http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/edit/learning-lessons-from-pathankot-incident.html
Wednesday, 06 January 2016 | Ashok K Mehta |
The air base attack has shown for the nth time that India's readiness to defend and prevent such strikes is well below par. The Government and the country have to get serious about countering terrorism
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s sudden turnabout in talks with Pakistan was hailed as an act of statesmanship. Surprisingly but not unexpectedly, within days, the spoilers, believed to be from the Jaish-e-Mohammed struck the Indian Air Force base at Pathankot but fortuitously failed to destroy any aviation assets. Even as mopping up operations were progressing slowly in Pathankot, terrorists presumably from the Haqqani network attacked the Indian Consulate at Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan. The pincer attack on India in the new year and less than robust response by the Indian security forces at Pathankot raised the usual questions about the prudence of restoring dialogue with Pakistan for the sake of talking the talk, the readiness of the security forces in counter-terrorism operations and soundness of our internal security structures even after seasonal cross border attacks from Pakistan including spectacular assaults on Parliament and Mumbai, and the Indian leadership’s warped idea of a befitting reply.
The strike at the air base in Pathankot is riddled with holes, that too after exceptional actionable intelligence was available days in advance. The ground operation has turned out to be the longest counter-terrorism action ever anywhere. The lapses by the Border Security Force and the Punjab Police were compounded by the deployment of a mixed band of forces confounding the command and control of the operation. In short, had the operation been properly coordinated, some of the terrorists would have been apprehended but that was not to be. Defusing a grenade booby-trapped to a dead terrorist that killed Lieutenant Colonel Niranjan Kumar of the National Security Guard was also a serious lapse. It was not clear who was directing the operation and from where. Several infantry units were available in Pathankot and should have been pressed into service well before the NSG was flown in. Cross border terrorist attacks in Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir have established a clear pattern, but security forces have failed to learn from it. The thermal imagers deployed on the border were apparently not working which reflects the casual approach to counter-terrorism. While great care and caution have to be exercised in counter-terrorism operations, a sense of urgency to terminate the operation is missing. Stretching out operations gives valuable 24x7 publicity to the terrorists and does not reflect well on the fourth largest Armed Forces in the world. An National Investigation Agency enquiry has been ordered and one hopes it will fix blame and some heads will roll.
We need to take a lesson from the West, notably the UK, the US and Europe who only recently have had to deal with terrorism. Their accent is on preventing acts of terrorism as nearly 70 per cent of the counter-terrorism resources are utilised in preventing at source, planned events of terror. As that does not appear to be politically and militarily doable inside Pakistan or Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, the next best option is to enhance our intelligence assets, strengthen surveillance on the Punjab border and ginger up the counter-terrorism apparatus in border States and integrated it with the central agency. Unfortunately, neither the National Counter Terrorism Centre nor the National Intelligence Grid has seen the light of day. Is India serious about combating terrorism?
That the twin strikes at Pathankot and Mazar-e-Sharif were designed to derail the dialogue process requires no second thought. What requires to be ascertained is the role of the Pakistani state, Pakistan Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence in doing a Kargil at Pathankot to break up the Lahore bonhomie. Already the United Jihad Council has thrown a smokescreen by saying India should not blame Pakistan for Pathankot as it is part of the Kashmiri freedom struggle.
We should not be misled by these diversionary tactics. Intelligence and security agencies should collect all the evidence and tell-tale signs of the two terrorist groups especially from the air base and fill up the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle to nail the Pakistan-based terrorist outfit — Jaish or Lashkar — and present it to Islamabad and if necessary consider presenting it to the UN and the international community.
So far, Pakistan’s official response to Pathankot is predictable: Its condemnation of the attack and reaffirmation of Islamabad’s intention to join India in tackling terrorism. It has said that it will cooperate with India on the leads that it has provided from the terror attack at Pathankot. This is a welcome departure from its habitual position of denial and transferring the blame to ‘freedom fighters’ from Kashmir. New Delhi similarly has been careful in its statements on the attack and has not named Pakistan or called off the talks. Union Environment Minister Prakash Javadekar said that one attack should not be allowed to derail talks. Similarly, General VK Singh, Minister of State for External Affairs, has said that talks need to be continued in order to strengthen the civilian Government.
Under the circumstances, the two National Security Advisors should meet prior to the scheduled meeting between the Foreign Secretaries at Islamabad. Mr Ajit Doval should ask for an explanation from Lt Gen Nasir Janjua on the Pakistani outfit responsible for the Pathankot attack. Mr Doval should be able to figure out whether the ISI was involved in the Pathankot attack. Both sides will need to reaffirm their commitment to continue with the dialogue process but only after it is reasonably clear that the Pakistan military establishment is not averse to it.
The attack at the Pathankot air base has shown for the nth time, that India’s readiness to defend and prevent such attacks is well below par. The befitting reply is shameful. This is in spite of the terror strikes against India’s Parliament in 2001 and the Mumbai assault. It is apparent that no lessons were drawn and very little done to enhance the equipment preparedness of the internal security architecture.
The Government and the country have to get real serious about countering terrorism as spoilers will strike at another time and place, sooner than later. Talking to Pakistan is not an option but a necessity. We have to engage Islamabad, the civilian Government as well as find suitable means to establish contact with the Army. But while doing so, be armed with a deterrent that we have failed to create despite the oral bravado of the establishment. For example, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar has said many things about countering terror with terror. Mr Doval likewise has dared Pakistan to do another 26/11. Talks and terror will continue till either Pakistan’s Army chief General Raheel Sharif becomes a Musharraf; or Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif becomes the real sheriff.
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