Petr Kozlov
4 October 2015
4 October 2015
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Vladimir Putin, in his address to the United Nations general assembly, called on world leaders to join him in what he described as a contemporary “anti-Hitler coalition”. It was to begin with air strikes on the positions of radical jihadis from Islamic State (Isis).
According to the official version, the goal is not to protect the “Russian world” (ethnic Russians living abroad), which was the justification for action in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea. Instead, it is in some ways the reverse – to protect Russia from outside influences, specifically from those fighting in the ranks of Isis who could one day return home and launch attacks in Russia.
Already, since the spring and with surprising regularity, top-ranking government officials have discussed the dangers posed by the claimed thousands of Isis volunteers who have joined from Russia.
There is a legitimate question in play here: does the danger posed to Moscow by Russian “graduates” of Isis really require the expensive transfer of a squadron of military aircraft, hundreds of soldiers and now air strikes on the positions of the Islamists fighting against Assad thousands of miles from the Russian border? Or could they be identified and stopped by special intelligence services on the Russian border if trying to get back home?
And for what other reasons might Russia have sent attack aircraft to Latakia? Why do we need it? To save the “legitimate power” as Moscow sees it of one of its only allies in the Middle East – Assad – whose forces have been retreating under the pressure from Isis militants and other opposition groups? A way of battling back against the popular revolutions that have swept from Kiev’ to the Middle East and North Africa? Perhaps the desire is to return Russian to the club of “great powers” that determined the fate of the world since 1945.
But there is also another possibility: that the air strikes are an attempt to get out of the “Ukrainian swamp” and the western sanctions it has brought. In this scenario, the Kremlin is trying to use the new global agenda of fighting Isis and helping to halt the flow of refugees as a way of finding a new direction out.
Putin could see the Syrian plan as a way out of isolation but he has seriously had to raise the stakes in the game. As shown in August and September, and in particular at the UN general assembly, the western policy of isolating Russia over Ukraine seems to be floundering. Syria dominated there and the Russian leader seized the spotlight and pushed Ukraine into the background of the global agenda.
Russian attack planes started assaults immediately, confusing the west and the east by their decisiveness. Despite negotiations with the US, Germany, France, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel and other top players, the first days of air operation have shown that Kremlin still hasn’t reached a compromise. Moscow was immediately suspected of attempting to use a new reality to help Assad’s fight against a “moderate opposition” and the media started reporting strikes in areas far from Isis-controlled positions, including those of rebels trained by the CIA. In response to these reports the Russian foreign ministry urged us “not to listen to the Pentagon about the Russian strikes and contact the Ministry of Defence of Russia”.
However clear this was, Moscow did not manage to convince others of its sincerity: in a joint statement, the US, Britain, France, Germany, Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia asked Moscow to stop air strikes against militants of the Syrian opposition and focus efforts on the destruction of Isis.
Watch Russian television and it has now all switched to Syria, with participants of numerous popular talk shows that once raged about Ukraine now spending hours discussing Isis and Assad. This seems an excellent opportunity to divert attention from the tired stories about the “fascist junta” in Kiev and give the audience a new storyline. Practice shows that it is always a good public relations move to distract the population from rising food prices and the devaluation of the rouble.
At the same time, interesting sociological research emerged from theLevada-Center (conducted between 18-21 September, before President Putin’s speech). Almost a half of Russians believed that in Syria there is a civil war and 32% believed a war was being waged against the legitimate Assad regime, spurred on by the west; 58% said that Isis is a threat to the region and to the world, 41% had heard about Russians volunteers in Isis and were concerned about it, though 35% had never heard anything about Russian volunteers fighting for jihadis.
Only 14% of respondents answered that Russia should provide direct military support to Assad regime (69% were against it), 43% for providing arms and consultations.
But people’s moods can be changed quite fast with a help of state-controlled media – that is what we have seen in 2014-2015 in the Donbass conflict in eastern Ukraine. The war in Donbass has served its function and given way to talk about a new, distant “small victorious war” – but wars in faraway places can be different.
One of the members of the Federation Council (the upper house of parliament) confidently told me, immediately after the house had unanimously given Putin permission to use the army outside of Russia, that Moscow would emulate the “successful Soviet experience” of Vietnam. There, Soviet air support for the army of the north, “in general, liberated the entire territory of South Vietnam and all the puppets ran out”.
Although the mandate for the use of the armed forces is not limited, the Kremlin claims that it intends to use it only for strikes and is not planning to dive “headfirst” into the fight on the ground. But, first, it is worth recalling that the war in Vietnam lasted 18 years. A few years after Vietnam, Moscow then responded to a “request” from Kabul to help restore order in Afghanistan. This is similar to the request just made by the “legitimate authorities” in Syria.
Back then, nobody planned a long ground operation in Afghanistan and certainly did not imagine that it could end in failure. That “small victorious war” dragged on for 10 years, killing hundreds of thousands and hitting the economy. Instead of success and fanfare for the USSR, the war was a PR disaster that damaged the country’s brand still further. And that is today perhaps the most important thing for the Kremlin.
If we try to learn from the mistakes of our history it’s difficult to see how with all the risks involved in Syria this latest military adventure is likely to be a “small victorious war” that will turn the tide in Russia’s favour in the long run.
Petr Kozlov is the home and foreign policy correspondent for Vedomosti newspaper, based in Moscow
Vladimir Putin, in his address to the United Nations general assembly, called on world leaders to join him in what he described as a contemporary “anti-Hitler coalition”. It was to begin with air strikes on the positions of radical jihadis from Islamic State (Isis).
According to the official version, the goal is not to protect the “Russian world” (ethnic Russians living abroad), which was the justification for action in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea. Instead, it is in some ways the reverse – to protect Russia from outside influences, specifically from those fighting in the ranks of Isis who could one day return home and launch attacks in Russia.
Already, since the spring and with surprising regularity, top-ranking government officials have discussed the dangers posed by the claimed thousands of Isis volunteers who have joined from Russia.
There is a legitimate question in play here: does the danger posed to Moscow by Russian “graduates” of Isis really require the expensive transfer of a squadron of military aircraft, hundreds of soldiers and now air strikes on the positions of the Islamists fighting against Assad thousands of miles from the Russian border? Or could they be identified and stopped by special intelligence services on the Russian border if trying to get back home?
And for what other reasons might Russia have sent attack aircraft to Latakia? Why do we need it? To save the “legitimate power” as Moscow sees it of one of its only allies in the Middle East – Assad – whose forces have been retreating under the pressure from Isis militants and other opposition groups? A way of battling back against the popular revolutions that have swept from Kiev’ to the Middle East and North Africa? Perhaps the desire is to return Russian to the club of “great powers” that determined the fate of the world since 1945.
But there is also another possibility: that the air strikes are an attempt to get out of the “Ukrainian swamp” and the western sanctions it has brought. In this scenario, the Kremlin is trying to use the new global agenda of fighting Isis and helping to halt the flow of refugees as a way of finding a new direction out.
Putin could see the Syrian plan as a way out of isolation but he has seriously had to raise the stakes in the game. As shown in August and September, and in particular at the UN general assembly, the western policy of isolating Russia over Ukraine seems to be floundering. Syria dominated there and the Russian leader seized the spotlight and pushed Ukraine into the background of the global agenda.
Russian attack planes started assaults immediately, confusing the west and the east by their decisiveness. Despite negotiations with the US, Germany, France, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel and other top players, the first days of air operation have shown that Kremlin still hasn’t reached a compromise. Moscow was immediately suspected of attempting to use a new reality to help Assad’s fight against a “moderate opposition” and the media started reporting strikes in areas far from Isis-controlled positions, including those of rebels trained by the CIA. In response to these reports the Russian foreign ministry urged us “not to listen to the Pentagon about the Russian strikes and contact the Ministry of Defence of Russia”.
However clear this was, Moscow did not manage to convince others of its sincerity: in a joint statement, the US, Britain, France, Germany, Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia asked Moscow to stop air strikes against militants of the Syrian opposition and focus efforts on the destruction of Isis.
Watch Russian television and it has now all switched to Syria, with participants of numerous popular talk shows that once raged about Ukraine now spending hours discussing Isis and Assad. This seems an excellent opportunity to divert attention from the tired stories about the “fascist junta” in Kiev and give the audience a new storyline. Practice shows that it is always a good public relations move to distract the population from rising food prices and the devaluation of the rouble.
At the same time, interesting sociological research emerged from theLevada-Center (conducted between 18-21 September, before President Putin’s speech). Almost a half of Russians believed that in Syria there is a civil war and 32% believed a war was being waged against the legitimate Assad regime, spurred on by the west; 58% said that Isis is a threat to the region and to the world, 41% had heard about Russians volunteers in Isis and were concerned about it, though 35% had never heard anything about Russian volunteers fighting for jihadis.
Only 14% of respondents answered that Russia should provide direct military support to Assad regime (69% were against it), 43% for providing arms and consultations.
But people’s moods can be changed quite fast with a help of state-controlled media – that is what we have seen in 2014-2015 in the Donbass conflict in eastern Ukraine. The war in Donbass has served its function and given way to talk about a new, distant “small victorious war” – but wars in faraway places can be different.
One of the members of the Federation Council (the upper house of parliament) confidently told me, immediately after the house had unanimously given Putin permission to use the army outside of Russia, that Moscow would emulate the “successful Soviet experience” of Vietnam. There, Soviet air support for the army of the north, “in general, liberated the entire territory of South Vietnam and all the puppets ran out”.
Although the mandate for the use of the armed forces is not limited, the Kremlin claims that it intends to use it only for strikes and is not planning to dive “headfirst” into the fight on the ground. But, first, it is worth recalling that the war in Vietnam lasted 18 years. A few years after Vietnam, Moscow then responded to a “request” from Kabul to help restore order in Afghanistan. This is similar to the request just made by the “legitimate authorities” in Syria.
Back then, nobody planned a long ground operation in Afghanistan and certainly did not imagine that it could end in failure. That “small victorious war” dragged on for 10 years, killing hundreds of thousands and hitting the economy. Instead of success and fanfare for the USSR, the war was a PR disaster that damaged the country’s brand still further. And that is today perhaps the most important thing for the Kremlin.
If we try to learn from the mistakes of our history it’s difficult to see how with all the risks involved in Syria this latest military adventure is likely to be a “small victorious war” that will turn the tide in Russia’s favour in the long run.
Petr Kozlov is the home and foreign policy correspondent for Vedomosti newspaper, based in Moscow
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