Heed the warning from Kunduz

Posted at: Oct 15 2015 , Suba Chandran

http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/heed-the-warning-from-kunduz/146089.html

The fall of Kunduz should be seen as a warning of what has gone wrong. We know what the problems are. Fortunately, we also know the solutions. We need to look beyond the “resurgent” Taliban, which is only part of the problem.

The government troops, supported by the US air cover, are fighting to reclaim the city. Kunduz, one of the northern provinces, along with Balkh on its west and Badakshan on its east (along with Takhar province) borders Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The famous Amu darya (Amu river) separates the province from Tajikistan and it is populated with Pashtuns, Tajiks and Uzbeks. Unlike the southern provinces of Afghanistan, Kunduz does not have an absolute Pashtun majority. Importantly, it does not have a border with Pakistan. Given the above ethnic profile of the province and its distance from the heartland of Taliban insurgency, even if the city is under Taliban occupation for a brief period, it should be a serious warning. Answers have to be found merely beyond the theory of “Taliban resurgence”.

For those who were watching the developments in Kunduz (and its neighbouring Baghlan province), the fall of Kunduz city was not a surprise. Given the lack of military response and inadequate political will to meet the challenge, it was surprising that the Taliban took so much time to capture it. The first question should be related to the security: If reclaiming the city is taking weeks, even with American air support, how did the Taliban manage to capture it with a few hundred fighters and in few hours? According to eyewitnesses, the Taliban started fighting in the morning, and drove the security forces (army, police and the militias) to the airport side before lunch time and took over the city. 

The Taliban had already established roots in the province. What did the local police and other intelligence-gathering organisations do? In retrospect, given the casualty figures, (or rather the lack of casualties during the Taliban takeover), it appears that more than the insurgents fighting for it, the security forces and the militias seem to have abandoned their positions and started falling back. Answers to the above questions should be the first warning.

The second warning should be over the ethnic divide that has not been bridged; blaming the ANSF alone for the disaster would be misleading. The primary ethnic divide — Pashtun, Uzbek and Tajik (besides the Turkmen and Hazara) has been historical. Post-2001 Afghan governments — Karzai then and Ghani now — have inherited the problem. With no ethnic group having an absolute majority (though the Pashtuns form the majority, with more than 30 per cent of the Kunduz population), the province remains an ethnic cauldron. 

History, especially since the last two centuries, has not been kind to this ethnic divide in Kunduz and adjoining regions. If the Russian occupation drove some of the Central Asian tribes into this region from the different Khanates there, post-Ahmad Shah Abdali consolidation of northern Afghanistan pushed the Pashtuns north of the Hindu Kush region. Since the 1930s, Kunduz attracted the Pashtuns further, thanks to the Spinzak Cotton Company-led economic development. Further, during the 1990s, the civil war in Tajikistan pushed thousands of refugees inside, with a substantial section staying back in Kunduz. These different waves of population movement from Central Asia and southern Afghanistan into Kunduz has led to a resource struggle — from land occupation and water rights to a share in the administration. 

The third warning should be over the role of militias and individual commanders owing allegiance to different political factions belonging to Uzbek, Tajik and Pahstun groups. Ever since the civil war in 1992, the Kunduz province has been divided between commanders owing allegiance to Dostum, Massoud and Hekmetyar. They fought with each other in different permutations, depending on (and at times, irrespective of) the alliances in Kabul. 

The Taliban was a late entrant into this game. When the Taliban came to Kunduz, the Mujahideen commanders at the ground level switched allegiance multiple times. Kunduz finally fell to the Taliban in 1997, to be evicted in 2001. Under the Taliban, Kunduz became a strategic staging point towards East and West. Even more, with support and patronage from the Taliban, Kunduz also became a staging point for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) into Central Asia. In return, the IMU supported the Taliban offensive against Ahmed Shah Massoud. The Al-Qaida had also stablished its camps in the province. It appears, in 2015, the new Taliban, under Mullah Mansour, is attempting to make use of the same divide between the different commanders. 

Instead of strengthening the institutions of governance at the grass-roots level, international troops earlier and now the Afghan State seem to have abdicated responsibility and found a shortcut in the militias. When these militias are allowed to patrol and even collect “taxes”, what else can one expect? Maybe they have a tactical use, but they are a long-term liability. 

The fourth warning should be in terms of what is happening at the national capital. There is a bigger divide in Kabul over Kunduz (as with the other provinces and various institutions created by the Constitution), between President Ghani and the Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah. According to reports, the Abdullah factions refuse to extend cooperation to the previous Governor of Kunduz, Omar Safi, a Ghani appointee. Supporters of Safi had complained that the Afghan intelligence and the Interior Ministry were pursuing their own agenda unknown to the Governor. The Governor had to be ultimately sacked, following the Taliban takeover. But the damage had already been done. 

The difference between the President and his CEO is damaging the government functioning. The security forces in Kunduz city — from the commanders at the top level to the police man in the streets — are divided. No wonder they fell at this pace. The fifth warning should be over the popular angst against the government. The post-2001 development has created a section, which wants to make use of the opportunity and move forward. Kunduz was witnessing a revival, led by the individual efforts. One should not forget that the Kunduz province was one of the better-governed and economically well placed provinces, thanks to the Spinzar Cotton Company. It also is rich in agricultural produce, including cotton, rice and wheat. Unlike most of the other provinces, Kunduz will be able to sustain an economy of its own, if there is better governance and opportunities for all. Unfortunately, the State today is neither able to absorb nor give people enough openings to utilise their potential. Instead, the locals see bad governance and a high level of corruption, resulting in increasing disappointment. 

The writer is a former Director of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.