October 11, 2015, Institute for the Study of War
Key Take-Away
Russia has escalated its military actions against NATO from its new airbase in Syria. Russian warplanes have violated Turkish airspace twice, repeatedly locked Turkish F-16s in their radar, and intercepted three U.S. Predator drones over Syria. Russian warships in the Caspian Sea also launched cruise missiles against targets in Syria via Iranian and Iraqi airspace on October 7 without warning the U.S., its coalition allies, or Iraq. NATO Ministers met for a second time within a week; Secretary-General Stoltenberg reaffirmed that NATO forces are prepared to deploy to “wherever is needed” including Turkey. NATO’s response is otherwise aimed at long-term deterrence. Russia will likely continue to test the boundaries of NATO’s will to invoke Article 5 on collective defense.
Russia is trying to marginalize the United States by deepening its relationships with other regional states. Russian volunteers will likely support the Syrian regime and Iranian forces in their ground campaign in central Syria. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has wavered as other Iraqi Shi'a politicians and Iranian-backed proxy militias have endorsed Russian airstrikes and demanded Russian assistance. Egypt’s Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry publicly approved the Russian air campaign and President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi telephoned Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 8 in order to help reach “political settlements to the crises in the region at the soonest possible time.” Senior Russian political and military figures also met with officials in Jordan and Israel to discuss efforts to coordinate their activities against terrorism in Syria and throughout the Middle East. Russian likely intends to lure traditional U.S. partners in the Middle East towards its alliance with Iran and Syria, undermining the position of the U.S.
The geopolitical struggle between Russia and the U.S. has overshadowed Afghanistan’s deteriorating security. The main Taliban faction continued its offensive in the north. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have clashed fiercely with Taliban militants in Kunduz City, which fell on September 28. General John Campbell, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, testified that security situation in the country warrants considering a residual U.S. troop contingent of three-to-five thousand after 2016 rather than the 1,000 that the White House has approved. Nonetheless, these numbers appear insufficient as Afghanistan descends into further violence while 9,800 U.S. troops remain. Russia bolstered its military forces in the capital of Tajikistan on October 7 as the Taliban’s northern offensive continued. Russia has a security agreement protecting Tajikistan, but it may also seek to assert itself in the anti-ISIS fight in Afghanistan.
Russia in the Middle East
Russia escalates confrontation with U.S. and NATO: Russia expanded its military intervention in Syria as part of a larger campaign to curb the influence of the U.S. and NATO in the region. Russian warships in the Caspian Sea launched advanced cruise missiles into Syria on October 7 in order to showcase Russia’s complete access to Iranian and Iraqi airspace. Russia launched airstrikes in support of a new ground offensive by Syrian regime and Iranian proxy forces, highlighting the level of coordination between the three countries. Russia also confronted U.S. and Turkish aircraft in an effort to intimidate the U.S. and its NATO allies. In the last week, Russian jets have intercepted U.S. predator drones flying over Syria, repeatedly violated Turkish airspace, and locked radar on Turkish fighter jets. The United States has not escalated in response to these provocations. U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter said the United States would not cooperate with Moscow’s “tragically flawed” strategy. Turkish President Recep Erdogan warned Russia on October 6 against “losing a friend like Turkey,” adding that “an attack on Turkey is an attack on NATO.” NATO itself sought to deliver a warning to Russia. NATO announced that it would double the size of the NATO Response Force to 40,000 troops after its second ministerial in quick succession over the last week and asserted that its forces are ready to deploy within 48 hours to “wherever needed.”
Russia expands Syrian intervention from air to ground: Russia has rapidly and covertly expanded its intervention in Syria by launching ground operations alongside pro-regime forces, according to U.S. officials. U.S. Ambassador to NATO Douglas Lute reported on October 7 that Russia had built up a “battalion-size ground force” with artillery, rocket systems, and air-defense systems over the “last week or so.” Unnamed U.S. defense officials reported that Russian ground troops launched rocket and howitzer artillery in support of an October 7 pro-regime ground offensive in northern Hama Province. Secretary Carter predicted on October 8 that Russia would begin to suffer casualties in Syria after launching a “joint ground offensive with the Syrian regime.” Russia may covertly increase its troop presence on the ground in Syria by deploying a range of official and unofficial forces disguised as Russian “volunteers” in a hybrid warfare model that Russia previously employed in eastern Ukraine. Chechen governor Ramzan Kadyrov asked President Putin on October 2 to deploy Chechen security forces to Syria, echoing previous requests regarding eastern Ukraine. On October 5, the head of Russia’s parliamentary defense committee Admiral Vladimir Komoyedev said that Russian veterans of the conflict in eastern Ukraine were “likely” to deploy as “volunteer” ground troops in Syria and suggested that they “cannot be stopped.”
Russia prepares to challenge the U.S. over Afghanistan: Russia’s campaign to curb the regional influence of the U.S. and NATO extends to Afghanistan. On October 5, Chechen governor Kadyrov expressed confidence that Moscow would support Afghanistan’s fight against ISIS in a meeting with Afghan Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum. Russia announced on October 7 that it would deploy a new “air group” of attack and transport helicopters to Tajikistan following a meeting between President Putin and his Tajik counterpart on the increasingly volatile security situation near the Afghan-Tajik border. On October 9, Russia’s presidential envoy to Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov said that Russia plans to sign a contract to provide attack helicopters to Afghanistan this month. Russia holds multilateral and bilateral obligations to defend Tajikistan, where it already has a division of ground forces headquartered. Russia may use these obligations to bolster its posture near Afghanistan in anticipation of the NATO troop drawdown. Russia’s military efforts in Central and Southern Asia are already beginning to mirror its campaign to pose as an alternative security guarantor in the Middle East through forward deployments and the courting of U.S. allies.
See: “Russian Military Activity: October 1-8, 2015,” by Hugo Spaulding, October 8, 2015; “Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 - October 7, 2015,” by Genevieve Casagrande, October 8, 2015; “Iraq after Russian Intervention in Syria,” by Patrick Martin, October 7, 2015; “Syrian Regime Launches Ground Offensive with Russian Air Support,” by Christopher Kozak, October 7, 2015; "Warning Update: Russia Expanding Facilities at Tartus Naval Base,“ by Christopher Kozak with Hugo Spaulding and Daniel Urchick, September 30, 2015; "Russia’s First Reported Airstrikes in Syria Assist Regime with Targeting Broader Opposition,” by ISW Research Team, September 30, 2015; “Russia Ushers in a New Era of Global Geopolitics,” Frederick Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, September 27, 2015;Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare, by Maria Snegovaya, September 21, 2015; “Russian Deployment in Syria: Putin’s Middle East Game Changer,” by Hugo Spaulding, Christopher Kozak, Christopher Harmer, Daniel Urchick, Jessica Lewis-McFate, Jennifer Cafarella, Harleen Gambhir, and Kimberly Kagan, September 17, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Russia and Ukraine analyst Hugo Spaulding or Syria analyst Chris Kozak here.
IRAQ
Iranian-backed powerbrokers pressure Iraq’s Prime Minister to accept Russian airstrikes: Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi is under significant pressure to accept Russian airstrikes from the Iranian government and its Iraqi proxies, which also oppose his reforms aimed at improving government efficiency and reducing corruption. Key Shi'a politicians and Iranian-backed militiamen voiced strong support for potential Russian airstrikes in Iraq. Russian officials previously stated that Moscow would consider conducting airstrikes in Iraq if Baghdad issues a formal invitation, which now seems increasingly likely. Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi'a militias, including Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and the Badr Organization, voiced their support for Russian airstrikes on October 5. Other Shi'a political groups, including the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, similarly support Russian intervention. The once militia-linked chairman of the Iraqi Council of Representatives’ Security and Defense Committee suggested that Baghdad may make such a request in a matter of “days or a few weeks,” though Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Iraq has not yet requested Russian airstrikes. The visit of pro-Iran national security adviser and Popular Mobilization Commission chairman Faleh al-Fayadh to Moscow on October 7 suggests that discussions over Russian intervention by pro-Iranian elements may already be underway.
Prime Minister leverages Russian presence to gain U.S. support. PM Abadi may try to leverage the possibility of Russian assistance to convince the United States to provide more robust military support in the form of increased airstrikes, equipment, and training, though he appears open to the possibility of accepting a degree of Russia military support. Last week, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said he would “welcome” such an outcome. This week, he accused those who oppose Russian intervention of “acting as if Obama were one of their relatives.” In addition, the Iraqi Defense Ministry’s admitted that Russia did not inform Iraq ahead of time of Russian cruise missiles flying through Iraqi airspace. This move demonstrates Russia’s willingness to act unilaterally in Iraq to thwart U.S. policy as well as Russia’s disregard for Iraqi sovereignty.
ISF advances against ISIS in Ramadi: Iraqi Security Forces aggressively advanced toward Ramadi in a bid to encircle the city that ISIS captured on May 18. The ISF failed in several previous attempts to encircle the city and hold key terrain around Ramadi. However, the Iraqi Army (IA), Counter Terrorism Services, Federal Police, and tribal fighters conducted large operations to encircle Ramadi from the north, south, and west while the U.S.-led anti-ISIS Coalition, the Iraqi Air Force, and IA Aviation conducted airstrikes following the October 4 announcement of a “large-scale military operation.” Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Gen. John Allen predicted that “Ramadi will be taken in the near future” at a meeting with Iraq’s Interior Minister in Baghdad. Recapturing Ramadi represents an essential test for Abadi, who seeks to demonstrate that Baghdad can undertake an offensive to reclaim a major ISIS-held city without relying on Iranian proxy militias that seek to undermine his reforms.
ISIS conducts terrorist attacks in nominally secure parts of Iraq: ISIS targeted Shi'a population centers to exploit the over-extension of the ISF. Between October 3 and October 5, ISIS conducted two major suicide attacks in Shi'a neighborhoods in northern Baghdad and an additional attack in Khalis, north of Baghdad. On October 5, ISIS claimed a Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) attack in Zubair, south of Basra, an area where ISIS has not claimed a successful VBIED attack since July 2013. ISIS has the capacity to infiltrate and attack cities throughout Iraq, even in secure areas with predominantly Shi'a populations. Continued attacks in the southern provinces could lead to further militia mobilization, force the ISF to redeploy away from the frontlines, and slow the army’s forward operations to recapture territory from ISIS. Elsewhere in Iraq, ISIS remains in a defensive posture southwest of Kirkuk, where a Peshmerga-led offensive has seized dozens of villages since September 12 including several additional towns south of Kirkuk on October 5. Pressure on the ISIS stronghold of Hawija has not forced ISIS to divert resources towards the defense of Kirkuk, nor has it stopped ISIS from probing for exploitable weaknesses in other parts of Iraq. The deployment of additional Iraqi border guards to the Jordanian and Saudi border areas on September 29 and a subsequent operation in the region on October 9 indicates that ISIS is probing for possible access points along the Jordanian and Saudi borders with Iraq. ISW has not detected significant ISIS activity near the strategic Trebil and Arar border crossings or in the surrounding desert. However, it will be important to watch for an increase in reports of ISIS sightings near the borders that would indicate an ISIS effort to open access points between Iraq and its western neighbors.
Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Presidency crisis escalates into violence. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has experienced a political crisis since August 19 when Regional President Masoud Barzani refused to step down after the end of his term. Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the opposition parties have repeatedly failed to reach a compromise. Popular frustration with the crisis and the poor performance of government turned violent across Suleimaniyah Province after talks broke down once again. Demonstrators clashed with security forces on October 9 and October 10 in multiple towns and in downtown Suleimaniyah, leaving at least one person dead. Demonstrators also attacked KDP headquarters buildings and affiliated media offices. The demonstrations are likely spontaneous eruptions of popular discontent with the poor state of government in Iraqi Kurdistan. Leaders in the primary opposition parties, including the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran (Change), called for calm and an emergency meeting of the major political parties to resolve the crisis. The opposition will attempt to harness popular anger to extract concessions from KDP leader and Regional President Masoud Barzani in a bid to resolve the political crisis. In particular, the opposition will renew its efforts to reduce the powers of the Regional Presidency and convert the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) from a presidential system to a parliamentary one, policies that the opposition has demanded of the KDP since June 17.
See: “Iraqi Security Forces Launch New Offensive in Ramadi,” by Patrick Martin, October 8, 2015; “Iraq Situation Report: October 2-5, 2015”; “Iraq after Russian Intervention in Syria,” by Patrick Martin, October 7, 2015; “Confirmed Iranian Personnel Sightings in Iraq: October 2014 - October 2015,” by Andrew Haddad and ISW Iraq Team, October 3, 2015; “Warning Update: Iran and Iraqi Shi'a Militias Deploy Ground Forces in Syria,” by Christopher Kozak and Sinan Adnan, October 1, 2015; “Iraq Situation Report: September 26 - October 1, 2015”; “Iraq Situation Report: September 22-25, 2015”; “Regional Conflict Between Iran and Turky Manifests Itself in Iraq,” by Sinan Adnan, September 12, 2015; “Iraq Control of Terrain Map: September 11, 2015”; “Kata'ib Hezbollah and Iranian Proxies Challenge Iraq’s Proposed National Guard Law,” by Sinan Adnan, September 8, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Iraq expert Patrick Martin or ISIS expert Jessica Lewis McFate here.
SYRIA
Russia deepens its involvement in Syria: Russia expanded its intervention in Syria in both scope and scale over the past week. Russian President Putin had stated that Russian aircraft would soon “synchronize” their strikes with the Syrian Army in order to assist “offensive operations” on the ground. Russian and Syrian forces are indeed coordinating on the battlefield for the first time since the start of the Russian air campaign on September 30. Russian warplanes conducted airstrikes in support of a large-scale offensive by Syrian Army forces and Iranian proxy fighters against rebel positions in northwestern Syria. Russian forces also used ground-based multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and howitzers in support of the offensive. This offensive, located far from ISIS-held territory, further demonstrates Russia’s intent to bolster the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad rather than defeat ISIS. Four Russian warships in the Caspian Sea launched at least 26 cruise missiles against targets in Syria as the operation commenced in a show of force to intimidate Syrian opposition factions and the U.S.-led coalition. Russia may further escalate its engagement in Syria by deploying ground personnel to active combat roles, according to a senior Russian parliamentarian. U.S. Ambassador to NATO Doug Lute stated that Russia has deployed a “battalion-sized” ground force to Syria in addition to its aircrews and support personnel.
Russia aircraft provoke U.S. and NATO allies over Syria: Russian fighter jets violated Turkish airspace along the Syrian border in two separate incidents on October 3 and 4. Warplanes and surface-to-air missile systems affiliated with either Russia or the Syrian regime also repeatedly acquired radar lock on Turkish F-16 fighter jets patrolling the border between Turkey and Syria. NATO held a ministerial meeting in response to these incidents and called upon Russia to “cease and desist” its incursions into NATO airspace. These provocative activities have also targeted U.S. aircraft flying missions against ISIS. Russian aircraft have closed to within a “handful of miles” of U.S. Predator drones operating over Syria on several occasions, according to U.S. Air Force Central Command head Lt. Gen. Charles Brown that. Russian air activity forced U.S. aircraft to take action to “maintain safe separation” between the two parties at least once in the past week, according to Pentagon spokesperson Capt. Jeff Davis. The U.S. and Russia are moving slowly towards an arrangement to de-conflict their aerial operations. Meanwhile, the deputy chiefs of staff of Russia and Israel held two days of talks in Tel Aviv to discuss the de-confliction of their own air, naval, and “electromagnetic” operations in the region.
U.S. reformulates anti-ISIS strategy as ISIS expands near Aleppo: The U.S. Department of Defense announced an “operational pause” in the train-and-equip program for moderate anti-ISIS rebel fighters after several embarrassing setbacks, including repeated targeting by Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), alleged defections, and the turnover of U.S.-provided equipment to suspected JN intermediaries. The remaining budget of the $500 million program will be devoted towards a new ‘equip-and-enable’ mission providing lethal aid to a select group of rebel factions fighting alongside the Syrian Kurdish YPG in northern Syria. The assistance will support an offensive to isolate and potentially seize the ISIS stronghold of ar-Raqqa City. Despite airstrikes by both Russia and the U.S.-led coalition, ISIS rapidly advanced at least ten kilometers into rebel-held terrain directly north of Aleppo City, threatening both rebel and regime positions in the northern Aleppo countryside. ISIS fire reportedly killed senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Hamedani near the besieged regime-held Kuweires Airbase east of Aleppo City. Hamedani oversaw Iranian operations in Syria since at least 2012 and his death may temporarily disrupt Iranian activities in Syria.
See: “Iran Loses a Key Player in its Syria Strategy,” by Marie Donovan, October 9, 2015; “Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 - October 7, 2015,” by Genevieve Casagrande, October 8, 2015; “Syrian Regime Launches Ground Offensive with Russian Air Support,” by Christopher Kozak, October 7, 2015; “Syrian Opposition Guide: October 7, 2015,” by Jennifer Cafarella and Genevieve Casagrande, October 7, 2015; “Russian Disinformation on Airstrikes in Syria,” by Genevieve Casagrande, October 3, 2015; “Warning Update: Iran and Iraqi Shi'a Militias Deploy Ground Forces in Syria,” by Christopher Kozak and Sinan Adnan, October 1, 2015; “Warning Update: Russia Expanding Facilities at Tartus Naval Base,” by Christopher Kozak with Hugo Spaulding and Daniel Urchick, September 30, 2015; “International Community’s Opinions on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,” by ISW Research Team, September 30, 2015; “Russia Ushers in a New Era of Global Geopolitics,” Frederick Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, September 27, 2015; “Perspectives on the Syrian Civil War: September 27, 2015,” by Genevieve Casagrande, September 27, 2015; “Forecasting the Syrian Civil War,” by Christopher Kozak, Jennifer Cafarella, and the ISW Syria Team, September 17, 2015; "Russian Deployment in Syria: Putin’s Middle East Game Changer,“ by Hugo Spaulding, Christopher Kozak, Christopher Harmer, Daniel Urchick, Jessica Lewis-McFate, Jennifer Cafarella, Harleen Gambhir, and Kimberly Kagan, September 17, 2015; "Control of Terrain in Syria: September 14, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Syria analysts Jennifer Cafarella or Chris Kozak here.
EGYPT
Egypt publicly supports Russian airstrikes: Egypt publicly approved Russian escalation in Syria and reiterated its support for a political resolution to the Syrian Civil War. Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry announced on October 4 that "Russia’s entrance [to Syria], given its potential and capabilities, is something we see is going to have an effect on limiting terrorism in Syria and eradicating it.” Shoukry added that the “information available to Egypt through direct contact with the Russian side affirms Russia’s eagerness to counter terrorism and restrict its spread in Syria.” Egyptian Presidential Spokesman Alaa Youssef further announced on October 8 that President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi phoned Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss methods of combatting terrorism in the region. Egypt’s support for Russian intervention in Syria reflects its increasingly warm relations with Russia. This growing alliance likely will strain ties with Egypt’s close partner Saudi Arabia, an outspoken opponent of Russia’s targeting of Syrian rebels. Meanwhile, Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula remains restive after ISIS’s Wilayat Sinai started a new campaign against the Egyptian security forces called “Hunting Apostates II” on October 5.
See: “ISIS’s Wilayat Sinai Launches Largest Offensive in Sheikh Zuweid,” by Yasmin Faruki, Jenna Gowell, and Laura Hoffman, July 1, 2015; “ISIS’s Wilayat Sinai Attacks International Base,” by Harleen Gambhir and Jantzen Garnett, June 13, 2015; “Wilayat Sinai Likely Preparing for Car Bomb Campaign,” by Jantzen Garnett and Aaron Reese, March 12, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests on Egypt here.
ISIS
ISIS exploits Russian offensive against Syrian rebels: ISIS launched offensives in northern and eastern Syria this week, capitalizing on clashes between Syrian rebels and the Russian coalition in western Syria. ISIS broke through a longstanding stalemate against rebels in northern Syria and possibly killed a senior Iranian commander in the area on October 9. ISIS also initiated a large offensive against a regime-held military airbase in Deir ez-Zour in eastern Syria on October 2, aiming to expel the regime and thus preclude Russian operations against ISIS in eastern Syria. The Russian offensive against Syrian rebels and the announced “operational pause” of the U.S.’s program to train-and-equip Syrian rebels will empower ISIS at the expense of the moderate Syrian opposition.
ISIS defends its control with mass executions and spectacular attacks: ISIS faces pressure on multiple fronts across Syria and Iraq, even as it positions against the Russian coalition. The U.S.-led coalition continues to strike ISIS in northern and eastern Syria and reportedly plans to provide weapons, ammunition and air support to a future joint offensive by Syrian Arab and Kurdish forces against ISIS’s stronghold of ar-Raqqa city in northern Syria. The coalition is also providing air support to the Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) advance on the ISIS-held city of Ramadi in western Iraq and to the Iraqi Kurdish forces’ operations against ISIS in northwestern Iraq. ISIS has responded to this pressure by increasing mass abductions and executions within its controlled cities to quell resistance, and by continuing high-casualty explosive attacks in Shi'a population centers in Iraq. In particular, ISIS claimed a rare VBIED attack in Iraq’s southern Basra Province, indicating ISIS may be exploiting the forward deployment of many of Basra’s security elements in order to divert ISF attention and exacerbate existing unrest in the province.
ISIS’s affiliates prepare to expand in Afghanistan and Libya: ISIS’s regional affiliates continued efforts to expand territorial control in eastern Afghanistan and along Libya’s central coast. ISIS aims to broaden its territorial control and governance in Afghanistan, where it has held district centers in Nangarhar Province near Kabul for months. ISIS’s affiliate in Afghanistan claimed its first attack in Kabul on October 9, targeting a Shi'ite religious center. ISIS has also claimed attacks on the Taliban and Afghan security forces in Nangarhar Province. ISIS aims to seize Jalalabad, a key Afghan city 155 kilometers east of Kabul, according to the testimony of U.S. forces in Afghanistan commander General John Campbell. ISIS could seriously threaten Jalalabad by exploiting the focus of Taliban factions and the Afghan government upon fronts outside of Nangarhar. Meanwhile, ISIS’s affiliates in Libya initiated attacks east and west of Libya’s primary oil reserves, suggesting intent to launch an offensive to seize lucrative oil facilities in the near term. Territorial control in these countries allows ISIS to claim continued success, even as it faces multiple opponents in Iraq and Syria.
ISIS claims attacks to assert power over AQ, coalition: ISIS claimed attacks in the Arabian Peninsula and in South Asia this week, supporting its assertion of continued growth in areas where al-Qaeda (AQ) affiliates operate. ISIS claimed it launched four coordinated suicide attacks on a Saudi-backed Yemeni government operations center and a Saudi-Emirati administrative camp in Aden in southern Yemen on October 6. Responsibility for the attacks is unconfirmed, but it is possible that ISIS conducted the assault using explosive capabilities transferred from its active elements in Yemen’s capital of Sana'a, north of Aden. Confirmation of ISIS’s responsibility would indicate that ISIS is successfully exploiting the Yemeni conflict to expand its military capability to new provinces. ISIS also claimed a second assassination against a foreigner in Bangladesh on October 3, characterizing the attack as punishment for U.S.-led coalition operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. ISIS likely seeks to expand operations in both of these areas in order to target the U.S.-led coalition broadly and to undermine AQ in the Arabian Peninsula and Indian Subcontinent.
ISIS’s supporters threaten the West: ISIS continues its campaign to encourage radicalization and lone wolf attacks in the West. An Australian teenager conducted a shooting attack outside of a Sydney police headquarters on October 3. Australian authorities subsequently arrested at least five individuals suspected of maintaining links to ISIS in Sydney, suggesting that both in-person networks and digital radicalization foster pro-ISIS attacks. ISIS also has ambitions to obtain weapons of mass destruction. A Moldovan smuggling cell sought to sell nuclear material to ISIS. The cell is allegedly linked to Russian security forces and seeks to “annihilate America,” indicating a dangerous potential for partnership between ISIS and criminal gangs.
This section draws upon sourcing and analysis provided by our partners at the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute.
See: “ISIS-Linked Regional Activity: September 2015,” by Harleen Gambhir, September 30, 2015; “ISIS-Linked Regional Activity: August 2015,” by Harleen Gambhir, September 30, 2015; “ISIS’s Global Strategy: September 2015,” by Harleen Gambhir, September 18, 2015; "ISIS Sanctuary Map: September 15, 2015"; ISIS’s Global Strategy: A Wargame, by Harleen Gambhir, July 15, 2015; The ISIS Defense in Iraq and Syria: Countering an Adaptive Enemy, by Jessica Lewis McFate, May 15, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Counter-Terrorism analyst Harleen Gambhir or ISIS expert Jessica Lewis McFate here.
Afghanistan
Battle of Kunduz and Taliban Northern Offensive: Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) continued to fight for control of Kunduz City, which Mullah Akthar Mansour’s Taliban faction seized on September 28. Although reports suggest the ANSF has recently retaken the city center, Taliban militants remain scattered throughout the city and ANSF clearing operations are ongoing. The ANSF also are clashing with Taliban militants over control of Bala Hisar hill, high ground critical to control of Kunduz City. The Taliban is reportedly regrouping in nearby Chahar Darah District, Kunduz Province. Meanwhile, Taliban militants have continued their offensive in northwestern Afghanistan. Taliban militants attacked the capital of Faryab Province, where NATO airpower stopped the advance. The Taliban nevertheless seized or contested other districts in Faryab and Sar-e Pul Provinces on October 5. The Taliban’s broader northern offensive indicates a significant degree of sophistication, prior planning, and intent to seize terrain before winter.
The Unites States has continued airstrikes in support of the ANSF after it mistakenly struck a Doctors Without Borders medical facility in Kunduz City in response to a request relayed from the ANSF to U.S. special operators up the U.S. military’s chain of command. Investigations by the United States Department of Defense, NATO Resolute Support Command and the Afghan government are underway. U.S. airstrikes have continued since the incident in support of ANSF operations against an October 6 Taliban offensive on Maimana City, Faryab Province.
Future U.S. presence in Afghanistan: President Obama is considering formal recommendations regarding the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan after 2016. General John Campbell, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, testified that security situation in the country warrants considering a residual U.S. troop contingent of three-to five thousand after 2016 rather than the 1,000 approved by the White House. Nonetheless, these numbers appear insufficient as Afghanistan descends into further violence while 9,800 U.S. troops remain. The residual contingent would engage in counter-terrorism operations against Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other direct threats to the United States. The force would operate out of Bagram Air Base and one or two other bases inside Afghanistan. Under this plan these bases would serve as staging areas to launch drone and manned aircraft strikes. The bases would also house elite counter-terrorism troops. Under President Obama’s original plan, a 1,000-strong contingent would conduct counter-terrorism operations out of the United States Embassy in Kabul. General Campbell testified that reducing the level of U.S. forces to 1,000 in Kabul would considerably diminish the United States’ ability to train, advise, and assist the ANSF. The plan would also eliminate ANSF capability for counter-terrorism operations. A larger reduction in US forces could lead to the Taliban establishing more safe havens in Afghanistan. These safe havens would pose a significant challenge to ANSF governance and control.
ISIS attacks a Shi'a religious center in Kabul: ISIS’s affiliate in Afghanistan Wilayat Khorasan conducted its first attack in Kabul city on a Shi'a religious congregation center on October 9. Wilayat Khorasan’s first attack in Kabul follows September 27 and September 29 coordinated attacks on ANSF positions in Nangarhar Province. Wilayat Khorasan is gaining in military strength and operational reach in Afghanistan and aims to seize the Nangarhar provincial capital in Jalalabad. Wilayat Khorasan has stated its intent to seize Jalalabad as its capital.
See: “Militant Attack and Support Zones in Afghanistan: April-October 6, 2015,” by Saagar Enjeti and Rob Denaburg, October 6, 2015; “Warning Update: Taliban Northern Offensive Expands,” by Saagar Enjeti, October 1, 2015; “Is the Islamic State Escalating in Afghanistan?” by Lauren McNally, April 27, 2015; The Taliban Resurgent: Threats to Afghanistan’s Security, by Lauren McNally and Paul Bucala, March 20, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests on Afghanistan here.
Ukraine
Russia pauses further in Ukraine with separatist election delay: Russia advanced its thinly veiled image as a constructive international security actor by ordering its separatist proxies to postpone their unrecognized elections. President Putin reportedly promised to pressure the separatists into delaying the fake elections on October 2, when the leaders of Ukraine, France, Germany, and Russia met for the first time since negotiating the “Minsk II” ceasefire agreement in February 2015. On October 6, Russian-backed separatists announced their decision to postpone the upcoming elections, which violated the terms of the ceasefire agreement, until February 2016. The postponement puts pressure on Ukraine’s pro-Western government to make the controversial political concessions to the separatists outlined in the “Minsk II” agreement and effectively extends the deal’s implementation into 2016, a step Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko had recently insisted could not be taken. Russia’s decision to reverse its position on the separatist elections extends its operational pause on the frontline in eastern Ukraine. Russia has not conceded its desire to dominate Ukraine by using the threat of force, and it will retain its ability to escalate the conflict in the months to come.
See: “Russian-backed Separtiststs Postpone Disputed Elections,” by Daniel Pitcairn, October 8, 2015; “Ukraine Crisis Update: September 23, 2015,” Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare, by Maria Snegovaya, September 21, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Russia and Ukraine analyst Hugo Spaulding here.
No comments:
Post a Comment