Lots of SIGINT in Declassified PDB Documents

November 12, 2015

I finally got around to going through the seven and one-half years worth (June 1961 - January 1969) of President’s Intelligence Checklist/President’s Daily Brief documents that the CIA declassified back in September. For those of you who have not had a chance to go through them, you can access the complete collection here.

Bear in mind that the CIA’s redactors deleted somewhere between 25-30% of all the items in these Top Secret Codeword daily intelligence briefs, so it is hard to make a complete judgement as to how important signals intelligence (SIGINT) was in terms of keeping Presidents Kennedy and Johnson apprised of what was going on around the world. But what I did find was surprising. Virtually every day there was at least one, and in some cases up to three briefing items based in part or in whole on SIGINT.

Below are the items from the declassified PICKL/PDB documents that I found that were based on SIGINT::

June 17, 1961 The CIA discontinued sending President Kennedy the daily Top Secret Codeword Current Intelligence Bulletin, and instead created a new daily Top Secret publication called The President’s Intelligence Checklist (PICKL), the first edition of which went to the White House on June 17, 1961. Six months later, President Kennedy ordered that the report be given on a daily basis to the Secretaries of State and Defense, but that was the full extent of the document’s distribution. (Michael Douglas Smith, “CIA Publications: Serving the President with Daily Intelligence,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Summer 1999, pp. 203-204.)

June 17, 1961 USSR/ballistic missiles/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Kennedy “Soviet ICBM shot aborts: A test at Tyuratam early yesterday morning either failed immediately after launch or was cancelled at the last minute. Previously this year there have been ten successful ICBM shots, six failures, and three with undetermined results.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, June 17, 1961, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

June 17, 1961 USSR/Soviet air force/LRAF/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Kennedy that “The Soviet Long Range Air Force exercise - most extensive ever - is over and practically all aircraft have returned to their bases.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, June 17, 1961, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

August 5, 1961 Cuba/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Kennedy that “Deleted all Cuban ports were closed and all aircraft departures forbidden, effective last midnight until further notice. Almost simultaneously, the police commands in Santiago de Cuba and Camaguey were placed on alert. The operation has the earmarks of an internal security freeze, but we are seeking clarification.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, August 5, 1961, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

August 23, 1961 China/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Kennedy that “Early today… deleted artillery crews on the mainland opposite the island [Kinmen] had removed gun covers and moved some batteries into firing positions. No firing had been reported up to 0830 EDT this morning. A sequence of developments during the past week had suggested that Communist Chinese military forces may have been placed on alert status, particularly in the Taiwan Strait area. These developments included: (1) the establishment of listening watches on the radio sets of senior force commands; (2) an increase in the number of fighter pilots kept on the alert at various airfields; (3) high levels of activity among East China Fleet units, and (4) a concentration of naval auxiliary units in the Wenchow area.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, August 23, 1961, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

August 25, 1961 China/North Korea/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Kennedy that “[Chinese] military forces in East China continue on an alert status. An unusually high level of air defense exercises in the North Korean air force has also been noted.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, August 25, 1961, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

August 26, 1961 North Korea/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Kennedy that “North Korean military air activity has returned to normal following the extensive exercise conducted Tuesday. The Chinese Communist military alert continues.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, August 26, 1961, Top Secret Dinar, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

August 30, 1961 USSR/nuclear weapons testing. USSR announced that it was resuming atmospheric nuclear testing after a two year moratorium because of the French nuclear weapons tests and the ongoing Berlin Crisis. Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) concluded “there has been increasing evidence since the middle of August suggesting that preparations have been underway for nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya. The pattern of activity has been similar in many, but not all, respects to that preceding earlier Soviet high yield test series in this area. The buildup of both ship and air logistical support required for testing deleted has continued and appears to be sufficient for the conduct of a nuclear test at any time in the future. Although the delivery aircraft of the unit previously used to drop large nuclear test devices have not yet been identified in the area, suitable bomber aircraft are available there. A large number of aircraft and ships believed to be connected with the Soviet air-to-surface missile development and testing [program] have been identified in the area near Novaya Zemlya. This latter activity closely resembles the pattern followed last year when three CHERUB air-to-surface missiles were fired in operational exercises in Novaya Zemlya area. It is possible that the nuclear test and air-to-surface missile exercises are independent.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, August 31, 1961, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

September 1, 1961 USSR/nuclear testing. CIA reported to President Kennedy that “Present activity in the Novaya Zemlya area indicates that a nuclear test could take place at an early date.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, September 1, 1961, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

September 4, 1961 USSR/ballistic missiles/nuclear testing. CIA reported to President Kennedy that “The Soviets had another successful ICBM shoot last night, probably firing the new type tested in several earlier shots this year. Semipalatinsk airfield was closed at midnight last night, a measure which in the past has often signaled an upcoming nuclear test.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, September 4, 1961, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

September 25, 1961 USSR/ballistic missiles/nuclear weapons testing. CIA reported to President Kennedy “Expansion of Communist guerrilla activity in South Vietnam: The number of stations in their clandestine radio network has risen from 5 in 1959 to 29 this January and 49 now. We have detected three new ones since July in the Central Highlands, where they have stepped up attacks this month.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, September 25, 1961, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

October 7, 1961 USSR/Germany/Czechoslovakia/military exercises. CIA reported to President Kennedy that “Warsaw Pact maneuvers about to begin: We have noted a wide variety of preparations through Soviet and Satellite ground and air forces. In addition, a Soviet mechanized army from the Carpathian Military District is passing through southern Poland into Czechoslovakia, while Polish and perhaps Czech troops are moving into assembly areas in East Germany. Naval exercises also can be expected.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, October 7, 1961, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

December 16, 1961 USSR/Soviet air force. CIA reported to President Kennedy that “Soviet fighter deployment: Moscow is carrying out a rather sizeable westward deployment of fighter aircraft. The movement, which began on 8 December and was continuing through yesterday, deleted. We are not seriously concerned at present - there are no other significant indications that Bloc forces are being readied for military action. Nevertheless, the movement has many unusual features for which we have no explanation now. An important key to the purpose of this move will be whether planes remain in Soviet hands or are turned over to satellite forces.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, December 16, 1961, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

December 18, 1961 USSR/Soviet air force. CIA reported to President Kennedy that “More Soviet fighters move into Eastern Europe: The total has now reached 250-300, the reasons behind this move are still not clear; the aircraft are not first-line models and may have come out of storage. The Watch Committee mechanism has examined these moves, as well as the general Communist military posture, and finds no evidence of an intention to start a war. We think it is more likely that the USSR is increasing its military capabilities in anticipation of further harassments of Western access to West Berlin or allied military access to East Berlin, or may simply be applying pressure looking toward the start of negotiations with the West.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, December 18, 1961, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

December 29, 1961 USSR/Soviet air force. CIA reported to President Kennedy that “There has been no further deployment of Soviet aircraft into Eastern Europe since the 26th. We cannot tell yet whether the movement has been completed or we are only seeing a temporary respite.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, December 29, 1961, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

February 8, 1962 China/ballistic missiles/Shuangchengtzu/SIGINT. The CIA reported to President Kennedy that “Chinese Communist missile activity: Two lines deleted we are beginning to get a look in on Chinese Communist missile activity. On the basis of this evidence, we think they may have launch, or at least tried to launch, a surface-to-surface missile toward the end of last year.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, February 8, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

March 9, 1962 USSR/ballistic missiles. The CIA reported to President Kennedy that “Berlin: Ten TU-16s entered East German airspace from the USSR this morning. Two dropped chaff, one conducted S-band jamming. This activity rendered the Tempelhof airport radar ineffective for 30 minutes. We cannot yet be certain whether this was intentional.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, March 9, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

March 15, 1962 China/ballistic missiles/SIGINT. The CIA reported to President Kennedy that “Chinese Communist military flight activity into the Shuangchengtzu missile rangehead area suggests the possibility of a missile test firing there. Similar activity deleted that could have reflected a surface-to-surface missile-launch test in early December 1961.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, March 15, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

March 23, 1962 China/ballistic missiles/SIGINT. The CIA reported to President Kennedy that “Activity at Communist China’s Shuangchengtzu missile test range suggests the launching of a surface-to-surface missile. Deleted” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, March 23, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

March 24, 1962 USSR/nuclear weapons testing. The CIA reported to President Kennedy that “Soviet nuclear test preparations: The pattern of Soviet aircraft activity in the western Arctic is consistent with with an intention to begin a new test series at Novaya Zemlya within three to five weeks.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, March 24, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

June 11, 1962 China/SIGINT. The CIA reported to President Kennedy that “Chinese Communist military movements: One line deleted a high level of alert over most of China. There are indications of the movement of at least three divisions - and probably considerably more - from north and central China, apparently toward the south. We are unable yet to determine the reason: reaction to Nationalist preparations, civil unrest, and flood difficulties have been suggested, but none completely fit the picture. There are already approximately a half-million troops in the area facing Taiwan. Deleted” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, June 11, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

June 13, 1962 China/SIGINT. The CIA reported to President Kennedy that “Chinese Communist military buildup in the Strait area: One line deleted evidence of a major military buildup in the coastal area opposite Taiwan. At least five infantry divisions are being deployed into the area. These divisions have apparently had some sort of special status in the past, perhaps because they have been given a priority on modern equipment. We are accumulating evidence which suggests the involvement of a number of other units. We are also beginning to see what looks like preparations for an accompanying air buildup. At least three airfields in the area are apparently being reactivated; two of these became operational during the Strait crisis of 1958. The only unusual naval activity noted to date is the presence - as yet not firmly established - in the area of two submarines. This would be the first time Chinese submarines have ventured this far south. Thus, with evidence coming in that a new force, possibly elite and specially equipped, may be forming in the Strait area, we cannot discount the possibility of offensive action against the offshore islands. We are still more inclined to believe these moves are a reaction to Nationalist preparations, of which the Communists must surely be aware.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, June 13, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

June 14, 1962 China/SIGINT. The CIA reported to President Kennedy that “Chinese army and air force units continue their move into South China opposite Taiwan; we now think that at least six divisions are involved. Deleted while still falling short of providing confirmation, have nevertheless strengthened our suspicions that Chinese submarines have also been deployed in the Strait area.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, June 14, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

June 15, 1962 China/SIGINT. The CIA reported to President Kennedy that a division of Chinese fighters had been deployed from Anshan airfield in Manchuria to Hsu-chou Southeast airfield near Canton; and that a bomber division with TU-2 light bombers had been moved from Hsian to Ming-chiang North airfield near Nanking. (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, June 15, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

June 16, 1962 China/SIGINT. Order of battle map showed that five Chinese infantry divisions taken from 5 separate armies (the 1st, 60th, 63rd, 66th and an unidentified army) had been moved to the Foochow Military Region over the past week. Chinese fighter and bomber units had been moved to the airfields at Ming-chiang, Hsu-Chou, Chu-hsien, Chung-an, Nanchang, and Ching-yang over the previous week, all within flight range of Taiwan. (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, June 16, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

June 19, 1962 China/SIGINT. CIA reported to President John F. Kennedy that “As time goes on and the extraordinary Chinese Communist military buildup continues, our confidence in the assessment that this movement is primarily defensive in purpose in dwindling. We are unable to find any fully satisfactory explanation for this large movement, and we therefore feel that the possibility of some offensive action (perhaps against the offshore islands) cannot be dismissed. We now have indications that yet another six, possibly eight, divisions will move into the Foochow Military Region. This would more than double the number (190,000) of ground forces deployed in the area before the current program began. Although hampered by weather, many of the jet aircraft noted en route from Northern China have arrived in the Foochow Military Region.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, June 16, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

June 20, 1962 China/SIGINT. Concern at the CIA continued to escalate as COMINT detected more PLA ground and air movements in the Foochow-Amoy region opposite Taiwan. The CIA informed President Kennedy that “Ground and air movements into the Foochow-Amoy area continued yesterday. Two lines deleted “war preparations” and mobilization of reserves; there are some indications that civilians are being evacuated from the coastal area.” (The President’s Intelligence Checklist, June 20, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

June 25, 1962 China/Taiwan. CIA reported to President Kennedy that “The military buildup in the Taiwan Strait area seems to have been completed, at least for the time being.” (The President’s Intelligence Checklist, June 25, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

June 27, 1962 China/Taiwan/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Kennedy that “There have been no significant changes in the military picture of the Taiwan Strait situation during the past 24 hours. However, we now have tenuous evidence that at least elements of an eighth division moved into the Fukien area during the buildup period in addition to the seven divisions believed earlier to have been deployed there.” (The President’s Intelligence Checklist, June 27, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

July 2, 1962 China/Taiwan. CIA reported to President Kennedy that “No new military movements have been detected in the Foochow Military Region. There are, however, tentative indications of a redeployment, involving at least elements of two divisions, along the southern coast of Chekiang Province, immediately to the north. Air and naval activity throughout the area appears normal.” (The President’s Intelligence Checklist, July 2, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

July 14, 1962 Vietnam/Laos/SIGINT. CIA reported that “There has been a notable upsurge of activity during the past few days on the communications link between military headquarters in Hanoi and the North Vietnamese forces in northern Laos. We are as yet unable to assess the significance of this, but, if it has something to do with the redeployment of those forces, we ought to be getting confirmation of movements before very long. Soviet aircraft, presumably engaged in ferrying Souvanna’s security troops, began flying between the Plaine des Jarres and Vientiane on Thursday. (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, July 14, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

July 18, 1962 China. CIA reported to President Kennedy that “A recent upsurge of military [communications] activity between Peiping and the Sinkiang Military Region in western China, no doubt stimulated by the recent pushing and hauling with the Indians in Ladakh, is nonetheless noteworthy in that it indicates the establishment of a special command authority responsible for Chinese forces deployed in the disputed territory.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, July 18, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

July 25, 1962 USSR/nuclear weapons testing. CIA reported that “We are now beginning to see flight activity indicative of impending nuclear tests in the Soviet Arctic. We expect these tests to begin on or shortly after 5 August, after which Moscow has declared that an area in the Barents and Kara Seas will be hazardous to shipping and aircraft (until 20 October). The wording of the Soviet announcement is similar to that used before the beginning of the 1961 Arctic test series; the first shot in that series occurred on the first day of the announced period. There may be tests elsewhere earlier as in last year’s series.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, July 25, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

July 27, 1962 China. CIA reported to President Kennedy that “The high level of communications between military headquarters in Peiping and the Sinkiang Military Region to the west, regarded as unusual when first detected earlier this month, now seems to be the normal routine. It is pretty certain that this activity is related to the shadow-boxing with the Indians in Ladakh, but so far still falls short of indicating an intention to escalate the conflict.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, July 27, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

July 31, 1962 Vietnam/Laos/SIGINT. “There have been further signs that the North Vietnamese have begun to pull part of their forces in Laos back to their home bases. In addition to the fall-off in communications linking these forces, we have been seeing, since the middle of last week, a sizable spurt in the number of round-trip flights between Nam Tha and Dien Bien Phu which would suggest troop ferry operations. North Vietnamese elements in the Tchepone area of southern Laos are also on the move. However, it looks as though they are heading in the direction of the South Vietnamese border rather than homeward.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, July 31, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

August 4, 1962 Vietnam/Laos/SIGINT. “There is gathering evidence that North Vietnamese elements are moving into South Vietnam by way of Laos and Cambodia at an increasing rate. We have received a number of reports on the sighting of well-equipped communist units in the neighborhood of the South Vietnam - Laos border - reports which look fairly good against the background of similar indications [appearing in SIGINT] In addition, the South Vietnamese have a Viet Cong captive, taken last month, who says he entered via Laos and eastern Cambodia. (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, August 4, 1962, Top Secret, ISCAP Release)

August 9, 1962 Cuba. President’s Intelligence Checklist reported (based on SIGINT) that “Soviet ships have been arriving [in Cuba] on an unprecedented scale since mid-July. Some 32 vessels are involved; at least half of which we believe to be carrying arms. Five passenger ships with a total capacity of about 3,000 persons have already arrived. Some of the personnel are said to be Soviet technicians, and we have no reason to doubt this. We do not believe that there are any combat troops among them.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, August 9, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

August 23, 1962 Vietnam/SIGINT. “180 Viet Cong codebooks were captured a few days ago. This haul may assist our cryptanalysts with their knotty problem, and at the least may cause some confusion among Viet Cong commands while they change their communications after their loss is discovered.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, August 23, 1962, Top Secret, ISCAP Release) Author’s Note: None of this was released in the September 2015 CIA PDB release.

August 28, 1962 Vietnam/Laos/SIGINT. “The Soviet airlift into Laos has fallen off sharply since late last week. We cannot say with such a limited sampling that it is about to end, but think it is entirely possible that future flights will be on a spot basis. Soviet flights have been averaging 7 daily since the first of this month. On Saturday there was on flight, none on Sunday, two yesterday, and none again today. Yesterday’s flights, both to the Plaine des Jarres, were engaged in the ritual withdrawal of the handful of North Vietnamese “technicians.” We continue to see activity on the communications networks serving North Vietnamese military units elsewhere in Laos.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, August 28, 1962, Top Secret, ISCAP Release)

August 28, 1962 USSR/Cuba/SIGINT. CIA reported that “A study of Cuban Air Force communications reveals that Bloc pilots, very probably Russian, have taken part with the Cubans in just about every major air force operation or new training exercise since last May.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, August 28, 1962, Top Secret, ISCAP Release)

August 31, 1962 Cuba/SIGINT. “A study of Cuban naval communications shows the navy reacted quickly enough to last Friday night’s raid on Havana, but that subsequent search operations were badly handled, permitting the [Alpha-66] raiders to slip away. We have no further word about Wednesday night’s affair off Cuba’s north-central coast, but it seems to have followed much the same pattern. These incidents have given Havana the jitters. The army, as well as the navy, has been alerted. One of our naval aircraft, on a routine mission, was fired on yesterday afternoon by Cuban patrol vessels at a point twelve miles off Cuba’s northern coast.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, August 31, 1962, Top Secret, ISCAP Release)

September 15, 1962 USSR/Cuba/SIGINT. The CIA reported in the President’s Intelligence Checklist that “A message deleted on a net serving deleted called for ‘volunteers for the protection of Cuba’. We are not sure of the weight to be placed on this and another deleted referring to the isolation of ‘volunteers.’ If valid, they would suggest that the influx of Soviet military personnel to Cuba is not finished. We are investigating further.” (PFIAB, Chronology of Specific Events Relating to the Military Buildup in Cuba, undated, p. 30, Top Secret, JFK Assassination Records, NA, CP) Author’s Note: This entire section was deleted from the version of the 9/15/62 Top Secret Dinar PDB released by the CIA in September 2015.

September 19, 1962 USSR/military exercises. CIA reported to President Kennedy that “Soviet military exercises in the Far East continue. For more than a week, Long Range Air Forces (LRAF) in the west have been much less active than usual. This normally means that a major exercise is upcoming, but there are no signs of it as yet.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, September 19, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

September 19, 1962 USSR/Cuba/SIGINT/ELINT. President’s Intelligence Checklist reported “The interception of 15 September of a [SPOONREST] signal from a missile-associated radar, probably coming from the surface-to-air missile site at Mariel, suggests that the site is or soon will be operational.” Also “The message asking for volunteers for service in Cuba, which we reported Saturday, has now cropped up on enough Soviet military radio nets to reveal that a fairly general recruiting campaign is going on. There is no indication yet of the numbers involved.” (PFIAB, Chronology of Specific Events Relating to the Military Buildup in Cuba, undated, p. 31, Top Secret, JFK Assassination Records, NA, CP) Author’s Note: This entire section was deleted from the version of the 9/19/62 Top Secret Dinar PDB released by the CIA in September 2015.

September 21, 1962 USSR/Cuba/SIGINT/volunteers. President’s Intelligence Checklist reported “Evidence is still coming in on Moscow’s canvas of its military forces for volunteers to serve in Cuba. This activity is puzzling; we have never seen anything like it before. The move may be purely administrative: to replace personnel who had been suddenly ordered there with others prepared to stay for some time. On the other hand, it could mean another sizeable increment to Soviet personnel in Cuba or a belief in Moscow that its people are likely to be engaged in combat. We are trying to get a better answer.” (PFIAB, Chronology of Specific Events Relating to the Military Buildup in Cuba, undated, p. 34, Top Secret, JFK Assassination Records, NA, CP)

October 18, 1962 USSR/SIGINT/clansig. The first hard evidence that the U.S. was using its embassy in Moscow as a listening post. A declassified CIA report for President Kennedy revealed that radio intercepts had determined that five senior Soviet party presidium members who normally resided outside Moscow had spent several days in Moscow preparing for an important CPSU party plenum meeting scheduled to take place in the Kremlin the following month. (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, October 18, 1962, Top Secret, p. 8, JFK Library, Boston, Massachusetts) Author’s Note: This entire section was deleted from the version of the 10/18/62 PDB released by the CIA in September 2015.

October 22, 1962 Cuba/SIGINT. Immediately after President Kennedy’s speech, Soviet communications in Cuba ‘lit up.’ A new Soviet air defense radio net went on the air immediately. (Dr. Thomas R. Johnson, American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-1989 (Ft. George G. Meade: Center for Cryptologic History, 1995), Book II: Centralization Wins, 1960-1972, p. 329, NSA FOIA) The CIA reported to President Kennedy that “Cuban ground, naval and air units have moved into the alert status decreed yesterday even before the President’s broadcast.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, October 23, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

October 29, 1962 USSR/Germany/SIGINT. The CIA reported to President Kennedy that “A very sophisticated air defense radar communications system deleted has cropped up in East Germany in an area adjacent to the central and southern air corridors. This is its first appearance outside the Soviet Union. One line deleted it will greatly improve the accuracy, reliability and transmission rate of radar tracking data.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, October 29, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

November 7, 1962 China/ballistic missiles/SIGINT. The CIA reported to President Kennedy that “One line deleted the Chinese, after a 20 month layoff, are preparing to get back into the ballistic missile testing business on their test range at Shuangchengtzu in central China.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, November 7, 1962, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

January 24, 1963 USSR/Soviet air force/LRAF. The CIA reported to President Kennedy that “Long Range Air Force medium and heavy bombers may soon begin deploying to bases in the Arctic for their annual exercise. One line deleted.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, January 24, 1963, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

March 13, 1963 China/ballistic missiles/SIGINT. The CIA reported to President Kennedy that “A sharp jump over the last two weeks in activity on the radio nets serving China’s missile test range [Shuangchengtzu], combined with increased transport flights there for several months, lead us to believe the range may be coming back to life. We cannot prove any operational activity there since last March.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, March 13, 1963, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

May 7, 1964 Cuba/air defenses. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Recent intercepts disclose that individual SAM sites are being placed under more centralized control.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, May 7, 1964, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

May 27, 1964 China/ballistic missiles. CIA reported to President Johnson that “There are tentative signs that the Chinese are preparing for a test firing of a surface-to-surface missile at the Shuangchengtzu missile test center. Such a test at this time would probably involve a version of a Soviet surface-to-surface ballistic missile - possibly the SS-3 (700 mile) or SS-4 (1,000 mile).” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, May 27, 1964, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release) “Unusual flight activity by Chinese Communist military aircraft suggests that the Chinese are preparing for a test firing of a surface-to-surface missile at the Shuangchengtzu missile test center.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Review: 27-28 May 1964, May 28, 1964, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

July 6, 1964 Cuba/air defenses/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Cuban control of the SAM systems now appears to be complete.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, July 6, 1964, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

August 11, 1964 China/Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Further study of deleted photography deleted now establishes that 36 MiG-15/17 jet fighters - a full regiment - are at Phuc Yen airfield near Hanoi. Many are camouflaged. COMINT indicates that these planes came from China’s Mengtzu airfield near the Vietnamese border. Air transport flights between Mengtzu and Hanoi are continuing. We have seen no indications of major air force redeployments inside China, but there are signs that fighters may soon be moved from east China to Nanning. If this occurs, it will be the first air augmentation in South China since the start of the crisis. We have seen no major ground force redeployment in China, deleted.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, August 11, 1964, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

November 12, 1964 China/Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Chinese Communist pilots seem in full control of the training being given North Vietnamese pilots at Phuc Yen airfield near Hanoi. This training activity has increased steadily since it was first noted in mid-August.” (CIA, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, November 12, 1964, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

February 9, 1965 Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Discernible Communist military reaction to the US and South Vietnamese air strikes on Dong Hoi and Chap Le remain minimal. North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist aircraft apparently were not sent up although radars were tracking th raid. The North Vietnamese Navy, at least, is still on alert and units are under orders to resist further attacks.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief: Special Issue, February 9, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

February 12, 1965 China/Vietnam. CIA reported to President Johnson that “There is no intelligence to support the sensational press reports that Chinese Communist ground forces are moving into North Vietnam.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, February 12, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

March 2, 1965 Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA informed President Johnson that “Communications intelligence shows continuing but gradual measures in southern China and North Vietnam toward better air and coastal defense capabilities… Intercepts indicate that North Vietnamese military units had been alerted to the possibility of air attacks several hours before the event… Communications intelligence shows continuing but gradual measures in southern China and in North Vietnam toward bettering air and coastal defense capabilities.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, March 2, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

March 20, 1965 China/Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “It is possible the Chinese Communists in the past few days have moved additional high-performance jet fighters to South China airfields. Two lines deleted. A Chinese transport made a nonscheduled flight to Hanoi yesterday.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, March 20, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

May 4, 1965 China/Vietnam/SIGINT/PHOTINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Vietnamese jet fighter pilots are now receiving advanced tactical training in south China, including night flying in Chinese Communist jet trainers. In North Vietnam revetments are being added and runways are being improved at several airfields. These fields soon can be used for aircraft dispersals or recovery bases, thus extending the combat time of jet fighter missions.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, May 4, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

May 15, 1965 USSR/China/nuclear test detection/Soviet espionage. CIA reported to President Johnson that “The Soviets are also keenly interested in Peiping’s nuclear weapons program. They have moved at least five sampling aircraft to the Far East and obviously plan a more extensive debris collection effort than they carried out on China’s initial test.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, May 15, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

May 24, 1965 China/Vietnam/PHOTINT/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Soviet military equipment is continuing to arrive in North Vietnam. High-altitude photography has confirmed the arrival of the three IL-28 bombers at Phuc Yen airfield near Hanoi. Communications intelligence has provided tentative indications that two more are on their way through China. Photography has also disclosed a total of 63 MiG-15/17 jet fighters at Phuc Yen, six of them in the process of being assembled. The previous count was 57, with a possible four more at Cat Bi airfield near Haiphong.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, May 24, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

May 29, 1965 China/Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “One line deleted four large and nine small aircraft flew from Communist China to Hanoi today in five separate flights. The small planes were probably MIG fighters, possibly high-performance MiG-19s, but it is too early to identify their exact designation. The flight characteristics of the larger aircraft suggest Soviet-made IL-28 bombers. All the aircraft in these flights are presumed to be Chinese, not Soviet.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, May 29, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

July 1, 1965 China/Vietnam/SIGINT/CFNVN. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Analysis of intercepted Chinese Communist radio traffic is showing what may be the beginning of a major military logistics buildup in South China along the principal road and rail axis to North Vietnam. There is now evidence of the establishment of a senior logistics command as well as the arrival of a military railway engineer division from Central China one line deleted. In addition, intercepts indicate that skilled workers are being recruited elsewhere for military construction projects in this general area. There is insufficient evidence so far to determine whether this foreshadows a buildup in combat units nearer the border or whether it is largely to facilitate the flow of supplies.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, July 1, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

July 2, 1965 China/Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “There is an indication in an intercepted message that military control may have been imposed over at least some rail lines not directly linking with North Vietnam. The message states that goods could not go by rail from a point in coastal East China to one in West China without a “certificate of military transport.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, July 2, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

July 3, 1965 China/Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Communications intelligence continues to reflect heavy rail traffic into North Vietnam… shipments of high-priority military and civilian goods are expected to strain North Vietnam’s rail facilities for some time.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, July 3, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

July 16, 1965 China/Vietnam/SIGINT/ELINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Emanations have been monitored over Hanoi from what may be a radar commonly used for target acquisition at Soviet surface-to-air missile sites. Although such radar sets are also used for early warning, this may be a tentative sign that missile equipment is being installed. There is no evidence, however, of the presence of missile guidance radar… Communications intelligence continues to indicate Chinese Communist military logistics support activity in South China along the key and apparently congested route into North Vietnam. A Chinese military entity continues to communicate from northeastern North Vietnam, but clarification of its role is still lacking.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, July 16, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

July 19, 1965 China/Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “The newly constructed airfield near the Sino-Vietnamese border at Ningming has apparently been activated. Communications intercepted yesterday indicated that area familiarization flights were being made by a minimum of 14 aircraft, probably jet fighters. It is unclear how many fighters are now based at Ningming, but at least 17 may have been transferred there from Canton on 14 July. Ningming was instructed to suppress all radar tracking reports on that date.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, July 19, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

July 31, 1965 USSR/SIGINT/air defense. CIA reported to President Johnson that “A large Warsaw Pact air defense exercise got underway yesterday when about 150 medium bombers flew simulated air attacks against most of the European satellites. Large numbers of Soviet and East European fighters reacted to the raid. Surface-to-air missile sites were also involved.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, July 31, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

August 11, 1965 Vietnam/SIGINT/ELINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Radar signals associated with surface-to-air missiles were intercepted from the vicinity of Haiphong yesterday. Photography has never shown missiles around Haiphong, although their appearance has been expected. The signals suggests that at least some equipment is now in place there.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, August 11, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

August 13, 1965 Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Intercepted messages indicate that bomb damage to railroads has cut exports of apatite ore, a fertilizer ingredient and one of North Vietnam’s major sources of foreign exchange.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, August 13, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

August 14, 1965 China/Vietnam/SIGINT/CFNVN. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Chinese Communist military communications are still being monitored from northeast North Vietnam. Their pattern to date, however, continues to suggest the elements involved are there in a military logistics support role and provides no evidence of the presence of combat troops.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, August 14, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

August 17, 1965 China/Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Intercepts reveal that a Chinese jet flew today 25 miles over North Vietnam in reaction to a US recce flight, but did not engage.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, August 17, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

August 18, 1965 Vietnam/SIGINT/ELINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Another new radar type has been identified at one of the surface-to-air missile sites southwest of Hanoi.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, August 18, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

August 30, 1965 Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Intercepted communications indicate IL-28 Beagle light jet bombers in North Vietnam are taking more training flights. As many as four bombers at a time are training together.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, August 30, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

September 1, 1965 China/ballistic missiles/SIGINT/satellite imagery. CIA reported to President Johnson that “One line deleted another series of ballistic missile firings is getting underway at the Shuangchengtzu test range in northwestern China. Satellite photography on 18 and 22 August shows no sign of such activity, but the Chinese probably can set up for tests in only a few days. The missile involved is probably a medium range one, similar to a Soviet model.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, September 1, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

September 10, 1965 USSR/Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Communications intelligence indicates that Soviet and Vietnamese personnel are jointly manning the communications complex that was involved in the launch of one or more missiles on 6 September. Overall control apparently is still in Soviet hands.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, September 10, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

September 14, 1965 Vietnam/SIGINT/ELINT. CIA informed President Johnson that “Signals from radars associated with the surface to air missile system have now been detected emanating from the Vinh area. This suggests that missile units will ultimately be set up to defend key military targets in the southern part of North Vietnam.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, September 14, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

September 17, 1965 China/India/Pakistan/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Chinese communications activity suggests that Chinese forces in the far western area of Tibet -adjacent to the Ladakh area of Kashmir - are in a high state of alert and raises the possibility of some military activity in this area in the near future.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, September 17, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

September 29, 1965 China/SIGINT/ELINT. CIA informed President Johnson that “The Chinese Communists continue to improve their air defense system on Hainan Island. One line deleted radars have now been installed there.” Fighter strength in southern China had increased to 240 MiG-15/17, 133 MiG-19 and 12 MiG-21 fighters - total 385 fighters located at ten airfields in southern China. Four new airfields had been started, of which two had been completed. Fighters were deployed at one of these new airfields - Ningming. (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, September 29, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

October 7, 1965 Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA informed President Johnson that “Communications facilities serving deleted units of the North Vietnamese 325th Division have appeared within South Vietnam after a ten week radio silence. When last heard from, deleted units were located near the border with Laos and Cambodia.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, October 7, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

November 1, 1965 Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA informed President Johnson that “North Vietnamese antiaircraft gunners apparently shot down one of their own planes which got in the way while US aircraft were destroying the strategic highway bridge at Kep, northeast of Hanoi, yesterday. We have intercepts of both a surface-to-air missile communicator and a North Vietnamese pilot referring to such an incident.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, November 1, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

November 9, 1965 USSR/Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA informed President Johnson that “Yesterday’s US air strike against a surface-to-air missile site near Haiphong apparently led to Soviet casualties. An intercepted conversation from the site made reference to “one comrade killed and four wounded.” Soviet technicians have been called “comrade” in previous voice intercepts.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, November 9, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

November 23, 1965 China/Tibet/SIGINT. CIA informed President Johnson that “Intercepted military communications indicate that Chinese units in Tibet are on a modified alert status.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, November 23, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

November 26, 1965 China/Vietnam/SIGINT/CFNVN. CIA informed President Johnson that “The Chinese military presence in North Vietnam continues to grow, but apparently still does not include any ground combat elements.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, November 26, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

November 30, 1965 China/Tibet/SIGINT. CIA informed President Johnson that “Chinese units along the Indian border continue on a modified alert status… Intercepted Chinese Air Forces messages indicate that Peking may for the first time have deployed a few bomber aircraft to Tibet.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, November 30, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

December 6, 1965 China/SIGINT. CIA informed President Johnson that “One line deleted Communist air activity in the area opposite Taiwan last month was the highest for any month since September 1958 - during the Taiwan Strait crisis. This could merely reflect good flying weather during November and Communist sensitivity following the defection of the bomber crew last month.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, December 6, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

December 14, 1965 USSR/Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA informed President Johnson that “The new high performance fighter aircraft in North Vietnam, referred to in yesterday’s Brief (q.v. above), are apparently MiG-21s. One line deleted one of the new planes was flying faster than the MiG-19 can fly.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, December 14, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

December 28, 1965 Turkey/SIGINT/aerial reconnaissance. CIA informed President Johnson that “Pressure is building up in Ankara for the suspension of US reconnaissance flights from Turkish bases. Soviet reaction to the recent crash of a US reconnaissance plane in th Black Sea has been low key and not by itself sufficient to cause the Turks to suspend the flights. The pressure in Ankara seems more likely a reflection of the increasingly hostile attitude among some prominent Turks toward the US military presence in Turkey. Parliament is scheduled to discuss the question of US bases in the near future.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, December 28, 1965, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

February 5, 1966 China/Vietnam/SIGINT/CFNVN. CIA informed President Johnson that “Continuing radio traffic analysis strongly suggests that the previously noted senior Chinese Communist military authority in the Hanoi area has important air defense functions. Four lines deleted. Communications intelligence also points to preparations to activate a new airfield in South Chinese near the Vietnamese border. These developments add to the growing signs of increased air defense coordination between China and North Vietnam.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, February 5, 1966, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

February 11, 1966 China/Vietnam/SIGINT/CFNVN. CIA informed President Johnson that “A Chinese Communist antiaircraft division has moved into North Vietnam. Communications of the 103rd Anti-Aircraft Division (AAA) indicated late last month that the division was moving toward the Vietnamese border (Brief of 28 January). These communications now show that the division crossed the border opposite Ningming into North Vietnam, perhaps today. This marks the first time a Chinese Communis tactical unit has deployed into North Vietnam. Previous Chinese units were engineer and logisic, although some of them may have had antiaircraft elements attached. The 103rd is one of 12 antiaircraft divisions attached to Peking’s air force. It would have, at a minimum, three regiments for a total of just over 3,100 men. It would have at least 32 medium or heavy and or more light antiaircraft pieces.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, February 11, 1966, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

April 8, 1966 China/nuclear weapons testing/SIGINT. CIA informed President Johnson that “Two lines deleted. Weather reporting in northwestern China has not yet been stepped up and we have not yet detected the usual preparatory flights by debris-collecting aircraft. Three lines deleted.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, April 8, 1966, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

June 10, 1966 China/Vietnam/SIGINT/PHOTINT/CFNVN. CIA study found that the number of Chinese troops in North Vietnam stood at between 30,000 and 47,000 men organized into four engineer divisions, two anti-aircraft divisions (AAA), a coastal security division, three lesser units apparently associated with construction projects, and service units of perhaps regimental strength. (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, June 10, 1966, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

July 2, 1966 France/nuclear weapons testing/SIGINT. CIA informed President Johnson that “The countdown on 1 July for the first French nuclear test in the Pacific was halted literally at the last second. Two lines deleted. No information on the reasons for the delay is available, but an adverse wind shift may have been a factor as announced.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, July 2, 1966, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

October 8, 1966 China/Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA informed President Johnson that “One of the seven major Chinese military support units in North Vietnam appears to have completed its mission and may be returning to China. This is the special engineer division one line deleted which has been working on coastal defense construction projects off Haiphong. Communications involving this unit have been gradually declining for some months, and now appear to have ceased altogether.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, October 8, 1966, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

March 24, 1967 Vietnam/SIGINT/infiltration. CIA reported to President Johnson that “We can now cite additional indications the Communists may be getting ready for something big south of the Demilitarized Zone: one line deleted North Vietnamese forces in and just above the Zone have built up from about three to four divisions [324, 341, u/i and DMZ Front Divisions] with supporting artillery. Substantial elements of one of these divisions are now operating in Quang Tri Province… We cannot be sure what all this adds up to, but the Communists certainly seem to be in a position to follow up their barrages against our artillery positions at Con Thien and Gio Linh with ground action.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, March 24, 1967, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

April 7, 1967 Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Communist forces have during the last two days launched a series of heavy - and obviously well coordinated - attacks against allied positions in South Vietnam’s two northernmost provinces. These actions may be the opening gambits in a Communist plan to pin down and overextend major allied forces in the area. We have been expecting something of this sort. Captured documents, defector reports one line deleted have for several weeks been point to Communist preparations for something big south of the Demilitarized Zone.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, April 7, 1967, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

April 8, 1967 USSR/space. CIA informed President Johnson that “An unusually large number of flights into Tyuratam over the last week suggests that the Soviets are preparing a major space launch. It is difficult, however, to be sure about the nature or timing of an event solely from flight activity. We expect to pick up other indications, such as deployment of space support ships.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, April 8, 1967, Top Secret, ISCAP Release)

April 24, 1967 USSR/space activities. CIA informed President Johnson that “Soyuz-1, the new Soviet manned spacecraft launched on Saturday, has been having serious difficulties. The cosmonaut tried to bring the spacecraft down at 8:00 PM EST on Sunday, but failed. He tried on the next orbit and may have succeeded..” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, April 24, 1967, Top Secret, ISCAP Release)

May 16, 1967 USSR/China/Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Eight Soviet medium transport planes are on their way across China to North Vietnam. This is the largest such contingent to transit China in recent years.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, May 16, 1967, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

May 20, 1967 USSR/China. CIA reported to President Johnson that “The flight of Soviet cargo transports to Hanoi via Peking, which did not materialize as scheduled earlier this week, now appear to have been definitely cancelled. We still do not know why the flight was called off. For that matter, Hanoi seemed unaware of the cancellation for several days.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, May 20, 1967, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

June 5, 1967 Middle East. Six-Day War began. At 0745 hours local time, Israeli forces launched a surprise attack against Egypt, marking the beginning of the “Six Day” Middle East War. Israeli planes began attacking airfields around Cairo at about 8:00 a.m. (2:00 a.m. Washington time). SIGINT intercepted a message which reported “Cairo has just been informed that at least five of its airfields in Sinai and the Canal area have suddenly become “unserviceable.” (CIA, Report, President’s Daily Brief, June 5, 1967, Top Secret, LBJL; White House, Memorandum, Walt Rostow’s Recollections of June 5, 1967, November 17, 1968, Top Secret [codeword not declassified], FRUS)

October 30, 1967 Vietnam/PHOTINT/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Phuc Yen airfield appears to be back in service, at least for limited fighter operations. A first look at high-altitude photography from a mission flown early Saturday morning shows all craters on the main runway filled and the runway apparently usable. Intercepted messages scheduling MiG-17 flights out of Phuc Yen on Saturday and Sunday back up the evidence in the photography. While fighters may be able to land and take off from Phuc Yen, there are not many left around to do so. Judging from the photography, there may have been only six MIGs in North Vietnam capable of getting into the air Saturday morning. The weekend flight schedules out of Phuc Yen indicate some of those have gone to China.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, October 30, 1967, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

February 2, 1968 Korea/Pueblo/SIGINT. CIA reported to President Johnson that “North Korean air and naval activity, with the exception of air patrols over Wonsan and a tight naval patrol along the lower east coast, now consists of routine training missions. Military activity along the Demilitarized Zone is at a low level.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, February 2, 1968, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

March 2, 1968 USSR/Egypt. CIA reported to President Johnson that “There is no doubt that the Soviets are actively involved in Egyptian air defense activities and that some Soviet pilots are flying with operational Egyptian units. One line deleted but we have no clear evidence on this point. We also cannot find any evidence that ferrying of more Soviet fighters is imminent. We doubt that Moscow wants Soviet pilots eyeball to eyeball with the Israelis. ” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, March 2, 1968, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

March 22, 1968 Vietnam/SIGINT/infiltration. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Intercepts suggest a least 14 - and perhaps as many as 16 - infiltration groups passed through the Thanh Hoa area of North Vietnam in the first two weeks of March. Four of threse units reported strengths to higher headquarters which averaged out to about a battalion apiece. If the others were of roughly the same size, we would guess that close to the equivalent of two divisions came through Thanh Hoa.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, March 22, 1968, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

March 25, 1968 Vietnam/SIGINT/infiltration. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Still more evidence that Hanoi is embarked on a major new infiltration effort into South Vietnam has appeared in communications intelligence over the weekend. The first units in the new wave - ones that apparently set out from North Vietnam in late January - already seem to be turning up in an enemy base area in South Vietnam’s Quang Tri Province.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, March 25, 1968, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

March 26, 1968 Vietnam/SIGINT/infiltration. CIA reported to President Johnson that “While military activity in South Vietnam remains at a low level, we continue to get more signs of heavy enemy infiltration into South Vietnam. Truck traffic through the Mu Gia Pass is at the highest level since just before the Tet Offensive. Some of the trucks carry troops - a highly unusual procedure which suggests that the movement has a good deal or urgency about it. Some Communist messages convey the same sense of urgency.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, March 26, 1968, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

March 29, 1968 Vietnam/SIGINT/infiltration. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Signs are accumulating in intercepts half line deleted that a new Communist offensive may be imminent. In the past few days there have been six references in Communist traffic to N-Day,” the Communist equivalent of “D-Day.” Dates between 28 March and 2 April have been mentioned. The last multiple references to “N-Day” came just before the Tet offensive.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, March 29, 1968, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

March 30, 1968 Vietnam/SIGINT/infiltration. CIA reported to President Johnson that “The series of attacks forecast in “N-Day” messages has not yet materialized, but Communist intercepts still point to early, wide-ranging actions.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, March 30, 1968, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

April 1, 1968 Vietnam/SIGINT/infiltration. CIA reported to President Johnson that “What appear to be eight more infiltration groups were discovered in Rear Services [GDRS] communications over the weekend, raising the number of units en route through central North Vietnam in March to 34, possibly 35. More than 17,000 troops could be involved.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, April 1, 1968, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

April 3, 1968 Vietnam/SIGINT/infiltration. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Evidence of heavy infiltration into South Vietnam continues to mount. North Vietnamese units above the DMZ are disappearing from their regular communications networks, a good indication they are moving south. At least 36 infiltration groups have now been identified. A premium appears to be on speed. Personnel of one North Vietnamese regiment now in the Central Highlands moved over 500 miles from North to South Vietnam in about a month.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, April 3, 1968, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

April 9, 1968 Vietnam/SIGINT/infiltration. CIA reported to President Johnson that “Intercepts reveal the movement of some 18 additional infiltration groups, about 10,000 men, along the infiltration corridor during the first week in April… The North Vietnamese are evidently preparing for a major military campaign in Kontum Province. Intercepts and aerial reconnaissance point to a high level of logistical activity in this area. Intercepts also disclose that the Communists intend to use 105-mm howitzers in southwestern Kontum.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, April 9, 1968, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

April 12, 1968 Vietnam/SIGINT/infiltration. CIA reported to President Johnson that “More signs are appearing that Communist main force units in several parts of the country are pulling back from areas that had until recently been of high tactical interest. In the Khe Sanh area, small-scale enemy rear-guard actions seem designed to cover withdrawal of major North Vietnamese combat units. Communications intelligence also points to withdrawals further south in I Corps,” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, April 12, 1968, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

May 10, 1968 USSR/Czechoslovakia/Czech crisis/faulty analysis. The CIA reported to President Johnson that “We cannot confirm the reports of Soviet troop movements along the Polish-Czechoslovakian border. Five lines deleted. In additional, several Western diplomats traveling outside the Polish capital on 8 and 9 May were stopped by security officers - an unusual practice in Poland. There is tentative evidence one line deleted that two Soviet armies in East Germany were placed on a high state of alert deleted, but there have been no indications that troops from these units have begun to move… So far it appears that the Soviets may be thinking of a show of force designed to pull the Czechoslovaks back toward orthodoxy. The Soviets would probably not intervene outright without a call for help from some segment of the Czechoslovak party.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, May 10, 1968, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

August 15, 1968 USSR/Czechoslovakia. The CIA reported to President Johnson that “The Soviets have moved additional divisions into Poland since the end of July. Two lines deleted the moves are a sign that Moscow remains deeply uneasy about developments in Czechoslovakia” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, August 15, 1968, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

August 29, 1968 Vietnam/SIGINT. The CIA reported to President Johnson that “A forward element of COSVN may have moved from the Cambodian border to within about 20 miles of Saigon. This element made a similar move at the time of the Tet offensive. There are other indications - 1.5 lines deleted of moves which would be preliminary to a major attack on Saigon.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, August 29, 1968, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

November 13, 1968 China/ballistic missiles/SIGINT. The CIA reported to President Johnson that “Communications, weather reporting, and transport flights all fit a pattern suggesting the Chinese are about to run another test of their medium-range ballistic missile [at Shuangchengtzu]. Since August there has been little or no testing of this missile which has been in development for at least five years. We have detected no operational deployment as yet.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, November 13, 1968, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

December 2, 1968 Vietnam/SIGINT. The CIA reported to President Johnson that “Intercepts indicate that several Communist units which have been inactive for the past two months are getting ready for action in northern I Corps. There are also scattered signs of Communist combat preparations farther south, notably in the provinces on the Cambodian border northwest of Saigon. There has been no indication so far that the Communists plan a drive on Saigon.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, December 2, 1968, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

December 10, 1968 Vietnam/SIGINT. The CIA reported to President Johnson that “Some portents of a possible Communist offensive are appearing in III Corps. Elements of two enemy divisions are moving from the Cambodian border in the general direction of Saigon. A third division is going into Tay Ninh Province. Communist message traffic is heavy and the bulk of the North Vietnamese now in the infiltration pipeline appear to be headed for III Corps.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, December 10, 1968, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

December 20, 1968 USSR/SIGINT/ABM. CIA informed President Johnson that “Analysis of [intercepted telemetry] on 12 December during an antiballistic missile firing from the test site [at Sary Shagan] suggests that the operation probably was connected with modification of the Galosh antiballistic missile. This is the system currently being installed around Moscow.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, December 20, 1968, Top Secret, ISCAP Release)

December 20, 1968 Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA informed President Johnson that “Intercepted messages have revealed that the North Vietnamese are deploying up to company-size units back into the DMZ. So far, enemy troops in the Zone have engaged primarily in patrol and reconnaissance activities, but the possibility exists that Hanoi is planning new offensive operations into areas immediately south of the Zone.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, December 20, 1968, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

December 27, 1968 Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA informed President Johnson that “Heavy Communist reinforcements appear to be headed for the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. A North Vietnamese division may be involved. Intercepted communications indicate elements of two, and probably three, regiments are moving south through southern North Vietnam and Laos. They seem to be coming around, rather than through, the DMZ. Arrival of a new division would almost double enemy main force strength in this area.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, December 27, 1968, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)

January 8, 1969 Vietnam/SIGINT. CIA informed President Johnson that “A “very urgent” message was sent on 4 January by the North Vietnamese high command in Hanoi to virtually all major Communist headquarters in South Vietnam. Although this sort of transmission does not invariably foreshadow widespread attacks, the last time one was observed was on 16 November - just before a period of stepped-up enemy activity throughout much of the country.” (CIA, The President’s Daily Brief, January 8, 1969, Top Secret, CIA September 2015 PDB Release)