Does India have a Plan B? Better to be slow and steady with Pakistan than novel and theatrical

http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/does-india-have-a-plan-b/180207.html

Jan 7 2016, MKC Singh

A bigger design? The attack on the Indian consulate in Afghanistan coincided with that in Pathankot.

For the second time in six months, in the same sensitive Gurdaspur-Pathankot area, Pakistan-based terrorists have struck. While the Dinanagar attack had random shooting at a passing bus, dispensary, etc., before the fidayeen dug-in next to a police station, this time, the Air Force station at Pathankot was the target. Furthermore, while in Dinanagar, an SP lost his life, this time the role of another such officer raises many questions. However, despite timely intelligence, a handful of terrorists penetrating the periphery of the air base and causing panic and loss of life hardly merit kudos for either the state or the Central government. 

Even more significantly, questions arise about the Modi government’s Pakistan policy, specifically his dramatic outreach that went from cursory chat in Paris between the prime ministers of India and Pakistan, to a meeting of the National Security Advisers in Bangkok, a visit of External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj to Pakistan and then finally the hand-holding between the two PMs in Lahore, like two strolling “boys from Pindi” as a Pakistani columnist put it. All this happening in weeks at a break-neck speed increased the probability of Pakistani spoilers, consisting of either the Pakistani army directly or via their surrogates, retaliating. The dithering by the Modi government and not quickly reassuring the public that it had factored-in such a relapse in its Pakistan policy indicated a lack of Plan B. 

The attack also exposed the perils of over-centralisation of policy-making and implementation. Neither the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) nor a Crisis Management Group under the Cabinet Secretary met. National Security Adviser Ajit Doval commenced to combat the threat with usual media leaks. Defence experts in television studios pointed out that rushing the National Security Guards (NSG) to Pathankot was fine if a hostage situation or close-quarter stand-off had developed, but perimeter security of the air base being the primary challenge, enough regular armed regiments were available in close proximity for deployment. This was particularly so when timely intelligence was available and an immediate army dragnet may have bagged the militants before they settled down. It is possible the NSA felt that the militants having had a head-start may have already penetrated the base. However, the NSG with 100-odd men was fine securing the inner perimeter, the Army should have been used to seal the outer one and commence a flushing-out operation. 

A related and more serious question is why steps were not taken to plug the loopholes in the riverine portions of Punjab’s India-Pakistan border since the last intrusion in July. The links of the narcotics lobbies in Punjab, allegedly with powerful patrons in Punjab’s ruling party, to the smuggler-terror network operating out of Pakistan have long been ignored. It is common knowledge that unlike when the Taliban rose in Afghanistan in the 1990s and eliminated the drug menace forcefully, it is now not averse to using drug money to fund its operations. The suspected hand of Jaish-e-Muhamed in the latest attack indicates the revival of loyal portions of that organisation despite its banning in 2002. One part of that group had gravitated towards the Tehrik-e-Taleban Pakistan (TTP), a renegade group targeting the Pakistan state and its army. Does the Pakistan army have a hand in its reincarnation? Is it a reflection of the realigning of militant groups post-US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in the entire Af-Pak theatre? 

There is a larger geo-political context in which the India-Pakistan drama is playing out. The 1990s scenarios, when the world re-configured after the collapse of the Soviet Union, are replaying to a different script. For instance, while then Russian influence and role contracted, the Putin presidency is now attempting to restore it, sensing US strategic fatigue and retreat. Also as the US then neglected the Af-Pak region, post-Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and got preoccupied with the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, it is now distracted by the Chinese rise and the Syrian imbroglio which has given rise to the ISIS that threatens the US and the West. It is not surprising that China has condemned the Pathankot attack as reports have emerged of Turkey facilitating the ferrying of Chinese Uyghurs to the Syrian battlefield. 

On the positive side, the Modi government has been able to construct a two-track dialogue process with Pakistan by hiving off the terror portion, raising it to the NSA level. This may be a clone of the Anti-terror Mechanism created in Havana in 2006, which I led from the Indian side for two years, but this time it leads directly to the Rawalpindi army headquarters as the Pakistani NSA is a recently retired corps commander. This can enable Delhi to figure out quickly whether Pakistan’s army is on board in curbing India-specific terror groups. The signs to the contrary are ominous. For instance, the attack on the Indian consulate in Afghanistan has coincided with that in Pathankot. Reports have just come in of possibly another nuclear test by North Korea, which it claims was a thermo-nuclear device. China and Pakistan have a history of co-venturing with that country. This test could upset the strategic balance in South Asia. 

The NSA-level mechanism allows India to postpone the foreign secretary-level meeting on January 15, which had to create a road map for the Comprehensive Dialogue (a rechristened version of the old Composite Dialogue), while it tests Pakistan’s willingness and ability to arrest and prosecute the collaborators of the Pathankot attack. Nawaz Sharif’s telephone call to Modi, assuring action, needs verification over the next few weeks. The one lesson emerging from the handling of Pakistan by the Modi government is that dramatic moves and frequent bickering confuse Indian public opinion and give fillip to counter reaction from Pakistani spoilers. Sudden moves, particularly after the Bihar electoral defeat, may have been misread by the Pakistan army as weakness that can be exploited. Nor can transactional approaches inserting tycoons to soften the business-friendly Sharif clan ease the path to commercial links as the Pakistan army has the veto on that. With Pakistan slow and steady, as the old adage goes, is better than the novel and theatrical. Otherwise, the NDA will get to carry, not only the baggage of Lahore 1, which PM Vajpayee crafted in 1999, but also Lahore II, with the Modi label on it. 

— The writer is a former Secretary, MEA