By Lt Gen Prakash Katoch
30 Sep , 2015
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) can be defined as “A major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of technologies, which combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of operations.” Transformation is essential to cope with these changes and most countries have put in place organisations dedicated to conceptualising and implementing transformation.
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) can be considered a phenomenon that is some four decades old. Soviet Military thinkers during the period 1960 to 1970 first dabbled with RMA (though the term ‘RMA’ was not coined by them). The Soviet experiment was primarily with respect to the impact of nuclear weapons and Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Their focus was to dovetail the employment of nuclear weapons into their war-fighting doctrine, giving them the cutting edge in future wars. More than a decade later, in the mid-eighties, Chief of Soviet General Staff Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov revived the debate about RMA with reference to precision guided conventional weapons. The concept caught the fancy of the US much later, who actually coined the term RMA.
Militaries worldwide have been experimenting with and adopting RMA. Chinese interest in RMA in the structure of future US armed forces remains strong and is adequately incorporated into the Chinese strategic military doctrine. Their interest in the RMA theory and practice was accelerated due to the dramatic and speedy US victory over Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War wherein US dominance was achieved through precision weaponry, satellites and superior information and communications technology. The power of technological advances coupled with matching strategy and concepts, organisations and training was fully apparent. This was a catalyst for the Chinese PLA to get going on the path to ‘informisation’.
RMA results when a nation seizes an opportunity to transform its military doctrine, training, equipment, tactics, operations and strategy in a coherent pattern…
Throughout history, advances in technology and strategy have revolutionised the way wars are fought. Many definitions have been coined to describe the nuances of RMA. Wikipedia says that “The military concept of RMA is a theory about the future of warfare, often connected to technological and organisational recommendations for change.” RMA results when a nation seizes an opportunity to transform its military, doctrine, training, organisation, equipment, tactics, operations and strategy in a coherent pattern in order to wage war in a novel and more effective manner.
RMA can be defined as “A major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of technologies, which combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of operations.” Transformation is essential to cope with these changes and most countries have put in place organisations dedicated to conceptualising and implementing transformation.
Global debate on RMA is centered on the following perspectives: one, this perspective highlights the political, social, and economic factors worldwide, which might require a completely different type of military and organisational structure to apply force. It focuses primarily upon changes in the nation state and the role of an organised military in using force; two, this most common “System of Systems” perspective on RMA highlights the evolution of weapon technology, information technology, military organisations and military doctrine including three overlapping areas for force assets – Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) and Precision Force and three, this portrays the pessimistic view that a ‘true’ RMA has not yet occurred or is unlikely to occur since much of the technology and weapon systems ascribed to contemporary RMA have been under development for quite some time. However, the bottom line is that RMA is an ongoing phenomenon with no specific start or end point. Perhaps it is akin to the pursuit of excellence which is a never ending process.
Militaries need RMA to create positive asymmetrical capabilities and comprehensive competitive edge over adversaries…
Why RMA?
Militaries need RMA to create positive asymmetrical capabilities and comprehensive competitive edge over adversaries plus transforming their current perception and thinking. Technological advances enable precision delivery of enormous firepower of hundreds of mega tonnes on a given target thousands of kilometres away. Destruction of satellites in orbit is possible.
The capability has increased phenomenally in ‘mass’ and ‘range’ but the ‘time’ factor is frighteningly compressed; battle is being viewed and decided in near real time. Real time communication links and the advent of aggressive media coverage enable viewing the battle from the bedroom. Everyone from the man on the battlefield to the entire chain of command and control right up to the chief political executive and the populace are on the same real time grid. The implication for the military is that decisions have to be taken with great swiftness and efficacy – and the entire, consultation-decision making process has to be radically reviewed. This calls for radical changes in our organisational structures, work culture, war fighting capabilities, doctrines and operational concepts.
Nuances
RMA involves a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations which creates new core competencies in dimensions of warfare that render obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competencies of erstwhile dominant players. The Blitzkrieg of Germany created new operational and tactical level models for land warfare, rendering the static lines of defence obsolete. During the World War II, Carrier Warfare created new tactical and operational level models for battle at sea, rendering large battleships obsolete. The introduction of ICBMs has created a new dimension of warfare initiating a new core competency of long range, accurate delivery of high-yield nukes. Anti-satellite capability, Space Warfare and Cyber Warfare have ushered in yet more core competencies. Rise in RMA has also enforced antidotes in the shape of asymmetric and fourth generation wars, the application of which is countering the RMA of the US Military in Afghanistan and Iraq to a considerable extent.
It is generally opined that RMA is driven by technological advancements made in recent past in Information Technology (IT) and changes in the fields of communications, computers and networks. This is only partly true; limiting RMA to only systems would be highly incorrect. Recent technological advancements actually require revolutionary changes in the manner in which we conduct our military business since RMA encompasses the entire military organisation.
RMA involves a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations which creates new core competencies…
There are four basic tenets. First, RMA is not simply technological but concerns significant progress and change in at least the important military related areas of technology, organisation, doctrine and operational concepts. Second, changes or progress in the above areas of technology, organisation, doctrine and operational concepts by themselves do not represent a true RMA, but rather it is the synergistic combination of these developments, which forms true RMA and alters the nature of warfare. Third, RMA emerges from revolutionary changes of historic magnitude within the broader social, economic and political environment of national and global societies, which in turn offer the conditions for RMA to be recognised, appreciated, internalised and exploited. Fourth, the smooth and successful process of recognition, appreciation, internalisation and exploitation requires flexibility, acceptability, innovation and openness to change particularly on the part of the military.
Force Application
Factors that are relevant to RMA are time, technological capabilities, percentage adaptability of technology, Human Resources (HR), inertia of the organisation, net-centric culture and security vulnerabilities. Increasing use of high technology, well-trained HR that understands the requirements of RMA and a net-centric culture, which refers to organisational policies and strategies, favour growth in RMA. Conversely, non-adaptive technology that does not lend to innovation and upgradation which can occur with a large import content, larger mass and poor security in implementation reduces the capability for RMA.
Increase in network-centric culture (largely a state of mind) causes an exponential rise in RMA. Measures for enhancing RMA include development of long range precision attack capability, integration of civilian hardware industry for defence production in common use technological areas and specific security measures particularly in the telecommunication sector to ensure proprietary protocols and standards through which they would have full control over the networks.
Increase in network-centric culture causes exponential rise in RMA…
Emerging trends of warfare have greater emphasis on the sub-conventional. Force application throughout the war continuum must be at the locus of engagement with the enemy. It must be ‘joint’ and could be virtual not necessarily physical, but it may include operations in the diplomatic, economic, information and military domains. These national level applications must be in place 365 days and 24×7 and even during ‘peace time’ since the military continues to be engaged in low intensity operations. The Army would require to continue as a manpower intensive and has to be equipped and networked for such operations with the internal security organs of the state. The Navy is similarly faced with low-intensity maritime threats, heightened after 26/11 Mumbai terror attack and requires addressing at a different plane. The Air Force in support role will need its own force multipliers, inter-operable with sister Services. Moving up to higher levels of the war continuum even the Army will need to be more and more machine intensive.
At the tri-Service/national levels, the far end of war would deal with the application of Ballistic Missiles, Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence and Nuclear weapons. Each zone of the war continuum requires transformation and synergy with different instruments of state power and a differential in the level of man-machine interface requirements. Inter-Service jointness simply has to be enforced as fait-accompli. Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is perhaps the most important component of RMA. The challenge is to do it within an organised framework and with full security.
NCW allows us to move from an approach based upon the massing of forces to one based upon the massing of effects. This allows us to reduce our battle space footprint which, in turn, reduces risk because we avoid presenting the enemy with attractive high value targets. Empowered with knowledge derived from a shared awareness of the battle space and a shared understanding of the Commander’s intent, our forces can display initiative to meet the Commander’s intent and be more effective when operating autonomously. Increase in NCW capabilities will exponentially enhance RMA.
Globally, militaries have researched and considered RMA as an organisational concept…
Political Direction
Globally, militaries have researched and considered RMA as an organisational concept. The nations which have capitalised on RMA have possessed very strong and focused political direction and legislation to enforce systemized programmes for its implementation. Axiomatically, the infrastructure and investment demands are heavy and many countries have not invested required sums in defence, especially where the potential of RMA is not grasped by the establishment.
A successful revolution also requires key bureaucracies to possess certain institutional characteristics that enable them to direct technological advances to dramatically improve military efficiency and efficacy. Developed countries that have had exponential increase in RMA, have adopted a Top Down approach emanating from the political apex. They made organisational changes necessary to accelerate synergy in the Armed Forces. This despite critics pointing out that a ‘revolution’ within the military ranks might carry detrimental consequences, produce severe economic strain and ultimately prove counterproductive.
RMA in China
China is actively promoting RMA with Chinese characteristics and making focused advancements in national defence and armed forces modernisation. Top Chinese military and civilian officials have periodically affirmed the importance and relevance of RMA to China’s military modernisation. Inspired by the 1991 Gulf War and subsequent US actions in Kosovo, China is shaping the modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army in the context of global trends in military transformation. To some Western analysts, the Chinese RMA is limited to ‘pockets of excellence’ only, since large amount of weaponry and technology is still imported.
A successful revolution also requires key bureaucracies to possess certain institutional characteristics…
It would be prudent for India to take note and monitor the Chinese RMA experiment. Chinese military technologies and production capabilities are impressive. Massive technological progress has been realised in short span incorporating sophisticated foreign technology and enabling the PLA to take advantage of an RMA of leading foreign militaries. China has hitched its technological evolution to the global train by committing itself to a more open economy and breaking the paradox of the snail paced ‘self-reliance only’ concept.
In terms of field of force structuring, the PLA has achieved growth in asymmetric capabilities. They have invested heavily in submarines and guided missile destroyers to counter a probable US Carrier Battle Group in the stand-off against Taiwan, making sea capability the answer to a superior US forces sea control capability. The Chinese are not only investing in PLA and military hardware but in all aspects of Diplomatic, Information Operations, Military and Economic (DIME) including foreign governments in India’s immediate neighbourhood and the Indian Ocean Region.
The PLA is being ‘informised’, downsized and the older leadership is being replaced with a younger and more technological aware force. Thousands of all ranks are being put through advanced studies in RMA related subjects on a yearly basis. Specific appointments for General Officers are tenable by those having had tri-Service experience or satisfying laid down technological criteria. Other measures include advanced ICBMs, nuke delivery systems and an undeclared chemical weapons capability; advanced satellite and anti-satellite capabilities; extensive third dimension capability, Rapid Reaction Forces, expanding Blue Water Navy and a formidable Air Force; potent Cyber warfare capability, political will to use it and increasing offensive potential in this context; large chip manufacturing capability; ongoing organisational adjustments in addition to mere downsizing. Reorganised logistics organisations are being put in place; development of sub conventional/asymmetric warfare capabilities. Media reports of support to the ULFA (including Paresh Barua’s base in Chinese territory), Maoists in Nepal and many such measures are indicative of this.
It would be prudent for India to take note and monitor the Chinese RMA experiment…
RMA in the Indian Military
Our military requires organisational changes that are necessary to give an impetus to synergising the Armed Forces towards integration and achieving RMA. These changes have to be driven from the top political leadership of the country. In the USA, the catalyst for the transformation process commenced with former Secretary of Defence, Donald H Rumsfeld; the US Department of Defence created US Joint Forces Command as the transformation laboratory of the US Military to force the US Armed forces into jointness. The Goldwater Nichols Act brought about revolutionary changes in the US Armed forces, accelerating synergy and boosting RMA. In China, the change was ushered in by Jiang Zemin and its implementation overseen by the Central Military Commission and Chief of General Staff of the PLA. In Germany, the transformation process was initiated by the Berlin Decree which aimed to integrate the Armed forces ensuring reaping full benefits of ongoing technological advancements. The German Chief of the Defence Forces is overseeing the transformation of the Armed Forces in was appointed. In India, even a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), though recommended by the Kargil Review Committee has yet to be appointed. Jointness in Services simply has to be forced from the top. Perhaps only an Act of Parliament can enforce this.
RMA can hardly be de-linked from the Indian State. Aside from lack of political direction, complete lack of military professionals in the MoD and the defence-industrial complex (DRDO-DPSUs-OF) has brought us to a sorry state, some of the indicators being – void of a National Security Strategy and Comprehensive Defence Review; the military lacks the required synergy including joint war fighting doctrine and organisations that facilitate implementing jointness. HQ IDS has not been integrated with the MoD and lacks operational responsibility and authority.
RMA can hardly be de-linked from the Indian State…
A CDS is yet to be appointed despite specific recommendations made by the Kargil Review Committee a decade ago. The Tri-Service NCW Doctrine and Enterprise NCW Architecture are yet to be evolved. Tri-Service net-centricity is absent. A large number of command and control equipment and networks are being established but lack common standards and protocols. Several inter-operability constraints exist both intra-Service and inter-Service. Long-range stand-off precision attack capability against land targets is limited though being built up; procurement of weapons platforms and equipment need to cater for technological adaptation; the ability of technological entities to be integrated for synergised joint operations and the scope for innovation.
Air Defence capability is limited and differences between the Services as to who controls the Air Space remain unresolved; establishment of army’s Tac C3I and TCS systems are inordinately delayed; no dedicated Defence Band has been allocated in the spectrum – adequate bandwidths are not available to exploit technology; development of HR for is largely being done on individual Service basis; Cyber Warfare capabilities in the Military and National level are at nascent stage with little offensive capability; no policy for countering asymmetric/fourth generation war has been evolved. National Information Grid is yet to be established and no national policy evolved for Employment of Special Forces strategically on politico-military missions; negligible indigenous chip manufacturing capability exists; enormous security vulnerabilities exist with practically all computer and communications equipment parts and large amount of hardware and software continues to be being imported while little capability exists for detecting and eliminating malware embedded at manufacturing stage, and defence imports continue at over 70 per cent though the new government is resolved to address the issue on priority.
An evolutionary approach that we have been following past decades can hardly suffice. At the National/Military level, we need to do the following – make a blueprint for RMA and legislate it through the Parliament as advanced countries have already done. The draft would need to be prepared by the Military integrating Diplomatic, Information Operations and Economic aspects; replace the MoD with a Department of Defence staffed by military professional directly under the PM; allocate Defence Budget in sync with the approved RMA blueprint, prohibiting the surrender of Defence Budget and permit carriage of unutilised funds to the next financial year; appoint a CDS with full operational powers without further delay; make jointness in the Services a fait accompli, initiating establishment of an Integrated Functional and Integrated Theatre Commands; charge the CDS to implement the RMA under the directions of the Prime Minister, including synergising military and developing NCW capacity; inject military professionals in DRDO-DPSU-OF at all levels including for management and decision making; evolve comprehensive policy for military diplomacy; allot a dedicated Defence Band from the spectrum considering the security requirements; establish a Cyber Command, develop offensive capabilities and make information dominance an integral part of the cyber warfare doctrine; enunciate a Policy for Countering Asymmetric/Fourth Generation War and a National Policy for Strategic Employment of Special Forces particularly for countering these forms of war; establish comprehensive indigenous modern chip manufacturing capability on fast track progressive basis; ensure self reliance in software, hardware, production of hardened active network components including storage area networks and in the interim develop testing capability for malware; focus efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in critical areas like space technology and development of modern weapon systems including comprehensive ‘System of Systems’; accelerate education and joint training of military personnel to support and promote the new RMA with Indian characteristics and speed up establishment of the Indian National Defence University (INDU) and ensure that our procurement process is able to absorb and leapfrog technology.
RMA in the Indian Military is ongoing but needs to be drastically focused and accelerated. The political hierarchy must enforce jointness in the military and ensure organisational changes that are necessary to give an impetus to synergising the Armed Forces into total integration. Advancements in military technology will enable military operations to be conducted with such speed, precision and selective destruction that the nature and way in which future wars are fought and their consequent political impact will fundamentally alter the way in which military and political affairs are conducted.
In order to respond to this imperative, as also to fully exploit the potential offered by these technologies, our organisation and processes, concerned with the whole business of producing military/security capability will need to be re-structured accordingly. We must be able to protect own information systems, attack/influence information system of adversaries and leverage own strengths to gain decisive advantage in a battle space where national security is threatened. Future threats require us to leapfrog into total transformation through the application of RMA.
© Copyright 2015 Indian Defence Review
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