Not All Is Sunshine Inside the Afghan Taliban

Afghanistan: Taliban Troubled By Failure And Factionalism

strategypage.com, January 21, 2016

It has been a disappointing year for the Taliban. I n early 2015 the Taliban undertook a major military effort against the Afghan security forces now that that foreign troops were no longer doing any of the fighting. That role ended in late 2014. As a result the 350,000 personnel of the Afghan security forces (170,000 troops and 180,000 police) have suffered 27 percent more casualties in 2015 compared to 2014. Taliban losses have also been very high, but they have lower recruiting standards and can offer drugs as well as money for those young tribesmen willing to take a chance during the “fighting season” (the annual warm weather period between the time crops are planted and harvested). Going off to try and gain some glory and loot during the fighting season is an ancient tradition in Afghanistan, especially there is not much alternative employment available in the countryside and the Taliban pay well.

Being part of an organized army is s different matter. American advisors believe that losing nearly three percent of its strength a year to combat deaths or crippling wounds, as occurred in 2014, is not sustainable. While the Taliban suffer higher losses the Taliban are more flexible in how they operate. This is more in line with the traditional Afghan way of warfare, which is more about raiding and ambushes than it is in operating like soldiers. The army and police are often standing guard in exposed positions (checkpoints or in bases) or obliged to go after fleeing Taliban, who often pause long enough to ambush the troops then move off again. Afghan soldiers and police know they are more effective fighters than the tribal warriors, but that their job requires them to expose themselves to danger regularly in order to maintain control of territory. The Taliban are not tied down nearly as much and that makes a big difference in morale.

The drug gangs provide the enormous quantities of the cash the Taliban need to operate as they do. Nearly all the 30,000 or so Taliban are paid and the Taliban leaders are paid much more. Moreover the drug gangs provide enough cash so the Taliban can “compensate” the families of Taliban killed in action. The drug gangs also bribe, and then control lots of government officials (civilian, military and police) and even some tribal leaders. The bribed officials will do things for the Taliban as well as the drug gangs.

The Taliban need all the money they can get because their 2015 plan was to eliminate Afghan security forces in the south (mainly Helmand province, where most of the world’s heroin is produced), the east (where most of the Helmand heroin is moved out via Pakistan and the Pakistani port of Karachi to the rest of the world) and parts of the north where heroin is also moved, mainly via Kunduz province to Central Asia.

The northern offensive failed, which is not surprising because in late 2001 the Taliban had still not been able to conquer all the northern tribes. The north never forgets and local tribal militias up there will go after any Taliban who come too close. Eastern Afghanistan is also increasingly hostile to the Taliban and other Islamic terror groups like the Haqqani Network. But there are so many Islamic terror groups in the eastern provinces along the Pakistani border, including a thousand or so ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) men and over 5,000 Pakistani Taliban and other Islamic terrorists pushed out of North Waziristan by the Pakistan Army in an operation that began in mid-2014 that the Taliban has a hard time maintaining any control in the east. These rival Islamic terror groups will often fight back if the Taliban tries to assert any control.

In the south the Taliban had some success in Helmand, where most of the 10,000 Taliban fighters lost in 2015 were killed. About 20 percent of Helmand is now under Taliban control and the government wants more American air power (bombers and surveillance) to enable the reinforced Afghan forces to push the Taliban out quickly and with fewer dead soldiers and policemen. It’s the drug gangs that finance all the mayhem in Helmand, as well they might because Helmand is where most of the opium poppies are grown and where the portable labs use chemicals smuggled in from bordering Pakistan to convert the sap of the poppies into heroin. The drug gangs would prefer to bribe the army and police to stay away but that has not worked because the heroin (and much cheaper opium) is hated in most of the country because over five percent of the population has become addicted to opium or heroin. So the troops and police from other parts of the country face disgrace back home if they do not attack the drug operations when they have a chance. Most Afghans don’t care if some tribes produce and export illegal drugs, they do care of the drugs are sold inside Afghanistan to Afghans. The Taliban understand this and have been living off the drug gangs since the late 1990s and justify this by promising to return to the system they imposed during the 1990s where the gangs were forced to export nearly all their production and were severely punished if any of the opium or heroin got out to the locals. That restriction disappeared along with Taliban control of most of Afghanistan in late 2001. It only worked back then because the Taliban offered security for the drug gangs in return for a large share of the profits and keeping the drugs away from Afghans. Some in the current Afghan government see that as a possible option now that the Westerners are gone. The Western donors have made it clear that the aid will disappear (and the bombs will return) if Afghanistan turns into a “narco state” (the national government is on the drug gang payroll). Many current government officials are already bribed by the drug gangs and the Afghans will keep wheeling and dealing with drug lords and foreign diplomats in order to keep the cash, but not the bombs, coming.

The drug angle has made most of the tribes hostile to the Taliban and the drug gangs. Westerners often lose sight of the fact that most of the violence in Afghanistan is all about the drugs and the disruption they causes to Afghan society and culture. Most of the 3,000 Afghan civilians killed in 2015 were because of this war against the drug lords and their hired guns (mainly the Taliban). The Afghan countryside has always been a dangerous place but it has become more dangerous because all that drug money has equipped many tribesmen with automatic weapons and fast vehicles.

Another largely ignored (outside the region) element is the growing number of casualties suffered by Islamic terror groups because of factionalism, feuds and infighting. By the end of 2015 the Taliban was fighting ISIL as well as some other “anti-Taliban” Islamic terrorists and a growing number of dissident Taliban factions. ISIL and factionalism are growing problems for the Taliban mainly because ISIL tends to persuade many very capable Taliban leaders to defect. The dissident Taliban factions survive by making deals with a local drug gang. It must be remembered that there is no one organization running the drug business in Afghanistan but dozens of drug gangs (many tribe or clan based) that tend to remain at peace with each other (for business reasons) and will hire the best mercenaries they can.

During 2015 only 27 foreign soldiers died (22 American, two British and thee from other countries) in Afghanistan. Most of these deaths occurred in the last three months of the year. In 2014 75 foreign troops died in Afghanistan and the peak year was 2010 when 710 died. Since late 2001 3,512 foreign troops (68 percent American) have died in Afghanistan. During the 1980s over 15,000 Russian troops died in an attempt to gain control of the country.

In Kabul a Taliban suicide bomber attacked a bus carrying employees of Afghanistan’s largest TV network. This killed seven people and wounded 25. At first it was believed the attack was directed at the nearby Russian embassy but it soon became clear that this was another attack on the media, to discourage coverage (especially unfavorable stuff) of Islamic terrorists or the drug gangs. The Afghan media, finally free after decades of war, is often outspoken in its criticism of Islamic terrorists and drug gangs. The Islamic terrorists don’t need media coverage as much as they used to because now anyone can get their message out via the Internet, especially if it is accompanied by videos of people being tortured and killed.