Stopping dangers from the sea

http://www.telegraphindia.com/1151205/jsp/opinion/story_56726.jsp#.VmKaO_mUdO0

Abhijit Bhattacharyya

Times do change. Till now, it is navyversus navy, army vs army and fighter plane vs fighter plane. Yet the conventional scenario faces challenges from technology, new ideas and the concept of minimizing the loss of trained men in war. Not that what has been referred to above was a fixed formula, as ever since the arrival of the air force on the combat scene, the increased synergy of the land and air warriors ensured the capture of land and the subjugation of enemy forces more easily than ever before. Although the navy was perceived to be a silent service, yet the reality is that it may be silent but it is most effective. History shows that it has done it all: "Attack, capture, hold." The navy conquered the world and built empires.

However, with changing times, naval ship design and deployment are also changing, along with their future role in war. A cursory glance around the geography of South Asia and naval forces operating in the vicinity would give a picture of the emerging geopolitical-cum-geostrategic scenario.

Of the three conventional naval war tactics, 'fleet-in-being', 'blockade' and 'decisive battle', one is interested to try analyse what is in store for the future of the three main navies, east of Aden - Iran, Pakistan and India, which together constitute a long, continuous and virtually contiguous arch of land of 5700 nautical miles (approximately) with a shoreline along the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and through to the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and then to the upper stretch of the Bay of Bengal, overseeing the critical sea route and the oil supply line of the world.

It would be pertinent to remember that historically, for the nations spanning the area from the mouth of the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf to the shorelines of India, land war usually overshadowed all forms of naval war. The absence of experience of a major war on the sea is the hallmark of this area. So much so that it perhaps would be correct to suggest that whereas Islam spread through land routes, the spread of Christianity and the dominance of a handful of west European powers over Asian, African and Latin American countries inevitably took the sea route, thereby establishing a virtual monopoly of naval forces of the West and a conspicuous capitulation of the Orient.

Against this backdrop, Iran, the traditional claimant of a 'superior' civilization and culture to this day, can indisputably be referred to as the natural geographical sentinel of the Persian Gulf; a gulf which today is the high alert 'action-station' of the Western naval powers once again. Understandably, Iran is no match for the naval build-up of the West. What, then, is the option for a country overlooking the Persian Gulf? The answer obviously is 'fleet-in-being' which in naval jargon is known as 'sea denial'. But can Iran really resort to sea denial? The answer is both yes and no. In a normal ship-to-ship fight, it cannot; but following the guerrilla tactics of 'hit the ship and run for cover' or 'hit the ship and go down into the sea', it appears more than a possibility. How? Just by going through the naval inventory of the Persian armada, it transpires that they are banking on the 'advantage' of light, fast, manoeuvrable boats in shallow water. Shallow water would be advantageous for ultra-light and limited-range midget submarines and Swimmer Delivery Vehicles both of which could be launched from 'mother ships' for the designated targets.

A practical problem still exists for Iran's 'sea denial' capability nevertheless. Can the powerful fleet of the West afford to miss the incoming fast attack boats or their anti-ship missiles? Certainly not; hence the alternative possibility of the use of camouflaged 'mother ships' and the launching of 'suicide missions', should the need arise. In fact, the recent downing of the Russian Sukhoi Su-24 by a Turkish F-16 gives rise to such a suspicion and to the possibility to test the battle preparedness of the large, sophisticated naval ships which normally are hard-to-manoeuvre in the shallow and narrow waters of the (virtual landlocked) Persian Gulf which undoubtedly is one of the most dangerous zones of the world. One point is certain, however. Iran's primary aim appears to be the protection of the Persian Gulf assets, limited distant water operation capability notwithstanding.

Pakistan, however, is comparatively more adept in open sea activity today with an overall defensive 'fleet-in-being' command, control and deployment plan of action, though with limited strategic objectives. The Indian navy being the only 'identifiable adversary' of Pakistan's navy, submarines are the trump card thereof to disrupt the sea-trade and destroy the surface fleet of New Delhi. In fact here the importance of geographical location and the position of Pakistan comes into play. Thus, being the weaker force, Pakistan could try to be a potential spoilsport to the superior Indian armada, especially in the brown water areas, where Oman, Iran and Pakistan meet. However, the Mumbai attacks of 26/11/2008 and the ceaseless land attacks since 1989 through State-sponsored unconventional tactics of guerrilla warfare will definitely be the main means to keep the Indian navy under pressure thereby leading to 24/7 operational readiness. Surprise attacks on shoreline and sea-based assets by commando-type or trained and disguised special forces, 'inserted' by midgets and Swimmer Delivery Vehicles (like that of Iranian preparedness against Western navies) along with airdrop at a safe distance on the sea are more than a looming threat; in fact, it is a real possibility. There nevertheless exists a deployment problem as Karachi is the only busy commercial port and other facilities in Gwadar are yet to be fully developed. Hence with a limited shoreline of 567 nautical miles, targeting of Pakistani ships and counter-measures by the Indian navy become somewhat less problematic.

Coming to the command, control and deployment of the Indian navy, the most positive of all developments is the Indian success (though a partial success till now) of the indigenization of naval ships. And the advantage and disadvantage of India is its long shoreline of 4104 nautical miles. But, unlike its eternally turbulent western neighbour's 'concentrated' force deployment, India can afford to circulate as well as scatter its naval assets, thereby possessing time and space to choose its target and resort to a multiple-plan 'action station' scenario.

However, there still exists in India certain points of concern. First, it is the coastal defence which does not inspire confidence yet. In the aftermath of the west coast 26/11, the eastern coastline appears highly vulnerable with a woeful lack of 24/7 vigilance. One hopes 26/11 is not repeated through the porous gates of the east. Second, India's love for aircraft carrier, which began in 1961, is a high-value, high-cost enterprise for which it requires an armada, known as the 'carrier task force'. And this armada should be in a position to effectively operate to counter any threat coming from 'beyond visual range'. Third, in the sphere of counter-attack or offensive operations, 'beyond the horizon' capability would be more than an asset which needs to be enhanced. Fourth, the recent Russian firing of the ship-based cruise missile on October 7, 2015 from the Caspian Sea to Syria is a lesson which could be worth emulating and a capability worth developing. Last but not the least, the doctrine of 'sea command' can be successful only if India succeeds in possessing overseas bases like that of the British, American, French and Chinese navies, to take on unexpected or expected threats from the sea to save the land frontiers and the shorelines of India.