https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/gen-keane-afghanistan-security-situation-deteriorating
JANUARY 6, 2016 | GEN JACK KEANE
Security in Afghanistan is worsening, and the trend has been downward for over a year. Afghan military and police force casualties are rising and rapidly reaching a point which makes it difficult to sustain, while morale is impacted as desertions are growing and some soldiers and police go months without pay.
Taliban forces are surging under the new leadership of Mullah Akhtar Mansour. The Islamic State (ISIS) has established an affiliation with former insurgents who are frustrated with the direction of the Taliban. Al-Qaeda is reemerging in Afghanistan as well.
U.S. conventional forces are no longer involved in ground combat as they now perform a “train and assist” mission with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Special Operations Forces (SOF) are performing counterterrorism missions, targeting Taliban leadership. U.S. force levels are down from a high of 100 thousand during the surge in 2010/11, to 9,800 in 2015, with that number expected to drop to 5,500 by the end of 2016.
The current Afghan security situation should not be a surprise. It was quite predictable given the arbitrary U.S. force level decisions made by the Obama White House that had no relationship to what was actually happening on the ground. In addition, two Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan are thriving and have been a crucial factor in protracting the war. No insurgency has ever been defeated when enabled by a successful sanctuary.
What is particularly galling about the current situation is that similar to Iraq and its deteriorating security situation, much of what is happening in Afghanistan was preventable.
U.S. policymakers have never accepted the force level recommendations of U.S. military commanders. In 2009, President Barack Obama correctly accepted a change in strategy in Afghanistan to one of counter insurgency. However, he rejected the recommendation of Gen. David Petraeus and Gen. Stanley McChrystal for a force of 40 thousand, instead, providing 25 percent less. Inexplicably, when this force level was announced, the President also indicated the surge forces would be withdrawn in a little over a year, providing incentives to the enemy to wait us out. The surge forces were never able to attack simultaneously in the East and West, which an effective military campaign would demand. In keeping with the President’s timetable, those forces were withdrawn over the objection of Petraeus.
During 2011, Obama ordered a further drawdown of U.S. forces, not based on ground truth, and he did so once again over the objection of his military commanders. Thus, the 9,800 force level is considerably lower than what the commander in Afghanistan recommended. Why does this matter? The Afghan Army is largely an infantry force, which does possess the will to fight with acceptable skills, but it lacks many of the same enablers that the U.S. has provided to NATO forces and previously to the Afghan Army: attack helicopters, fighter aircraft, UAVs, air medevac, anti-IED capability, intelligence systems, and logistics. It is one thing to reduce the U.S. fighting capability to 9,800 troops, but it is quite something else to pull out all the enablers which significantly empowered the Afghan army to fight effectively. It's no wonder casualties are rising. The impact would be similar if NATO and U.S. forces were without these much needed capabilities. Time and time again, the Obama White House has been dismissive of these arguments in favor of arbitrary force level numbers.
The fact that Pakistan, an ally of the U.S., directly supports the Taliban by providing sanctuary inside their own border is simply outrageous. At the two sites, Miram Shah and Quetta, the Pakistani military provides intelligence on U.S./Afghan operations in addition to training and logistics support. It is from these two bases that the Taliban and Haqqani leadership are located, enabling them to plan and prepare operations against our forces in relative safety. For ten plus years, U.S. policy, largely because it is not sufficiently forceful, has acquiesced to this irresponsible and immoral behavior.
As for the future of Afghanistan, the Taliban does not have the combat power to depose the Afghan government. However, the Taliban can undermine the government as they recently did in seizing Kunduz, the provincial capital of Kunduz province in the north; pressuring the districts surrounding Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand province; and attacking the Kandahar airport and targets within Kabul.
The political situation in Afghanistan under President Ashraf Ghani is improved by comparison to his predecessor, Hamid Karzai. But widespread corruption still persists, and the people are becoming increasingly frustrated. The U.S. needs to work closely with Ghani, who desires to be an inclusive leader, and support him in his efforts to improve the effectiveness of the government.
Credit Gen. John Campbell, the commander of U.S./NATO forces, for stating in a recent interview that he will not only request to keep forces at the current levels, but if more U.S. troops are needed, he will ask for them. Regrettably, this is likely to occur.
THE AUTHOR IS GENERAL JACK KEANE
General Keane, a four-star general, retired after 37 years of service which culminated in his appointment as acting Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army. General Keane is president of GSI Consulting and serves as chairman of the Institute for the Study of War, a director of General Dynamics and a former and recent member, for 9 years, of the Secretary of Defense Policy Board.
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