Posted on October 7, 2015
Russia has caught the West by surprise with its military intervention in Syria. But the risk of escalation or humiliation – or both – is high.
This Wikistrat report, written by Senior Analyst Mark Galeotti, highlights Russia’s interests in Syria as well as the risks it runs.
Russia appears to have no exit strategy beyond complete victory over all Syrian rebel forces, which is vanishingly improbable. While Russia’s aim is to provide a period of respite for the Assad regime, it is unlikely that Russian forces will substantively change the situation on the ground. Major defections or desertions, or open rifts within the Alawite elite, could also easily send Assad’s regime into a spiral of fragmentation and recrimination. In such circumstances, would Moscow back an alternative to Assad who may have a better chance of recovering the regime’s coherence? Or would it feel forced to deploy ground troops to try and force a reconstitution of a client regime?
Furthermore, there is a risk that Russian action against ISIS, however minimal, will incite terrorist attacks inside Russia, given the number of northern Caucasus insurgent groups now professing their allegiance to the self-declared caliphate.
The United States has three broad options to respond, argues Galeotti:
Quiet Cooperation. Though it falls short of Vladimir Putin’s ambitions, there is scope for the kind of informal cooperation enjoyed with Iran against ISIS in Iraq, not least in military deconfliction. While this does in effect sanction Russia’s intervention, it essentially does nothing more than recognize the facts on the ground and offers no rewards to Russia for its coup de main.
Make a Deal. Putin is clearly looking for a wider political arrangement; he might well be willing to back away from his support for Assad in return for concessions over Ukraine. However, this would be ruinous for Washington in terms of international and domestic credibility.
Bind and Bleed. The temptation might be to allow Putin to overreach and become mired in Syria, not least because the more effort committed there, the less available for his parallel Ukrainian adventure. However, given that his priority is supporting Assad rather than fighting ISIS, the outcome would also be to extend the duration of the war and increase the polarization between ISIS and Damascus, squeezing out the other, so-called “moderate” rebel forces. It also grants Putin the initiative in region.
Click here or on the cover image to download the full PDF report.
Mark Galeotti is a professor of Global Affairs at New York University’s Center for Global Affairs. He is an authority on Russian security affairs and transnational crime, and has authored several Wikistrat reports.
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