http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/the-danger-chinas-military-reforms/
By Joseph A. Bosco, December 10, 2015
China’s new military reform measures, intended to “give more power to lower-level authorities,” are likely to increase the threat of conflict with its neighbors and with the United States – in ways both obvious and more subtle.
First, to the extent the reforms succeed in making the People’s Liberation Army more effective and “capable of real combat” as Xi Jinping has advocated, that is bad news for the region, the United States, and its allies. Given the territorial gains China’s aggressive posture has already made, any enhanced military power, real or perceived, can only whet the PRC’s appetite for further advances.
Second, the devolution of authority to local commands portends a rise in incidents like the 2001 EP-3 collision and multiple ship-to-ship confrontations in the South and East China Seas. Beijing attributed each of those dangerous encounters to the unauthorized actions of individual captains or pilots or local commanders, not to higher-level military or Communist Party direction. (This from a government that has controlled the communications and family planning practices of its 1.3 billion citizens.)
The ostensible expansion of lower-level military decision-making has set the stage for additional air or maritime confrontations and provided Beijing with further plausible deniability if its aggressive top-level policies happen to trigger incidents potentially involving material destruction and loss of life.
By Joseph A. Bosco, December 10, 2015
China’s new military reform measures, intended to “give more power to lower-level authorities,” are likely to increase the threat of conflict with its neighbors and with the United States – in ways both obvious and more subtle.
First, to the extent the reforms succeed in making the People’s Liberation Army more effective and “capable of real combat” as Xi Jinping has advocated, that is bad news for the region, the United States, and its allies. Given the territorial gains China’s aggressive posture has already made, any enhanced military power, real or perceived, can only whet the PRC’s appetite for further advances.
Second, the devolution of authority to local commands portends a rise in incidents like the 2001 EP-3 collision and multiple ship-to-ship confrontations in the South and East China Seas. Beijing attributed each of those dangerous encounters to the unauthorized actions of individual captains or pilots or local commanders, not to higher-level military or Communist Party direction. (This from a government that has controlled the communications and family planning practices of its 1.3 billion citizens.)
The ostensible expansion of lower-level military decision-making has set the stage for additional air or maritime confrontations and provided Beijing with further plausible deniability if its aggressive top-level policies happen to trigger incidents potentially involving material destruction and loss of life.