STEMMING THE ROT OF INSURGENCY

http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/oped/stemming-the-rot-of-insurgency.html

Monday, 18 January 2016 | KG Suresh | 

Traditionally, the responses over the growing Maoist problem have swung from one extreme to another. If certain people view every Adivasi as a Maoist-sympathiser, others find the Maoists as legitimate fighters against inequality. We need to find middle ground

For a long time, India had witnessed consensus, political and otherwise, on issues of foreign policy and national security. Any threat to the country’s security, internal or external, saw the nation overcoming its narrow differences and uniting in its resolve to defeat the nefarious designs of the enemy. A similar consensus existed in matters of foreign policy as well. One vividly remembers how senior BJP leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee represented India at the United Nations and backed to the hilt the then Indian Government even while being a prominent Opposition leader.

Over the years, this consensus on security and foreign affairs has gradually faded away with some Opposition leaders going to the extent of attacking the policies of the ruling party even on foreign soil. On internal security issues too, such as terrorism and Left-wing extremism, the political divergence has grown to the extent that harsh measures and legislations taken by one Government are repealed by the successor dispensation. Apart from weakening the nation’s resolve to put a united fight against such forces, the open display of differences also shows the country in poor light.

It is but natural that every political party has a right to have its own views on critical issues confronting the nation. However, while one may disagree on the modus operandi, what is disturbing is the growing differences over the problem itself. For example, it is not necessary that all political parties hold the same view about ‘Operation Greenhunt’, but the problem arises when you don’t even have consensus on the basic premises that violence has no place in a democratic country and any outfit which takes the law in its hands has to be dealt with severely, if it refuses to avail of the opportunity to shun the path. And when political parties take the help of these very anti-national forces to win elections, it crosses all limits of a democratic and civilised polity.

Unfortunately, in matters of foreign policy or internal security, even the intelligentsia appears to be vertically divided and devoid of any consensus. In fact, their views border on the extremes of both sides. If one section views all Adivasis as Maoist-sympathisers, the other looks at the state and its machinery as the villains of the piece. A realistic assessment of the ground situation would reveal that neither reflects the harsh realities. There are certainly elements associated with the state who are exploiting the innocent and poverty stricken masses in these areas but it is also a fact that the Maoists are not good Samaritans who are there only to fight against injustice and exploitation. 

The Maoists had not originally identified Bastar as an area to start a revolution. The ‘Rear Area Document’ they prepared in the early 70s after the debacle in West Bengal clearly indicates that they viewed the Dandakaranya forest as a ‘rear area’ where the population ‘does not have the political consciousness to lead revolution’. They saw the region as a secure place for hiding and gathering strength.

As the Maoists could not continue their activities in cities, as planned, with police and paramilitary forces cracking the whip across the country, the movement took root in the Dandakaranya forest which spreads across six States, and over the past few decades became the headquarters of the Maoist movement. Gradually, the Maoists cemented support among the vulnerable Adivasis by learning the local languages. A complete breakdown of communication between the Adivasis of central India and mainstream India alienated them further and pushed them into the lap of the Maoists.

Again, there are perception issues as cited above. Both the policymakers and the intelligentsia, including the mainstream media, need to distinguish between Maoists and Maoist sympathisers/supporters. To cite an example, we often read that hundreds of Maoists perpetrated some attack on the security forces or politicians. In reality, only one or two per cent of the people involved in such incidents are Maoists. The rest are ‘Maoist supporters’. The support these Adivasi foot soldiers extend to Maoists is mostly based on opportunity, not ideology. These indoctrinated Adivasi supporters view the entire state apparatus as exploitative as they have been sold an illusion that if they fight to bring communism, their day-to-day problems will be solved. In the absence of any communication between the state and the Adivasis, the perception on both sides gets further strengthened and the security forces suffer major reverses in the absence of actionable intelligence at the ground level.

Communication, thus, becomes the key component and the catalyst in bringing about this perceptional change. Effective communication is needed not only to de-convert the Maoist sympathisers among the Adivasis but also their growing numbers in university campuses, industrial areas and cities across the country, as the Maoists steadily but silently spread their tentacles.

If the Adivasis are to be taught to recognise the propaganda war unleashed against the Indian state by the Maoist front organisations and ideologues, the impressionable young minds in the campuses and cities need to be sensitised to the dangers of the outdated, failed and deeply-flawed Maoist ideology.

Even as the Maoists indulge in mindless destruction of the states communication machinery, including telephone lines, it is important that radio, television and the web media, apart from traditional tools such as street theatre and folk art forms, are extensively utilised to reach out to the untouched. Such communication is done in the language the Adivasis understand. In fact, one of the reasons for the failure of the state machinery in the region is their inability to communicate with the Adivasis in their language. The state should seriously ponder over taking the cooperation of Non-Government organisations, who have been working among the tribals.

One innovative example of a civil society driven outreach programme is CGnet, an experiment for democratisation of media and governance founded in 2004 in Chhattisgarh, which has since expanded its operation to the entire central Gondwana region in central India. It has developed the world’s first community radio on mobile phone and also a Bluetooth radio. It now has three platforms. Adivasi Swara is a platform in Gondi language whereas Swasthya Swara is a platform to discuss traditional health knowledge from forests in central India where vaids (traditional doctors) from remote areas share their knowledge using their mobile phones. This has also helped in the development of the first standard dictionary in Gondi language.

In the words of Shubhranshu Choudhary, co-founder of CGNet Swara, “If we can create a continuous dialogue between mainstream India and Adivasis as a way to solve some of their day-to-day problems, we will be able to wean them away from the Maoist ranks.”

(The author is a senior journalist based in Delhi)