Fifty Years Since Haji Pir: Where did we go wrong?

By Lt Gen Prakash Katoch

Issue: Vol. 30.3 Jul-Sep 2015 | Date : 11 Sep , 2015

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/fifty-years-since-haji-pir-where-did-we-go-wrong/

50 years have gone by since the capture of Haji Pir Pass by India and its return to Pakistan under the Tashkent Agreement. Where did we go wrong? We have had Parliament resolutions that Kashmir is an integral part of India, and rightfully so because the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir was acceded to India by the then ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh through an Instrument of Accession signed on October 26, 1947, post massive Pakistani infiltration. The CFL had been drawn under the 1949 Karachi Agreement under aegis of the UN Commission. It was Pakistan (not India) that breached the Cease Fire Line (CFL) through massive infiltrations by her Gibraltar Force and ‘Op Grand Slam’.

Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto convinced Ayub Khan that Pakistan was in a position to dislodge the Indians from Kashmir…

At a height of 2,637 metres, the Haji Pir Pass is located on the Western fringe of the formidable Pir Panjal Range that divides the Srinagar valley from the Jammu region. It is through this Pass that a wide, metalled highway connected Srinagar to Jammu via Uri-Poonch–Rajouri, over which bulk of passenger and trade traffic used to ply. This road is of strategic importance as it connects Uri with Poonch; but since a major portion of road is in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), it cannot be used by India. In the event of a conventional war with Pakistan, Haji Pir would be a vital objective for India because it is through this Pass that trained Pakistani militants have been sneaking into the Kashmir Valley, Poonch and Rajouri districts. Also, this Pass cuts into Indian-held territory by severing the Poonch-Uri route and can provide access to much of POK.

The Poonch Valley link road connecting Jammu with Poonch Valley was a hot favourite military objective of military planners in Pakistan, right from 1947-1948. Pakistan captured 78,114 square kilometres of area in Kashmir in 1947-1948 through a mix of regular troops and mujahideen post independence, and this territory called POK, remained with Pakistan because Pandit Nehru halted the Indian Army pursuing the fleeing Pakistanis through a unilateral ceasefire and approaching the UN. Buoyed by this success, the idea of launching a guerrilla war in Jammu and Kashmir was in vogue in Pakistan since the 1950s as admitted by A.O Mitha, a former Pakistani General, who had raised the Special Services Group (SSG) though he had been advising the hierarchy that such operations had no chance of success.

It was Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who convinced Ayub Khan that Pakistan was in a position to dislodge the Indians from Kashmir and once trained Pakistani soldiers went inside Kashmir, the people of the Valley would spontaneously rise in revolt while fear of China would prevent India from provoking an all out war. Bhutto did not have to cajole Ayub much because the latter had his own vision of a grandiose victory based on the pusillanimous performance of India in not getting POK vacated from Pakistani aggression post partition. While approving Operation Gibraltar, Ayub wrote, “As a general rule, Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of blows delivered at the right time and place. Such opportunities should, therefore, be sought and exploited.”

India had realised that Pakistani infiltrating groups were a serious threat to the security of Jammu and Kashmir…

Gibraltar Force and Operation ‘Grand Slam’

Success of capturing POK apart, Ayub was primed by Chinese Premier Chou-en-Lai who while visiting Pakistan in the early 1960s advised Ayub that, “Pakistan should prepare for prolonged conflict with India instead of short-term wars. He advised Pakistan to raise a Militia Force to act behind enemy (India) lines.” So, Ayub used a minor skirmish in the Rann of Kutch area in May 1965 to launch Operation Gibraltar. According to a Pakistani military scholar, the Gibraltar Force, established in first week of August 1965, consisted of a number of guerrilla groups of roughly a battalion strength including Kashmiri volunteers trained by the Pakistan Army, SSG and some regular infantry troops, some 5,000 to 7,000 strong.

Wikipedia puts the strength between 26,000 and 30,000. The forces had five sub-divisions, each with nucleus of regulars, with specified area targets – Srinagar Valley, Mendhar-Rajauri area, Dras-Kargil area, Nowshera-Sundarbani area and Bandipura-Sonarwain area. The Kashmir Valley task force was further subdivided to target specified areas of Qazinag-Naugam, Tithwal-Tangdhar, Gurais and Kel-Minimarg. The mission assigned to the various Gibraltar forces was warfare in the enemy’s rear including harassing communications, destruction of bridges, logistic installation and headquarters with a view to create conditions of an armed insurrection in Kashmir finally leading to a national uprising against Indian rule – much akin to what Chou-en-Lai had advised Ayub Khan who in turn believed that his Gibraltar Force would capture Jammu and Kashmir for keeps.

In conjunction and as follow up to launch of the Gibraltar Force, Ayub wanted Number 12 Division to capture Akhnoor. This objective was chosen because it had a single Class 18 bridge on the fast flowing River Chenab which was the key to Indian communications from Jammu and a group of valleys lying South of the Pir Panjal Range and West of River Chenab, most prominent of which was the Poonch Valley. The bridge was the sole all-weather lifeline of an Indian infantry division, with some twenty infantry battalions defending Poonch, Rajauri, Jhangar and Nauhshera and one independent Infantry Brigade defending the Chhamb-Dewa Sector. Possession of Akhnoor could enable Pakistan to threaten Jammu; the key to all Indian communications from Pathankot to Srinagar/Ladakh. The offensive to capture Akhnoor was assigned the codename ‘Operation Grand Slam’.

All communication between the infiltrators in Uri-Poonch area passed through the Haji Pir Pass…

India had realised that Pakistani infiltrating groups were a serious threat to the security of Jammu and Kashmir and that the only way to deal with the threat was to plug their infiltration routes and destroy their sanctuaries across the Cease-Fire Line (CFL) even as Pakistani forces moved a large concentration of their guns close to the CFL and began shelling Indian positions near Tithwal, Uri and Poonch. So, Indian troops sallied forth to capture two important posts in the Tithwal Sector advancing up to the Kishanganga River, Point Pt 13620 in Kargil Sector, Rishmar Ridge in Tithwal Sector and moved onwards to the Pir Sahiba feature from where they could see more of POK and dominate infiltration routes. Next, was the capture of Sunjoi feature on the outskirts of Mirpur and this was retained despite two counter attacks. Next was the capture of Ring Contour overlooking the Mirpur Bridge, which the retreating Pakistanis destroyed. This was followed by the capture of Haji Pir Pass and then Point 9013 in Tithwal Sector, which gave our troops complete domination of the Mirpur area right up to the bridge at Jura on River Kishenganga thus cutting off the routes for further infiltration into the Gurez Valley and Tithwal Sector.

Operations ‘Bakshi’ and ‘Faulad’

All communication between the infiltrators in Uri-Poonch area passed through the Haji Pir Pass. The Pass was dominated by three neighbouring hill features; on the East by Bedori (3,760 metres), on the West by Sank (2,895 metres) and Ledwali Gali (3,140 metres) to the South-West. It was considered essential to seize these posts before proceeding to the Haji Pir Pass (2,673 metres). Bedori was situated 14 km South East of the CFL and Haji Pir Pass is some ten kilometres South West of Bedori.

Being an important lifeline for the Pakistani infiltrators-cum-saboteurs, it was considered vital to capture the Haji Pir Pass. Considering the lie of the ground, it was apparent that capture of the Haji Pir Pass involved large-scale pincer movement for quick capture of the dominating features without giving time to the enemy to regroup and bring in reinforcements, finally converging to capture the Haji Pir Pass itself. The pincer movement required one thrust along the general axis Uri-Haji Pir Pass, in combination with a second thrust from the South via the Poonch-Kahuta approach.

Being an important lifeline for the Pakistani infiltrators-cum-saboteurs, it was considered vital to capture the Haji Pir Pass…

It was appreciated that the link-up between these forces would cut off all routes of approach into the crucial area of the Haji Pir Bulge. The responsibility for the thrust from the North (along general axis Uri-Haji Pir Pass) was given to 19 Infantry Division and 68 Infantry Brigade under Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) Z.C Bakshi, Commander, 68 Infantry Brigade, was tasked for this operation codenamed ‘Operation Bakshi’. The responsibility for the combination pincer along general axis Poonch-Kahuta approach from the South, to link up at Haji Pir Pass, was given to 25 Infantry Division with 93 Infantry Brigade in the operation codenamed ‘Operation Faulad’.

Operation Bakshi

This operation was planned as a two-pronged simultaneous attack against an enemy holding well-fortified defences adding up to some three and a half battalions. The left prong was to advance along Uri-Sank-Ledwali Gali-Haji Pir Pass while the right prong advanced along Uri-Bedori-Kuthnar Di Gali-Kiran-Haji Pir Pass. The capture of objectives was planned by August 25, 1965, followed by mopping up of the area. The time schedule of the plan, however, had to be modified due to heavy rains. Also, in preparation for the operation and to facilitate forward dumping of artillery and infantry ammunition and other war-like stores, the formation’s engineers were also constructing motorable tracks for one-tonne trucks up to Solikot reasonably close to Haji Pir and a 21-metre Bailey bridge across a torrential river under conditions of darkness and in heavy rain.

The operation commenced at 2150 hours on August 25 on schedule as per the new plan. The rain-sodden ground being slushy, progress was slow resulting in the attack on Sank being daylighted and contact was broken on the morning of August 26, with the enemy to enable preparing for the second attack the same night. The second attack by 1 PARA was pressed home at 2230 hours on August 26. ‘B’ Company led by Major (later Lieutenant General) Ranjit Singh Dyal charged up the slopes of Sank followed by ‘D’ Company, supported by artillery fire. Enemy troops rushed forward from their trenches and opened fire with MMGs, LMGs and other small arms but effective fire from the attackers forced the enemy to fall back to his trenches.

The capture of Haji Pir Pass by 1 PARA was a remarkable achievement, an example of excellent leadership…

By 0430 hours on August 27, ‘B’ Company had reached within 450 metres of the enemy positions, where they formed up in front of the enemy positions at Sank and charged frontally. In a daring platoon attack, enemy MMGs and LMGs were silenced as closing up troops showered enemy emplacements with grenades and bullets. The enemy withdrew to Sar and Ledwali Gali features leaving 16 dead but managed to evacuate about 100 wounded. As a follow up, 1 PARA soon captured Sar, Ledwali Gali, Sawan Pathri, Agiwas, clearing the area South of Sank including Point 10033, thus capturing all allotted objectives.

The progress along the right prong (Uri-Bedori-Kuthnar Di Gali-Kiran-Haji Pir Pass) could not keep pace with the left prong. The massive Bedori feature was heavily defended by the enemy. With Bedori still in enemy hands and the delay in capture of Sank having alerted them, the enemy had begun moving a regular brigade into the bulge. 1 PARA, therefore, was tasked to go for the Haji Pir Pass though it was not the original task allotted to them. The only chance of success at capturing Haji Pir Pass lay in a frontal attack through a re-entrant that ran North of it. The risk was that the advance would be under observation by the enemy.

A company strength column of 1 PARA was formed under Major Ranjit Singh Dyal for the task. The approach involved a climb of over 1,220 metres, and it had to be done during the hours of darkness. The force starting from Ledwali Gali was to infiltrate through Hyderabad Nullah on the night of August 27 and 28 and capture Ring Contours 1194 and 1094 to proceed further, descending from Ledwali Gali into the Hyderabd Nullah in heavy rain and under intermittent enemy fire, which was silenced through artillery fire and quick physical action by a platoon. Climbing along the Hyderabad Nullah and later directly to the Pass, the column surrounded a house and captured one LMG, nine rifles and ten personnel of Azad Kashmir Militia.

China noted India’s vacillation from the time of Partition and did not think twice about invading and occupying Tibet and Aksai Chin…

At 0430 hours, the company hit the old Uri-Poonch Road. Here, the troops were given a much needed short break in the cold and bitter morning. At 0600 hours, the column was again on the move. Moving along the road, it reached 700 metres short of the Pass at 0900 hours. The enemy was surprised to see the 1 PARA column and opened up with MMG fire from the Western shoulder of the Pass and with LMG and rifle fire from the Pass area itself. Major Dyal ordered two platoons to climb up the spur, assault the enemy from the Western side of the Pass and then roll down to eliminate the LMG and rifle fire on the Pass. The enemy could not withstand this daylight daring attack and withdrew in confusion to a feature to the West of the Pass.

Soon the LMG on the Pass was silenced and by 1000 hours on August 28, the formidable Pass fell to the column of 1 PARA. The enemy did try to counter attack but could not succeed. The capture of Haji Pir Pass by 1 PARA was a remarkable achievement, an example of excellent leadership, the element of surprise and the ability of our troops to quickly regroup and continue attacking. On August 29, information was received that the enemy was regrouping some 2,000 yards South-west of the Haji Pir Pass. A column of 1 PARA under Major A.S Baicher made a daring daylight attack descending nearly 1,000 feet to get to the other side of the Nullah. Hand-to-hand fighting erupted but stunned by the ferocity of the attackers, the enemy panicked and fled leaving behind bodies of eight of their comrades, identified from 20 Punjab. Further attempts at counter attack by the enemy failed. The surviving members of Pakistan’s 20 Punjab then retreated and took up positions on two tall hill features; Points 8786 and 8777 which overlooked a long stretch of the Uri-Poonch Road. Point 8768 was subsequently captured by 1 PARA in the face of heavy resistance.

Simultaneously, following the stalemate at Bedori, the feature was being attacked again and was finally captured by 10 Punjab by 0600 hours on August 29. The battalion then moved to Kuthnar Di Gali and further on to Kiran. The link up at Haji Pir Pass through the right prong by 19 Punjab was achieved on September 01.

The Indian media did hint at the possibility of an international conspiracy…

Operation Faulad

‘Operation Faulad’ aimed at sealing the Haji Pir Bulge from the South. The enemy had many fortified picquets on numerous hill features between Poonch and Kahuta, which effectively dominated the Poonch-Haji Pir track, the most formidable posts being Raja and Chand Tekri picquets held individually by battalion strength enemy. These posts served as the main pivots and staging camps for all infiltrator activities in the Poonch Sector. On the night of September 05 and 06, 1965, a simultaneous attack was launched on both these posts. Under heavy fire and hand-to-hand fighting for over two hours Raja and Chand Tekri were captured by by 2 SIKH and 3 DOGRA respectively. These two massive features dominated most of the area, East of Betar Nullah, along which ran a track that linked Poonch with Haji Pir Pass. The capture of these picquets was necessary not only to seal off the Haji Pir Pass area but also for the destruction of the two major bases of the enemy operations. The link up with 93 Infantry Brigade eventually took place on September 10. The entire Haji Pir Bulge was thus captured by Indian troops. This closed the mouth of the Bulge and sealed the Haji Pir Sector, ceasing all enemy resistance East of Betar Nullah. On September 01, 1965, Pakistan had launched ‘Operation Grand Slam’ with a view to capture Akhnoor but this was yet another fiasco.

Pakistani Blunder

‘Operation Gibraltar’ may be termed a bold operation that was well coordinated through multiple infiltration routes. However, it was also stupid since its failure lay in the basic presumption that that the population of Jammu and Kashmir would side with them and rise against India. It failed miserably despite limited local support in some pockets of the Srinagar Valley and Mandi area South of the Pir Panjal Range, only resulting in sporadic violence other than its use for embedding contacts for future use. The blunder may be attributed to the hallucinations of Ayub Khan and his Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, with their juniors not raising much opposition.

Had the Haji Pir Pass remained with us, the distance from Jammu to Srinagar through Poonch and Uri would have been reduced by over 200 kilometres…

The Tashkent Agreement

Indian and Pakistan forces withdrew to their respective positions, as prior to August 05, 1965, in accordance the Tashkent Agreement signed on January 16, 1966 under Russian brokerage. It will never be known what pressures, if any, were brought upon Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri since he died under mysterious circumstances the very next morning and though his body was brought back to India, no autopsy was conducted.

The Indian media did hint at the possibility of an international conspiracy. But even if there were no pressures on Prime Minister Shastri and there was no international conspiracy, the Prime Minister possibly signed the agreement in good faith and hoping for good neighbourly relations with Pakistan in the future. What is known is that Prime Minister Shastri had wanted talks with Ayub Khan at Tashkent itself, the day after signing the Tashkent Agreement, the aim being to extract a promise from the latter never to use force again. But that meeting did not take place because he passed away. However, a promise of this nature would not have made much difference given Pakistan’s history of deceit and broken promises. Under the Tashkent Agreement, the strategic Haji Pir Pass and its adjacent areas were thus returned to Pakistan. Had the Haji Pir Pass remained with India, the distance from Jammu to Srinagar through Poonch and Uri would have been reduced by over 200 kilometres and Pakistan’s major infiltration routes would have remained blocked.

Beyond 1965

50 years have gone by since the capture of Haji Pir Pass by India and its return to Pakistan under the Tashkent Agreement. Where did we go wrong? We have had Parliament resolutions that Kashmir is an integral part of India, and rightfully so because the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir was acceded to India by the then ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh through an Instrument of Accession signed on October 26, 1947, post massive Pakistani infiltration. The CFL had been drawn under the 1949 Karachi Agreement under aegis of the UN Commission. It was Pakistan (not India) that breached the CFL through massive infiltrations by her Gibraltar Force and ‘Operation Grand Slam’.

The military certainly did not want the strategic Haji Pir Pass and surrounding areas returned…

The 1949 UN Resolution called for plebiscite, categorically ruling that first Pakistan must withdraw all its security forces from territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan not only reinforced her security forces in Jammu and Kashmir but also changed the demography of area through large number of settlers from the plains, which continues to date. So there was no reason for India to return the Haji Pir Pass or for that matter any captured territory as citing the above could have thwarted any international pressure including that of the UN. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri was strong willed. Therefore, one possible reason would have been the bureaucratic advice he got sans any strategic sense – the bane of India’s defence from independence till date. The military certainly did not want the strategic Haji Pir Pass and surrounding areas returned, laying open the Haji Pir Bulge for infiltration again.

China noted India’s vacillation from the time of partition and did not think twice about invading and occupying Tibet and Aksai Chin, taking over the Shaksgam Valley from Pakistan, nibbling our territory across the Himalayas, particularly in Ladakh, and now claiming the whole of 90,000 sq. km. of Arunachal Pradesh. Pakistan remains emboldened with the support it receives from China, the United States, Saudi Arabia, OIC and now even Russia. Post 1965 was the 1971 Indo-Pak War. Despite having some 92,000 Pakistani Prisoners of War, India failed to extract a written agreement over Kashmir from Pakistan. How could we agree to a verbal assurance from Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto when he, along with Ayub Khan, was the main architect of the Gibraltar Force and ‘Operation Grand Slam’ during 1965?

While enabling the birth of Bangladesh, we also missed the opportunity of straightening out the issue of the Siliguri Corridor or resolving the final border with Bangladesh. But then as Lieutenant General R.S Dyal once said, “Our people never read maps.” How do you expect a bureaucrat to read a map when he has no sense or education of matters military? So, Pakistan continues to exercise the state policy of terror, a proxy war against India with 42 terrorist training camps in POK, instigating sedition and waiving of Pakistani flags at rallies in the Srinagar Valley while Sartaj Malik, the NSA of Pakistan declares that Pakistan should not target those terrorist organisations that do not attack Pakistan. So, we have a rogue country, Pakistan, as a neighbour, being pampered by China and the US with all the military hardware and financial largesse while we still do not have an effective deterrent in place against sub-conventional and asymmetric war despite being subjected to terror for some three decades.

India’s higher defence structures do not match the 21st century conflict scenarios…

Conclusion

What have we learnt post Pakistan’s Operations Gibraltar and Grand Slam during 1965? Apparently, not much as we still are without a strategic culture. India’s higher defence structures do not match the 21st century conflict scenarios. The military is still kept outside strategic planning and decision-making on matters military. Generalist bureaucrats man the Ministry of Defence and the users (military) are deliberately kept out of the planning, decision-making and even design levels of the defence-industrial complex.

India is still without a National Security Strategy while national security objectives remain undefined and comprehensive defence review is yet to be undertaken. India is still without an effective deterrence against Pakistan’s proxy war. The question is whether the present government can cure the Parkinson’s disease afflicting the defence of the country.

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