India’s Security Sector: An Appraisal

By Lt Gen Prakash Katoch

15 Sep , 2015

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/indias-security-sector-an-appraisal/

Challenges to India’s security are mounting by the day. The governance of India’s security sector needs to be seen in the context of its external and internal vulnerability. Integrated, comprehensive Security Sector Reform (SSR) must be preceded by a comprehensive needs assessment to identify critical gaps and potential links across sectors. Governance is unlikely to improve across the board anywhere in the short term and political patronage to terrorists cannot disappear overnight either, especially in the absence of resolute and focused action against such a nexus. Presently, our SSR though progressing appears more akin to the blind man’s bluff. Indeed, we have a very long way to go.

We have numerous terrorist organisations and insurgent groups operating within the country, the looming shadow of the ISIS and Pakistan’s demonstrated resolve to accelerate terrorism against India – all leading to the requirement of an effective security sector.

Reference to the security sector in India is generally alluded to with homeland security to include mention of private security as also the industry providing equipment related to homeland security. More often than not, such reference does not take the armed forces into account and even the focus on the balance is generally compartmentalised to individual organs of the security sector, like the CRPF or CISF separately, not as a whole. This hardly augurs well for India being the second most populous country in the world with land borders of some 15,072 kilometres that are porous with bulk of it over difficult terrain bordering a volatile neighbourhood, a coastline of some 7,863 kilometres, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 1.02 million sq. km and offshore assets (oil wells, processing platforms, pipelines) spread over a total area of some 17,000 sq km.

Then we have the continuing proxy war being waged by Pakistan over the past three decades supported by China, the latter too employing asymmetric warfare against us and supporting insurgent movement in India. To add to this, we have numerous terrorist organisations and insurgent groups operating within the country, the Al Qaeda’s refocusing to South Asia, the looming shadow of the ISIS and Pakistan’s demonstrated resolve to accelerate terrorism against India – all leading to the requirement of an effective security sector. But then, when India has not been able to define a National Security Strategy all these decades, a ‘holistic’ appreciation and strategy for the security sector would obviously also be distant. It may be recalled that while projecting the case for the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), the then Home Minister, P Chidambaram, had also projected the requirement of a separate Ministry of Internal Security. The obvious deduction was that in its present shape the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is not capable of looking after the entire gamut of internal security, the threats and asymmetric battlefield being borderless.

Defining the Security Sector

Though there is no common definition for the security sector per se, in the United Nations and the West, security sector is a broad term used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. These can include defence, law enforcement institutions, corrections, intelligence services, border management, customs, elements of the judicial sector, management and oversight bodies, civil society groups and other non-state actors among other elements. Inclusion of the armed forces are axiomatic at the upper crust of the cutting edge but also taking into account that asymmetric war as it exists today is not waged against the military of a nation but the nation itself. This requires a national response, of which armed forces are but one segment.

The need to infiltrate terrorist organisations is all pervasive and not relevant to Maoists alone…

India’s Security Sector

If the above definition of the security sector is taken as the basis and the fact that the whole nation is involved, India’s sector would encompass at least the following major components – government ministries of defence, home, external affairs, law and justice, human resources, aviation, railways, surface transport and shipping, intelligence services, armed forces, Para Military Forces (PMF), the Indian Coast Guard, Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF), state police forces, customs and immigration services, private security services and the like.

Then, considering the size and diversity of India and its population, intelligence gathering requires participation by the entire citizenry – putting the billion plus eyes concept on the ground. The security sector, therefore, cannot be restricted to the security forces alone. The security forces themselves in no small strength of 1.3 million plus armed forces and others including PMF (NSG, SFF, AR), CAPF (BSF, CRPF, ITBP, SSB, CISF, RPF and the like) too numbering 1.3 million plus. Then come the police, home guards and civil defence.

The police force is woefully short of even the level authorised. More importantly, going by media reports, though there are three policemen for every VIP, only one is available for 761 commoners – an atrocious state in a sycophancy-ridden country with rampant crime. As per data compiled by the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D), the number of police personnel per one lakh of population in India as on January 01, 2006, was 1:142.69. This is much lower than the United Nations standard of police to citizen ratio which stands at 222 policemen for every one lakh people.

Command and Control channels are disparate, which hinders a national level response…

State governments have been reluctant to even implement police reform, especially with regard to the 2006 Supreme Court Directives on establishing State Security Commissions and Police Complaints Authorities. The number of private security guards has crossed five million already, which logically are the first line of on the spot response for internal security.

Shortcomings

Threat Appreciation: The first ever India Risk Survey was undertaken conjointly by ICCI and Pinkerton in recent times. At the government level, reforms are reactive and piece-meal not on any integrated and comprehensive level that should have happened as part of a national strategic planning process. But this requires a holistic threat appreciation that should be continuously reviewed. As far as reforms are concerned, it is a question of which organ makes the most noise and can get its way through.

Intelligence: India has nine major intelligence agencies with the charter of some not even having been ratified by the Constitution. The major ones are not under parliamentary oversight and a former Joint Director IB had penned in 2005 that these agencies were primarily being used to target opposition parties. The question also remains that in the absence of a National Security Strategy, that axiomatically should include internal security as well, and absence of defining national security objectives, how do you task the intelligence agencies? The MHA has recently stated that 33 Pakistani spy modules had been busted in the past three years but the other side of the coin also is that it is only after the Burdwan blasts, it was discovered that the Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) had grown roots in West Bengal for the past two years plus.

The MARCOS, NSG and Force One who would be called upon to respond to a 26/11 type situation have never actually undertaken a joint exercise…

Take the case of Maharashtra. Force One, a special police unit, was raised within one year of 26/11. It is manned by sons of the soil but is not permitted to generate its own intelligence because of several reasons including the politician-police-underworld nexus. Post 26/11, MJ Akbar had questioned as to why the surprise about the vessel that brought the terrorists from Karachi when practically every week dhows were ferrying narcotics from Pakistan into Mumbai. The Home Minister had stated some weeks ago that Maoists organisations should be infiltrated; but has that happened or is it the slipshod reliance on ‘informers’ who easily double-cross as it had reportedly happened in the recent CRPF massacre at Sukma.

The need to infiltrate terrorist organisations including those across the border, is all pervasive and not relevant to Maoists alone. It is ironic that the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) though mandated to operate sources cross-border is denied this and instructed to rely on TECHINT which is grossly inadequate, HUMINT being the most important amongst all source intelligence.

Command and Control: Command and Control channels are disparate, which hinders a national level response. It affects equipping, manning, training and most importantly, synergising the security sector. There is perceptible problem of synergy between the local police and CAPF battling Maoists in the affected states. An across-the-board review is needed lest we continue with knee-jerk reactions. A former Home Minister while approaching the saluting dais at the NSG parade was whispered that the boys need some more money. So he went ahead and announced a special allowance of 25 per cent of basic pay – making the NSG the highest paid force of its kind in the country.

Though the Special Action Groups of the NSG were 100 per cent army personnel on deputation, we pick up the DGP of a state and appoint him DG-NSG, a person who fancies wearing headgear replete with the red band authorised to the army, even though he has little idea of Special Operations. En route to the scene of 26/11, the then DG NSG told the NSG force that he wanted the terrorists ‘alive’ as if the terrorists were unarmed. With the expansion of the NSG, army personnel on deputation to NSG are being placed under IPS officers even at unit and sub-unit level that reflects a complete lack of understanding of the military ethos.

Presently, the government has cleared procurement of two helicopters by the ITBP ostensibly for “air support” which shows utter lack of understanding what air support implies, training, maintenance and the like. Is there a better example of one-upmanship, disjointed planning and squandering of money?

Optimising Technology: The NATGRID still appears few years away and needs to be connected to the Global Intelligence Grid (GIG). The NCTC appears to have been lost amidst promises by the government to review it. The NCTC was required a decade ago and should be connected via the NATGRID to State-level Counter Terrorism Centres (SCTCs) in ‘all’ States, not just chosen few. Intelligence from ground level (HUMINT) is equally or rather more important in countering terrorism and insurgencies and upward flow can only be ensured through effective SCTCs with links down to district and below levels.

Within the NATGRID, the priority of establishing it must go to the security sector…

Within the NATGRID, the priority of establishing it must go to the security sector. While the Indian Army is going in for Battlefield Management System (BMS) and Battlefield Surveillance Systems (BSS), these are required pan the security sector (with adequate checks for need to know basis) replete with a Common Operational Picture (COP). A decision support system is required that can enable short, medium and long term assessments.

While an effective state-of-the-art Geographic Information System (GIS) is needed, the irony today is that we are years behind mapping and their updating even to cover the areas of Maoist-infected insurgency because of corruption and lack of accountability and prioritisation in the Survey of India. The Indian Navy’s National Command, Control & Communications Intelligence Network has just been launched that would track ships at sea, for which the Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC) was recently inaugurated by the Defence Minister at Gurgaon. Although being integrated with some 20 countries, will it be capable of picking up the type of small vessel used by terrorists during 26/11? And how come a foreign vessel slipped through the Coast Guard recently close to Mumbai?

The Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS) is still far from linking all police stations in the country. Then is the issue of tackling the use of cyberspace by terrorists and terrorist organisations for propaganda, recruitment, funding and targeting which requires Private-Public Partnership in a major way. Having just taken baby steps in this direction, we have a long way to go. Optimising technology for 24×7 surveillance is essential. Integrating the database of the security sector itself is a herculean task. Presently, the National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI) is not even interfaced with the concerned government agencies.

Special Operations are important internally as well as across the border…

CAPF: The blunt fact that we refuse to acknowledge is that our CAPF by and large, are poorly manned, officered, trained and equipped for the type of threats that we face. That part of the CAPF, which is tasked for counter terrorism and counter insurgency operations, must be reorganised on the lines of the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) or the Assam Rifles (AR). These two models have been effective on the ground all these years; but governments have continued with the stupidity of merely going in for raising more and more CAPF battalions without giving thought to their reorganisation.

Also, CAPF like the CRPF battling Maoists must be given officers from their own cadre (especially at senior levels) rather than being given IPS officers who are experienced in law and order but not in counter insurgency. Posting of IPS officers to CRPF is disliked by the latter and is detrimental to the important officer-man camaraderie in CI environment but is glossed over because of the IPS lobby.

Training: There are multiple aspects to training. First is the training of the CRPF which despite all the brouhaha is poor to say the least. It is for this reason that the same mistakes are being made time and again at the cost of precious lives. The recent Sukma ambush has proved this the umpteenth time. The short forays into Abu Majh area are hardly going to shake the Maoist citadel especially with the foreign support they are getting. Then is the question of joint training. Take the example of Mumbai, where the MARCOS, NSG and Force One are located who would be called upon to respond to a 26/11 type situation but have never actually undertaken a joint exercise.

What India needs is to be prepared for chemical, biological or radiological terrorist strike…

Conversely, post 26/11, the entire security sector of Indonesia (armed forces included) undertook a national level counter terrorism exercise for three days. In our case, such a national level exercise would be scoffed at under the pretext that it would create public scare – an excuse to avoid the hard work, planning and required coordination. For that matter, the military and the SFF have never exercised jointly.

Special Operations: Special Operations are important internally as well as across the border. Internally, we need to infiltrate the terrorist organisations and go for precision elimination of terrorist leadership and vital infrastructure, other tasks being psychological operations and de-radicalisation. These can hardly be left to individual states but need coordination at the national level in consultation with states. There must be a roll on national level plan.

As for cross-border Special Operations, we have largely been ineffective despite a large number of Special Forces because national intelligence agencies perceive this to be their exclusive domain. That is why we have not been able to hit at the roots of terrorism across the border and have failed to create any measure of deterrence, leave aside a credible one.

CBRN Response: The Tokyo Subway was subjected to Sarin gas attacks by terrorists in 1995, the US to Anthrax attacks in the early 2000s and chemicals have been used more than once against civilians in Syria. The ISIS has reportedly captured some 88lbs from Mosul and more significantly, a 1.5 kg uranium mine was recovered by the Indian Army from Assam early last year. What India needs is to be prepared for chemical, biological or radiological terrorist strike, against which there appears to be no thinking. We do not appear to be giving any thought in this direction at all. The manpower for the NDRF is through three-year deputation from CAPF primarily from the CRPF. Not only is there total lack of specialisation, the equipment for disaster relief in event of CBRN strike is little both in terms of detection and post strike assistance.

All government-level task forces have consistently recommended the concept of “One Border, One Force”…

It is obvious that the public in affected areas will be abandoned to their fate, as it had happened during the Bhopal Gas Tragedy in 1984; 30 years hence, we still have not learnt any lessons. The magnitude of such a terrorist strike requires appreciation of likely target areas, holistic efforts to stymie it including the foreign roots, deployment of resources for detection and post strike assistance and public education and rehearsals. Placement of resources, public education and periodic rehearsals incorporating the citizens is an essential part.

Manning of Borders: All government-level task forces have consistently recommended the concept of “One Border, One Force”. If then we continue to deploy the ITBP in sensitive areas such as Depsang and Chumar in Ladakh without placing them under the command of the army, it is nothing but obduracy, obstinacy and consolidation of turf at the cost of national security. On top of this has been the authorising procurement of two helicopters by ITBP as mentioned above. The Government would do well to place all national borders under the MoD setting aside the established order of previous governments facilitating smuggling, infiltration and illegal infiltration for obvious fiscal and political gains, latter increasing the vote-bank.

Private Security: The private security industry in India born in the 1960s with a handful of players, is estimated to cross Rs. 40,000 crore by 2015 as per FICCI estimates. The number of private security guards has crossed five million already. For skill development in the Private Security Sector (PSS), the Security Sector Skill Development Council was formed in 2011 incorporating many top-level private security companies as also represented by as also represented by members from NSDC, CAPSI, CII, FICCI and Army Welfare Placement Organisation (AWPO) amongst others.

The number of private security guards has crossed five million already…

It aims to transform the PSS from an unorganised industry to an organised one by taking initiatives on developing the driving forces of knowledge and skills to address the interests of all stakeholders of the industry. But such skill development is a gigantic requirement which needs persistent efforts. This five million plus resource of the PSS must be integrated into the security sector both for intelligence gathering and on-the-spot incident response.

Conclusion

Challenges to India’s security are mounting by the day. The governance of India’s security sector needs to be seen in the context of its external and internal vulnerability. Integrated, comprehensive Security Sector Reform (SSR) must be preceded by a comprehensive needs assessment to identify critical gaps and potential links across sectors. Governance is unlikely to improve across the board anywhere in the short term and political patronage to terrorists cannot disappear overnight either, especially in the absence of resolute and focused action against such a nexus. Presently, our SSR though progressing appears more akin to the blind man’s bluff. Indeed, we have a very long way to go.

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