Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons might just be a ploy to cadge US favour, but India has to be on its guard
To deploy TNWs to deter India from engaging in any future armed conflict with it
Get the US to mediate to restart stalled Indo-Pak dialogue and resolve Kashmir issue
To get a civil nuclear deal from US, as had been granted to India in 2008
For doomsday seekers, an India-Pakistan confrontation deteriorating into a possible nuclear conflagration has always been a terrible final scene since the two countries went nuclear in May 1998. When a face-off came next year, India relied solely on its conventional weapons and some hard-nosed diplomacy to evict Pakistani intruders from Kargil. Though fears of a nuclear armageddon faded somewhat, they never quite went away.
Now, in a backdrop of bilateral talks stuttering to a stop, a rise in militant infiltration and periodic attacks and unprovoked firing across the Line of Control, they are back in circulation. This time, the focus is on Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs)—a device designed for battlefield use—and their possible use to stop an advancing Indian army inside Pakistani territory.
As the theory goes, there is a strong possibility that Pakistan may be forced to deploy and use their TNWs if confronted with a conventional Indian military attack on its soil. A short, conventional war, from India’s point of view, can become possible under its newly evolved ‘cold start’ doctrine if Pakistan embarks on another ambitious ‘Mumbai-like’ terror attack.
How real is that possibility?
“The only tactical weapon Pakistan seems to be using is to raise the level of concern around the world,” says a senior Indian diplomat in South Block.
His reference is to the well-crafted campaign that the Pakistani establishment—civilian as also military—had launched over the past few months in the West. “Having tactical weapons would make war less likely,” General Khalid Kidwai, a top advisor to the Pakistani government told his interlocutors in Washington this March while participating in a conference on nuclear security organised by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The general was in charge of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programme for 15 years.
“The talk about TNWs is a worrying aspect.... The Indian establishment has to decide if it can call Pakistan’s bluff.”Rakesh Sood, Former Indian Diplomat
While Gen Kidwai couched his remarks well and emphasised on the need for Pakistan to develop and deploy TNWs to deal with “India’s aggression”, a series of moves emanating from Pakistan over the past several months, including the deployment of a number of ballistic missiles of different ranges, is obviously an attempt to demonstrate that it is in possession of these ‘battlefield nukes’.
The issue happened to figure once again during the Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s meeting with US President Barack Obama in Washington last week when the former spoke about rising tension along the LoC. Sharif attempted to seek US intervention to lower tension in South Asia and lobby for a civilian nuke deal like the US-India one. Though Obama glossed over both issues and stressed on Pakistan’s need to rein in groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba that operate from its soil, the fact that the two leaders met in the backdrop of reports of possible deployment of TNWs by Pakistan itself has special significance.
But Indian diplomats and scientists seemed highly sceptical about Pakistan’s ability to develop such tactical weapons on its own. “I think it’s sheer bluster and bluff,” says a South Block official. He points out that in nuclear technology ‘miniaturising’ a warhead for tactical use or developing ‘battlefield nukes’ is an extremely difficult process. It involves bringing masses of fissile materials to near-critical levels, but pulling back before criticality—a highly sophisticated exercise described by physicist Richard Feynman as to ‘tickling the dragon’s tail’.
When India conducted its five nuclear tests on May 11 and May 13, it developed the technology for both a thermonuclear device as well as those for tactical use. But Pakistan, which retaliated with six nuclear tests after a few days, had announced that all were for carrying heavy warheads. There was no mention of TNWs. “So unless they have outsourced it to some other country to develop these miniature warheads for them, how did they get battlefield nukes?” asks the South Block official. Moreover, any possible use of TNWs would invariably result in enormous Pakistani civilian deaths.
Despite such reassuring scepticism, sections in New Delhi advise caution to deal with the situation. “It is always a grey area and one is never sure on whether the other side is bluffing or is serious about its intentions,” says former diplomat Sheelkant Sharma.
Sharma points out that even if Pakistan didn’t have TNW technology, it could have got them from its friends like China or North Korea, both of which have helped Pakistan in its nuclear and missile programmes. “While we need to engage with Pakistan and restart the stalled dialogue, we should never take our eyes off the Pakistan ball,” adds Sharma.
But what does Pakistan intend to do?
“Basically, it is to seek parity with India and drive a hard bargain with the US at a time when the Barack Obama administration is on its way out,” an Indian diplomat points out. However, he adds that going by the Sharif-Obama joint statement, it seemed that Pakistan failed miserably to get any major concessions.
“While we need to engage with Pakistan and restart the stalled dialogue, we should never our eyes off the Pakistan ball.”Sheelkant Sharma, Former Indian Diplomat
Others in India accord the Pakistani PM’s meeting with Obama the status of a ‘semi-final’. They of course say the final—the more important meeting—will be when Pakistan army chief Raheel Sharif visits the US next month.
The US government is well aware that Pakistan’s civilian premier is on an extremely weak wicket and has over the past years yielded much ground to Gen Sharif on security- and foreign policy-related issues—the Pakistan military’s traditional turfs. So, if the US prioritises stability in Afghanistan, where Pakistan’s active help is required both in taking action against Taliban elements operating from its restive northwest to destabilise the government in Kabul and also in delivering those Taliban members to the talks table with the Afghans, the Pakistan army chief would definitely be the man to negotiate with.
Therefore, there is a possibility that Raheel Sharif may be able to drive a better bargain with the US than what Nawaz Sharif managed. Though no one is sure if Washington will be more enthusiastic about Pakistan’s TNWs if Gen Sharif raises the issue and grants him concessions to cool the rising temperature in South Asia, sections in India worry about such an outcome.
“The talk about TNWs is a worrying aspect and we should have taken them more seriously,” says former diplomat Rakesh Sood. While he does not rule out future Pakistan-based terror attacks, he raises questions on how the Indian leadership might respond to them. “It will definitely be the Indian political establishment’s call to deal with such a situation and decide on whether or not it can call Pakistan’s bluff.”
India and Pakistan are old foes who have met on the battlefield. Moreover, they have expended an inordinate amount of energy in sabre-rattling. With nuclear-tipped offensive capabilities, crossing a line can be fateful not only for the belligerents, but for South Asia. War now will wreak biblical destruction.
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