July 28, 2015
Introduction
The once-praised concept known as population-centric counterinsurgency, typically abbreviated simply as "COIN", has fallen on hard times. On December 1st, 2014, The American Conservative published an op-ed by U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Daniel L. Davis entitled "COIN Is a Proven Failure".[1] A month earlier, retired Lieutenant General Daniel P. Bolger published Why We Lost, in which he claims that "by the time [Field Manual 3-24] came out, the techniques had already been tried and found wanting."[2] With the Taliban still intransigent nearly fourteen years after the 2001 invasion, and owing to ongoing conflict in Iraq, COIN's reputation for calming the chaos has taken a substantial hit.
Popular perception states that in late 2006, with stability in both Afghanistan and Iraq in sharp decline, a combined Army and Marine Corps team led by then-Lieutenant General David Petraeus drafted a new COIN field manual, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency. In early 2007, President George W. Bush announced a controversial surge of additional combat troops to Iraq. Petraeus, subsequently promoted to General, took command of Multinational Forces in Iraq (MNF-I), which employed the new COIN doctrine codified in FM 3-24 to exploit opportunities offered by the mid-2006 Anbar Awakening movement, and from a ceasefire by the Jaish al Mahdi militia. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) adopted a similar approach in Afghanistan, bolstered by a comparable 2010 troop surge ordered by President Barack Obama in late 2009. The COIN initiative in Iraq produced a temporary settlement that eventually deteriorated after American troops withdrew in late 2011; meanwhile, Afghanistan's COIN initiative largely failed to produce even a comparable temporary settlement.
While the preceding narrative contains nuggets of truth, it fails to accurately appraise the history of either Afghanistan or Iraq. Instead, an accurate analysis could be characterized in terms of accepted COIN theory and best practices; the concepts codified in FM 3-24; and what the Department of Defense, and particularly the U.S. Army, actually did in Afghanistan and Iraq both before and after FM 3-24’s release. To paraphrase the classic line from an 1897 edition of The Sun: "No, Virginia, COIN is not a proven failure."
Operational History
The Father of Strategy, Carl von Clausewitz, speaks of both the overwhelming value of historical examples for understanding and formulating strategy and, conversely, the danger of historical misinterpretation. According to Clausewitz:
"Misuse[d] historical examples... generally distract and bewilder the judgment and understanding without demonstrating anything; for when exposed to the light they turn out to be only trumpery rubbish, made use of to show off the author's learning."[3]
Planning for both the Afghan and Iraq Wars was informed in large part by the misinterpretation of two recent wars: the Vietnam War, and the 1991 Gulf War.
The narrative surrounding the Vietnam War has led to an oversimplification of the conflict as a failure of COIN, rather than a failure of conventional warfare to counter unconventional threats. (In addition, the role that American disengagement from Vietnam played in aggravating the Sino-Soviet Split remains absent from the conflict's narrative.[4]) Thus, since 1973, American military operations have been specifically planned to avoid prolonged, manpower-intensive COIN engagements.
Conversely, the coalition victory in the 1991 Gulf War inspired a false confidence in the dominance of precision air strikes and combined arms maneuver. The United States and its allies secured an important strategic victory, but did so under extremely specific circumstances, with limited objectives, against a quantitatively and qualitatively inferior enemy. In early 1991, the Iraqi military was already exhausted following a bloody, nine-year stalemate, and over-extended even before major combat began. In the wake of the post-Cold War "Peace Dividend" drawdown, political and military leaders fixated upon this limited victory as the model for how future wars should be planned and fought. This misinterpretation of the alleged decisiveness of the Gulf War continues today. The aforementioned retired Lieutenant General, Daniel Bolger, interviewed in late 2014, said:
"What is the U.S. military trained to do? The U.S. military is trained to carry out short, and decisive conventional operations against a uniformed foreign enemy... Given what I knew then, I would have recommended to do like we did in 1991."[5]
Thus, both the Afghan and Iraq Wars were initially planned and executed to avoid a prolonged engagement, and to capitalize upon the same capabilities that proved effective in 1991. Operation Enduring Freedom began as a combined air and unconventional warfare campaign, with a full scale conventional campaign and reconstruction effort executed later. Operation Iraqi Freedom was planned as a repeat of Operation Desert Storm, with a combined precision air and conventional maneuver campaign. Both operations, and particularly the Iraq War, showcased operational concepts such as Rapid Decisive Operations/"Shock and Awe" and Effects-Based Operations (EBO), which derived from the "Revolution in Military Affairs"/"Military Transformation". The RMA/Transformation initiative began after the Vietnam War as a method of balancing the Soviet Union's quantitative conventional superiority with American qualitative technological superiority. The initiative gained new prominence in the 1990's, partly because of its success during the Gulf War, and partly because it offered efficiencies for the post-Cold War “Peace Dividend” drawdown.[6] As a result, strategic leaders were slow to acknowledge that violence perpetrated by the Taliban or a variety of Iraqi groups constituted an insurgency, and were similarly slow to change their approach in either theater.
Established COIN Theory and the COIN Field Manual
Insurgencies, like counterinsurgency campaigns, have taken a variety of names and been couched in a variety of terms in recent history. However, whether a nation's troops engaged in colonial pacification, fought small wars, mounted counter-rebellion operations, or undercut communist revolutionaries, theories and best practices remain similar. Prior to the Afghan and Iraq Wars, a variety of noteworthy authors discussed the topic. These included Sir Charles Edward Callwell in 1896, Roger Trinquier in 1961, David Galula in 1963 and 1964, and Sir Robert Thompson in 1966, as well as recent theorists such as David Kilcullen and David Petraeus. Meanwhile, the U.S. Marine Corps published Small Wars Operationsin 1935 and the revised Small Wars Manual in 1940 to codify lessons learned in the "Banana Wars" of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Conversely, counterinsurgency theory has traditionally focused on the writings of such successful insurgent leaders as T.E. Lawrence and Mao Tse-tung, and to a lesser degree Ernesto "Che" Guevara. Thus, a corpus of knowledge exists to describe how insurgencies, guerrilla campaigns, and small wars are both waged and countered.
FM 3-24 omits most of that corpus. At nearly three hundred pages in length, mention of the aforementioned authors is sparse. Mao, perhaps the most influential guerrilla warfare theorist in modern history, receives a mere pair of sections, while Lawrence is quoted sparingly, and Guevara is mentioned only once. Only one of Galula's publications is mentioned, and this is cited only twice; his account of COIN operations in Algeria from 1956 to 1958 is omitted entirely. Thompson is quoted twice in the manual's body, Trinquier is mentioned only in the annotated bibliography, and Callwell is omitted entirely.
The field manual is similarly selective about which COIN campaigns it highlights. Alistair Horne's authoritative history of the Algerian War, A Savage War of Peace, was read by President Bush and other senior leaders early in the Iraq War, leading to its 2006 reprinting and a mid-2007 meeting between Horne and President Bush. However, FM 3-24 mentions the Algerian War only thrice, and Horne's book is cited only in the annotated bibliography. The successful Anglo-Omani counterinsurgency campaigns in the Jebel Akhdar and Dhofar are omitted, save for the citation of Major General Tony Jeapes' account of the latter conflict in the annotated bibliography. The successful British campaign in Malaya is mentioned only twice. Other significant counterinsurgency successes and failures are mentioned either in passing, or not at all. Conversely, FM 3-24 mentions Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq a total of sixty, ten, and eighty times, respectively, despite the fact that Vietnam is widely considered to be the only war America ever lost, and the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq were both ongoing in 2006 (and the Iraq War was generally considered to be failing).
FM 3-24 diluted or omitted most of the lessons from recent history's COIN campaigns. The 2006 edition of FM 3-24 was, at best, an abridged sampling of a handful of America-centric COIN case studies. (The 2010 British Army COIN field manual is similarly sparse.) At worst, its authors selected a narrow range of examples, of varying relevance, from past and ongoing campaigns that did not accurately present best practices for successful COIN operations.
The COIN Field Manual and Recent Operations
As the Soviet military infamously noted, "One of the serious problems in planning against American doctrine is that the Americans do not read their manuals, nor do they feel any obligations to follow their doctrine." American forces, and particularly the U.S. Army, upheld this trend in Afghanistan and Iraq: although FM 3-24 was published in late 2006, its operational adoption was limited. While examples are manifold, several examples are noted below.
On the topic of force strength, paragraph 1-67 of FM 3-24 states:
"A better force requirement gauge is troop density, the ratio of security forces (including the host nation’s military and police forces as well as foreign counterinsurgents) to inhabitants. Most density recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1000 residents in an AO. Twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation."
Twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 residents equates to a ratio of 1:50. The current population of Iraq is approximately 36 million, and the current population of Afghanistan is nearly 39 million. The high water marks of coalition troops in Iraq were just over 180,000 personnel in late 2005 (pre-surge) and again in late 2007 (surge). For Afghanistan, this was approximately 150,000 in mid-2011. This means that at the high water mark point for Iraq, the troop density was approximately 1:200; and at the high water mark point for Afghanistan, this density fell to approximately 1:260. While these ratios omit host nation forces, both Afghan and Iraqi security forces continue to struggle to achieve operational competence. This density erodes further once one accounts for the legions of support troops[7] and general staffs[8] who contribute only indirectly to the provision of security. (By 2009, so few American troops were engaged in active security assistance that the Army ramped up morale events such as Salsa dance classes to break the tedium[9], and media outlets ran headlines such as "U.S. troops in Iraq have time on hands".[10])
Paragraph 8-13 states:
"Bases must be set up so that they do not project an image of undue permanency or a posture suggesting a long-term foreign occupation. Similarly, logistic postures that project an image of unduly luxurious living by foreign forces while HN civilians suffer in poverty should be avoided. Such postures undermine the COIN message and mission. Insurgent propaganda can twist such images into evidence of bad intentions by counterinsurgents."
While many troops deployed to both theaters lived in austere conditions, most personnel serving in support billets have enjoyed the sort of concessions that are taken for granted in the States. These conditions contrast directly with the austere lifestyle led by most Afghans and many Iraqis. In addition to provisions such as air conditioning and Internet access, other luxuries included regularly scheduled steak and lobster nights at some posts in Iraq, Kyrgyz-run massage parlors in Afghanistan[11], the Canadian donut chain Tim Horton's in Afghanistan, T.G.I. Friday's, Pizza Hut, Dairy Queen, KFC, and Burger King.[12][13] Prior to his 2010 dismissal, General Stanley McChrystal banned such concessions in Afghanistan in order to improve military discipline and fitness[14], reduce the campaign's logistical footprint, and provide opportunities to support the local economy.[15][16][17] However, upon McChrystal's ouster, General Petraeus cancelled the ban.[18]
Paragraph 8-31 states:
"In many cases 'good enough to meet standards' equipment that is indigenously sustainable is preferable to 'high-technology, best available' equipment that requires substantial foreign assistance for long-term maintenance."
Both ISAF and MNF-I supplied relatively sophisticated equipment to the Afghan and Iraqi security forces. In addition to legacy Soviet/Russian equipment, ISAF and MNF-I have equipped and indoctrinated the Afghan and Iraqi armies with M113A2, M1117, and MRAP armored personnel carriers, in addition to thousands of HMMWVs. Both forces field American artillery (M114 155mm howitzers in Afghanistan, and M198 155mm howitzers in Iraq), and both Afghan and Iraqi soldiers have either adopted or intend to transition to notoriously maintenance-intensive M16 rifles and M4 carbines.[19] The Iraqi Army has lost dozens of its M1A1M Abrams tanks to ISIS and Hezbollah in recent months.[20]
Following from this, in Appendix E, paragraph E-31 states:
"Planners should consider HN economic and technological resources when selecting equipment. In most cases, the host nation acquires, or the U.S. and multinational partners provide, a small air force. Although this air force often has limited resources, the host nation still should effectively operate and maintain its aircraft and supporting systems. Multinational support in training and equipping the HN air force can be very important. U.S. aircraft have tremendous capabilities, but they can be too expensive and too complex for some developing nations to operate and maintain. Multinational partners with capable, but less expensive and less sophisticated, aircraft can often help equip the host nation."
Among other advanced aircraft, the DoD purchased a number of Alenia C-27A Spartan cargo aircraft for the Afghan Air Force, only to scrap them when maintenance and logistics for the aircraft proved untenable for both ISAF and Afghan forces.[21] The United States is in the process of supplying a variety of advanced aircraft, including F-16 fighters, to the Iraqi Air Force.[22]
Once FM 3-24 was published, few troops actually read it. As U.S. Army officer Crispin Burke noted in 2011:
"At a US Army Combat Training Center, an informal poll of Observer-Controllers, many of whom had just returned from counterinsurgency conflicts and had advised units of counterinsurgency tactics, only twenty percent admitted to reading FM 3-24. Perhaps the problem with counterinsurgency lies with us, not with the doctrine?"[23]
irness to DoD personnel, policy-makers do not appear to have taken FM 3-24's guidance to heart, either. As paragraph 1-134 states:
"Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus, COIN operations always demand considerable expenditures of time and resources. The populace may prefer the [host nation] government to the insurgents; however, people do not actively support a government unless they are convinced that the counterinsurgents have the means, ability, stamina, and will to win."
Political pressure to withdraw from Afghanistan and Iraq arose almost instantaneously, and calls for an "exit strategy" dominated headlines (and even satire[24]) as early as 2004. While the Bush Administration made a point of dismissing opposition calls for a precipitous withdrawal from Iraq, President Obama's 2008 election victory was based in part on a promise to enact an abbreviated withdrawal from Iraq in order to focus on bringing the Afghan War to a close; his 2012 re-election campaign emphasized the fact that "I ended the war in Iraq as I promised". When President Obama announced the Afghan troop surge in late 2009, the 30,000 American reinforcements were deployed on an eighteen month timeline, leading some of the President's critics to joke that the surge forces were being dropped in with parachutes attached to bungee cords. For both campaigns, both American and allied nations have sent the signal to their electorates, host nation citizens, and insurgents that their nations' commitment was as temporary as possible.
These observations should not be misconstrued as a judgment as to the wisdom or folly of the choices made by Presidents Bush or Obama, or their foreign allies, at the strategic level. Rather, they should serve merely as an observation that FM 3-24 says one thing, and America and its allies did another. Indeed, the purpose of each of these observations is to demonstrate a single point: established COIN theory is different from the doctrine codified in FM 3-24, and neither reflect the approach adopted by ISAF in Afghanistan or MNF-I in Iraq.
Conclusion
In early 2012, after the last troops left Iraq, and with Afghan-deployed forces staging for a gradual drawdown, the White House released Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (colloquially known as the "Defense Strategic Guidance"), which called for a drawdown of American ground forces and a "pivot"/”rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region - all of it a tacit indication that the Obama Administration rejected COIN and intended to reduce its security commitments in the region from whence fresh calls for American intervention were most likely to arise. Noted COIN expert Andrew Exum said of the guidance:
"If th United States has to fight another resource-intensive counterinsurgency campaign (and I pray that we do not), it is easier to design and build new brigades than to design and build new aircraft or ships. I am more concerned the U.S. Army and Marine Corps will abandon the doctrine, training and education wrapped up in preparing for counterinsurgency and stability operations."[25]
Unfortunately, the very sentiment that Exum feared appears to be popular in the active duty and veteran community. A recent commenter at War on the Rocks, writing under the pseudonym "Pave Low John", summarized the opinion of many veterans:
"We’ve been fighting small wars so long that we think Iraq and Afghanistan were real wars."
However, as noted strategist Colin S. Gray wrote in 1999:
"There are two principal errors to avoid. The first is to regard the realm of real war and 'real soldiering' as coterminous with symmetrical conflict, at least as roughly identical to the experience of regular forces fighting regular forces. This error can promote the idea that 'small wars', in Callwell's meaning, are irrelevant, perhaps dangerously irrelevant, diversions from the mainstream requirement to prepare for real war (i.e. grande guerre). Armed forces that decline to take small wars seriously as a military art form with their own tactical, operational, and political - though not strategic - rules invite defeat. The second error is to regard small wars and other forms of savage violence as the wars of the future that will largely supplant the allegedly old-fashioned state-centric 'regular' wars of a Westphalian world."[26]
As Gray rightly notes, both "small wars" and conventional conflicts shall continue to occupy positions of prominence on the strategic spectrum. America’s ability to secure its strategic interests shall continue to require a significant capacity to prevent or respond to guerrilla, irregular, and asymmetric threats. Indeed, such methods shall remain attractive to America’s adversaries, as they have proved particularly effective against the conventional warfighting styles preferred by America and its allies.
Population-centric COIN was not “tried and found wanting” in Afghanistan or Iraq, nor is COIN “a proven failure”. At best, COIN is misunderstood; at worst, it remains untested. Established COIN theory has both failed and prevailed in a variety of historic conflicts, but did not significantly impact the formulation of the DoD’s COIN doctrine in 2006, nor was it applied in any coordinated or comprehensive fashion in either conflict. As such, COIN should not be blamed for the failure to achieve American strategic goals in either theater. Dismissing COIN’s potential utility based on false notions to the contrary will do nothing to improve the future ability of America and its allies to defeat irregular enemies in the pursuit of critical strategic goals.
Bibliography
[1] Davis, Daniel L.; COIN Is a Proven Failure; N/A; 1 December 2014;http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/coin-is-a-proven-failure/
[2] Schogol, Jeff; 'Why We Lost' offers few answers on Iraq and Afghanistan; Military Times; N/A; 20 November 2014; http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2014/11/20/why-we-l...
[3] von Clausewitz, Carl; On War; Clausewitz.com; N/A; 1832;http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/BK2ch05.html
[4] Weltman, John J.; World Politics and the Evolution of War; The Johns Hopkins University Press; Baltimore, Maryland; 1995; pp. 169-191
[5] Grigsby Bates, Karen; A 3-Star General Explains 'Why We Lost' In Iraq, Afghanistan; National Public Radio: All Things Considered; N/A; 11 November 2014;http://www.npr.org/2014/11/09/361746282/a-3-star-general-explains-why-we...
[6] Sloan, Elinor C.; Modern Military Strategy: An Introduction; Routledge; New York, NY; 2012; pp. 49-64
[7] Brook, Pete; The 40,000 People on Bagram Air Base Haven't Actually Seen Afghanistan; Wired.com; N/A; 2 February 2015; http://www.wired.com/2015/02/edmund-clark-the-mountains-of-majeed/
[8] Sellin, Lawrence; Outside View: PowerPoints 'R' Us; UPI; Kabul, Afghanistan; 24 August 2010
[9] Burney, Specialist Jazz; Deployed Soldier uses Salsa dancing to help cope with combat environment; 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team Public Affairs, 25th Infantry Division; COB Speicher, Tikrit, Iraq; 25 September 2009;http://www.army.mil/article/27867/Deployed_Soldier_uses_Salsa_dancing_to...
[10] Madhani, Aamer; U.S. troops in Iraq have time on hands; USA Today; COB Adder, Iraq; 21 October 2009; http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/military/2009-10-20-idle-troops-iraq...
[11] Foust, Joshua; Dispatches from FOBistan: The Kyrgyz Magiciennes of Bagram; unknown; Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan; 10 February 2009; http://registan.net/2009/02/10/dispatches-from-fobistan-the-kyrgyz-magic...
[12] Hodge, Nathan; A Medal for Canada’s Frontline Donut-Vendors?; Wired.com Danger Room Blog; N/A; 31 March 2010; http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/03/a-medal-for-canadas-frontline-do...
[13] Remtulla, Alim; Fast-Food From The Frontline: T.G.I. Friday's And Tim Hortons In Afghanistan; Forbes; N/A; 30 June 2011; http://www.forbes.com/sites/alimremtulla/2011/06/30/fast-food-from-the-f...
[14] N/A; Battle of the Baghdad Bulge; The Times; N/A; 13 November 2009;http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6914946.ece
[15] Adams, William Lee; Pizza Hut Re-Opens in Afghanistan, Soldiers Satisfy Year-Long Pepperoni Cravings; Time Magazine; N/A; 24 February 2011; http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/02/24/pizza-hut-re-opens-in-afghanistan-so...
[16] Athanasiadis, Iason; No more Burger King on Afghanistan base? Soldiers grumble.; Christian Science Monitor; Kandahar Air Base, Afghanistan; 07 April 2010;http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2010/0407/No-more-Burger-King-on-Afghanis....
[17] Boone, Jon; US commander in Afghanistan bans burger and pizza bars at Kandahar base; The Guardian; Kabul; 25 March 2010; http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/25/us-commander-afghanistan-ban...
[18] Rosenberg, Matthew; Afghan Forces Eat Up Return of Fast Food; Wall Street Journal; Kabul; 22 February 2011;http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870361060457615861011173716...
[19] N/A; 'I prefer my 30-year-old Kalashnikov to an M16'; Associated Press; Gardez, Afghanistan; 22 May 2012; http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/south-asia/i-prefer-my-30-year-old-...
[20] Roggio, Bill and Weiss, Caleb; Video shows Hezbollah Brigades convoy transporting American M1 tank; Long War Journal; N/A; 28 January 2015;http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/01/hezbollah_brigades_c.php
[21] Pocock, Chris; New Twist to U.S. C-27 Saga With Afghan Scrappings; AINonline; N/A; 27 October 2014; http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/2014-10-27/new-twist-us-c-27-saga...
[22] Barnes, Julian E.; U.S. Delays Delivery of F-16 Fighter Planes to Iraq; Wall Street Journal; Washington, DC; 11 November 2014; http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-send-fighter-plans-set-for-iraq-to-ar...
[24] N/A; Bush Announces Iraq Exit Strategy: 'We'll Go Through Iran'; The Onion; N/A; 9 March 2005;http://www.theonion.com/articles/bush-announces-iraq-exit-strategy-well-...
[25] Exum, Andrew; On the Defense Strategic Guidance; CNAS Abu Muqawama Blog; Washington, D.C.; 05JAN2012; http://www.cnas.org/blog/on-the-defense-strategic-guidance-5857
[26] Gray, Colin S.; Modern Strategy; Oxford University Press; Oxford; 1999; pp. 279
Tom Ordeman, Jr. is an American risk management specialist. In addition to several positions in training and risk management in support of several DoD commands, he spent fifteen months forward-deployed as an antiterrorism advisor in Kuwait.
I really enjoyed your piece but have a number of issues with it. For starters, you appear to be quoting the 2006 FM 3-24 instead of the updated May 2014 version. You mention the infamous force ratio quote from the earlier version but no such passage exists in the update. However, in a roundabout manner using quotes from the updated version of that manual, we can derive the need for substantial counterinsurgent forces beyond just SF/SOF or weak host nation forces. The first example, as Grey Wolf points out, reminds us that in both Iraq and Afghanistan there were neither credible security forces nor credible governments in place.
We can complain about the decision to disband the Iraq Army and Baathists but a Sunni force and Baath-retained government could not have secured/ruled Shiites/Kurds any more than the Shiite force secures/rules Sunnis/Kurds today. In Afghanistan, a largely Northern Alliance force continues to secure Pashtun areas of Afghanistan meaning that to some extent we sabotaged our efforts from the get go:
1-26. U.S. forces should expect that the host-nation government will have its own interests that may not coincide with U.S. national interests. It may not be willing to undertake the political changes necessary to address the root causes of the insurgency. The commitment of U.S. forces may depend upon the degree to which U.S. policy makers consider the affected government to be receptive to assistance, advice, and reform. How Soldiers and Marines are employed will also require a clear determination by national decisionmakers as to what post-conflict commitments by military and civilian organizations will be required. Outside counterinsurgents, however, can never fully compensate for lack of will, incapacity, or counterproductive behavior on the part of the supported government. If a government is unambiguously committed to the defeat of insurgency, it is more likely to defeat it, regardless of the actions (or commitment level) of an outside supporter.
In paragraph 1-26 above, we see the heart of the problem inherent in a weak Iraqi and Afghan government and its own interests that differed from the coalition. Because we did not plan ahead of time to have adequate stability forces and forces able to speed the transition to host nation security forces, it gave the insurgent time to adapt. Leaders we helped facilitate had their own agenda and President Karzai, for instance, continues to interfere with the new leadership just as Iraq’s leader is influenced by Iran and Shiites in the Parliament. The appointment of weak Shiite leadership led by weak civil leaders exemplified the “lack of will, incapacity, or counterproductive behavior” that led to ISIL takeover of much of Iraq and Kurd efforts to take matters into their own hands since we were gone.
Next, we see a passage that further explains why large numbers of external coalition forces were initially required, The lack of adequate initial numbers led to a slow transition and prolonged the conflict:
1-60. The essential unified action partner is the host nation and its own forces. The purpose of counterinsurgency operations, from the viewpoint of the U.S., is to support or enable the host nation to defeat an insurgency. In the worst case situation, this may require the U.S. becoming the primary counterinsurgent or working with groups inside a state to build a legitimate government. However, even in the worst case, the goal is still for the host nation and its forces to defeat an insurgency.
Tom points out that the Shiite-led Iraq Army had the right tools such as tanks and HMMWVs, but those tools and territory largely were abandoned because the Iraq Army and its civil and military leadership lacked the competence and motivation to stand and fight, as exemplified by this quote from FM 3-24:
2-19. The commitment and motivation of a host nation to defeat an insurgency is an important motivation.
Governments with more than one of the following traits have tended to lose historically, even when supported by competent and committed external forces:
Government sponsors or protects unpopular economic and social arrangements or cultural institutions.
Government is involved in corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule.
Government operates as a kleptocracy.
Government is controlled by elites with perverse incentives to continue conflict.
Government is economically dependent on external actors.
The harsh reality for counterinsurgents is that some of these negative characteristics are usually present, and they are key factors in sparking insurgencies in the first place. As a result, the interests of a host-nation government are often at odds with what the best practices would be to solve its political problems.
So you may be thinking, couldn’t we have just left SF/SOF behind to prevent an ISIL takeover? There is some logic in that as a raiding element which when coupled with airpower (to include attack and lift helicopters) could have reinforced host nation forces from relative sanctuary. However earlier in the conflicts we have these issues that illustrate it isn’t as simple as a few thousand SF/SOF to cover Texas-sized territory:
(last sentence of 6-15) The synchronization of conventional forces and SOF have special considerations in counterinsurgency.
6-16. Conventional forces and SOF depend on each other. SOF lack long term sustainability without conventional support. More importantly, if SOF are conducting direct action missions, it becomes vital that conventional forces and SOF coordinate so that they do not produce negative effects on the operational environment. However, SOF can provide conventional forces with important cultural and advising capabilities. They also provide important offensive capabilities. SOF capable of conducting direct action might be able to conduct raids and gain intelligence that conventional forces cannot.
Conventional forces provide the beans, water, bullets, and gas for SF/SOF. They provide the ground/air movement, MEDEVAC, field hospitals, personnel recovery aircraft, air and ground quick reaction forces, indirect fire, engineer support, signal support, intelligence support, and a host of other requirements that SF/SOF require. In addition, because we are talking Texas-sized territory, some such units must exist throughout the area or they cannot get the job done fast and safely enough on the ground and in the air. You may think, just concentrate on the center of gravity of the insurgent. Is it that simple in a Texas-sized area with 30 million people and many cultures and ethnicities? How do you bring all those small villages or even big cities into the central governments legitimate control and influence? What if outsiders next door have their own agenda?:
7-21. In an insurgency, the population is not necessarily the center of gravity for an insurgent. A center of gravity could be external support from another country, it could be a group of core leadership or believers, or it could be a host of other factors or vital functions. Center of gravity analysis begins with the understanding that every environment is unique, and a center of gravity analysis must not begin with a preconceived center of gravity.
7-22. Counterinsurgents must understand their own center of gravity and that of the host nation. In many cases, political support is the strategic center of gravity for the U.S. Some tactical actions, such as war crimes, can undermine political support for the counterinsurgency. Host nations may also have a wide range of centers of gravity. Operational and tactical leaders must plan and execute operations that do not undermine the host nation’s center of gravity.
This illustrates the difficulty in securing a wide area where each village, valley, district, and province has a unique center of gravity that may differ from that of the central government. The Stockholm Syndrome may result when we rely solely on small U.S. SF/SOF elements that each are going their own way in support of their own locals and they inadvertently end up undermining the host nation’s center of gravity. That somewhat reflects the problem of ALP/VSO elements.
If we accept that for some time period in a large area with a large population that a large conventional COIN force must exist in addition to SF/SOF, how do we determine that size when a 1:20 ratio simply is unrealistic, particularly in a mega-city with 20 million potential insurgents? If some mix of host nation and conventional military and police forces can count toward that total, we still are unlikely to have a million troops in the mega-city alone while trying to also support the countryside and border regions to cut off external support. Remember that Pakistan has 180 million and Iran over 70 million folks making any suggestion of invasion or stability operations in such territories highly unlikely no matter what ground proponents may believe.
But the opposite extreme is to rely on histories of COIN efforts in Central America and a limited area of the Philippines and somehow attempt to translate that to requirements to stabilize larger territories and populations. You can get a general idea of what is required in terms of forces by looking at how many FOBs and COPs you need for a particular area and population:
7-81. Normally, when U.S. forces are the primary counterinsurgents, at least one forward operating base exists in an area of operations. The size of the area, its physical characteristics, and the number and size of the units operating within the area often require additional operating bases. The forward operating bases established by a brigade or battalion are often semipermanent and provide deployed units with command, control, and communications facilities; sustainment; personnel systems support; staging areas; and intelligence activities. They provide units with relatively secure locations from which to plan and prepare for operations. During counterinsurgency operations, they aid in limiting insurgent mobility nearby and in providing some security and contact to the local population.
So you know from the above passage that battalion and brigade level FOBs are required for a given size area dependent on factors of METT-TC. But that can be a large area particularly when aircraft are introduced and road networks with MRAPs/M-ATVS/Strykers-LAVs/other armor are involved. To avoid the perception of commuting to war and being out of touch with the operational environment, General Petraeus and company brought us Joint Security Stations or COPs:
7-83. A combat outpost is a reinforced observation post capable of conducting limited combat operations (FM 3-90-2). In counterinsurgency operations, combat outposts are often company and platoon-sized bases inside of insurgent influenced territory. When U.S. forces are acting as the primary counterinsurgents, combat outposts represent a cornerstone of counterinsurgency operations. Located in strategically important areas, a combat outpost provides security in its immediate area and direct contact with the local population not possible from remote bases. Although this method carries with it potential downsides in terms of increased proportion of forces used for force protection, thus limiting combat power available, combat outposts provide an increase in security for the population.
So multiplying the number of companies and platoons in a given battalion and BCT, you start to understand that light footprints are a myth. If we want to succeed, we must Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Stabilize which cannot occur over large areas with lots of people with only a few forces. It cannot occur at all exclusively from the air because no stability or transition force exists.
The “Build” aspect may be controversial and costly, but no shortcuts exist that eliminate the need for a larger upfront footprint if we truly are interested in fixing the problem rather than temporarily suppressing it. The “Build” we might substitute is the need to build a coalition consensus upfront on how many forces we need upfront and how we can “Shape” international boundaries to better reflect the need for self-rule and ethnically-based security forces.
"Planning for both the Afghan and Iraq Wars was informed in large part by the misinterpretation of two recent wars: the Vietnam War, and the 1991 Gulf War."
Re: "planning" for these major conflicts, the above quote, I believe, sends us in the wrong direction.
In the place of the quote above, consider the following:
Planning for both the Afghan and Iraq Wars was informed, in large part, by our erroneous post-Cold War beliefs; beliefs which suggested that populations, liberated from their oppressive regimes would, quickly, easily and mostly own:
a. Throw off their old ways of life, old ways of governance, old values, attitudes and beliefs, etc. and
b. Adopt, in the place of these, modern western ways of life, ways of governance, etc.
This such belief suggested that "counter-insurgents," if encountered at all post-our "liberation" activities, would only be a very few "dead-enders" (who were going to be highly unpopular with the liberated populations striving for immediate "modernization" more along modern western political, economic and social lines).
Now the stage is set, I suggest, for the highly unexpected (except by folks like GEN Shinseki) events that would follow in Iraq and Afghanistan.
From the author above:
"Thus, both the Afghan and Iraq Wars were initially planned and executed to avoid a prolonged engagement, and to capitalize upon the same capabilities that proved effective in 1991."
This, as I have suggested above, misses the point.
The reason why we believed a "prolonged engagement" could be avoided is because of our erroneous post-Cold War beliefs; beliefs which suggested that:
a. While the regimes were our enemy.
b. The populations were our friend.
When you make a mistake like this, then you cannot, quite obviously, (1) avoid a prolonged engagement by (2) simply doing beautifully surgical, and amazingly quick, regime decapitation/regime change.
Re: "planning" for these major conflicts, the above quote, I believe, sends us in the wrong direction.
I'm sorry, Bill, but no. This article is about methodology - ways - rather than the outcome sought - ends. The observation about the Afghan and Iraq Wars being planned as a repeat of Desert Storm is quite obviously about operational methods, not strategic goals, as is literally the entire article. I won't go so far as to say that your oft-repeated proprietary soliloquy is entirely irrelevant, but it is irrelevant to the discussion that this article is attempting to address. In no way does the article's phrasing "send us in the wrong direction".
Bill C,
There's a degree of justice in your points.
This written, COIN, as laid out in the 'official' manual, overly relied on good faith participation from other U.S. Federal entities outside the DoD, as well as International Institutions, engaging as "good faith' participants, which never remotely materialized, and in hindsight shouldn't have been assumed by the DoD in the first place. Having been one of those who warned over and over again that aside from bad faith international partners, it was crazy to take the DoS and USAID and etc.'s "development" claims seriously, let alone base a third of our overall strategy on non-DoD or local entities actually producing the deliverables as ordered.
The problem was that there was (is?) no simple way for planners and Officers within the DoD to politely call the U.S. Diplomatic Corps and Development/NGO community, thieves and liars. In hindsight, the U.S. military command should have had blanket overall authority over ALL non-locals in the theatre, including the spooks and diplomats and NGO's and even journalists. But especially over all financial transactions and institutions offering financial services. It's not clear to me that this is even politically possible today, as it was during the reconstruction of Germany and Japan after WWII.
In Afghanistan, it was initially a NATO mission, so it's difficult for me to imagine all the NATO member Nations bankers and politicians and etc. falling into line with an overall military command having a say in their various business dealings. Frankly, the DoD hasn't, in recent times, even demonstrated an ability to reign in the DoS or CIA… so the notion of accomplishing THAT, as well as demanding something like quality control over civilian charities, doesn't seem realistic. If the lesson learned was that the U.S. DoD is unwilling to commit the politics capital needed to control the area of conflict in all respects, then the rest of COIN's assumptions rest on that flaw, or failing, and probably aren't worth considering.
As I'm not an expert on the military aspects of the COIN doctrine, I can't judge. But writing from exhaustive experience in the NON-millitary aspects involved, I'd repeat now what I've written previously… unless vigorously and obtrusively supervised, the civilian contribution needed for the COIN concept to work, will act in Bad Faith in the majority of situations, and leave the DoD holding the bag.
"In every country there are existing frameworks. The great mistake for European people, coming there as a conqueror, is to destroy these frameworks. Bereft of its armature, the country falls into anarchy. One must govern with the mandarin and not against the mandarin."
—De Lanessan
One might surmise, from this quote, that:
a. De Lanessan appears to argue strenuously against regime decapitation/regime change. He suggests, instead, working with the existing regime. If one absolutely must do regime decapitation/regime change, then
b. De Lanessan appears to argue strenuously against, at this initial juncture, attempting to transform the state and society more along foreign, alien and often profane political, economic and social lines.
If, however, you are one of those nations/civilizations who believe, for example, in "world revolutions." And believe, accordingly, that your purpose in life -- your raison d'etre -- is to advance your version of same (America/the West fitting both of these bills?),
Then it is nearly impossible for you to separate, even for a moment:
a. Your raison d'etre from
b. Your immediate "conquest and pacify" job at hand.
If, of course, you believe (let's use the communist "world revolution" folks this time for our example) that:
a. No matter what distinctly different individual is before you (Christian, capitalist, Hindu, etc.) there is, just under the surface of this person's skin,
b. A Communist trying to get out.
Then one can understand just how difficult it must be for one's national and military leaders to not only rely upon, but indeed base, their invasion "planning" exactly on these "everyone wants to be life us" beliefs. (Much as the United States did, re: Iraq and Afghanistan, and based on our "world revolution" concepts?)
De Lanessan, it would seem, cautions against succumbing to these type desires, drives and instincts; suggesting, instead, that:
a. "World revolution" thinking is a bunch of baloney. And that, accordingly,
b. One must plan be meet in battle -- not only hostile regimes -- but also hostile populations; people who, in truth, want nothing to do, at all, with your way of life, way of governance and/or values, attitudes and beliefs.
("Cold water," indeed, for all "world revolution"-thinking folks.)
Thus, might we say, and as per De Lanessan's thinking and guidance above (if I have indeed captured this right), that one must achieve one's goals (conversion/transformation) -- re: these hostile populations -- in a more indirect, realistic and surreptitious manner.
For example:
a. By working more "by, with and through" an existing regime. And, if this is not possible, then:
b. By working more "by, with and through" a newly-installed regime; in both cases,
c. These regimes (1) working within the existing/traditional political, economic and social system/structure to (2) achieve -- over time -- the changes desired by the foreign power?
("a" - "c" immediately above being what future COIN looks like?)
Herein, "conversion"/"transformation" ultimately not being an impossible task, but just one which requires a much longer and more entailed process; one based on the reality of hostile populations -- who must be convinced over time -- to move our way. (Rather than on such erroneous/irrational/unrealistic beliefs that everyone, everywhere, wants to -- and can -- be [1] exactly like you and [2] right this very second.)
After reading all the quoted current FMs, references to the various doctrines can anyone point me to a US successfully completed COIN engagement since say 1890s to 1920s when the US Marines were being employed in Small Wars globally??
The U.S. has supported many successful COIN engagements where the HN was the lead counterinsurgent, but none where we deployed tens of thousands of troops and in essence were the main COIN force.
Am open to any name of those that were even HN led successful--again outside of the US Marine Small Wars of the 1890s thru to about the mid 1920s.
Which BTW if one really does analyze the Marine Small Wars of that period were actually using all the elements that you wrote about, but some would argue they were in support of an expansionistic US foreign policy for that period.
So again need a name and or names of successfully led HN COIN operations.
Outlaw: On the American side, I'd point you toward El Salvador, Colombia, and the Philippines. There are probably a handful of additional examples. Most people focus on Vietnam, which is its own animal. The British have traditionally been better at small wars than the Americans, though these skills have atrophied in recent years.
But are they all actually examples of a truly successful COIN as all are still to a degree and in some cases large degree having violence levels that would reflect they were not successful to include currently Columba.
If we define COIN doctrinally the way we have-- success equals no violence and the government in complete control ---I would challenge that all these are in fact examples of a not successful HN COIN campaign.
Why--- we have not defined international drug cartels in the same breath as an insurgency in our doctrine.
All three of these examples are deep in the drug trade with all of it side affects and destabilization which has to a degree "replaced" the original "insurgencies".
And are we as a military in the counter drug business or is it a police problem?
So in affect is our current doctrine even fitting an ever changing reality?
Good example is Mexico--can COIN ever be applied to Mexico--not really as the problem is now so systemic that COIN would never work.
In addition there was Croatia 92-95.
Nicaragua and Afghanistan in the 80s...never mind, we backed the "bad guys" in those conflicts.
FID only works if a competent HN government and military exists. Our mission in OIF and OEF was to crush the HN govt and military, build a new one, then get the hell out. When we finally acknowledged that our actions (debathification, disbanding the Iraqi army, etc.) unwittingly created an insurgency, the best COA was to conduct COIN.
U.S. COIN doctrine works, if it is actually applied broadly and over time. Many examples of COIN success exist in both OIf and OEF. The biggest problem as I see it is that the HN government never assumed the lead counterinsurgent role in either theater. FM 3-24 (2006 version) says:
"U.S. forces committed to a COIN effort are there to assist a HN government...the host nation has to win on its own...HN elements must accept responsibilities to achieve real victory"
The Rand study "Victory Has a Thousand Fathers" also noted that in every successful COIN effort over the last 50 years "The government/state was competent". In COIN efforts that failed "The primary COIN force was an external occupier."
Not only were/are the governments of Iraq/Afghanistan incompetent, but they often intentionally worked against coalition objectives.
Bottom Line: U.S. COIN doctrine is solid, but mistakes by both the U.S. led coalition and our HN partners doomed it to failure.
I am sorry, I could not disagree more with this position.
US policy created an impossible mission, to which any military solution would prove infeasible in ways unique to the approach applied. Sure, we could have suppressed the symptoms more completely, but that is no cure to the insurgency beneath.
US COIN doctrine is a "zombie doctrine" as it is a collage of effective tactics employed historically by outside forces to help some partner suppress the symptoms of insurgency, but lacks any soul of understanding of the nature of insurgency itself.
The Rand study defined success as the insurgent defeated and the government uncoerced. That is not victory, that is suppression. True victory in resolving insurgency demands evolution of governance to some degree to remove the strategic energy from the population the insurgent draws upon.
We draw comfort from stating irrelevant facts to rationalize our failures - we would be better served by seeking to appreciate the strategic reasons for our failures.
"we could have suppressed the symptoms more completely, but that is no cure to the insurgency beneath."
Did I say we need to suppress the symptoms and not address the root causes of insurgency? No. Those units that achieved COIN success addressed the underlying factors fueling the insurgency.
U.S. doctrine "lacks any soul of understanding of the nature of insurgency itself."
FM 3-24 contains 2 chapters on insurgency, but I would agree that more needs to be written. Good commanders, however, study the threat, the operating environment, history, as well as proven COIN methods, and take all into consideration when developing a strategy. Yes, there are plenty of commanders who failed to understand the threat, but many more did, and many achieved success.
Robert, previously you stated "US doctrine would be much improved, IMO, if in the context of this construct we recognize that COIN is a domestic operation."
I think that is exactly what I was pointing out.
Greywolf. I recommend that if you want to study more about insurgency other than the two chapters in 3-24 that you consult with the Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies project at this link: http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html or at this one:http://maxoki161.blogspot.kr/2013/03/assessing-revolutionary-and-insurge... Pay particular attention to the Undergrounds in Insurgencies and the Human Factors studies in addition to the 46 case studies.
I am an Army Intelligence officer with decades of experience who has served in both OIF and OEF. Trust me, I have studied insurgencies.
Robert, I'm still not sure what your objection is to my comment, nor have you proposed a better doctrinal method.
My apologies Greywolf. Most of us are students of unconventional warfare, insurgency, irregular warfare, and small wars. I have yet to meet anyone who knows everything about insurgency and would refuse to consult with a premier resource on revolution, resistance and insurgency.
Here is the text of a slide from one of my lectures. Although it is focused on unconventional warfare, the same goes for those who study and try to practice advising on counterinsurgency.
Assessing Revolution and Insurgent Strategy Project
Do you have it, have you read it?
Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts
Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II 1962 - 2009.
Human Factors Considerations of Underground in Insurgencies, 2d Edition, 2013,http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/HumanFactorsS.pdf
Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare, 2d Edition, 2013,http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/UndergroundsS.pdf
Any UW planner or strategist must
READ, STUDY, SYNTHESIZE, INTERNALIZE
Without this foundation you cannot be a UW practitioner
No mention of a FID approach as being a possible way. And we should remember that a "foreign counterinsurgent" is in reality an occupying force.
a. Consider that there are generally four “elements” that may be involved in the insurgency:
(1) The insurgent
(2) The population
(3) The counter-insurgent (the existing government)
(4) An external supporting force
Gentlemen: I fail to see how this line of discussion, while enlightening, is relevant to the article. The article's thesis, in essence, is that America's COIN doctrine is not representative of accepted COIN theory (which has been successful in some cases); nor were either employed in Afghanistan or Iraq; ergo, COIN remains untested, rather than having been proven as a success or failure. Whether or not a "FID approach" is an alternative to COIN is not what is in question here, or else the article would be entitled "Evaluating FID as a Possible Alternative to COIN". (Conversely, I tend to think of FID as one tool in the wider toolkit that can be applied to COIN, or conventional warfare, or all sorts of other contingencies, but that's another matter for another discussion.)
I would also challenge Colonel Maxwell's notion that "a 'foreign counterinsurgent' is in reality an occupying force". The word "occupation" has a meaning: it constitutes the seizure of a piece of real estate and the imposition of foreign rule as administered by the seizing party's military forces. (Typically, this is carried out by one nation against another, but I suspect we'd agree that, technically, a national military could "occupy" a subordinate region within its own territory, e.g., Operation Banner.) America has sent "foreign counterinsurgents" to a variety of nations which it did not, in fact, occupy - the Philippines, Colombia, El Salvador, and Mali, to name but a few. I am of the mind that such imprecise descriptions are unhelpful in discussions such as these.
Foreign civilian populations impacted by US support to the COIN efforts of some government who we are either protecting and enabling to ignore the complaints of some segment of their society; or have created and are protecting from some segment of their society most likely do not read, nor much care about how we have defined "occupation" to not include what we are doing.
Playing these types of word games with ourselves to rationalize our behavior is extremely counterproductive to achieving our desired strategic effect.
What we are talking about here is human nature, and how people in general feel and respond to certain types of foreign activities that impact the governance of their day to day lives. Add onto that human nature foundation an overlay of the human culture of the specific populations affected to get a more refined position.
The nature of occupation drives the nature of resistance to the same, and that is in our human DNA. As we are seeing in the Middle East over the past 20 years that occupation need not even be a physical one to create this resistance effect. AQ has been very successful in waging a distributed and networked approach to UW across the region by tapping into the resistance energy created primarily by the impact of US foreign policy on the region. Occupation by Policy, if you will.
We cannot define our way out of our poor success in these types of situations, but we can seek to improve our understanding of the nature of these types of conflict (again, NOT in the US COIN doctrine), and design better whole of government approaches for peace that in turn create better conditions for success if things ever do go violent and lead to a physical application of US military power to shape in some way.
My main beef with many who criticize U.S. COIN doctrine as ineffective is that they blame strategic failure on poor doctrine, yet don't understand how the doctrine was actually applied.
Additionally, critics often offer little in the way of practical solutions.
We should remember that Field Manuals are written for the tactical and operational level commander and staff. Military commanders do not pick and choose where their unit deploys, or under what conditions, and have almost no influence over strategic/political decisions that ultimately impact the operational mission.
I can (and do) nit pick specific passages from doctrine, but strategic failure in OIF and OEF has almost no connection to our COIN doctrine since the essence of the doctrine was never widely employed in good faith.
Dave,
In this construct, do you divide category four to those who provide external support to the insurgent (UW), and those who provide foreign support to the government (FID)?
US doctrine would be much improved, IMO, if in the context of this construct we recognize that COIN is a domestic operation. Equally, that when we do inject ourselves as "an external supporting force", be it in a UW context or a FID context, that there must be a presumption of resistance to any such external support by some segment of the affected population; and equally a presumption of revolution against any government protected from their own population, or created for their own population by that external supporter.
The nature of one's actions drives the nature of the response. But by recognizing that nature, one can shape the character of their external support so as to minimize the character of that natural response.
Yes, Bob that is a very important relationship. Here is a link to my blog where I posted one of my charts from one of my counter-UW lectures that I think Illustrates the relationship you are talking about. Since I cannot figure out who to post a graphic here in the comments please go to this link:http://maxoki161.blogspot.kr/2015/07/a-counter-uw-relationship.html
"Access Denied" by the USSOCOM security Nazis. Apparently Dave, you are a very suspicious character and not to be trusted... (I'll check the link when I get home. Cheers!)
Yes Bob, I am a criminal these days. I have the escort required badge at all conferences. Hell, I could not even get into my old HQ today as I was visiting Seoul for a conference this week. But I can begin all my lectures with the caveat that I am unconstrained by doctrine, I am unconstrained by funding, and I am unconstrained by a chain of command.
You know as well as I do that when you are no longer constrained you are no longer an active player in the arena. You were in numerous key leadership positions in SOF throughout your active duty career, and no doubt I'm sure there were times you wished you were unconstrained to conduct operations as you saw fit. However, the world being what the world is will always prevent that. Anytime theory or doctrine meets the real world, there is normally so much friction that neither the theory nor doctrine can be executed as envisioned by the authors who developed it in a doctrine or academic facility. This is true even when the authors had a wealth of personal experience. How many of our present day plans are mere shadows of what they were intended to be due to the numerous constraints put on them?
Neither OIF nor OEF-A were FID missions until very recently. They started off as wars where the object was to change the regimes in both countries. Then these missions devolved into complex stability operations, where at first we were the defacto occupying power, which has legal implications in accordance with international law. Responsibilities we side stepped by rushing to establish illegitimate proxy governments. When we attempted to prompt those governments up through major economic investment and doing most of their fighting (the people their were not going to fight for illegitimate governments, a condition ISIL exploited after we left), some called this FID, but that seems like a stretch to me. I think the broader mission, stability operations is more accurate. It certainly had FID like features, but our mission was not FID. It was to destroy designated adversaries, and then build a city on a hill that would protect and forward our interests. In neither case the locals did not have our interests in their hearts. Furthermore, the COIN argument is also somewhat flawed. Iraq involved not only insurgencies (and not just one) against the central government, but also civil wars between various ethnic groups, and the impact of transnational terrorists riding the negative waves of both the insurgencies and civil wars.
There were no doctrinal answers, but obviously when we violated certain principles regarding our relationship with the local populace we made the situation worse. We can call the change in our approach population centric COIN, but more accurately we applied commonsense. I am not entirely convinced we were put into an unwinnable situation, but that is a reasonable assertion. One thing is clear, we didn't have a viable strategy to achieve the grand ends given, and we didn't adjust the ends nor the ways and means, so we continued to flounder. We only adjusted the strategy in Iraq to ward off a pending defeat. Sad that is what it takes to make us take a hard look at our strategy. One would hope we would be more honest with ourselves and self correct. COIN doctrine is what it is, it isn't terrible and it isn't great, but it irrelevant if there isn't a viable overarching strategy.
Being "unconstrained" is indeed a liberating thing.
First bullet on the slides presenting our new Strategic Appreciation is that it is "unconstrained and not directive." Second bullet is that it is the strategic environment to the best of our understanding and that the purpose of the document is to provide a lens, or context through which to view situations, decisions, missions through.
Third bullet, however, is that the strategy that follows is completely constrained and may only direct 20% of the course direction implied by the Appreciation.
A huge problem in our community is that we bureaucratize, homogenize, and politically correct size our understanding. That certainly was the case in both versions of our post 9/11 COIN doctrine.
Keep swinging that pipe.
Professor Criminal, I just came across an old Lenin quote you’ll like -- “Are we to proceed from things to sensations and thought, or are we to proceed from thought and sensation to things?” I never did quite understand the interaction of deduction and induction myself, and so I’d be the last to answer Vlad’s question there. I am, perhaps as you are, drawn to Tom’s article because of visceral doubts about COIN’s influence (as theory) on what our military did for a decade, not to mention doubts about what we did for a decade. Tom’s article does what Spanish-speakers call ‘putting one's finger in the scar’. I bet I’ve read as much as you or Tom have on the subject of insurgency, but have forgotten twice as much of it as either of you have. I can’t claim that the reading of cases has lead me to understand the theories of insurgency and counterinsurgency any more than the theoretical writings have led me to understand the cases. This is not to say it is not good to do both, of course it is. That said, I don’t much care for the ARIS case study on Colombia, which is among the few cases about which I feel confident to opine. My dislike for that case study, to include the theoretical assumptions on which it seems to be built, makes me wonder about the value of the other histories. Not a big deal, mind you, just worrisome is all, a worry about the real caliber of the theoretical influences, presented as historical fact. So, anyway, I never liked COIN, as you are aware, and for a slew of reasons. To summarize: I don’t believe there is a whole lot of historical support for the notion that an Army using a highly population-centric approach is especially likely to win against a determined insurgent; I don’t think we applied the best techniques and priorities of effort for a population-centric approach even to the extent such an approach is appropriate; and I don’t feel as a matter of political philosophy that our Army has much business building the structure or content of society at all. I do think, nevertheless (and, therefore, bless you, Professor), that we should build our UW and counter-UW theory, capacity and skill. I doubt that should include letting leftover bits and pieces of discredited COIN-think insinuate themselves into the theory intended to support the healthy growth of American SOF generally. Just say no to the zombies of COIN.
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