25 February 2016
Pakistan's Nawaz Sharif Government is bending over backwards to start talks with India because it desires some say in Pakistan's foreign policy, which has been hijacked by its Army's leadership. Even the Government’s NSA is from the Army
This (proxy) war must stop. Many soldiers are sacrificing their lives and I don’t know when this Government will take some concrete decisions… There are forces who have vested interests”, said retired lecturer Devraj Gupta, father of Captain Tushar Mahajan, who died fighting terrorists on February 22 in Pampore in south Kashmir.
Few are asking the question that Mr Gupta has raised; certainly not the Government, nor the Army leadership. Since both have their reasons, the proxy war, unfortunately, will continue, with the likelihood of — at Pakistan Army’s initiative — snowballing into a limited conventional war.
Talking with Pakistan is getting difficult for India; more difficult would be what to talk that abates, if not stops, the proxy war. The Modi Government has made it clear that the Kashmir resolution is not on the table. While Jammu & Kashmir is a part of the Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue agreed to by both sides in December 2015, from India’s viewpoint there are numerous issues associated with it that could be discussed. For example, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Gilgit-Baltistan, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and so on.
Moreover, for talks to commence, India’s condition is that Pakistan must demonstrate sincerity by tangible progress on 26/11, Pathankot and now Pampore terror attacks. While India would like to stick to its terms for talks, there is pressure from the US and Russia — India’s strategic partners — that both sides resolve outstanding issues. Iran, Afghanistan and perhaps China too see merit in the bilateral engagement between India and Pakistan.
Pakistan’s Nawaz Sharif Government is bending over backwards to start talks with India because it desires some say in Pakistan’s foreign policy, which has been hijacked by its Army’s leadership. For this reason, Islamabad accepted its Army’s condition that the National Security Advisor should be an Army officer nominated by the Army chief, General Raheel Sharif. Despite resistance from its army and their strategic jihadi assets, it has managed to file a First Information Report against unnamed jihadis in the Pathankot attacks. Raids have been launched across Pakistan to nab a few Jaish operatives.
Mr Sartaj Aziz, Pakistan’s Foreign Affairs Advisor to the Prime Minister, has made efforts to inform the Indian media that Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Masood Azhar, named as the mastermind of the Pathankot attacks identified by India, has been under ‘protective custody’ since January 14. Mr Aziz also said that a special investigation team from Pakistan was ready to visit Pathankot to collect evidence soon, and that Pakistan was waiting to hear from India to start the bilateral dialogue.
What Mr Aziz did not say, however, is that more terror attacks from Pakistani soil into India would stop. This will be decided by General Headquarters, Rawalpindi, based upon its assessment whether the bilateral dialogue was making sensible headway. Terror, for them, is linked to meaningful talks. While selected by the Prime Minister, Pakistan’s Army chief draws his authority from three extraneous sources: Total control over nuclear weapons; the nine corps commanders; and friendly jihadis, who form the first line of offence against India. Both the Director Generals of the Strategic Plans Division which controls Pakistan’s nuclear weapons’ assets, and the Inter-Services Intelligence which sustain friendly jihadis like the Jaish and the Lakshar-e-Tayyeba report directly (and only) to the Army chief.
For Islamabad, and ironically for India, Rawalpindi’s global stature, since the 1998 nuclear tests when it followed India’s blasts with its own, has risen exponentially. Big powers like the US, Russia and China, Islamic powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran, close neighbour Afghanistan and distant neighbours in Central Asia seek proximity with Rawalpindi. Consequently, Pakistan’s national security and foreign policies are unambiguously controlled by the military leadership, despite a civilian Government.
Conscious about India’s hesitation to talk with the Pakistan Army with a civilian Government around, Rawalpindi had hoped that the new channel of National Security Advisors talking alongside the bureaucrats on the Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue could be used for Kashmir resolution talks. Since this, in its assessment, is now unlikely with the Modi Government, it has upped terror attacks, where terrorists are fighting the Indian Army in pitched tactical battles. The purpose of doing this is to put pressure on India to talk on the Kashmir resolution, or continue taking heavy Army casualties.
War, Pakistan knows, has been ruled out as an option by India. After the November 26, 2003, ceasefire on the Line of Control, the then Indian Army chief, General NC Vij took the decision of adopting strategic defensive posture against Pakistan — the fence on the LoC, completed on July 4, 2004, was its visible manifestation. On January 12, 2007, Army chief, Gen JJ Singh, got Minister for Defence AK Antony to release the ‘doctrine for sub-conventional operations’ or counter-terrorism. This was followed by directions from the Army Headquarters to Army academies (Indian Military Academy and Officers Training Academies) to change the basic infantry training meant for conventional war, to counter-terrorism operations for young officers.
This was disclosed by the commandant IMA, Lt Gen RS Sujlana who, on the eve of his retirement, spoke with the media in mid-April 2011. Asked to comment on changes at the IMA from when he was a cadet there four decades ago, he said, “That’s going back 40 years. There have been many overall changes but the biggest change has been in the field of training — from conventional and nuclear warfare to sub-conventional or non-conventional dealing basically with insurgency, terrorism or certain international duties under the United Nations flag.” The primary role of the Army has transformed from conventional warfare to CI ops.
However, the Army leadership does not admit this. It maintains that training for conventional war is being done alongside CI ops, which, is not possible. The two operations need different mindsets, training (both within and with the Air Force) and equipment. The Pakistan Army is certainly not fooled by the Indian Army’s war preparedness, which explains its continuing proxy war without fear of retaliation.
Putting things into perspective, in his recent book, Playing to the Edge, former CIA and National Security Agency chief Michael Hayden writes that then Pakistan’s ISI chief, Shuja Pasha told him in December 2008 that “the (Pakistan) Army was built to fight India and not terrorists”.This was when the US was keen that the Pakistan Army take out terrorists in Pakistan’s tribal areas.
Since the bulk of the Army is doing CI ops in Jammu & Kashmir, which, given the nuclear weapons with Pakistan, has also become the pivot for conventional war, I was baffled by then Army chief, Gen Bikram Singh’s response in January 2013. When I asked him why he did not reduce his offensive forces meant for plains and use the saved money for critically needed mountain equipment, he said that they were meant for deterrence. Since conventional war capabilities are meant to stop Pakistan’s proxy war, they have not been successful. Not because the Indian Army has less of these, but because they are focused on CI ops. This explains why Mr Gupta’s plea that India take decisive action to stop the (proxy) war will not be heeded anytime soon.
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