COVER STORY: Who to deal with in Pakistan

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Prime Minister Modi faces his toughest foreign policy challenge after the Pathankot attacks. Wisely he has kept his options open and is learning fast on how to and who to deal with in Pakistan.
Raj Chengappa, January 6, 2016 |

New beginnings in relations between India and Pakistan have an ominous proclivity to revert to old endings. On Christmas Day, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a grand gesture of dropping in to greet Nawaz Sharif, his Pakistani counterpart, on his birthday in Lahore and to grace his grand-daughter's shaadi, it crowned a month of breathless diplomacy that saw the pendulum swing from a macho dushman-maro to a pappi-jhappi bonhomie with the two countries embracing the dialogue process again.

A week later, on New Year's Day, the euphoria was shattered when heavily armed terrorists from across the border stormed the Air Force base in Pathankot but were foiled in their dastardly bid to destroy the squadrons of jet fighters and attack helicopters. They were eventually gunned down, after a prolonged 72-hour battle, but not before they killed seven Indian security forces personnel and exposed the alarming chinks in our preparedness to handle such terror attacks.

As cries of Pakistani betrayal echoed across the country and the ghosts of 26/11 and Kargil were resurrected, Modi faced his toughest foreign policy challenge since he occupied the prime minister's gaddi in May 2014. The script with the familiar ending had been enacted before-call off foreign secretary level talks scheduled for mid-January, sabre rattle on terror and round up international support by decrying Pakistan's perfidy.

However, after similar twists and sharp turns-his critics compare his Pakistan policy to the bounce of a yo-yo-Modi appeared to be getting a measure of what his wily neighbour was all about. Wisely, he didn't do the predictable. There was no fist shaking and chest thumping. Instead, every response his government made was deliberated upon and calibrated.

The result: Unlike in Mumbai 26/11, Pakistan did not deny that the terrorists who attacked Pathankot were from its soil. Then, Pakistani National Security Adviser Nasir Khan Janjua called his counterpart Ajit Doval and told him they would follow up on any leads he would give on the terrorists. Soon after, Sharif, who is on an official visit to Colombo, called Modi to express his concern and reiterated what Janjua said. Meanwhile, Modi kept all his options open, including whether, when and how to proceed with the talks. Importantly, Modi was learning fast on not only how but also who to deal with in Pakistan.

Lesson 1
It's the Pakistani Army, stupid
When Modi came to power, he scored a diplomatic coup by inviting Sharif for his swearing-in ceremony along with other South Asian leaders and signalled his "neighbourhood-first policy". By engaging with Pakistan, Modi was keen on shaking off his image as an ultra-nationalist. Also, he was clear that Pakistan was important for his neighbourhood policy of building the 3Cs-contact, connectivity and cooperation. Without Pakistan's cooperation, his plan would be a non-starter.

For Sharif, who has always been committed to better relations with India, Modi's invitation was a chance to refurbish his flagging image domestically. Like Modi he had come to power in 2013 with a commanding majority but flattered only to deceive. Sharif's third stint as prime minister was viewed with trepidation by the Pakistani army, especially when he went after his bete noire, former president and army chief General Pervez Musharraf, who had ousted him in a bloodless coup in 1999 and forced him into political exile in Saudi Arabia. Sharif ignored warnings from senior generals about taking on Musharraf-it was the first time that a Pakistani general was being put on the dock-and soon paid the price. The army mounted a counter attack by propping up Imran Khan and brought Sharif's government to a halt through political protests.
When Raheel Sharif took charge as army chief in November 2013, although he was hand-picked by Nawaz, he soon began to assert himself. Viewed as a cool-headed soldier who lets his actions speak louder than words, Raheel drew the redline on Musharraf's prosecution and also began to question Nawaz's policy of engaging in talks with extremist groups inimical to Pakistan's interests. The army began to assert its supremacy over internal security and foreign policy issues and Sharif was politely told to focus on improving the floundering economy.

The Pakistani army was not too happy with Sharif spontaneously accepting Modi's invitation to attend his swearing-in ceremony without any commitment to resume the stalled dialogue, particularly on Kashmir. In the final years of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's government, India had refused to engage with Pakistan until it showed significant progress in bringing the perpetrators of 26/11 to book, ending the frequent ceasefire violations on the LoC and keeping the border peaceful. The Pakistani army was also concerned about India's deep involvement in Afghanistan, which it regarded as its strategic backyard and had turned the heat on again in Kashmir to warn India to keep off. It noted with concern that Sharif had not met with the Hurriyat leaders when he attended Modi's swearing-in ceremony.

So when Modi agreed in August 2014 to send then foreign secretary Sujatha Singh to Islamabad to work out the road map for resuming the dialogue, the army decided to put a spanner in the works. Pakistani High Commissioner Abdul Basit was asked to invite Hurriyat leaders and get their views on the Kashmiri issues that needed to be raised during the foreign secretary talks. The Hurriyat had been consulted in the past and most visiting Pakistani dignitaries routinely engaged in conversations with them. For Modi and his National Security Adviser Ajit Doval though this was a red rag as even the opposition Congress began to criticise him for going soft on Pakistan. Accusing Islamabad of trying to inject the Hurriyat as a third party in the dialogue process, Modi abruptly cancelled the foreign secretary talks.

For Sharif, the cancellation was a personal affront-he had invested much political capital by coming to India for Modi's swearing-in ceremony. For the Pakistani army, it was a victory of sorts as they had prevented the civilian government from gaining primacy in the dialogue process with the country they considered Enemy Number 1. While Modi may have endeared himself to his right-wing constituency, among major international powers there was consternation at the breakdown of talks. They had thought Modi had made a good beginning but was in danger of losing his way. In the months ahead, Modi would find that cancelling talks was the easy part. Restarting the dialogue would prove to be a tough nut to crack, the Pakistani army even tougher.

Lesson 2
For Pakistan, it's Kashmir first
There was no thaw in relations when Modi spoke to Sharif in Kathmandu on the sidelines of the SAARC summit in November 2014. It was only after the Jammu and Kashmir assembly elections were over that Modi began in earnest to restart the dialogue process. Pakistan had made no serious attempt to disrupt the Assembly elections believing that Mufti Mohammed Sayeed and his PDP would come to power with a clear majority. Sayeed had talked of the need for building bridges again with Pakistan and Islamabad saw him as an ally. But as it turned out, the PDP took the Valley and Modi's BJP swept Jammu. To Pakistan's dismay a PDP-BJP coalition government took power for the first time in the state's history in March 2015. It gave the Modi government greater leverage over J&K affairs and strengthened India's hand while dealing with Pakistan.

Soon after the assembly elections, new foreign secretary S. Jaishankar headed to Islamabad ostensibly on a SAARC yatra but really to test the waters. India's proposition was that while it was willing to start the dialogue, progress in convicting the perpetrators of 26/11, keeping the border quiet and turning the terror tap off where prerequisites. The sequencing was the key for the Modi government-it had to talk on terror first and only then could all other issues including Kashmir be discussed.

Click here to EnlargeThe breakthrough came when Modi and Nawaz met in Ufa in Russia in July last year, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit, and agreed to restart the dialogue. The two national security advisers were to meet first on terror in Delhi after which the foreign secretaries would meet to discuss how to proceed on all other outstanding issues including Kashmir. The joint statement inexplicably left out the word Kashmir and when Nawaz returned home the army chief expressed his unhappiness. Pakistan then began to backtrack on its commitments and it was clear that it was determined to kill the process one way or the other. It demanded that the foreign secretaries also meet simultaneously and added that National Security Adviser Sartaj Aziz would meet the Hurriyat first. The Ufa process was as good as dead and the blowback was embarrassing for Modi.

Another window of opportunity came when Modi and Nawaz were attending the UN General Assembly meeting in New York in September. Indian interlocutors talked to their Pakistani counterparts. Sartaj Aziz agreed to meet Doval but also wanted a meeting with External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj simultaneously. India baulked as the sequencing was the key and the efforts failed. India, as one official put it, felt "Aziz was not creative enough or desirous to move towards a solution".

Soon after, Pakistan made a significant change by appointing Janjua as its National Security Adviser. A former army commander who dealt with Balochistan rebels, Janjua had the confidence of both Raheel and Nawaz. It would also bring the Pakistani army to the negotiating table with India. Then in Paris, when the two leaders were attending the Climate Change Summit in November, Modi made his move. In a two-minute conversation in the lounge, he told Nawaz that Swaraj would attend the Heart of Asia summit in Islamabad where she would discuss the restarting of the dialogue process but before that the two NSAs should meet. Sharif agreed and within a week, the NSAs met in Bangkok rather than Delhi to get away from the media glare and avoid issues of meeting the Hurriyat. Also present were the two foreign secretaries, but Jaishankar made it clear that they were present only as deputies to the principal interlocutors.

The two NSAs spoke for four hours, dominated mostly by Doval who explained India's concerns and also made it clear that India had actionable proof about Pakistan's nefarious links with terrorists inimical to India's interests. Janjua said that Pakistan itself was under attack from terrorists and assured Doval of all cooperation. When Swaraj flew down, she was given a red carpet welcome with Sharif introducing her to his family. The two countries agreed to resume what they called the Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue process to discuss all outstanding issues including Kashmir. India wanted the word 'bilateral' inserted to prevent Pakistan from pushing for a trilateral meeting with the Hurriyat as a third party in the future. Pakistan got its way by bringing Kashmir on the table without showing proof that it was acting to curb terror. Modi's impromptu visit to Lahore helped cement the process. It was out-of-the-box diplomacy so characteristic of Modi to not only repay a favour to Nawaz but also soften his image in Pakistan.

Lesson 3
Pakistan is not a homogenous entity
The Pathankot attack is clear indication that Pakistan is not a homogenous entity and has multiple stakeholders which India has to engage and address. The attack was not in reaction to Modi's Lahore visit but seemed to have been planned months in advance. There is also a clear pattern that has emerged over the years. The more serious the engagement, the more violent is the provocation in terms of terror attacks. So Atal Bihari Vajpayee's path-breaking visit to Lahore in 1999 saw the Kargil aggression by the Pakistani army. When back-channel talks had made much progress during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's tenure, the Mumbai 26/11 attacks set the process back by years.

Statements made by the Modi government after the Pathankot attack indicate that India will stay the course of dialogue with some caveats. That is a good sign. Because restarting the dialogue process and Modi's Lahore visit have already enhanced India's image internationally and are paying dividends. Earlier, when India complained about terror attacks by Pakistan, major powers would point to the absence of a dialogue process. After Pathankot, all of them expressed their sympathy with India and have put pressure on Pakistan to act.

The problem is what is the threshold for India for such acts of terror? Would another strike break the dialogue process? There is every likelihood that terrorists would go for even softer targets in a bid to destroy the peace process. It is also clear that the Pakistani army will always keep its powder dry and covertly support a range of terror groups to give it plausible deniability. Initial investigations show that Pathankot was a result of a Jaish-e-Muhammad operation rather than the Lashkar-e-Taiba. For India, as one expert said, it is a tricky position to be in-we are damned if you do, damned if you don't. If we go back to the tent and sulk we concede defeat, if we ratchet up tensions there could be mayhem in both countries. As Sushma Swaraj said, "War is not an option." Particularly between two nuclear powers.

The other criticism that Modi must pay heed to is what experts say is the lack of a sustained Pakistan policy. Experts think that Modi makes up the narrative as he goes long, that he is impetuous and impulsive, that he loves the grand gesture and believes that style is substance. They advise him to develop a range of advisers who can act as speed breakers and to prevent him from tripping. Also not to make too many U-turns but be consistent and keep the engagement going, whatever be the provocation.

There are other reasons to be watchful. Raheel Sharif has emerged as a major force in Pakistan, he is popular after he moved against lawlessness in Karachi and terrorists in the troubled FATA regions and he is seen by the US as well as others as a doer. Major powers now acknowledge Pakistan as a key to Afghanistan's stability and that gives Raheel more clout. The Chinese with their economic corridor plans are pumping money into Pakistan. The economy is looking up and Nawaz has reportedly reached a new equilibrium with his army chief. So Pakistan's tail is up and believes it is now dealing with India from a position of strength. Talking to India legitimises the army's position and allows it to carry out calculated levels of hostility and tension. Yet there are multiple forces in Pakistan which usually work at cross purposes which India should identify and exploit.

Experts say that India should now evolve a modus vivendi that puts its relations with Pakistan in perspective. While the Modi government doesn't believe in back-channel talks, quiet diplomacy done by the NSAs in Bangkok helps. The army wants tension to maintain its position in Pakistan and prevent India's rise. India needs to maintain its cool and not take extreme action unless absolutely necessary. The Modi government needs to calibrate its response and engagement so as to get the maximum out of every meeting. For instance, before Vajpayee went for the SAARC summit in Islamabad in 2004 he ensured that Musharraf came up with major deliverables. Modi should do that before he goes to the SAARC summit in Pakistan later this year.

Modi's 'neighbourhood first' policy is on the right track as is the determination to stay engaged. To his credit, Modi has shown both openness and flexibility in dealing with Pakistan. This gives him far more options in dealing with an unpredictable and belligerent neighbour that geography and history has bestowed on India. As one senior official clarified, " It doesn't mean we will lower our guard or not take tough action. If countries mess with us, they better watch out."