http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/pathonkot-attack-in-defence-of-intelligence/article8078138.ece
THE HINDU I SPY: “The world has become too complicated a place in the past few years for traditional intelligence collection.” Picture shows vehicle checking in Chandigarh after the Pathankot attack.
The Pathankot attack was certainly not an intelligence failure. While there can’t be inputs right down to the last detail, clear warnings had been issued by the IB and State intelligence.
While many dedicated officers worked day and night for years to piece together the growing body of evidence on al Qaeda and to understand the threats, in the end it was not enough to gain the advantage before the 9/11 attacks.
R. K. Raghavan, D. Sivanandhan
THE HINDU I SPY: “The world has become too complicated a place in the past few years for traditional intelligence collection.” Picture shows vehicle checking in Chandigarh after the Pathankot attack.
The Pathankot attack was certainly not an intelligence failure. While there can’t be inputs right down to the last detail, clear warnings had been issued by the IB and State intelligence.
While many dedicated officers worked day and night for years to piece together the growing body of evidence on al Qaeda and to understand the threats, in the end it was not enough to gain the advantage before the 9/11 attacks.
R. K. Raghavan, D. Sivanandhan
Every terror strike anywhere in the world is invariably followed by a tirade against intelligence agencies for their alleged failure to alert the police on the field. The history of the CIA/FBI (9/11 attacks on New York’s Twin Towers), the MI5 (July 7, 2005 attacks on London’s public transport system) and our own Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Research and Analysis Wing (26/11 Mumbai attacks) is replete with instances in which the police could not be tipped off about an impending assault on specific targets. The criticism of intelligence agencies after the recent Pathankot incident, in which at least six terrorists strongly suspected to belong to the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) sneaked into an Indian Air Force (IAF) base, followed the same pattern.
Many reports have conclusively established that in this instance, both the IB and the Punjab State intelligence had sent out clear communications down the line, five days ahead of the terrorist incursion, that there was a huge threat to installations on the border with Pakistan, and therefore the need for extreme preparedness. An impression has gained ground, rightly or wrongly, that the warning had not been taken seriously, either by the local police or the defence installations in the area. As a result, the terrorist group was able to smuggle themselves into the Pathankot airbase and launch a daring attack.
Intelligence and inaction
In our view, here is one instance in which intelligence agencies were not to be blamed. The lapse was most probably on the part of the defence and police personnel in the area in not plugging every possible hole to avert the incursion. The airbase, a little more than 20 sq. km. in extent, is situated close to the border with a hostile neighbour. It did not require any extraordinary vision therefore to reach the conclusion that it was extremely vulnerable to enemy designs at all times, and particularly after information had been received of the incursion of a specific group. There was apparently a chink in the physical security arrangements. This was certainly not an intelligence failure.
There is a near parallel here to what happened in Mumbai on November 26, 2008. The R.D. Pradhan committee appointed by the State government pointed out how several valuable inputs were given to the Mumbai Police highlighting the possibility of terrorists designing an attack on the city. The Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) chief Hemant Karkare actually went to the extent of proactively advising leading hotels of the need for extreme circumspection. The Pradhan committee was highly critical of the lack of preparedness of the government and the police despite the availability of specific intelligence. (Ironically, the then Navy chief attributed the failure to foil the intrusion of the terrorists through the sea to the absence of specific intelligence!) It noted with regret that whatever intelligence was available was not shared with the lower formations of the police.
No police force anywhere in the world concedes that it had received specific intelligence on a possible attack. Even when it admits otherwise, it has a tendency to complain that whatever was given to it was not specific enough to thwart mischief. The question that arises here is, how much intelligence can do, and also, what it cannot do. Investing the latter with superhuman capacity and expecting it to give inputs to the last detail — such as exact time of the attack, and the exact spots targeted — seems preposterous.
The new-age terrorists
The world has become too complicated a place in the past few years for traditional intelligence collection. The 9/11 attacks, a successful operation by an essentially religious outfit with limited resources, is a landmark that will find a prominent place in any comprehensive history of the intelligence trade. It highlighted how the world’s most reputed intelligence organisations — the CIA and FBI — were no match for the al-Qaeda. In this case, vital inputs on the latter’s activities came in bits and pieces, which had to be woven into a whole fabric to make some sense for action.
Hitherto, the belief was that aircraft were targets only for hijacking. This proved to be a naïve reading of terrorist capabilities when commercial aircraft were used as tools for bringing down massive buildings. This was almost identical with the discovery, after Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, that a ‘human bomb’ could be employed to liquidate VIPs. In both cases, efforts were not lacking on the part of intelligence operatives. What was distressingly missing was the ultimate in intelligence: the exact mode, time and place of attack.
Can this lacuna be ever filled? We do not think so, unless you stumble upon some stray conversation between unidentifiable participants in a conspiracy. Conspirators of the present day are far more clued up than those in the business yesteryear, and take every conceivable precaution to protect information. Only if a message cannot be delivered by hand and through an absolutely reliable courier do terror outfits use other media. With increasing judicial restraints on intelligence organisations, monitoring of telephones and electronic mail has become extremely complicated and hazardous, and is attended by an exposure that invites criminal action against public servants working in national interest. The public should be made aware of this. Gone are the days when intelligence accountability was nearly a myth. Intelligence officers now function on a razor’s edge, with the prospect of either being bumped off by reckless terrorist groups or being prosecuted by judicial authorities who have no clue about the perils that accompany an intelligence operation.
The alternative to eavesdropping is infiltration into terror groups. This has been found to be an almost impossible task, because of the extreme motivation resulting from indoctrination of members. Here I recall the decision a year ago of the New York police to stop its men or their associates entering mosques with a view to mingling with the gathering and observing proceedings, especially on Fridays. This reversal of an operational tactic was a sequel to exposure of the mechanics of the police infiltrating religious meetings.
The most recent incident (December 2, 2015) in San Bernardino (California) in which a young couple opened unprovoked fire on county employees, killing 14 of them, illustrated the enormity of the task of intelligence organisations. The couple had Pakistani connections, but had merged so well into the local community that they could hardly have been expected to unleash a terror attack. They revealed no aberrations or any activity that even remotely suggested that they were capable of such a dastardly act. What intelligence outputs on them were possible to thwart their designs?
In the ultimate analysis, we are inclined to agree with Jessica Stern of Harvard, an outstanding scholar of terrorism, that the world cannot fight terrorism by merely upgrading intelligence capability. It needs a lot more imagination and also dedication to removing economic grievances in the less developed nations, where religious fanaticism has become the opium that suppresses the pain of depravity.
(R.K. Raghavan is a former CBI Director. D. Sivanandhan is a former Commissioner of Police, Mumbai, and a former DGP of Maharashtra.)
Many reports have conclusively established that in this instance, both the IB and the Punjab State intelligence had sent out clear communications down the line, five days ahead of the terrorist incursion, that there was a huge threat to installations on the border with Pakistan, and therefore the need for extreme preparedness. An impression has gained ground, rightly or wrongly, that the warning had not been taken seriously, either by the local police or the defence installations in the area. As a result, the terrorist group was able to smuggle themselves into the Pathankot airbase and launch a daring attack.
Intelligence and inaction
In our view, here is one instance in which intelligence agencies were not to be blamed. The lapse was most probably on the part of the defence and police personnel in the area in not plugging every possible hole to avert the incursion. The airbase, a little more than 20 sq. km. in extent, is situated close to the border with a hostile neighbour. It did not require any extraordinary vision therefore to reach the conclusion that it was extremely vulnerable to enemy designs at all times, and particularly after information had been received of the incursion of a specific group. There was apparently a chink in the physical security arrangements. This was certainly not an intelligence failure.
There is a near parallel here to what happened in Mumbai on November 26, 2008. The R.D. Pradhan committee appointed by the State government pointed out how several valuable inputs were given to the Mumbai Police highlighting the possibility of terrorists designing an attack on the city. The Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) chief Hemant Karkare actually went to the extent of proactively advising leading hotels of the need for extreme circumspection. The Pradhan committee was highly critical of the lack of preparedness of the government and the police despite the availability of specific intelligence. (Ironically, the then Navy chief attributed the failure to foil the intrusion of the terrorists through the sea to the absence of specific intelligence!) It noted with regret that whatever intelligence was available was not shared with the lower formations of the police.
No police force anywhere in the world concedes that it had received specific intelligence on a possible attack. Even when it admits otherwise, it has a tendency to complain that whatever was given to it was not specific enough to thwart mischief. The question that arises here is, how much intelligence can do, and also, what it cannot do. Investing the latter with superhuman capacity and expecting it to give inputs to the last detail — such as exact time of the attack, and the exact spots targeted — seems preposterous.
The new-age terrorists
The world has become too complicated a place in the past few years for traditional intelligence collection. The 9/11 attacks, a successful operation by an essentially religious outfit with limited resources, is a landmark that will find a prominent place in any comprehensive history of the intelligence trade. It highlighted how the world’s most reputed intelligence organisations — the CIA and FBI — were no match for the al-Qaeda. In this case, vital inputs on the latter’s activities came in bits and pieces, which had to be woven into a whole fabric to make some sense for action.
Hitherto, the belief was that aircraft were targets only for hijacking. This proved to be a naïve reading of terrorist capabilities when commercial aircraft were used as tools for bringing down massive buildings. This was almost identical with the discovery, after Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, that a ‘human bomb’ could be employed to liquidate VIPs. In both cases, efforts were not lacking on the part of intelligence operatives. What was distressingly missing was the ultimate in intelligence: the exact mode, time and place of attack.
Can this lacuna be ever filled? We do not think so, unless you stumble upon some stray conversation between unidentifiable participants in a conspiracy. Conspirators of the present day are far more clued up than those in the business yesteryear, and take every conceivable precaution to protect information. Only if a message cannot be delivered by hand and through an absolutely reliable courier do terror outfits use other media. With increasing judicial restraints on intelligence organisations, monitoring of telephones and electronic mail has become extremely complicated and hazardous, and is attended by an exposure that invites criminal action against public servants working in national interest. The public should be made aware of this. Gone are the days when intelligence accountability was nearly a myth. Intelligence officers now function on a razor’s edge, with the prospect of either being bumped off by reckless terrorist groups or being prosecuted by judicial authorities who have no clue about the perils that accompany an intelligence operation.
The alternative to eavesdropping is infiltration into terror groups. This has been found to be an almost impossible task, because of the extreme motivation resulting from indoctrination of members. Here I recall the decision a year ago of the New York police to stop its men or their associates entering mosques with a view to mingling with the gathering and observing proceedings, especially on Fridays. This reversal of an operational tactic was a sequel to exposure of the mechanics of the police infiltrating religious meetings.
The most recent incident (December 2, 2015) in San Bernardino (California) in which a young couple opened unprovoked fire on county employees, killing 14 of them, illustrated the enormity of the task of intelligence organisations. The couple had Pakistani connections, but had merged so well into the local community that they could hardly have been expected to unleash a terror attack. They revealed no aberrations or any activity that even remotely suggested that they were capable of such a dastardly act. What intelligence outputs on them were possible to thwart their designs?
In the ultimate analysis, we are inclined to agree with Jessica Stern of Harvard, an outstanding scholar of terrorism, that the world cannot fight terrorism by merely upgrading intelligence capability. It needs a lot more imagination and also dedication to removing economic grievances in the less developed nations, where religious fanaticism has become the opium that suppresses the pain of depravity.
(R.K. Raghavan is a former CBI Director. D. Sivanandhan is a former Commissioner of Police, Mumbai, and a former DGP of Maharashtra.)
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