By Harsha Kakar
22 Oct , 2015
The recent announcement by the defence minister to the air force, that it cannot have any more Rafale fighter aircraft but should plan to induct the modified and indigenously developed Tejas due to paucity of funds, was logical. The current financial year has seen the ministry of defence approving military hardware for all the three services, not only from abroad but also from domestic producers. The procurements are presently in the pipe line; to be inducted over the next couple of years, thereby enhancing the capabilities of the services. These capabilities would be best employed when the services are employed jointly in operations as one force.
…all futuristic planning and procurements should be based on a common platform of joint threat and joint capabilities.
In the present system of procurement, each service carries out its own assessment of the future battle field milieu and emerging threats, as it pertains to that service and its present capability shortfalls to deal with them. This is then projected as procurement requirements over the next five years. Therefore each service plans and projects what it requires for itself. However, what is missing in the entire system is that the future environment is common for all and would entail joint employment. Therefore all futuristic planning and procurements should be based on a common platform of joint threat and joint capabilities. Ideally therefore all procurement planning should be done under the aegis of one central organization. This should be an organization of service personnel but by protocol senior to the service headquarters and a part of the ministry.
The military is the only profession where there is no parallel intake. Therefore military expertise is the specialty of the military alone. There are strategic experts and think tanks within the government, including the almost defunct National Security Advisory Board and the Strategic Planning Group. However, whenever the government needs military advice, it would need a single point advisor, from the military, an individual who would represent the services and their view point. However, where specifically essential a service chief may provide specialist advice on his service, but for across the board advice a single point advisor is most ideal.
While the military is responsible for the security of India from external threat, it is also called upon to aid the civil authority when the situation so warrants. Most military operations including the recent one launched across the Myanmar border and Kargil involved the coordination and employment of more than one service. The same has always been the case whenever natural disasters have occurred, whether in the country or in our vicinity, the Nepal earthquake, flood relief and Uttarakhand being some examples. There is thus a need to have an organization to control and coordinate such operations, both operational and in aid to civil power, ensuring total harmony in joint execution.
…due to varying perceptions of the government, civil bureaucracy and the opposition of the service chiefs themselves, the organization (IDS) was created, but its chief was never appointed. Thus the organization exists as a toothless tiger.
The shortcomings in joint execution and management of defence during the Kargil war prompted the then Vajpayee government to order a committee to recommend measures. The post Kargil committee report did recommend the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to head the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS). However, due to varying perceptions of the government, civil bureaucracy and the opposition of the service chiefs themselves, the organization (IDS) was created, but its chief was never appointed. Thus the organization exists as a toothless tiger.
There was discussion at that time on what the role and task of the CDS would be. However from the beginning there were misconceptions on the creation of this appointment. It was feared that as a single point advisor and the senior most military individual, he would hold enough power to be a threat to democracy. Issues pertaining to protocol between the military and the bureaucracy, as also within the military only acted as stumbling blocks. To avoid any controversy the previous governments stated that they were seeking a political consensus, which never even commenced.
The above misconceptions could never be further from the truth. The CDS would never command troops directly. Command would continue to function under the service chiefs as hitherto fore. He would only be coordinating operations and bringing in synergy by being involved in joint planning and joint execution. He would be responsible for capability planning and coordination of procurement plans for the military. This is the system adopted in all developed countries and has proved to be ideal.
The CDS would never command troops directly. Command would continue to function under the service chiefs as hitherto fore.
In very simple terms, he would be the force provider, not the force employer. By being senior in appointment and protocol, he would be able to push through the right perspective and development for the military as a whole. Being a part of the ministry, he would work hand in glove with them, ensuring better synergy in functioning. Thus the defence minister would have only two advisors, the defence secretary for matters civil and the CDS for matters military.
The earlier system underwent an overhaul; post Kargil, because the government of the day realized how lax we were when dealing with issues pertaining to national security. The committee made recommendations some of which were fulfilled; however, the most important one was ignored. It was the BJP government then which set up the Kargil committee, and now that they are back in power, should culminate the process by appointing the CDS. This would complete the transformation that their predecessors started, and put in place a mechanism which the military and the country require.
The hesitation in decision making on security matters was rightly quoted in the Kargil report which sarcastically said, “The political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence establishments appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo. National security management recedes into the background in times of peace and is considered to be too delicate to be tampered with in times of war.” I wonder for how long the nation would need to wait, before management of defence is put on the right track.
© Copyright 2015 Indian Defence Review
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