soft Power
Achieving top military/economic power status by India, even in Asia would be a difficult, if not impossible. However current economic growth and future projections as per IMF, our economy might double by 2020. To sustain unbridled national growth in all spheres, we must be ‘militarily’ strong. That can be achieved if we focus on attaining a top Soft Power status, which is possible.
It would neither be prudent nor technologically possible to bridge the yawning technological and manufacturing capability gap in the field of shipping, aeroplanes and weapons. The only option we have is to expand in the field of our strength, which are satellite manufacturing and launch vehicle design and production. We can safely move into the top echelons of aerospace powers by manufacturing and demonstrating that not only can we fabricate satellites embedded with suitable sensors for national applications but also have the satellite neutralisation/destruction capability. Wasting time, effort and money in indigenous manufacture/imports to acquire BMEW/BMD systems will be counterproductive.
The world today has become increasingly dependent on transponders embedded in satellites. Destroying few important functional satellites can virtually ‘blind’ the nation to which those satellites belong. Deployed satellites are in different parking slots allotted to each nation in case of geo-stationary satellites. Others are in geo-synchronous orbit around the earth and many more in the Molniya orbit. Thus, orbit parameters of most of the satellites in orbit are known to everyone.
We must adopt a fundamentally different approach in acquiring aerospace power status. Firstly, we must aim to achieve fabrication of satellites embedded with sensors required for national development thus becoming a prominent soft power. Currently transponders numbering around 200 are installed in various satellites of Indian origin. We need to increase this number to around 500 by 2020. Secondly, in order to maintain a viable, effective and strong deterrent we should focus on satellite destruction capability of our adversaries, if and when the need arises. We can accomplish this within our existing technological capability envelope. Nations are developing missiles to destroy satellites. Few nations have attempted it but success rate is unlikely to be high or guaranteed.
The position of all satellites in their respective orbits is known. As a concept, if a nation desires to destroy the satellite of her adversary, placing an explosive laden satellite in close proximity of intended target satellite and exploding it would cripple the target satellite. Geo-stationary and geo-synchronous satellites could be engaged with relative ease as compared to satellites in Molniya orbit. Engaging a satellite in Molniya orbit at/or near the perigee might be relatively more difficult than engaging it at the apogee, when target satellite would be at the slowest speed in its orbit. Satellite destruction capability would have an adverse fall out as well. It will give rise to uncontrollable space debris, which would remain in orbit for years. Anti-satellite weapon development, viable economically and technically, therefore, is a distinct possibility and should be explored.
Anti-missile weapon systems will require extensive and highly advanced tracking infra-structure spread all over the world. Still guarantee for successful intercept cannot be assumed because each strike missile will have a different trajectory. Even if a small portion of the missile trajectory falls in no radar coverage area, chances of intercept would virtually be nil. However, in case of anti-satellite system no such dilemma exists because satellite orbits are known since these are pre-designated.
Most nations, India included, which are involved in the development of BMEW/BMD systems are actually influenced by US infatuation with Ballistic Missile Defence Shield and incurring huge expenditure in procuring a non-functional and unreliable system. In order to influence other nations US strategists have successfully embarked on linking Nuclear Deterrence and Ballistic Missile Shield and have succeeded. An objective analysis would reveal that the development programme of Ballistic Missile Defence Systems was in fact a planned “Economic Weapon” against the erstwhile USSR to bleed it economically. Indeed, the US succeeded in its plan beyond its wildest imagination. Each nation, individually as well as in a group, is spending (read wasting) huge amounts of money in developing a system that is bound to underperform under operational conditions. In a make-believe world of ballistic missile defence systems, new technologies and systems are being sold to less than informed nations. All known/proclaimed ballistic missile defence systems are highly localised and their effectiveness against supersonic missiles with extremely small radar cross section, is highly questionable notwithstanding various test results under controlled conditions.
A key component of aerospace power is the development of drone technology, both for surveillance and attack purposes. Our progress in this field has been tardy. Extensive and deliberate effort in R&D to develop high quality/capability drones must become one of our top priorities. Budgetary support for R&D merits a total overhaul in our thinking so far. DRDO is assumed to be the sole proprietor of R&D. In order to retain our top class engineers from IITs, we must offer them better R&D facilities than the USA does to reduce or prevent ‘brain drain’. At least one per cent of the GDP must be allocated for R&D in diverse fields. R&D has been our weakest link in overall national development. While our software engineers rule the world, we have virtually nothing to show in the domain of hardware. We cannot, should not and must not subjugate ourselves voluntarily to wear a tag of a ‘Data Entry’ nation. Unless we change our outlook towards investment in R&D, we as a nation would never become the global power that we can become.
Conclusion
For all or some of the above suggestions to fructify, we have to alter our thinking radically. Aerospace power is not to be assumed as an extension of air power. In fact, air power is one of the several constituents of aerospace power. In the short term, the strike element of air power will continue to remain a formidable and most preferred option in the event almost instantaneous pre-emptive/retaliatory strike is required against an adversary. In the long term, aerospace power can be used to strike a telling blow by destroying satellites belonging to adversary. During peacetime, aerospace power would contribute significantly to overall growth of the nation. Every component of aerospace power listed above has a definite function towards making us a potent soft power.
© Copyright 2016 Indian Defence Review
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