By Claude Arpi
17 Aug , 2015
In 1913, war in Europe appeared imminent for the British; they finally realized that the treaties regarding Tibet signed with China (and Russia) had no relevance as they could not be implemented in practice. In these circumstances, London decided to call China and Tibet for a tripartite Convention to solve the Tibetan problem, secure a buffer zone between British India and China and ensure peace and stability in the region. Simla was selected as the venue of the Conference1and Sir Henry McMahon2 was to chair the tripartite talks.
It was not an easy proposal; for months the Chinese were rather reluctant to sit at the negotiating table on an equal footing with the Tibetans. But diverse factors were putting pressure on them. They knew that the Dalai Lama was close to some British officers such as Charles Bell. They could fear another Lhasa Convention where they would perhaps not even be asked to participate.
In Kham, the military situation was not favourable to the Chinese as most of the territory captured by Zhao Erfeng had been recovered by the Tibetan troops. The Tibetan army was now better organised and arms and weapons were imported. After the Dalai Lama’s return, the Tibetan army was given a British type of training.
This fact worried the Chinese who were also apprehensive after Mongolia had been passed over to Russian control. Would the Tibetans join the British sphere of influence if they refused to participate in the Conference?
Hence the Chinese felt they had no alternative but to accept the British conditions and attend the Convention.
The Thirteenth Dalai Lama chose Lonchen Shatra Paljor Dorje, his old and experienced Prime Minister as his representative. He had dared to suggest negotiations with the Younghusband Mission ten years earlier. His assistant was Trimon, who had prepared detailed documentation on the legal status of Tibet, especially of the eastern border areas.
It was certainly one of the great surprises of the conference: the Tibetans had come so well prepared with volumes and volumes of original documents,3 while the Chinese had no documents to prove their allegations.
The Chinese were represented by Ivan Chen while the British Plenipotentiary, Sir Henry McMahon4 was assisted by Charles Bell, the Dalai Lama’s old acquaintance from his Darjeeling days.
The brief given to Lonchen Shatra by the Dalai Lama was clear:
Tibet was to look after its own internal affairs;
Her foreign affairs were to be managed for important matters in consultation with the British;
No Chinese Amban or official should be posted in Tibet;
Tibetan territory should include all the Tibetan-speaking areas up to Dartsedo in the east and Kokonor in the north-east.
When the Conference assembled it became immediately obvious that the positions of the Tibetan and Chinese delegates were diametrically opposite.
In his presentation, Lonchen Shatra reiterated the Dalai Lama’s points and asked for recognition of the independence of Tibet. He also wanted the Dalai Lama to be acknowledged as the temporal and spiritual leader of Tibet. He claimed that the Tibetan territory should include all the Tibetan-speaking areas of Kham and Amdo. Lonchen Shatra also requested that the Conference declare the Conventions of 1906 and 1908 invalid, as Tibet had not been a party to them. Further, an indemnity from the Chinese was claimed for the damage and destruction in Lhasa and in Kham following Zhao Erfeng’s invasion a few years earlier.
The Chinese stand was very different. Ivan Chen claimed Tibet as a part of China. He explained that due to the conquest of Genggis Khan, Tibet had become a part of the Chinese Empire. This was further confirmed when the Fifth Dalai Lama accepted some titles from the Chinese Emperor.
Another argument he used was that the Tibetans had called upon the Manchus for military assistance many times and each time the Emperor had come to provide support. He gave the examples of the invasions of the Dzungar Mongols in the 18th and the Gurkhas in the 19th century.
Regarding Zhao Erfeng, Ivan Chen explained that his government had only acted in accordance with the Treaty of 1906 and his troops were sent to protect the Trade Marts. Another ‘proof’ advanced by the Chinese Plenipotentiary to show that Tibet was part of China, was that the compensation under the Convention of 1904 had been paid by China to the British Government on behalf of the Tibetan Government.
He further claimed that the Amban had the right to have an escort of 2,600 men to control the internal and foreign affairs of Tibet. He requested that a thousand men be stationed in Lhasa and the rest in other places to be decided by the Ambans.
For the Chinese, the status of Tibet had to be restored as per the 1906 Agreement and the border between China and Tibet was to be in Gyamda, some 150 miles east of Lhasa.
The Tibetan delegate managed to counter the Chinese point by point, especially on the issue of demarcation of the territory, by tabling revenue documents.
Regarding the payment of compensation for the Younghusband expedition, the Tibetans declared that they had never asked the Chinese to pay the amount of 25 lakhs of rupees to the British and that they were not even aware of the payment.
The British Plenipotentiary was caught between two opposing viewpoints, and on behalf of His Majesty’s government, McMahon had to harmonize the two sides.
He found a way out by dividing Tibet into two parts with consequences which can still be felt today.5 McMahon thought that he could impose on both parties a ‘fair deal’ which would also have advantages for Great Britain. Tibet would be divided into two parts:
‘Outer Tibet’ which corresponded roughly to Central and Western Tibet including the sections skirting the Indian frontier, Lhasa, Shigatse, Chamdo; and
‘Inner Tibet’ including Amdo Province and part of Kham.
The arrangement was as follows: ‘Outer Tibet’ was to be recognised as autonomous. China would not interfere in the administration of Outer Tibet, nor with the selection of the Dalai Lama. No troops or Ambans would be stationed there. It would not be converted into a Chinese Province. Maps were also prepared showing the boundaries of Inner and Outer Tibet. In the interest of settling the dispute, Lonchen Shatra reluctantly agreed to McMahon’s proposal. This was in February 1914.
The Indo-Tibetan Border: the McMahon Line
But then the Chinese delegate started delaying tactics. This gave the opportunity and the time to the Tibetan and the British delegates to discuss their own borders. The object of the talks was India’s North-eastern areas, between what the British called the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and Tibet.
The Chinese were not invited to discuss the question of the border between India and Tibet and their acceptance of the McMahon Line was never sought; nor did they ask anything about the final demarcation. At the same time, it was not a ‘secret’ negotiation as alleged by the Chinese today.
Through an exchange of notes between the British and Tibetan Plenipotentiaries, the Indo-Tibet frontier was fixed in March 1914. It is worthwhile to quote these letters that would have important consequences for the future of both nations, especially India which, 48 years later, would fight a war along the McMahon Line.
The British Plenipotentiary wrote to Lonchen Shatra on March 24 attaching a rough map (1 inch for 8 miles).
In the first letter dated 24 March 1914, McMahon writes:
To Lonchen Shatra, Tibetan Plenipotentiary,
In February last you accepted the India-Tibet frontier from the Isu Razi Pass to the Bhutan frontier, as given in the map6 (two sheets), of which two copies are herewith attached, subject to the confirmation of your government and the following conditions:
The Tibetan ownership in private estates on the British side of the frontier will not be disturbed.
The sacred places of Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa fall within a day’s march of the British side of the frontier, they will be included in Tibetan territory and the frontier modified accordingly.7
I understand that your Government has now agreed to this frontier subject to the above two conditions. I shall be glad to learn definitely from you that this is the case.
You wished to know whether certain dues now collected by the Tibetan Government at Tsona Jong (Dzong) and in Kongbu and Kham from the Monpas and Lopas for articles sold may still be collected. Mr. Bell has informed you that such details will be settled in a friendly spirit, when you have furnished him the further information, which you have promised.
The final settlement of this India-Tibet frontier will help to prevent causes of future dispute and thus cannot fail to be of great advantage to both Governments.8
On March 25, Lonchen Shatra officially replies:
As it was feared that there might be friction in future unless the boundary between India and Tibet is clearly defined, I submitted the map, which you sent to me in February last, to the Tibetan Government at Lhasa for orders. I have now received orders from Lhasa, and I accordingly agree to the boundary as marked in red in the two copies of the maps signed by you subject to the condition mentioned in your letter, dated 14th March, sent to me through Mr. Bell. I have signed and sealed the two copies of the maps. I have kept one copy here and return herewith the other.
Thus the McMahon Line was born in the form of a fat red line on a map showing the Indo-Tibetan boundary in the eastern sector. The British and the Tibetan delegates signed and sealed the map.
The Simla Convention
The Convention itself was finally initialled on 27 April 1914.
China pledged not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province, while Great Britain was not to annex any portion of the country.
We shall go through some of the Articles of the Simla Convention and study their implications for the three nations.
In Article 2, the contracting parties recognised ‘the autonomy of Outer Tibet’ and engaged “to respect the territorial integrity of the country, and to abstain from interference in the administration of Outer Tibet (including the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama), which shall remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa.”9
More importantly for the Tibetans: “The Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province” while the British Government engaged not to annex Tibet or any part of her [its] territory.
The following Article would have very serious political repercussions when in 1947, the Government of newly independent India took over the mantle from the British. It recognized “the special interest of Great Britain, in virtue of the geographical position of Tibet, in the existence of an effective Tibetan Government, and in the maintenance of peace and order in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and adjoining States.”
In 1947, not only did the Government of India step into Britain’s shoes, but it was also felt that due to the geographical proximity, the Indian Government naturally had a ‘special interest’ in Tibet and should give a lead in any policy concerning it. This explains why the Western governments chose to always align themselves with India’s position at that time.
The use of the term ‘foreign power’ to describe China in the 1904 Convention was cancelled. The Tibet Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 were also cancelled and the Tibetan Government and the British agreed to negotiate new Trade Regulations for Outer Tibet.
The borders of Tibet, and the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet, were drawn on maps attached to the Convention.
The Chinese did not want to accept the new demarcation line between Inner and Outer Tibet and between Inner Tibet and China. After the conquests of Zhao Erfeng, China was not keen to surrender the newly-acquired territories and the Tibetans were more than reluctant to let go of any territories inhabited by Tibetans, especially in areas where Tibetan monasteries were commanding great authority and revenue.
It was the thorniest point of the negotiations and eventually became the reason (or pretext) for their breakdown.
Although in April Ivan Chen initialled the draft Convention, he received an order from his government not to sign the final Convention.
Finally, the British lost their legendary tolerance: “the patience of His Majesty’s government is exhausted and they have no alternative but to inform the Chinese Government that, unless the Convention is signed before the end of this month, His Majesty’s Government will hold themselves free to sign separately with Tibet.”
On July 3, 1914, Great Britain and Tibet signed the Simla Convention. The map of the McMahon Line was also attached to the Convention though at a smaller scale than the one exchanged in March 1914.
On the withdrawal of the Chinese, a Declaration was signed by the plenipotentiaries of Britain and Tibet declaring that the Convention was to be binding on the Governments of Britain and Tibet and agreeing that so long as the Chinese Government withheld its signature, it would be debarred from the enjoyment of privileges accruing from it.
The following para was included: “The powers granted to China under the Convention shall not be recognized by Great Britain and Tibet until and unless the Government of China ratifies the Convention.”
The law of impermanence, however, was knocking at Europe’s door.
On August 4th 1914, just one month after the signature of the Convention, Great Britain entered the First World War. This perhaps explained London’s impatience and what Richardson called the “disinclination to assume additional responsibilities.” London now had to concentrate its efforts on the European front.
By not signing the Convention, the Chinese were not only deprived of the benefits of the Convention but also of the Notes exchanged between the signatories. It is in these Notes that the Tibetans had made some major compromises, particularly the one that says that ‘Tibet forms part of Chinese territory.’ This was conditional to the acceptance of the Tibet-China boundary.
The other benefits that the Chinese lost were the recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet; the right of sending a Representative to Lhasa with 300 troops; the admission that China was not a ‘foreign power’ for the purpose of the 1904 Convention.
The new Anglo-Tibetan Trade Regulations were also signed on the 3rd July 1914. As mentioned in Article 7 of the main Convention, these were to replace the Regulations of 1893 and 1908 which stood cancelled by this article.
The new Regulations gave tremendous advantages to the British who became suddenly the main and only player in Tibet. This would remain in force till the signature of the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954. In the meantime, the Government of India had stepped into British shoes in August 1947.
The border agreement between British India and Tibet of 1914 will be the main focus of our study in the following chapters. It was important for Lhasa which for the first time had a demarcated border with India.
The legal implications were not understood by all in Tibet in the 1940’s, but we shall come back to it.
The Following Decades
The relations between Tibet and the British Empire continued to be cordial but in Lhasa many had begun to doubt that the British had the power to bring the Chinese back to the negotiating table and get them to sign the Simla Convention.
Were the British only interested in securing their border and opening trade marts? Were they also able to be an effective protector? These were some of the questions doing the rounds in Tibet.
It was in this context that in 1920 London decided to send to Lhasa, Charles Bell,10 McMahon’s Assistant in Simla, to have a frank discussion with the Tibetan leaders. It has to be noted that for once it was London which took the initiative while the Viceroy’s Office was shying away from extending more recognition to Tibet. One of the considerations might have been that after the Russian Revolution, the Anglo-Russian Agreement had been declared null and void and the danger from that quarter had faded away.
Charles Bell remained in Lhasa for one year and through his many meetings with his friend, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, he was able to give London a clear picture of the political situation at the Roof of the World. As a result of Bell’s visit, the British Government decided to help the Tibetan Government in its development and also to supply a reasonable quantity of arms and ammunition for its self-defence.
Other projects were also undertaken, such as laying a telegraph line from Gyantse to Lhasa, making a geological survey of Central Tibet, building a small hydro-electric plant at Lhasa and reorganizing the Police. However the most important aspect for Tibet’s security was the training of officers and men by British instructors in Gyantse and in India.
On the diplomatic front with China, no positive development occurred as a result of “disunity in China, the low prestige of the Central [Chinese] Government and the prevalence of a chauvinistic spirit made progress impossible” as Richardson put it.
Although the British position was clear, as seen from Lord Curzon’s declaration in 1921: “We should regard ourselves at liberty to deal with Tibet, if necessary without referring to China; to enter into closer relation with the Tibetans …to give the Tibetans any reasonable assistance they might require in the development and protection of the country,” the Tibetan issue remained unresolved and the situation on the eastern front was very unstable.
Notes
Ten years earlier, Curzon had already thought of Simla as the place for such a Conference.
Lieutenant Colonel Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, (1862 — 1949) was a British diplomat and Indian Army officer who served as the High Commissioner in Egypt from 1915 to 1917. He was also an administrator in British India, and served twice as Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan. McMahon is best known for the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence, as well as the McMahon Line between Tibet and India. He also features prominently in T.E. Lawrence’s account of his role in the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire during World War I, Seven Pillars of Wisdom. In 1914, he was Foreign Secretary to the Government of India.
All the documents had to be examined and initialled by Sir Henry McMahon, the president of the Conference.
McMahon left his name to the famous line demarcating the border between Tibet and India.
It has to be noted that the major stumbling block in the negotiations between the present Dalai Lama’s administration and the Chinese government between 2002 and 2009 was the definition of Tibet’s territory. The Chinese want to negotiate for the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) only, which corresponded roughly to McMahon’s ‘Outer Tibet.’
The map referred to in this letter was published for the first time in An Atlas of the Northern Frontier of India, issued on 1st January 1960 by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.
We shall study the implications of this clause in a later chapter.
Shakabpa, op. cit., pp. 256-257.
For text of Convention, see Richardson, op. cit. p. 283 ff.
Adapted from Wikipedia: “Charles Alfred Bell was born in Calcutta in 1870. Educated at Winchester school and New College, Oxford, Charles also joined the ICS in 1891. He was transferred to Darjeeling in 1900. It was there that he had his first contact with Tibetans and became fascinated with the people and their culture. Bell at once applied himself to learning the Tibetan language. During the next few years Bell became increasingly involved in the political affairs of Tibet and the surrounding regions. In 1904-5 he was put in charge of administration of the Chumbi Valley, an area that had been temporarily ceded by Tibet to Britain under the terms of the Younghusband Treaty. Bell also served as the acting Political Officer for Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet during the absence of John C. White, before succeeding him in the post in 1908. After meeting the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in 1910, Bell formed an intimate and lasting friendship, which was to prove critical to the British in their future negotiations and dealings with Tibet after the Dalai Lama’s return to Lhasa in June 1912. In 1920, he was sent for a few months to Tibet by the British Government.”
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