By Brig Amar Cheema
27 Oct , 2015
Celebrated as the Infantry Day by the Indian Army, 27th October, 1947, was truly spectacular in the annals of Indian History – Not only did the Post-Independence Indian Army come into its own, but it was also the finest hour for the Indian Air Force and the brave Kashmiris who collectively contributed in their own way to the ‘rescue’ of Kashmir. This piece covering these fateful events is an extract from my book, ‘The Crimson Chinar: A Politico-Military Perspective of the Kashmir War.’
Concurrent to these developments in Delhi, Sheikh Abdullah sent Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and GM Sadiq to Pakistan to meet Mr. Jinnah and/or Mr.Liaqat Ali Khan.
The Military Situation and Initial Indian Responses
News of the Pakistan sponsored Qabali invasion reached Delhi on 24 October via two channels. Generals Auchinleck and Lochhart were informed by the officiating C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, General Gracey, and by the evening, the second input came through Mr. R L Batra, the Deputy Prime Minister of Kashmir, who had flown to Delhi with an urgent request from the Maharaja. His mission requesting for immediate help also conveyed the willingness of the Maharaja to accede to India to save his state from the ‘Marauders’ as he dubbed the Qabalis, who by then had already ravaged Uri and had the same state was feared for Baramulla.
The next day the Defence Cabinet Committee (DCC), chaired by Lord Mountbatten held their first meeting. Against strong opposition from the Service Chiefs and from Lord Mountbatten himself, it was decided to help Kashmir militarily. However, what could be adduced as delaying tactics,[1] it was decided to send Mr. Menon to Srinagar to make an ‘on the spot’ assessment. As a consequence, Menon and Batra flew to the valley the same afternoon.
Concurrent to these developments in Delhi, Sheikh Abdullah sent Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and GM Sadiq to Pakistan to meet Mr. Jinnah and/or Mr.Liaqat Ali Khan. This move of Sheikh Abdullah proved abortive as Jinnah sensing victory did not deem it prudent to meet the emissaries, now that success was within his reach. This enraged the Sheikh and he flew to Delhi and met Pundit Nehru. In fact he was there when Batra reached Nehru’s house on 24 October. On the same day Pundit Nehru informed Prime Minister Attlee of the developments and that India was considering military intervention.[2] Mr Attlee responded by requesting both Nehru and Liaqat to avoid precipitating the situation which could lead to a military confrontation.
When Menon flew back the next morning, Mr. Mahajan, the Prime Minister of Kashmir, also flew in with him and he carried the letter seeking accession to India. Thus, 26 October was the date when after a stormy DCC session, the decision was taken to send Indian troops to the rescue of the state. The situation had become so acrimonious, that the Indian Ministers were constrained to state that since the British officers opposed the operation, they could step down and it was Mountbatten’s intervention that saved the situation. However, after this ugly turn of events, he took upon himself to become the de facto military advisor for the impending Indian operation.
…it is worth mentioning, that after the Second World War, the Indian Army was fortunate to have a number of Battalions who were trained for parachuting and it was fortuitous for India that the first wave of Indian troops landed unopposed.
The Military Response
Lieutenant General (Retd) S K Sinha in his book, Op Rescue: Military Operations in J & K, 1947-49[3] has brought out the circumstances when instructions were received at HQ Delhi and East Punjab (DEP) Command. This HQ had been raised after partition and was tasked to control the sub-areas of East Punjab and Delhi as well as the restore ‘law and order’ in Delhi and in the newly created state of East Punjab. General Sinha, who was then a Major, recounts how they had been summoned to the Operations Room at 2200 hours on the evening of 26 October, 1947, when the Army Commander, General Russell tasked them for the ‘rescue’ of Kashmir. He instructed his officers to expeditiously dispatch one Battalion group by air to Srinagar using a combination of Air Force and civil aircraft and one Brigade group by road to Jammu; moves which were required to commence by first light the next day i.e. 27 October. The Battalion for Srinagar was required to be built to a Brigade group before the onset of winters. One term of reference was laid down at the outset; no British or Muslim officer who had opted for Pakistan could accompany the forces. With one stroke, this reduced the availability of officers to lead the expeditionary force. The military imperatives for the task entrusted to Russell are analysed below:
Secure Srinagar Air Head. This was paramount as air was the only means to build up forces in the time frame. It is pertinent to interject that in the absence of information,[4] especially on the security of the airfield, it would have been militarily desirable to have provided a fighter-bomber escort and paratroopers with the first wave to secure the air head. Since this was not done or planned for, it may have been because of their non-availability in the time frame. However, it is worth mentioning, that after the Second World War, the Indian Army was fortunate to have a number of Battalions who were trained for parachuting and it was fortuitous for India that the first wave of Indian troops landed unopposed. Had the landing been opposed, India may not have been able to recapture the valley as the instructions to Colonel Rai were to land only if the airfield was un-held. From Pakistan’s point of view, going by the timing of Op Gulmarg, it was expected that the airfield would be in the hands of the raiders by the 24/25 October. It was the delay in Baramulla that upset their time plan and provided the window to land forces. The futility of the contingency instructions are obvious.
Securing of the Banihal Pass. This was a concurrent priority, as the pass provided the only possible road link to the valley. Again, it was fortuitous for India that Pakistan could not/did not block this strategic pass. India also erred in this regard and it was only later that a company of 3 RAJPUT (PARA) was sent there when reports of a threat building up were received.
Kashmir has acceded to the Indian Union and Sheikh Abdullah has been invited to form a popular Government.
Aggressive employment of Air. Interdicting the tribals at Kohala or Domel and delaying their move to Srinagar should have emerged as the first priority.[5] However, for inexplicable reasons, such strikes were not undertaken.[6]
Independent India’s First Expeditionary Military Deployment
The honour of the first unit going into combat on behalf of Independent India was bestowed on 1 SIKH, whose Commanding Officer (CO), Lieutenant Colonel Ranjit Rai had taken over the unit recently and fortuitously, the Battalion had been conducting internal security duties in Gurgaon. HQ 161 Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier J C Katoch who had moved for internal security tasks from Ranchi was available as the formation for controlling operations in the valley; while the second formation selected for the Jammu sector was 50 Parachute (Para) Brigade under Brigadier Paranjape. It may be pertinent to point out that as a result of their internal security role, 1 SIKH was not carrying heavy weapons, which had to be hastily found for them.
The sketchy Intelligence and the vague tasking to CO 1 SIKH can be judged from the Operational Instructions personally drafted by General Russel: excerpts are reproduced:
Kashmir has acceded to the Indian Union and Sheikh Abdullah has been invited to form a popular Government.
Tribesmen, numbers and arms unknown but reliably reported to be in large numbers, are reported moving to Srinagar from the western and north-western areas of the state. Situation in Srinagar reliably reported on 26th October to be deteriorating.
You will: –
(a) Secure Srinagar airport and civil aviation wireless station;
(b) Take such action, as your first task and available troops allow to:-
(i) Drive tribesmen away from Srinagar.
(ii) Aid the local government in the maintenance of law and order in Srinagar.”
It is also to the credit of 1 SIKH that the Battalion could be inducted so effortlessly in such a short time. It needs to be pointed out that these men were from Punjab, the state that had been the worst affected by partition.
With this as the only background, Lieutenant Colonel Rai was handed over his instructions along with two sets of maps at 0300 hours on 27 October at the airfield, implying that all his planning had to be done enroute. This may have been the first time in the history of Independent India that troops were launched into battle with such sketchy information and vague tasking. Unfortunately, this was not the not to be the last.[7] It is to the credit of Rai and his men as well the staff of HQ DEP and the numerous airmen, both military and civil, who rose to the occasion and affected the air lift flawlessly. The personal impressions of General Sinha, as the Command HQ staff officer assisting Rai in the airlift of the man given this arduous task is worth recounting and is quoted both as a tribute and as an inspiration for military leadership. “I must mention that his calmness was indeed inspiring. He showed no excitement or agitation and appeared, as always, supremely self-confident. With my little experience of war, I am convinced that calmness and self-confidence during stress and strain are very important assets for a good leader. Self-confidence in a leader is contagious, it soon spreads among the led, and a self-confident fighting team is a battle winning factor.”[8]
It is also to the credit of 1 SIKH that the Battalion could be inducted so effortlessly in such a short time. It needs to be pointed out that these men were from Punjab, the state that had been the worst affected by partition. These men had their homes and families uprooted and they had arrived in Indian Punjab as refugees; many had had their loved ones killed, maimed or separated – most of them were homeless. That these men could put aside their personal losses and fight for their nation so resolutely, in a state not their own, speaks volumes of the soldiers they were. That was not all the handicaps these indomitable breed of men endured. The initial wave which was to be flown in also included one battery of Sikh Artillery gunners, re-organised for an Infantry role. Not only were these gunners enmeshed seamlessly but assimilated as a fighting sub-unit of the unit.
The command and control of the forces for the forces to operate in Kashmir remained awkward to say the least. HQ DEP,[9]which essentially was an ad-hoc HQ was organised to control the internal security situation and in no way was it geared up to oversee full-fledged operations in distant Kashmir. However, being located in Delhi, it was made responsible for collecting, transporting and arranging logistical support of the forces being sent to Kashmir; the operational control of the forces, however, rested directly with Army HQ.[10] This arrangement continued till late and resulted in the war being remotely controlled from distant Delhi, with no intermediate HQ in between, and in the initial stages, 1 SIKH was directly reporting to Army HQ.
The Air Bridge and Build up in the Valley
With the Pakistan sponsored tribals virtually knocking on the gates of Srinagar, the only way to plant Indian boots on the ground was to provide an immediate air bridge to the valley. What followed was an extraordinary airlift hastily organised seemingly from nowhere and speaks volumes not only for the team and staff work between the Air Force and the Army, but also with the Civil Aviation. With three Dakotas of the RIAF and six mustered from the civil, twenty-eight sorties were affected on 27 October itself.
By 6 November, approximately 3,500 troops along with their supplies and equipment had been airlifted to the valley. This was an unparalleled feat, especially in the context of the sub-continent.
The civil planes carried 15 fully kitted soldiers along with 225 kgs of supplies while the RIAF planes carried two additional men. Hence, it was only possible to accommodate the Tactical HQ of 1 SIKH, one Rifle Coy and one Composite Coy of the Artillery in the first lift. The first two flights took off as planned and commenced landing at 0830 hours. By 1000 hours, the force was on ground and this information was relayed to the relief of Delhi and this momentous event marked the first military deployment for war by Independent India. By 6 November, approximately 3,500 troops along with their supplies and equipment had been airlifted to the valley. This was an unparalleled feat, especially in the context of the sub-continent. Not only did the RIAF and the Indian Army rise magnificently to the task, but the contributions of the civil pilots and their ground staff was praiseworthy. It was indeed a laudable effort and was done without any mishap whatsoever. “If the airlift had not made the landing of the troops possible, Kashmir would have been lost before we could defend it.”[11]
Lord Mountbatten who had been proved wrong by the Indians was full of praise for the effort and he went on to write, “..in his war experience, he had never come across an airlift of this order being successfully undertaken with such slender resources, and at such short time.”[12]General S K Sinha, who himself was involved with the airlift as a staff officer, was to call this effort a ‘miracle.’ The important lesson to take home from the airlift, was the alacrity of response and unity of purpose which was displayed by the men ‘in’ and ‘out’ of uniform. Without this, as the late Air Commodore Jasjit Singh has pointed out, the valley and with it Kashmir, would have been lost.
The timely demolition of the bridge was the first of the acts that saved the valley and the officer’s valour earned him eternal recognition as the ‘Saviour of Kashmir’ apart from the award of Independent India’s first gallantry award, a well-deserved MVC.
The Defence of the Kashmir Valley
Kashmiris Rise for the Defence of their Homeland
After being done in by their Muslim compatriots,[13] 4 Kashmir Infantry(KI) of the State Forces tasked to deny the all-important road from Muzzafarabad to Srinagar simply disintegrated and this threw open the road to the Srinagar valley. The heroic resistance put up by Brigadier Rajinder Singh, the Chief of Staff of the State Forces, and a hastily collected 150 strong force managed to delay the lascars for two invaluable days at Uri. The timely demolition of the bridge was the first of the acts that saved the valley and the officer’s valour earned him eternal recognition as the ‘Saviour of Kashmir’ apart from the award of Independent India’s first gallantry award, a well-deserved MVC. This was an apt recognition by a grateful nation since it is because of the delay imposed by his actions that the raiders could only enter Baramulla on 24 October. The next day, information on the formation of Azad Kashmir’s Government under Sardar Ibrahim Khan of Punch was received and became the cause of friction between the rebels and the Pakistan Government, since Khurshed Anwar, who was spearheading the onslaught was eyeing the premiership. The political intrigues behind his back infuriated him and he now refused to move beyond Baramulla till he was pacified by Akbar Khan. As a result of the delay, the tribals found time to plunder the town and their cries were chilling, “Loot lo Hindu kaZar, MussalmankaGharaurSikhonka Saar” (Loot the wealth of the Hindu, the Home of the Muslim and behead the Sikh). This was typical of Qabalis who spared no one, not even their co-religionists. Three days of rapacious plunder which followed when Baramulla burned and blood flowed, eventually cost Pakistan the valley.
Kashmir produced its own heroes and the story of young MaqboolSherwani, a youngNational Conference member of Baramulla is remembered till date. This gutsy lad of nineteen years intentionally misled the enemy and had delayed them at the cost of his life. Despite being publically tortured,[14] the fearless lad cried “victory to Hindu-Muslim unity”[15] till he was finally shot dead by the raiders. The wanton lust of the Qabalis along with the heroism of Kashmiris like young Sherwani dashed the Pakistani dream of liberating Kashmir. The extraordinary courage of this ordinary Kashmiri galvanised the valley and it is to the credit of the Kashmiris, who regardless of their religion came out on the streets to express their solidarity and to provide support to the NC which quickly moved in with their volunteers to control the situation created by the collapse of the civil administration. The cry that went up throughout the valley was “Hamlaawarkhabardar, ham kashmirihaitayyar.”[16]Ironically, the situation was analogous to the earlier aggression of Kashmir by Muslim co-religionists, the Mughals, who had also used deceit to run over the Kashmiris four centuries earlier. This time, Punjabi Mussalmans had subverted the sentries on the gate in the name of religion, though the Kashmiri people led by the Sheikh Abdullah were unwilling to be duped this time.
Initial Operations by the Indian JAK Force
On landing, Rai quickly organised the perimeter defence of the airfield. After tiding over the immediate task, this gallant officer decided to take the initiative and blunt the enemy’s advance. After shedding one Coy for the defence of the airfield, he collected his men and advanced towards Baramulla. On seeing armed tribals in the town, he deployed on either side of a defile on the axis leading to Srinagar and it was here that he met the enemy head on, who after their orgy now recommenced their advance.
Despite the years of conflict in Kashmir, young people like Maqbool Sherwani and the countless volunteers of the National Conference, need to be remembered for the patriots they were.
While meeting the Sikhs of the Indian Army came as a rude shock to the tribals;[1] Rai was also taken aback as he to discover after the first encounter that these tribesmen were no rabble of the type normally encountered in the frontiers. These were men led by regular military officers, adequately equipped and armed with support weapons, and their mortars being used with military precision. This called for a change in tactics and the Indians decided to dig in.
The next day forced a running encounter as the enemy kept developing pincers along the adjoining hills to cut him from the rear. This forced Rai to keep falling back, and this cat and mouse game continued till Rai was forced back to Pattan. While coordinating the move of his rear party, Rai fell, mortally wounded. This gallant officer had gained valuable time for India, earning for himself the gratitude of the country and a well-deserved MVC. The time gained by him offered India the chance to build up the second Battalion, 1 KUMAON (PARA).
General Bajwa has quoted a Pakistan historian who commented on how Pakistan lost the chance of a lifetime. “Two tricks of fortune conspired to cheat the Quaid-I-Azam of the Kashmir Gaddi; the loss of a day and a half in pillaging at Baramulla, and the reckless bravery of an Indian officer, who with no reserve of men or ammunition made an attack on the invading forces as if he had the whole Army Division at his disposal, dashed down the Baramulla road. He seized the airfield, delayed the raiders advance by 36 hours, and enabled reinforcements sent by air to reach Srinagar. He saved Kashmir though he gave his life in the effort.”
Conclusion
Within two months of independence, at a time when the frenzy of the partition was at its peak and the nation still had to stabilise, India rose as one – be they the braves of the Indian Army or the Airmen of the Indian Air Force. Indeed, this was the finest hour of integrated operations and an example that should be the guiding light for the Forces. Despite the years of conflict in Kashmir, young people like Maqbool Sherwani and the countless volunteers of the National Conference, need to be remembered for the patriots they were. But for these men and women, who stood up for the nation as one, the fate of Independent India would have been different.
[1] Hypothetically, if the dates of Op Gulmarg were known to Lord Mountbatten, then he would also have known that Srinagar was expected to fall within the next few days. Since the Indian decision was only taken on 26 Oct, Mountbatten ‘could’ have calculated that the Indians would be late in any response they tried.
[2]The purpose remains speculative, especially in the absence of records. Was it a request to call off the Pakistani invasion or was it an ultimatum? In retrospect, it appears Nehru was merely being diplomatically correct as both nations were members of the commonwealth.
[3]Sinha S K, Lieutenant General (Retd), Op Rescue, Military Ops in Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-49, Vision Books, New Delhi, 1977.
[4] As per Air Commodore Jasjit Singh in ‘Defence from the Skies’, p-52, published by the Centre of Air Power Studies, one sortie of an Oxford plane flown by Wing Commander N Chaterjee and Flight Lieutenant N K Shitoley was flown over Srinagar on 26 Oct. However, this recce mission could not provide any useful information for the Dakotas who flew in blind on 27 Oct.
Destruction of the bridges at Kohala and Domel were demanded by Pundit Nehru but he had been advised that this was not possible in view of the type of aircraft held by the RIAF. This advice was surprisingly seconded by Subroto Mukherjee who later became the Air Chief Marshal of the Indian Air Force (IAF).
[6] A week after J & K acceded to India, Sardars Patel and Baldev Singh demanded a ‘cordon sanitaire’ to be effected 10 miles on own side of the IB. The Three Service Chiefs and Mountbatten vehemently opposed the proposal on the grounds that the Tempest aircraft which were the mainstay of the RIAF were unsuitable for the task.
[7]The 1962 war and India’s Sri Lankan misadventure and the start of Op Vijay are cases to support the point.
[8]Sinha S K, Lieutenant General (Retd), p- 15-16, Op Rescue, Military Ops in Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-49, Vision Books, New Delhi, 1977.
[9] Later re-designated as Western Comd.
[10]Since the Supreme HQ was also required to function from Delhi, the newly created Indian Army HQ had been shifted to Red Fort and this impacted efficiency at a critical time and the experiment had to be abandoned within a month..
[11] Excerpted from Singh Jasjit, Air Commodore (Retd), ‘Defence from the Skies: Indian Air Force through 75 years’, Centre for Air Power and Knowledge World, New Delhi, 2007.
[12] Ibid.
[13]The Battalion had two companies of Punchi Muslims, who changed sides and participated in slaughtering the Dogra soldiers of their own Bn. This was despite a track record of communal harmony of the Battalion during the Second World War, a fact the CO had reiterated just a week before the carnage.
[14]Praveen Swami has quoted Bourke White who has written. “It was a curious thing that the tribals did next. I don’t know why these savage nomads should have thought of such a thing unless the sight of the sacred figures at St Joseph’s Chapel on the hill just above had suggested it to them. They drove nails through the palms of Sherwani’s hands. In his forehead, they placed a jaggered piece of tin and wrote on it ‘the punishment of a traitor is death.’
[15]Ganjoo S K, Kashmir: Earliest Times to the Present Day, p 409, Indian Publishers Distributors, New Delhi, 1997
[16]RazdanOmkar, The Trauma of Kashmir:The Untold Story, p-13, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1999.
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