Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)
February 12, 2016
Today, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, John F. Sopko, testified before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services U.S. House of Representatives.
The testimony notes:
– Congress has appropriated more than $68 billion towards building self-sufficient Afghan security forces, 61% of the $113 billion in U.S. reconstruction funding.
– Security is the most critical component of U.S. efforts to rebuild Afghanistan.
– If recent developments are indicators of what is to come, we may not be on course to achieve and sustain for the long term the U.S. national security objectives in Afghanistan.
– SIGAR has found many instances when U.S. funding dedicated to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) was wasted, whether inefficiently spent on worthwhile endeavors or squandered on activities that delivered no apparent benefit.
– SIGAR has also found that the capability of ANDSF units regressed when deprived of U.S. or Coalition assistance.
– With fewer forces in theater, the United States military has lost much of its ability to collect reliable information and data on ANDSF capability and effectiveness.
– Resolute Support (RS) mission advisors rely almost exclusively on data provided by the Afghan ministries to evaluate the operational readiness and effectiveness of the ANDSF. In some ways, this is like the fox guarding the hen house, and, in this case, the hen house is billions of dollars in U.S. funds appropriated for the ANDSF.
– With billions of dollars still in the funding pipeline, it is troubling to learn that the RS mission has not conducted its own independent review of the Kunduz incident to consider whether our current “train, advise, and assist” effort is as effective as it should be, or whether changes need to be made.
– SIGAR’s work shows that neither the United States nor its Afghan allies truly know how many Afghan soldiers and police are available for duty, or, by extension, the true nature of their operational capabilities.
– SIGAR is concerned that other measures of ANDSF capabilities and effectiveness have never been very reliable and are getting worse.
– SIGAR has long been concerned about the risk to U.S. funds provided to the ANDSF in the form of on-budget assistance, and in 2015, DOD provided approximately $2 billion in on-budget assistance to the ANDSF.
– The Afghan economy is not expected to grow quickly enough in the next five years to cover a significantly larger share of ANDSF costs, $5.4 billion annually, than it is currently paying.
– This year, the United States contributed $4.1 billion, and even with U.S. funding of this magnitude, SIGAR’s work shows that the ANDSF is unable to sustain itself in many areas.
No comments:
Post a Comment