By DP Ramachandran
21 Sep , 2015
To begin with Pakistan had codenamed it ‘Operation Gibraltar’, after the Arab invasion of Spain which began with the capture of the Rock of Gibraltar. It was an ambitious plan conceived by the military dictatorship of that country under Field Marshal Ayub Khan, for the conquest of Kashmir. The Indian Army’s dismal show against the Chinese in 1962 had emboldened Ayub to make the move; and he was also in a hurry. The expansion and modernization of the Indian Army was going on at a rapid pace, and he would find himself at a disadvantage if he waited anymore.
Essentially the plan propounded to have a 30,000-strong guerilla force to infiltrate through the porous borders of Kashmir, and incite an uprising in the state. But before that he had to go in for a ploy, to cause imbalance in India’s troop deployment along its border with Pakistan. This would also provide his armed forces with the much-needed opportunity to try out the array of latest weaponry they had received from the US (the Sabre Jets, the Star Fighters and the Patton Tanks among them), concurrently assessing their adversary’s capacity to fight back. The venue selected for this initial trial phase was the Rann of Kutch in Gujarat.
Pakistan began the game in early 1965 with small scale incursions into this vast and thinly manned segment of Indian border, forcing India to relocate its troops to bolster the defences there.
Pakistan began the game in early 1965 with small scale incursions into this vast and thinly manned segment of Indian border, forcing India to relocate its troops to bolster the defences there. However, despite some hot engagements, the affair did not come about to much, with the British Prime Minister brokering a ceasefire to restrain the two members of the Commonwealth from fighting each other; and it ended up getting referred to the International Court of Justice for arbitration.
The second phase of the Pakistani plan got off the ground in August, with massive infiltrations into Kashmir. But Ayub Khan was in for a shock. In the first place the local population refused to play ball, and the planned insurrection just didn’t materialize. Second, the Indian Army chose offence as a means of defence, and went after the infiltrators, striking at their routes and capturing a number of enemy posts along the ceasefire line of 1948, most significantly the stronghold of Haji Pir Pass. The Uri-Punch Road was now open for the first time after 1948. India had won the first round.
The Pakistan High Command reacted with its contingency plan, that of an open invasion. Operation Gibraltar was off; in its place they now launched Operation Grand Slam – its objective: cut off all of J&K north of Jammu by striking at the Chamb-Akhnur front, and take Jammu itself. They unleashed the blitzkrieg with a massive tank and infantry attack in the wee hours of 1 September. By the 5th, Jaurian had fallen and Akhnur was being threatened.
The Indian Army opened two new fronts simultaneously, a southern one on the Lahore Sector and a northern one on the Sialkot Sector.
The Pakistanis were in for the second surprise now. A diminutive looking but highly determined Indian Prime Minister stuck to the word of warning he had issued to Ayub Khan that India would retaliate at the time and place of its choosing, should J&K be attacked. The Indian Army opened two new fronts simultaneously, a southern one on the Lahore Sector and a northern one on the Sialkot Sector. The offensive on the southern front was under way by early morning on 6 September; three infantry divisions of 11 Corps pushing forward on three different axes, the GT Road axis from Amritsar, the Khalra-Barki axis and the Khemkharan-Kasur axis. Capturing enemy territory in their drive, they were to converge on Ichhogil Canal – the 47-mile long obstacle which protected Pakistan—to threaten Lahore. The northern thrust by 1 Corps which got off the ground thirty-six hours later, with 1 Armoured Division – India’s only armoured division at that time – spearheading the advance of its three infantry divisions, would threaten Sialkot.
The Indian offensive didn’t exactly turn out to be a roaring success as it was expected to be; but we did snatch a victory of sorts, grabbing sizeable chunks of enemy territory by the time the war ended with the ceasefire coming into effect on 23 September. The Pakistanis who had started it all, ended up looking downright silly. They were hit for a six in their much-planned infiltration game under Operation Gibraltar. In Operation Grand Slam that followed too, they failed to exploit the initial advantage gained with their successful foray into the Chamb area. And if they didn’t end up losing Lahore and Sialkot, it had more to do with the fumbling1 of the situation by Indians rather than their own merit. And in armoured warfare – the war saw some of the fiercest tank battles after World War II – the Indians certainly got the better of their adversaries. The Indian tank men, riding their vintage Centurions, Shermans and AMX-13s, knocked off an awful lot of brand new US built Patton Tanks the Pakistanis were equipped with. Their armoured division was virtually written off. The story of their Sabre Jets in the air wasn’t any better either. Thus at the end of the day, India had managed to undermine the massive arms buildup Pakistan was pursuing. (The territorial gains or losses didn’t amount to much for either side anyway, since the pre-war status was eventually restored.) And it gave the Indian Army the much needed shot in the arm after the demoralizing ordeal of 1962.
Across every battle front, the war of 1965 saw the Madras Regiment in action in a big way, with as many as ten battalions taking the field. 1 Madras, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel CPA Menon (the nephew of the officer of the same name killed in J&K in 1948), was engaged from early August itself in the search-and-destroy operations against the infiltrators in the Rajauri Sector of J&K, where it did a commendable job of rounding up scores of infiltrators, before being shifted to Naushera by the end of the month to throw defensive piquets along the Ceasefire Line. Later by 10 September, the battalion joined the 1 Corps offensive in the Sialkot Sector as it got under way, forming part of 52 Mountain Brigade under 26 Infantry Division. Concentrating at Fatehpur by the 12th, the unit was assigned for an attack on Tilakpur, a village across the Ceasefire Line, 12 kilometres short of Indo-Pak Border.
Formed of a salient extending about a kilometre and a half into the Indian territory across the river Ravi, it was encircled by an embankment along which the international boundary ran.
The brigade attack, which materialized only on 18 September, went in an hour before midnight, 1 Madras forming its left point and 2 Mahar the right, with 5/11 GR in reserve. It was a gritty battle with the enemy artillery coming down murderously on the attackers. The brigade successfully took the objective, albeit at the cost of a considerable number of casualties. A squadron of tanks from 18 Cavalry drove in by daybreak to reinforce the infantrymen, who had dug in by then to take on the counter-attacks. During the next four days, before the ceasefire came onto effect in the early hours of 23 September, the enemy – mostly Baluchi troops – staged three powerful counter-attacks, backed by armour, artillery and air-power; but the battalion, with the rest of the brigade, doggedly held on, beating the enemy back every time, inflicting heavy casualties on them, including one of their tanks knocked out by anti-tank guns.
Soon after the ceasefire, the battalion was diverted for operations in the Akhnur-Chamb-Jaurian Sectors, first for penetration into enemy territory for establishing forward defence positions, and later to take up the defence of the Jhung Feature overlooking Sunderbani. On 30 September it was called up to go in for another attack, that of an important feature, Malla, in the Kalidhar Range, which had been lost to the enemy two days earlier. The attack was launched at 0330 hours the next day. Pounded by artillery and mortars and braving machinegun fire, the men had a job of clearing the false front the enemy had put up; and by the time they made it to the actual objective it was broad daylight. A nasty bit of fighting ensued with fierce hand-to-hand combat; but the assault carried the day, and by noon the objective had been taken. The enemy brought down heavy artillery with a vengeance; but the battalion stuck to the position, and later went on to secure a forming up place for another unit to attack a neighbouring feature. 1 Madras was to man the Kalidhar Defences for more than three months, until relieved in early January 1966. The battalion suffered 88 casualties in all during the course of the war; 2 JCOs and 28 men killed, and 3 officers, 2 JCOs and 53 men wounded.
2 Madras, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel CV Donoghue, based at Ambala before the war, joined the 11 Corps offensive towards Lahore right at the beginning. Forming part of 29 Infantry Brigade, which had been assigned to guard the northern flank of the offensive, the battalion found itself engaged in one of the most significant battles when it was earmarked, along with 1/5 GR, to attack the Dera Baba Nanak Enclave. Formed of a salient extending about a kilometre and a half into the Indian territory across the river Ravi, it was encircled by an embankment along which the international boundary ran. The place was clustered by ‘Sarkhanda’ grass growing ten to twelve feet all over. A massive steel-and-concrete bridge, about 800 metres long spanning the river, linked the enclave to Pakistan. The enemy had deployed about three companies of regular infantry – 3 Punjab – and a company of the Sutlej Rangers along with a battery of 25-pounder field guns, a platoon of mortars and a squadron of medium tanks to defend the place. The main body of the infantry with the field guns and mortars held the enclave, while the tanks with the rest of the infantry remained in reserve across the river.
The attack commenced sharp at 0400 hours on 6 September, the H-hour for the entire Corps, with 2 Madras going in from the right of the bridge and 1/5 GR from the left. Assaulting on a two-company front, the Madras men ran into a tough defence line refusing to yield ground. The fight that erupted was ferocious, but by daybreak the attackers had wrested a victory, occupying the objective. 32 Pakistanis lay dead and another 10 had been taken prisoner. The Gorkhas were victorious as well. The Indian Brigade had won the first round. The enemy had been driven to the far side of the river.
Despite heavy odds the attack went in at 1400 hours on 22 September, only to make very slow progress against the fierce resistance the enemy put up.
Almost immediately they counter-attacked with massive artillery and armour support. There were anxious moments when one of the Madras companies were almost overwhelmed and had to be reinforced by men from the reserve company; but finally the enemy was beaten back for good. Meanwhile the Gorkhas found themselves in a spot of trouble as the day wore on, with the counter-attacks on their side gaining momentum2, and two of their companies getting overrun. Alarmed, the brigade threw in its third unit, 3 RAJ RIF (Rajputana Rifles), by nightfall. The RAJ RIF men, in an interesting ruse, drove in in a huge convoy of vehicles with headlamps on, simulating the arrival of a much larger force. They then mounted an assault at 0200 hours on the 7th, and dislodged the enemy troops who had come to occupy the embankment by the river. The Pakistanis, having fallen for the ruse, panicked, and fearing an Indian thrust across the river, blew up a span of the bridge once it was daylight. They had blunted any more Indian offensive in the area, but the Dera Baba Nanak Enclave was firmly in Indian hands.
With the northern flank of the Indian advance so secured, 2 Madras and 1/5 GR were pulled out the next day – leaving only 3 RAJ RIF to hold the enclave – for deployment in other sectors where battles were raging. With the typically confused scenario most military operations create, the two units were moved about from one location to another for almost a fortnight, often under shelling and air attacks, until they found themselves together once again on 21 September, poised to attack Khemkaran, where we had suffered reverses in the face of a major offensive by the enemy. It proved to be a disastrous mission, wherein the battalion started taking casualties from intense enemy shelling3 even as it was establishing a firm base. Despite heavy odds the attack went in at 1400 hours on 22 September, only to make very slow progress against the fierce resistance the enemy put up. The next morning Pakistanis intensified their air strikes and artillery fire to a saturation point; and with its forward position no more tenable, the battalion was pulled back some 800 metres. The ceasefire was declared that afternoon; and the unit remained facing Khemkaran till relieved on 29 September. 2 Madras lost 27 lives in all, including those of 3 officers in its two major engagements of the war, at Dera Baba Nanak and Khemkaran.
The capture of the place was part of 6 Division’s mission to secure a bridgehead for the breakout of 1 Armoured Division later.
3 Madras, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel BK Bhattacharya, and 4 Madras, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel HL Mehta, were inducted into the operations together, along with 9 Kumaon (the three units forming 69 Mountain Brigade of 6 Infantry Division under 1 Corps), on 7 September for the capture of Maharajke in the Sialkot Sector. A fairly big-sized village some two and a half miles across the international border and 13 miles from Sialkot, it became tactically significant because of being the site of a major crossroads on the drive to Sialkot. The capture of the place was part of 6 Division’s mission to secure a bridgehead for the breakout of 1 Armoured Division later.
The brigade attack, well-supported by artillery and synchronized with flanking attacks by other formations, went in at 2300 hours with 3 Madras and 9 Kumaon going for the right half of the objective in the first phase, so as to block the roads to Pagowal-Badiana and Sialkot. Deadly fighting ensued with the enemy machine gunners playing havoc; but the assault proved unstoppable4, and the objective was overrun by 0130 hours. The losses of the Madras battalion amounted to 20 in all, 3 killed and 17 wounded.
The phase-2 of the attack, for the left half of the objective – to block the roads to Charwa and Zafarwal – by 4 Madras, launched at 0200 hours on 8 September, turned out to be a far bitter contest, against a rather dogged defence by the men of Pakistan’s famed Frontier Force Regiment. With the initial two-company-up assault flagging, the CO was forced to commit the reserve companies as well. In the end it was a trench-by-trench bloody hand-to-hand fighting; but the Madrassis had taken the objective by 0530 hours. The amount of casualties was considerable on both sides. 16 dead bodies of the Frontier Force men and the Mujahideen were counted on the objective after the battle; the number of Madrassis killed weren’t much lesser – 11 in all, which included their Commanding Officer. The wounded numbered 34.
Trench after trench was cleared by men closing in and lobbing grenades, often led by young officers.
It was the 4th Battalion’s – ‘Wallajahbadis’ as they proudly call themselves, being the descendant unit of the old Wallajabad Light Infantry – hour of glory. Trench after trench was cleared by men closing in and lobbing grenades, often led by young officers. The Adjutant of the unit, Lieutenant Ramesh Kumar, was wounded in such a sortie. Two JCOs, Subedars, CA Madhavan Nambiar and PM Gregory, leading a handful of men charged two enemy posts from the rear. They both were to be awarded the Vir Chakras later. The CO of the battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Harbans Lal Mehta, who personally led an outflanking attack by a reserve company, was mortally wounded. He was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra posthumously.
After the Battle of Maharajke, 3 Madras was engaged in clearing some of the villages in the vicinity until 13 September, when it was assigned, along with a company of 4 Madras and two squadrons of 62 Cavalry, to form the vanguard of the brigade advance to Pagowal. The enemy was contacted within two hours of the commencement of the advance at 0400 hours, and a position cleared and occupied north of Pagowal without much of a hassle. But the enemy kept the stakes high with constant shelling, and counterattacked with tanks and infantry in the afternoon. It was repulsed with the powerful support of own artillery. After holding on to the position for three days the battalion captured Pagowal itself on the 17th and cleared three more outlying villages during the next four days until the 23rd when the ceasefire was declared. The operations after Maharajke had cost the battalion 23 casualties, 4 killed and 19 wounded.
6 and 7 Madras were deployed to contain the Pakistani infiltration in Jammu and Kashmir, mainly on the Rajauri-Punch Sector. Although ceasefire had been declared by the time 6 Madras arrived, it took part in a subsequent attack on Balnoi in Punch. 7 Madras had been hunting the infiltrators from early August itself and held vital pickets in Punch during the operations. The battalion continued to be deployed in the area for another three years. The casualties of 6 Madras were 1 killed and 1 wounded, and that of 7 Madras were, 6 killed, 16 wounded and 1 missing. 8 Madras, though mobilized, could not see action since the ceasefire had come into effect by the time it concentrated in Punjab. Lance Havildar Kannappan of 7 Madras was awarded a Sena Medal for exceptional bravery.
9 Madras, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel BK Satyan, forming part of 65 Infantry Brigade under 7 Infantry Division, was part of the 11 Corps thrust aimed at Lahore. As part of the advance guard, the battalion captured the village of Barka Kalan, a vantage point, prior to the armour-supported assault of 10 September on Barki, around which the Pak defences of Ichhogil Canal Bund were built. The Ichhogil Canal5 being a strategically significant barrier for its nearness to Lahore (12 miles), the Pakistanis put up a stout defence. Having had to abandon their positions in disarray under the tank assault, they blew up the bridge; but before the Indian troops had consolidated their hold, managed to reoccupy a part of the Bund in strength. With the deadline fixed for the ceasefire on 23 September, the battalion (short of one company) – which has so far been holding the firm base for the attack by the other two battalions of the brigade, 4 Sikh and 16 Punjab – stormed the Bund during the night 22nd-23rd and dislodged the enemy in a do-or-die fight.
The enemy was virtually routed, with a number of them jumping into the canal to escape the fury of the assault, while many of the rest were bodily lifted and thrown in, if not shot down or bayoneted.
The Battle of Ichhogil Bund was by far the fiercest engagement the Madras Regiment fought in the war of ’65. It was a tricky mission wherein the unit had to assault in waves, one company at a time from the flank, and clear the enemy entrenched along the Bund with colossal fire support from their comrades on the far bank barely 150 feet across. Nevertheless, in an amazing feat of arms, the battalion, endowed with an abundance of fresh youngsters and equally vigorous young leadership, made short work of it with a lightning charge that bordered on recklessness, supported eminently by our own guns and tanks which kept up a steady fire across the canal through out the engagement, effectively neutralizing the enemy fire from the far bank. The enemy was virtually routed, with a number of them jumping into the canal to escape the fury of the assault, while many of the rest were bodily lifted and thrown in, if not shot down or bayoneted. It was all over in 2 hours and 30 minutes from the word go at 0030 hours on the 23rd. By 0300 hours the objective had been overrun. The enemy casualties were heavy, 48 dead and an estimated 80 washed away in the canal. 11 were taken prisoner, including one officer. An enormous amount of arms and ammunition including 2 RCL guns were also captured. Own casualties were considerably heavy too – 49 killed including one JCO and 65 wounded including one officer.
It was a night of unfettered heroism, layered with glorious acts and poignant scenes. There were the two jawans of the lead platoon, Narayanan and Bhaskaran, who volunteered to silence a machinegun and crawled forward in the darkness. The gun was silenced in 20 minutes, but in the heat of the battle no one noticed their absence. They were found after the battle, sprawled dead in front of the pillbox wherein the weapon had been located. A similar pair, Sepoys Mallappan and Ramachandran, was found dead, frozen in sitting posture manning their machinegun, one handling the weapon, the other belt feeding. Then there was Major Dharam Pal, leading his men in the assault undaunted by a splinter lodged in his leg. There was the sight of the CO, Colonel Sathyan, cheering his men on, walking up and down the Bund fully exposed to the enemy, gifted with a charming existence; as the night reverberated with the Madrassi Battle Cry, “Veer Madrassi Adi Kollu, Adi Kollu”, a no-nonsense phrase, to the point, and deadly – “Brave Madrassi Strike and Kill, Strike and Kill.” (The 9th Madrassis call themselves the “Terrors” – indeed that’s what the Pakistanis would have found them to be that night.) And giving it all a sombre touch was the medical inspection room truck plying up and down non-stop, picking up the casualties, with the popular Medical NCO, ‘Rasam’ Thankappan, at the wheel. For 9 Madras, a unit which traces its origin to the Travancore State Forces, it was quite an Onam, the traditional harvest festival of Kerala that the men of the whole Madras Regiment celebrate with zest in the month of September every year.
Since the Pakistanis did not open a front in the east, 16 Madras, deployed on the East Pakistan border, saw no action. 17 Madras went into action during the night 19-20 September, forming a firm base at Dali in Pakistani territory for the advance of 85 Infantry brigade towards Khinsor. However they had to withdraw late in the evening on 21 September following an enemy attack heavily supported by air and artillery. Subsequently after the ceasefire, they captured Kinra and Point 413 in Skarbu area, both within Pakistan, during September-October. The total casualties the battalion suffered were 3 killed, 15 wounded and 59 taken prisoner.
The Madras Regiment won the Battle Honours, KALIDHAR 1965 and MAHARAJKE 1965, and the Theatre Honours, JAMMU AND KASHMIR 1965 and PUNJAB 1965, for the participation of its battalions in the operations.
The Madras Engineers had two of its field companies taking part in the 11 Corps offensive towards Lahore; 10 and 63. Major PP Srivastava’s 63 Field Company, which formed part of 29 Infantry Brigade, was the first unit to be engaged. The Company found itself in the thick of action at Dera Baba Nanak as soon as the enclave had been captured by our troops – which included 2 Madras – and the initial counter-attacks beaten back. By the early hours of 7 September, the Company was called upon to demolish a span of the Ravi Bridge and mine the approach on its home side to prevent further forays by the enemy. The mines and explosives were late in arriving, and it was broad daylight by the time the work could be taken up. Nevertheless, a team led by Second Lieutenant N Chandrasekharan Nair got down to the nightmare of a job, laying mines right under the direct small arms and tank fire and artillery shelling.
And adding insult to injury, the young Indian Sapper officer, Nair, in an act of daredevilry, crossed over the ‘demolished’ bridge all alone, captured an enemy jeep and drove it back.
The enemy himself meanwhile contributed to the effort by demolishing a span of the bridge; except that it turned out to be a shoddy piece of sapper craft – the bridge still remained usable. And adding insult to injury, the young Indian Sapper officer, Nair, in an act of daredevilry, crossed over the ‘demolished’ bridge all alone, captured an enemy jeep and drove it back. The officer was later decorated with Vir Chakra.
Major MM Mathew’s 10 Field Company – the second unit deployed for the 11 Corps offensive – with 67 Infantry Brigade in Fazilka and Firozepur area couldn’t see much of action except for mine laying and braving constant shelling, since no enemy threat materialized in that sector.
The 1 Corps offensive towards Sialkot saw 8 companies of the Madras Sappers in action; 13, 14 and 65 Field Companies and 684 Field Park Company with the 1 Armoured Divisional Engineers at the Samba Sector, and 9, 36 and 39 Field Companies and 372 Field Park Company with the 26 Infantry Divisional Engineers at the Suchetgarh Sector.
When 1 Armoured Division launched its two-pronged offensive on 8 September, Major RC Mehta’s 14 Assault Field Company advanced with the tanks of 1 Armoured Brigade headed for Phillora, and Major Gur Dayal’s 65 Assault Field Company joined 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade on its way to Pagowal. On 11 September Phillora witnessed the biggest tank battle fought anywhere in the world till then after World War II, which was to turn the place into a graveyard of Pakistani Patton Tanks. Before the battle, in the brigade’s advance to Phillora and later as it struck out towards Chawinda, the Sappers kept at it tirelessly developing the tracks for the division to advance, constantly harassed by the enemy air force and artillery. At least 4 Sappers were killed in strafing and shelling. Pagowal fell on 13 September, and Alhar Railway Station and the areas south to it were taken on the 15th. The operations ended before Chawinda could be taken. 13 Field Company joined the track building effort towards the end.
After the charge had been fired, the demolition group was confronted by the strange sight of some 20 Pakistani soldiers and a JCO emerging from the smoke and debris with their arms thrown up in surrender. They had mistaken the demolition for gunfire.
In the Suchetgarh Sector, the advance elements of 26 Infantry Division had reached within striking distance of Sialkot when ceasefire was declared. 39 Company was engaged to move the bridging equipment forward, which made it a favoured target of the enemy air force for strafing.
The Sappers’ war wasn’t without its lighter moments either. In 26 Divisional Sector 36 Field Company was carrying out the demolition of a low wall for clearer field of fire. After the charge had been fired, the demolition group was confronted by the strange sight of some 20 Pakistani soldiers and a JCO emerging from the smoke and debris with their arms thrown up in surrender. They had mistaken the demolition for gunfire. The young officer in charge of the Sappers promptly disarmed them and marched them off to captivity.
A large number of other Madras Engineer units were also rushed to the western sector from elsewhere, anticipating a long haul, but the conflict ended before they could go operational. The MEG won the Theatre Honours, JAMMU AND KASHMIR 1965, and PUNJAB 1965.
The 1965 operations also saw the South Indian cavalry regiment, the 16th Light Cavalry (commonly referred as 16 Cavalry), in action in a significant role. Equipped with Centurion Tanks, the regiment formed the vanguard of advance of I Armoured Division towards Sialkot, up to Gadgor in Pakistan. In a major tank battle fought at Gadgor on 8 September, and a subsequent engagement at Alhar Railway Station, they destroyed 16 Patton Tanks of the enemy, against a loss of 6 tanks of their own. 2 officers, 1 JCO and 14 Other Ranks of the unit were killed in these actions; and a number of officers, JCOs and Other Ranks were wounded.
The Regiment won the Theatre Honour, PUNJAB 1965. The gallantry awards won by its officers and men comprised 1 Vir Chakra, 1 Sena Medal, 8 Mention-in-Dispatches and 3 Commendation Cards from the Chief of Army Staff.
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