Ron Tira
Between July 8 and August 26, 2014, Israel and Hamas engaged in hostilities known in Israel as Operation Protective Edge. An analysis of the operation can provide valuable understanding regarding the orchestration of ends, ways and means – in a distinct context.
Politicians, strategists and campaign planners tend to survey experiences that resemble the current challenge. Yet often, the seemingly analogous case is characterized by different contexts, and may thus be misleading. Rather than seeking resemblance, the differences between the specific challenge ahead and the seemingly analogous precedents should be distilled. Extracting the distinctness of the challenge may provide the real guidance.
Operation Pillar of Defense - the Misleading Backdrop
Between November 14 and 21, 2012, Israel and Hamas engaged in earlier hostilities; Operation Pillar of Defense. As the belligerent sides, theatre and other features resembled those of Operation Protective Edge, and as the occurrences were 20 months apart, it was tempting to find guidance in the successes of Operation Pillar of Defense. The temptation led to a lack of timely articulation on Israel’s part regarding the distinct context of Operation Protective Edge, and the fundamental way that it differed from Operation Pillar of Defense. This, and delayed crystallization of Israel’s own desired ends, have both led to potential incoherence between the ends and the ways and means.
The earlier Operation Pillar of Defense revolved around relatively specific details of the status quo between Israel and Hamas – in its capacity as the de facto sovereign of what is essentially the state of Gaza. These details include the extension of Gazans’ fishing privileges and their ability to cultivate fields adjacent to the border, the freedom of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to operate inside the “Perimeter”[i], etc. More material yet still modest was Israel’s desire to enhance its deterrence vis-à-vis Hamas, so as to scale down the frequency, range and intensity of Hamas’ cross-border fire.
As both parties’ ends were fairly unassuming, so were their ways and means: Israel ran a short yet precise air campaign, Hamas fired rockets into Israeli cities, and the exchange of fire constituted no more than “kinetic background music” to negotiations facilitated by Egypt[ii]. Hence, Operation Pillar of Defense can be described as no more than armed negotiations to amend certain aspects of the status quo. Ends, ways and means were in concert; by both sides.
The Distinct Context
Much of Hamas’ history has been spent under Iranian foster parenthood, even though Iranians are Shiites and Hamas is a member of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood. But, in 2011, the outbreak of the civil war in Syria presented the relations with an impossible test: Iran backed the Alawite (non-Sunni) Syrian regime in its bloody war against the rebels – many of whom are theological and ethnic brothers of Hamas. Hamas had to break ties with the Shiites.
Luckily for Hamas, in November 2011 the Muslim Brotherhood won Egypt’s parliamentary elections and, subsequently, Egypt elected a Muslim Brotherhood president. An improved replacement for Iran was found. But on July 2013, the Egyptian army ousted the Muslim Brotherhood government. The new military rulers of Egypt regard the Muslim Brotherhood as their archenemy – Hamas included.
Running out of options, Hamas looked to its nemesis Fatah and the Palestinian Authority (PA) as a last financial and political resort. After years of disengagement – following the brutal killing of Fatah personnel in Gaza in 2007-8, the Hamas take-over of Gaza and divorce from the PA-run West Bank – Hamas eventually approached the PA and in April 2014 signed the Palestinian Unity Agreement. “Show me the money” demanded Hamas as the ink dried; yet the PA declined to finance Hamas-run Gaza.
With almost no allies and a financial inability to run Gaza or pay salaries, Hamas was at the brink of collapse. From its perspective, it experienced a near-existential threat. From Hamas’ side of the hill, it had no alternative but to fight its way out of the corner. This hardly resembled the context of the earlier Operation Pillar of Defense.
Israel’s lack of clarity regarding this unique context was followed by a lack of clarity in defining the enemy. Was it Hamas’ military wing, its exiled political leadership, the organization as a whole, or the Gaza Strip as a de facto state? And in this distinct context, what were the relevant centers of gravity? Hamas’ offensive capabilities, its center of combatant mass and leadership in the inner neighborhoods of Gaza City, the nod between Gaza’s military leadership and Hamas’ political leadership in Qatar, or the popular support of Gaza’s 1.8 million inhabitants?
The Sides’ Ends
Hamas’ policy objective was to fundamentally alter its situation and secure economic viability for Gaza, assured by reliable third parties (reliable – from Hamas’ perspective).
Hamas had no clear idea regarding what political mechanism would realize its ends. But if all one has is rockets, then, from Hamas’ perspective, it had no choice but to hope that by firing rockets at Israel it could somehow generate a political snowball that would eventually secure its economic lifeline. Perhaps Israel would be willing to make economic concessions for pacification. Maybe the PA would rally up to the sights of suffering Palestinians in Gaza. And perhaps the conflict would bring about Aljazeera footage that would in turn rock Arab public opinion, and ultimately Egyptian and other Arab governments would offer their economic and political collaboration. Bringing sympathetic Turkey and Qatar into the picture was also an angle for play.
Yet these kneejerk political instincts must also accommodate other aspects of the distinct context. The incumbent ruling military elite of Egypt is committed to combating the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas included. Fatah regards Hamas as its prime threat[iii]. Regional political dynamics were, to a degree, realigned from Arabs versus Israelis to stability-defending Arabs and Israelis versus revolutionary Jihadists. Indeed, behind closed doors most Arab players opposed Hamas.
Israel is Hamas’ longstanding archenemy; intuitively it should be interested in its downfall. But that’s too simplistic: in many respects Israel is better off with Hamas as the de facto sovereign of Gaza. First, Gaza burdens Hamas with state-like rationale. With the necessity to feed 1.8 million mouths, three times a day, run schools, hospitals and sewage systems, Hamas loses many of its former advantages as a non-state actor. The current version of Hamas is susceptible to state-like levers and can be deterred, and is thus a more convenient opponent. Second, Hamas imposes a state-like rationale on Gaza. As a home to a large number of rogue jihadist groups, ranging from the Al Qaeda-inspired, to Iranian proxy factions, and to dozens of armed gangs and clans, Gaza is almost uncontrollable. Hamas enforces its will upon these factions, and presses the Strip into an almost coherent state-like entity. Finally, there is political utility in Hamas vis-à-vis the PA. Indeed, some members of Israel’s leadership were minded not to over-weaken Hamas, thereby barring the PA from stepping into the resulting vacuum and becoming over-empowered.
With this in mind, Israel did not seek to remove Hamas from its de facto sovereignty in Gaza. And if Israel’s end was to preserve Hamas, then surely it follows that Hamas should be permitted out of its economic corner. Why then fight?
At some stages, Israel lost focus of the distinct context, stating its ends: “quiet will be met with quiet”[iv], as if this was another “routine” round of escalation that sooner or later would run out of steam on its own. As the distinct context came into clearer sight, three desired ends came into play.
First, even if accepting Hamas’ core economic demand, the encompassing mechanics matter a lot and raise numerous issues: control of Gaza’s gateways to ensure that weapons do not accompany commercial goods; use of raw materials for civilian development and not for the constructions of tunnels and the manufacturing of rockets; funneling of funds to improve civilian livelihood and not to finance terror; and Hamas’ quid pro quo concessions vis-à-vis disarmament.
Second, Israel’s overarching defense doctrine seeks to achieve “grand-deterrence”; a deterring posture that transcends a specific foe or context, but is always prevalent. In view of the potential next round with Hamas or Hezbollah, or any other regional foe, it is unacceptable that all that happens in a conflict is that an enemy fires at Israel, Israel fires back at the enemy, and the enemy eventually improve its position. This may incentivize future escalations. Hence, the distilled end was to have the cake and eat it too: yielding to Hamas’ core financial demand while being triumphant and maintaining deterrence.
The third end was to degrade Hamas’ capability to disrupt Israeli day-to-day life, and mainly degrade its high-trajectory assets and offensive tunnels[v]. Indeed, Hamas constructed about three dozen offensive tunnels, capable of transporting hundreds of its combatants into Israeli towns.
Ways and Means: Phase I (July 8 to July 17)
Hamas’ campaign plan was to immediately utilize almost everything it had in its playbook: mainly high-trajectory weapons covering practically the whole of Israel, but also explosives-carrying UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), raids via offensive tunnels and coastal raids by its naval commando. While it had significant depots, its main dilemma was the intensity of its fire: it began with relatively intensive utilization of its assets, slowing down as it realized that the conflict may be longer than expected. Hamas wanted to pace the use of assets to safeguard its ability to fight another round, should it erupt immediately thereafter. Another complementing campaign theme was to achieve maximum survivability of combatant leadership and personnel, by hiding them in an array of tunnels below Gaza City’s inner neighborhoods.
Israel’s most impressive ways and means (throughout all phases of the conflict) were actually on the defensive side. Its innovative Iron Dome anti-missile defense system managed to intercept almost all incoming rockets aimed at populated areas. Indeed, while Hamas fired 4,600 rockets at Israel throughout the conflict, civilian fatalities from rockets amounted to two[vi] (including one Thai national). Israel successfully interdicted or shot down all UAVs before they could inflict any damage. And a combined echelon of sensors integrated with rapid reaction forces, have intercepted all sea- or tunnel-based raids before reaching any Israeli civilians. This not only foiled Hamas’ attempt to inflict damages to the Israeli home front, but also gave Israeli decision-makers the entrapping ability to ‘go slow’ in their deliberations and actions without paying an immediate price. Good defense permitted – even induced – being less punctual on the offensive side, thereby impeded an Israeli decision on rapid, decisive offensive ground operation that might have allowed Israel to better accomplish its ends.
Indeed, during Phase I, Israel committed the IAF (Israel Air Force) to combatting an enemy characterized by three features: hidden, hence presenting a targeting challenge; operating in tunnels, hence presenting a survivability challenge; and deployed underneath densely populated urban areas, thereby presenting an avoidance of collateral damage challenge. Air power is arguably a less efficient operational tool for this set of challenges. And as collateral damage constituted a prime restriction, the IAF did not even utilize a small portion of its capabilities. Further, many strikes against high-value targets were executed using the “Knock on Roof”[vii] technique, eliminating the element of surprise and resulting in the destruction of mere bricks and mortar rather than enemy combatants.
Thousands of airstrikes incrementally added up to a partial, yet painful, degradation of Hamas. This may have sufficed for the context of Operation Pillar of Defense; but it was insufficient for the distinct context of Operation Protective Edge.
The First Egyptian Ceasefire Proposal
On July 15, Egypt published a ceasefire proposal that offered a cessation of hostilities first, followed by a negotiation of the details, and indicated willingness to open land crossings into Gaza in a limited and supervised manner. The proposal was drafted in consultation with Israel, presented thereafter to the PA, and finally forwarded to Hamas as a fait accompli. This was an offer Hamas could not accept at that stage of the conflict, for its content and the manner in which it was formed, and Egypt knew this. Hence, the Egyptian proposal should not be seen as an actual attempt to exit the conflict, but rather as a bid to anchor high its position for future negotiations.
Hamas expectedly rejected the proposal, appealed for Turkish and Qatari intervention, and, on July 16, published its own counteroffer for a 10-year ceasefire. While some of Hamas’ demands were knowingly unrealistic, the counteroffer confirmed the economic nature of the conflict: Hamas demanded the funding of salaries, reopening of Israeli and Egyptian commercial land crossings to Gaza, sea and air access, increased fishing privileges, and the construction of an industrial zone. These were demands expected from a state-like bureaucrat, not from a jihadist.
Israel naturally accepted the Egyptian proposal, thereby buying international legitimacy for the escalation that followed, and further strengthening Israeli-Egyptian coordination. It was a nice Israeli diplomatic maneuver, as such. But it is difficult to see how Israeli decision-makers should think that the Egyptian proposal actually addressed root causes and Israel’s ends for the conflict – especially at that timing.
Moreover, while Israel was aware of the existence of Hamas’ offensive tunnels, only by mid-July, when Hamas squads began to repeatedly pop up into Israeli plantations and fields, did Israel digest their full meaning.
Ways and Means: Phase II (July 17 to August 1)
On the night of July 17 Israel forwarded ten[viii] brigade-level combined arms teams to the border, committing several of them to a limited ground offensive. The IDF’s line-of-operation was aimed at degrading Hamas’ cross-border offensive tunnels apparatus, and hence focused on the border area and Gaza Strip’s outer urban rim.
The Israeli ground offensive led to the discovery and destruction of about three dozen offensive tunnels. It also drew Hamas to surface from its defensive tunnels and engage in combat, which resulted in the killing of hundreds of Hamas’ combatants, and it allowed for the suppression of a few adjacent rocket launch zones. However, by definition, this line-of-operation could not significantly degrade the leadership and personnel of the military wing of Hamas or press Hamas’ political leadership in exile.
Given the distinct context – Hamas coming from what it perceived to be a near-existential economic threat – the IDF’s line-of-operation was insufficient to pose an even graver, more imminent pain and risk, which would break Hamas’ will and effectively set the scene for termination. Even when executed meticulously, Israeli ways and means on Phase II were insufficient to address the full spectrum of Israel’s ends: merely degrading Hamas’ cross-border subterranean infrastructure could not motivate Hamas to terminate the hostilities on Israel’s terms, or significantly build up Israel’s “grand-deterrence” vis-à-vis Hamas and others.
As for Hamas, since its strategy involved putting all the cards it had on the table at the conflict’s commencement, it could not step up its ways and means so as to counterweight Israel’s ground offensive. It could not stop the IDF from reaching its geographic objectives, and sustained 1:10 inferiority in direct combat fatalities when trying to engage the IDF on Hamas’ own preplanned, saturated urban defenses. Hence, after a few days of fighting it began to lessen the intensity of its urban engagements. As the IDF closed in on most of Hamas’ offensive tunnels, a sense of “use-it-or-lose-it” emerged. Hamas consequently attempted to utilize some of its yet unrevealed offensive tunnels. All such tunnel-based attacks were blocked by the IDF before reaching Israeli civilians, yet their use disclosed their locations.
Wave of Ceasefire Initiatives
Between July 22 and August 1, various actors published ceasefire initiatives, reflecting the mutually-exclusive nature of the interests behind them. Most evident was the polarization between the emerging block of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel – and the radicalizing bloc of Qatar and Turkey, Hamas’ sympathizers.
Of the various competing initiatives, the proposal extended by US Secretary of State Kerry stood out. While the fog of war still shrouds this curious proposal[ix], it seems as if it focused on immediate humanitarian needs and diplomatic formulas while failing to understand and address the vital interest of Israel[x], Egypt[xi], Saudi Arabia or the PA[xii]. Secretary Kerry offered to realize Hamas’ core objective to improve economic conditions in Gaza, while putting aside Egyptian, Israeli and PA bids to monitor land crossings – not to mention the ends of deterrence and degradation of Hamas’ offensive capabilities. Working with Qatar and Turkey, Secretary Kerry undercut Egypt’s role as the primary dealmaker, ignoring the need to empower Egypt as the region’s political leader[xiii]. It is not that Kerry’s proposal represented a conflicting realpolitik rationale; the proposal was detached from any policy or ends. (For example, Kerry’s policy ends may have been best served by maneuvering Netanyahu into a position where he must negotiate peace with an empowered PA, by driving him to topple the contesting representative of the Palestinians – Hamas. Kerry may have also provided incentives to Israel to take territorial risks in the West Bank; if Israel withdrew from Gaza and that territory was abused to attack Israel, then the IDF may uproot the threat and roll things back. Kerry’s actual positions did the opposite).
Throughout the conflict, Israel rightfully insisted on Egyptian exclusivity in facilitating any ceasefire agreement, as Israel and Egypt share common interests vis-à-vis Hamas, and Egypt is best placed to enforce some post-conflict arrangements. However, as Egypt also wanted to weaken Hamas, but without sharing the burden of war (from casualties to the political cost of collateral damage), Egypt tended toward a more “ideal” resolution. Even when Prime Minister Netanyahu wanted to manage the costs and risks, non-cost-sharing Egypt went ‘slow’ insisting on its ends. Further, as Israel and Egypt rightfully excluded Qatar and Turkey from the diplomatic process, the two latter benefactors of Hamas were incentivized to disrupt the process.
More importantly, even at that stage neither Israel nor Hamas had yet experienced sufficient pain to feel a sense of urgency to terminate the conflict. Israel had not internally articulated who should be subject to such pain – the military leadership of Hamas or its political leadership in exile – and via which centers of gravity to affect each of them. Neither side has yet applied such ways or means that would allow it to earn in the battlefield sufficient chips to be cashed into a compelling political stance.
Both sides already invested considerably in the conflict, yet neither could show how reality has changed in its favor. Each side was better off continuing to fight the current conflict than retreat to its corner only to fight another round soon. As crossing the threshold of conflict requires paying a significant “fixed price admission ticket” – politically, diplomatically, economically, militarily, psychologically etc. – it seemed more economical for both sides to continue fighting with the “admission ticket” already purchased, than facing the prospect of having to purchase another ticket in the near future.
This is particularly true for Israel, which mobilized nearly one hundred thousand reservists and experienced an economic disruption. This kind of undertaking cannot be repeatedly sustained time and again in short intervals. Hence, open-ended ceasefire initiatives that do not decide the crisis create significant dilemmas for Israel: keep the reservists mobilized for weeks or months? Release them and run the risk of mobilizing again in a few weeks? Keep the economy suppressed in the conflict’s prolonged twilights?
Hamas moreover assessed that the rift between the Obama administration and Prime Minister Netanyahu was limiting Israel’s steps. Coupled with Netanyahu’s apparent lack of enthusiasm to order a major ground offensive into the inner neighborhoods of Gaza City made Hamas assess that the worst was behind it, and that time was finally on its side.
Between July 25 and August 1, Israel did agree to a number of so-called “humanitarian ceasefires” during which it continued to search for and destroy offensive tunnels. On August 1, hours after another “humanitarian ceasefire” was declared, Hamas opened fire on Israeli towns and attacked an IDF unit, capturing an Israeli officer. This led to two developments: Operationally, the IDF rapidly closed in on and combed the city of Rafah, where the Israeli POW[xiv] was believed to be held. This unplanned, daytime, direct approach attack involved crossing a certain psychological barrier relating to the depth and tempo of Israeli ground operations in the Strip. More importantly, the Israeli cabinet completed the in-depth reassessment it began a few days earlier.
Netanyahu’s Reassessment
Prime Minister Netanyahu’s reassessment of the termination mechanism, ways and means was based on a number of distinct contexts. Against common wisdom, Netanyahu assessed that he was under no actual pressure to terminate the operation. The Israeli public almost unanimously supported the operation, and while international public opinion was critical of collateral damage, in the intergovernmental arena there was little real pressure to terminate. Even the US reversed its policy and no longer perused a cessation of hostilities for humanitarian purposes detached from policies, and accepted Egypt’s deal-making role.
Furthermore, by the end of Phase II Hamas lost most of its offensive tunnels, and was left with about a third of its rockets. And with the success of the Iron Dome anti-missile system, Hamas’ remaining rockets were downgraded from a threat to a mere inconvenience. Israel’s defense frustrated Hamas’ offensive capabilities and made Israel less sensitive to a prolonged operation. Hamas lost much of its nuisance value.
While there may have been no operational surprise, there was a paradigmatic one: Netanyahu no longer looked at Hamas as an armed non-state actor only partially degraded, but as a de facto state in dire stress: 485,000 of the 1.8 million Gazans were displaced from their homes, 11,000 buildings had been destroyed, Gaza’s electricity and water systems were collapsing, and food and medicine were in short supply. Hamas’ Clausewitzian “trinity” of people, army, and government showed signs of disconcert.
In sharp contrast with Israel’s defense doctrine, Netanyahu assessed that in the distinct context he could outlast his Arab opponent in a prolonged attrition; and outmaneuver it politically. Netanyahu then declared a revision of the termination mechanism from a multilateral agreement to a unilateral deterrence. By doing so, he attempted to place Hamas in a position whereby major operations may be terminated without Hamas having a vote on the terms and without achievements to Hamas[xv]. Nonetheless, Israeli-Egyptian proposed multilateral termination arrangements were implicitly still on the table (as Egypt continued to negotiate them) with the only variable left open being how much further pain would Hamas endure before agreeing to them.
As to ways and means, Netanyahu ordered commencement of Phase III of Operation Protective Edge: redeployment of the ground forces back to the border, instigating a siege-and-attrition line-of-operation. Israel continued to apply standoff fire against Hamas, and its decapitation efforts yielded several results: the targeting of Mohammed Deif[xvi], Chief Commander of the military wing of Hamas; of Hamas’ Commander of Southern Gaza Strip and two of his senior deputies; and of one of Hamas’ chief financiers. The IDF released some of its reservists; normally a sign of de-escalation, but in this distinct context it was a sign of preparation for a prolonged competition of staying power.
Termination
Between August 5 and 26, negotiations and exchanges of fire occurred alternately. Negotiations reflected an underlying reality in which, arguably, neither side had experienced such pain or threat that would break its military or political will. Yet neither side felt comfortable with continuing the fighting: Hamas had no cards for escalation and had to consider the dire state of the Strip, while risk-averse Netanyahu developed a sense of “let’s get it over with”.
In the negotiations Hamas found itself isolated against a coalition comprised of Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Qatar and Turkey were excluded. The terms of the resulting so-called “unlimited” ceasefire were rather humble. Immediate action items included the partial reopening of the Israel-Gaza land crossings under Israeli supervision, a minor extension of Gazan fishing privileges, and allowed the provision of partial funding of salaries for some of Gaza’s civil servants. Egypt partially reopened its land crossing to Gaza, bidding for PA’s supervision. Yet no immediate, effective mechanism reassured the end uses of cement, metals or funds, once they entered the Strip. The more significant issues (such as Hamas’ demand for air and seaport, and Israel’s demand for the demilitarization of Gaza) were deferred to later negotiations, which will probably never be concluded.
As intended by Israel, Hamas was weakened yet continues to rule Gaza. Israel and Egypt did not permit Qatar, Turkey or other competitors to assure Hamas of post-conflict arrangements. Hamas lost much of its offensive capabilities, and will find it difficult to rearm via Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula as long as the current regime runs Egypt.
Yet one may doubt whether the root cause of the conflict was fully addressed, and whether the regional system was re-stabilized. Perhaps the minimalistic post-conflict arrangements merely lay the foundation for future escalation. One may speculate that had the military ways been more decisive, Netanyahu wouldn’t have had to demonstrate to the Israeli public that Hamas did not significantly improve its position as a result of the conflict, and could have afforded greater flexibility in post-conflict arrangements.
The main question that remains open relates to the conflict’s impact on Israel’s “grand-deterrence” vis-à-vis Hamas and other potential foes. Gaging deterrence is a tough call, but some pointers are listed below.
The IDF demonstrated tactical excellence in the field, with its forces carrying out their missions effectively and as ordered. The IDF met Hamas on Hamas’ own terms, in an urban arena prepared in advanced by Hamas, saturated with anti-tank guided missiles and fighting tunnels as well as flooded with area-denial weapons (landmines, IEDs, booby trapped buildings etc.), yet the IDF achieved domination and freedom in its area of operation.
The IDF also boosted its deterrence by excellent – thought context-dependent – defense: fending off practically all of Hamas’ rockets, UAVs, and sea- and tunnel-based attacks. Anti-missile defense came close to challenging the prevailing war paradigm of Israel’s enemies.
The IDF complied with the international laws of war and operated under a clear directive to minimize collateral damage, curtailing the effectiveness of the air campaign; nonetheless, as Hamas embedded practically all of its warfighting assets in condensed civilian neighborhoods, the pain inflicted on Gaza as a state was severe. And if Operation Protective Edge served as the annunciation that he who hides his forces amongst his own civilians will get war amongst his civilians, then not only did Israel enhance its deterrence but also challenged the war paradigm of Hamas and Hezbollah.
In sharp contrast with the “Spider Web” analogy[xvii], Israeli public and political systems demonstrated impressive resilience and staying power. Public opinion accepted Israeli casualties and met incoming rockets with maturity. During the limited ground offensive, Prime Minister Netanyahu was awarded one of the highest approval ratings ever recorded in Israel, dropping sharply as it became apparent that he was unlikely to approve a more extensive ground offensive[xviii]. It was a different, more resolute and adult Israel than that of 2006. Another difference from the past was the overt collaboration offered by Egypt, the leader of the Arab world, and the quite backing by Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf Emirates. Western public opinion was critical of collateral damage, yet Israel did not face meaningful constraints in the intergovernmental arena. Israel’s home front resilience and its new ability to harness the regional political system may also enhance Israel’s deterrence.
But there are also setbacks to deterrence. The main one being PM Netanyahu’s reluctance to approve a major ground offensive into Gaza City’s inner neighborhoods – where Hamas’ leadership and most of its fighting force found shelter – that might have allowed Israel to realize its ends in a more rapid, decisive and deterring manner. The architects of Operation Protective Edge may rationalize this in a variety of ways, mainly asserting that such a major ground offensive might have pushed Hamas over the edge from being a de facto government with state-like responsibilities, to being a non-state guerilla organization. But observers such as Hezbollah may conclude that Netanyahu was simply deterred from entering the heart of the urban area. Netanyahu appeared to be prioritizing risk- and cost-aversion over the prompt realization of his ends – sometimes an unhelpful position for an Israeli leader. This also reduces Israel’s value as an ally to Egypt and others.
Likewise is the issue of time. Irrespective of outcome, the mere fact that a small organization deployed less than 10 kilometers from Israel’s border managed to joggle Israel for 50 days – determining the timing of escalation and termination, disrupting Israel’s economy while remaining armed and defiant – is unhelpful for Israel’s deterring posture.
A core element of Israel’s deterring posture is its intimate relationship with the US. This was diluted, as PM Netanyahu found it difficult to continuously align American and Israeli plays[xix], sometimes deteriorating to clumsy public quarrels with the Obama administration. While Netanyahu on occasion simply mismanaged this vital relationship, he did at times clash with the US over genuine vital interests, and the whole of the Israel-Egypt-Saudi Arabia coalition was interested in distancing the US from the conflict due to its oscillating policies and pressures it applied in disassociation from any realpolitik rationale.
With two armed conflicts under his prime ministerial belt, a distinct Netanyahu way of war has emerged. Netanyahu predominantly regarded the armed conflicts he confronted as political occurrences, and kept the conductor’s baton close to himself. Armed conflict management generally reflects a gearbox; transmitting policy into military strategy, which then clutches, changes RPM and converts torque into campaign planning, finally changing RPM and torque into tactics. Under Netanyahu’s way of war, there is a direct axis between political dynamics and operations. While eliminating the opportunity for military strategic brilliance and spectacular campaign planning, under Netanyahu’s way of war political rationale directly dictate lines-of-operation and tempo. This has arguably worked for him, to a degree, but it is very dangerous to attempt to replicate in future conflicts.
Endnotes
[i] An area on the Gaza side of the border;
[ii] Egypt was at the time ruled by the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’ parent movement, yet also had full diplomatic ties with Israel;
[iii] Mitch Ginsburg, “Times of Israel, Israel says it foiled Hamas plan for massive attacks on Israel, coup against PA”, August 18, 2014;
[iv] Amos Harel, Haaretz, “IDF mobilizes troops to Gaza front, but calls for quiet with Hamas”, July 3, 2014;
[v] Offensive tunnels are dug from the urban areas of Gaza, under the Israeli defenses, all the way to beneath Israeli villages, allowing Hamas raids to take place. The last 5-10 meters are left undug, to conceal the tunnel;
[vi] Five more Israeli civilians were killed by mortar fire;
[vii] “Knock on Roof” is a technique in which early telephone warnings are placed to the civilians residing in buildings in which Hamas operated, followed by firing light weapons on the roof as a second warning, and only then does the actual strike take place;
[viii] Amos Harel, Haaretz, “Using Gaza lessons to prepare for next Hezbollah war”, August 7, 2014;
[ix] See for example: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/07/229855.htm
[x] Barak Ravid, Haaretz, “Kerry’s latest cease-fire plan: What was he thinking?”, July 27, 2014;
[xi] Tim Lister, CNN.com, “Anatomy of failure: How Gaza cease-fire never happened”, July 29, 2014;
[xii] Elhanan Miller, The Times of Israel, “Abbas fumes at Kerry over alternative ceasefire bid”, July 27, 2014;
[xiii] Joanna Walters, The Guardian, “Israel PM Netanyahu tells US talk shows Hamas violated own ceasefire”, July 27, 2014;
[xiv] Later declared KIA;
[xv] Amos Yadlin, “A Unilateral Move: Preferable to a Bad Agreement with a Terrorist Organization”, INSS Insight No. 583, August 3, 2014;
[xvi] Deif’s presence in the targeted building was confirmed, but his exact status following the strike remains unknown;
[xvii] Zvi Magen and Olena Bagno-Moldavsky, “Ukraine and Operation Protective Edge: Two Sides to Russia’s Foreign Policy Coin”, INSS Insight No. 589, August 14, 2014;
[xviii] “Spider Web” theory is notion, articulated by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, according to which Israel’s reverence for human life, and its alleged self-indulgent Western values, makes it weak and vulnerable. Such a society, though technologically advanced, will crumble under continued war and bloodshed;
[xix] From 82% during the ground offensive to 38% on August 25, 2014; according to Israel’s Channel 2 surveys;
[xx] Zaki Shalom, “The US Administration on Israel’s Military Activity in Operation Protective Edge: Fluctuating Positions”, INSS Insight No. 590, August 15, 2014; Oded Eran, “Another Casualty of the Third Gaza War: US-Israel Relations”, INSS Insight No. 600, September 1, 2014
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