“The Kargil Operation was an audacious attempt to seize an opportunity of historic proportions.”[1]
The 1999 military confrontation on the heights of Kargil was a perilous episode in the ongoing Indo-Pakistan conflict as unlike the past, this could have easily spiralled beyond Kashmir. The conflict has been characterized based on its scope, intensity and context. Mr. Peter Lavoy comments: “This crisis, in comparison to previous conflicts in the region, drew an unprecedented level of controversy, competing narratives and implications for domestic politics not specifically for Pakistan, but also for India and for the course of international relations in South Asia.”[2] The Kargil War, which has been described as a ‘limited’ war,[3] since the ‘ends’ and ‘means’ were limited, has also been classified as an escalation of the ongoing Indo-Pak ‘proxy war.’ In a way, it was all that, but more as it was fought with the added risk of a nuclear exchange. Nevertheless, it was also a war that should never have taken place, and the fact that it did, especially in the way it could have manifested, was a grim reminder that India was reacting, yet again, and this remains the nub of the questions that are being brought up in this article.
The Kargil War highlighted familiar weaknesses in the Indian psychological makeup once again and the same macro lessons emerged – lack of strategic forethought and synergy at the politico-military levels…
Mr. K Subramanium, the doyen of India’s strategic thought sums up Pakistan’s motives: “The Kashmir intrusions were essentially a limited Pakistan exercise designed to internationalise the Kashmir issue which was tending to recede from the radar screen of the international community. It was, therefore, mainly a move for political and diplomatic gain.”[4] If the intension of the intrusions was merely to flag the attention of the world, Pakistan certainly achieved her aim. Though in the end ‘Vijay’ (victory) was declared by India, this proved ‘tactical,’ as the strategic ‘victory,’ would have been Musharrafs,’ as his aims, both diplomatic and political were achieved, though he had to face defeat in military terms on the wind swept – rocky peaks of Kargil.
The Kargil War highlighted familiar weaknesses in the Indian psychological makeup once again and the same macro lessons emerged – lack of strategic forethought and synergy at the politico-military levels, both in letting the surprise to manifest as it did, and later in conceptualising the conflict termination objectives. The military leadership also cannot be condoned, as its exaggerated focus on countering the insurgency in Kashmir contributed to lowering her guard against just the type of ‘conventional – unconventional’ threat that manifested in Kargil. More importantly, the political decision not to violate the sanctity of the LC had far reaching implications and added to the human cost of the war.
While each of the earlier Indo-Pak Wars had thrown up their own lessons, many were repeated, and by the end of the Kargil War, most re-emerged with disappointing frequency. India had learnt little, if at all, and as put by Ms. Navnita Behra, the “…two and a half wars on Kashmir soil have failed so far to produce an effective military strategy in the region, owing to a deep seated defensive outlook and the lack of offensive military objectives.”[5]
1999 was in many ways a repeat of 1947 and 1965. Pakistan initiated hostilities by infiltrating proxy warriors into Kashmir and a sub-conventional war escalated into a multi-dimensional war.
The Unlearnt Lessons from the Kargil Episode
While Kargil proved the mettle of the Indian military, especially of her junior leadership, it also raised fundamental issues that need to be addressed by the establishment and the armed forces. In many ways, Kargil was a repeat of the familiar shortcomings that had already emerged in the wars before 1999, and Kargil was yet another wake up call. More than the lessons learnt from actual events, there are greater lessons to be learnt ‘from what could have happened.’ Since a detailed and pragmatic study has already been carried out by the Kargil Committee Review, repeating them is not intended in any way. However, it is important to highlight that the recommendations made by the late Mr. K Subramanium should have seen the light of the day after a decade plus after the war, at least by the same political party, who is in power for over a year now. In drawing military lessons from the Kargil conflict, it will be endeavoured to link them with those that remained unlearnt from the past; those which have got lost somewhere in the din and dust of bureaucracy and petty politicking, at great cost to the security of the nation and detrimental to the morale of the armed forces.
The Myth that the Possession of Nuclear Weapons mitigates Conventional War
The Kargil conflict flew in the face of the thinking that the overt demonstration of nuclear weapons would consign conventional wars to the dustbins of history. The fact that Kargil exposed the strategic space that still existed, was, and should remain the biggest lesson for India. General Malik has commented on the Pakistani propensity to use the nuclear card and exploit the decision dilemma within the Indian leadership to gain operational gains. He writes: “As Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability grew, the sub-conventional war in J&K kept escalating. It’s military strategy since late 1980’s has been to escalate proxy war, and brandish the likelihood of a conventional war and a nuclear ‘flashpoint,’ whenever India threatened to use of its conventional force.”[6]
1999 was in many ways a repeat of 1947 and 1965. Pakistan initiated hostilities by infiltrating proxy warriors into Kashmir and a sub-conventional war escalated into a multi-dimensional war. There is a very thin line distinguishing the two forms of war, as it is the response that can turn any proxy war into a wider conflict. To exemplify, the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 nearly led to a war. Even under the prevailing situation of unrest within Pakistan, India need no reminder that the east can be the only direction where Pakistan can vent internal pressures. Despite the change in guard in Pakistan and CBMs in place, this threat lurks beyond the horizon.
…Kashmir, which includes Gilgit-Baltistan and POK, were integral parts of the Kashmir that had officially acceded to the Indian Union.’ This sentiment was even reiterated in the Parliament Resolution of 22 February, 1994. Thus, this short-term aim went against the ‘declared’ national aim.
Conflict Termination Objectives
It would be an understatement that Kargil was intimately linked to the ongoing Indo-Pakistan conflict in Kashmir. While limiting the immediate battle space to the Kargil sector was a clearly stated Indian term of reference, one that won kudos for India diplomatically, this worked to the military’s disadvantage in great measure. What is also important is that the ‘end state’ in no way contributed to lowering of violence levels in Kashmir as Pakistan’s sponsored proxy war continued to plague Kashmir and the sub-continent. Even as the nation celebrates the sixteenth anniversary of the victory, neither Kashmir nor the nation is still secure.
In 1999, the only defined objective by India was to ‘evict the intruders.’ This aim, though well intended, was a ‘reactive’ one and helped sanctify the LC in the minds of the international fraternity. Forgotten in this stated aim was the impassioned resolution made on the floor of the Indian Parliament by Pundit Nehru that Kashmir, which includes Gilgit-Baltistan and POK, were integral parts of the Kashmir that had officially acceded to the Indian Union.’ This sentiment was even reiterated in the Parliament Resolution of 22 February, 1994. Thus, this short-term aim went against the ‘declared’ national aim.
While it is not intended to suggest that India should have escalated the war beyond Kargil, speaking with the (undue) advantage of hindsight, this was an opportunity to deliver an unambiguous signal for Pakistan to stop abetting proxy war in Kashmir. It is argued that Pakistan’s blunder of intruding in Kargil could have been exploited and selective Trans LC targeting could have been undertaken on militant camps/ installations during the din of the conflict. In any case, from her side, Pakistan had disowned the intruders by insisting that they were mujahedeen. India’s retaliatory targeting of their camps in POK and Gilgit-Baltistan would have found acceptability in the comity of nations as they were purportedly supporting the intrusions. The world could also have been provided proof of Pakistan’s abetment of the proxy war, which was the reason for the insurgency in Kashmir in the first place – this was not done in adequate measure.
In the ultimate analysis, the insurgency in Kashmir not only continued to flourish, but following the change in guard in Pakistan, the war on India, became even more vicious and wide spread. Despite India’s tactical Vijay at Kargil – clearly the Indian response proved ‘inadequate.’ In the light of this politico-military lesson, Late Air Commodore Jasjit Singh writes that for the future: “Serious consideration must be given to planning for ways and means for winning such (limited) wars.” [7] India therefore, needs to come up with an ‘end to end’ strategy for another such eventuality.
India’s Strategic Culture or the Lack of it
“Strategic culture is that set of common beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behaviour, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.”[8]
The weakness does not lie in the failures, of which there have been many, but more in the fact that India has learnt little from her recent military history and tends to repeat mistakes with disappointing frequency.
Independent India’s strategic culture remains amorphous and not only is it difficult to define, it is complex to understand and this is essentially due to organisational inhibitions to define strategic aims and objectives. Having said that, the quote above is important to benchmark a course for the future and it is recommended that clarity on matters of such import is essential to chart the course to the future. An objective analysis of how the Kashmir conflict has been handled thus far, highlights persistent infirmities in the manner vital issues of national ‘security,’ ‘strategy’ and ‘matters military’ have been addressed by independent India. The weakness does not lie in the failures, of which there have been many, but more in the fact that India has learnt little from her recent military history and tends to repeat mistakes with disappointing frequency. In view of major power games and re-alignment of forces taking place, India needs to reflect on certain fundamental issues and also on the stance taken by her to chalk out her future; issues that require a re-visit are flagged for consideration.
The Concept of Defence versus Security
At the conceptual level, independent India has invariably favoured ‘defence’ rather than seeking ‘security;’ the difference between the two is fundamental and it is this that afflicts the nation’s approach on matters strategic. Though there are many reasons for following this approach, at the fundamental level, the malady lies in having a ‘reactive’ mindset. Conceptually speaking, by its very nature, defence can only provide ‘prophylactic’ security, but this can never be ‘all-inclusive’ and while visible security tends to be comforting, it is generally illusionary. In the ultimate analysis, nations are required to ensure security for her people, and defence which is essentially a reaction, is incapable of providing ‘holistic’ security. Any reaction is against an action(s) and the initiative always remains with the other side – this has been the common thread of the military history of the nation; barring the exception of 1971 on the Eastern Theatre, India has always reacted, never seized the initiative over the adversary/ potential challenger.
Nations who are clear of their aims and objectives seek security through preventive action(s), and the concept of ‘Pre-emption’ advocated by the USA and ‘Active Defence’ as advocated by China exemplify this approach. Since they consider themselves to be strong nations in military, diplomatic and economic terms, this becomes their natural response, and they prefer to ‘act’ rather than ‘reacting.’ India has never acted in this manner, even in the regional context and the paradox lies in the fact that it has been Pakistan who has followed a preemptious approach and it has been India who has reacted. It is this that gifted her operational advantage – the examples of Op Gulmarg, Sledge, Venus, Gibraltar and Badr, in the not too distant past, can be recounted to substantiate the point.
…it is important to predict the future and to take anticipatory actions – this is an essential difference in the approach and for that to happen, there is a requirement for the Indian ‘reactive’ mindset to change.
Security is derived by ‘presumptive planning’ and by well thought through action plans in anticipation of meeting the challenges of the future, and to change/moderate/shape the outcome ‘beforehand.’ Pre-emption is all about seeking success ‘prior to the event’ as was done by the Chinese against India in 1962, and in a way, in the manner how Bangladesh was liberated by India. Thus, it is important to predict the future and to take anticipatory actions – this is an essential difference in the approach and for that to happen, there is a requirement for the Indian ‘reactive’ mindset to change.
Strategic Culture and Approach to Matters Military
India’s post independence stance taken on security alliances has been marked by ‘neutrality’ or in baser terms, the avoidance of ‘entangling (strategic and/ or military) alliances.’ ‘Non-Alignment’ was the Nehruvian plank for maintaining linkages and despite the ongoing conflict with Pakistan and even the traumatic Chinese War, there is no real reason to deviate from this path and India needs to conserve her strategic autonomy and remains important in the ongoing US-China strategic competition.
In any case, India cannot afford to make the mistake of the past to apply diplomacy without the corresponding ‘capability based’ military to back the effort. Combining these along with concurrent economic prowess could herald the coming of age of resurgent India in geo-strategic terms and make her a lead player – modern India has to make her own destiny.
Integrated Approach to Intelligence Generation and Analysis
The Kargil intrusions were only the latest in a series of failures. In 1948, Pakistan surprised India by Op Gulmarg and again by launching Op Sledge. In 1965, the dismal showing was again a result of India being unprepared, first in Kutch followed by Kashmir. Though this national weakness was theoretically plugged by the creation of R&AW, yet even in 1971, there was a paucity of actionable intelligence. The traditional Indian weakness in intelligence gathering and running of operations persists, especially when seen in relation to the ISI of Pakistan. This was apparent when the Kashmir insurgency erupted and this malady continues – the attack on the Indian Parliament and later in Mumbai bear testimony. This is not to say that the Indian Intelligence establishment is not capable, it is, as proved by the timely interception of the telephonic conversations between Musharraf and his CGS in 1999. However, this coup was an exception rather than the rule, hence the surprise in Kargil.
…“there is no mechanism of tasking the agencies, monitoring their performance and reviewing their records to evaluate their quality…As it happened in Kargil, 9/11 and the Mumbai attacks, there is never enough of intelligence – human and/ or technical.
The report on Kargil rightly “draws attention to deficiencies in the present system of collection, reporting, collation and assessment of intelligence. There is no institutionalised mechanism for coordination or objective-oriented interaction between the agencies and consumers at different levels.” More importantly, “there is no mechanism of tasking the agencies, monitoring their performance and reviewing their records to evaluate their quality. Nor is there any oversight of the overall functioning of the agencies.” As it happened in Kargil, 9/11 and the Mumbai attacks, there is never enough of intelligence – human and/ or technical. It is not that information of the intent, timings and outrages are not picked up. More often than not, they are, the failure lies in deciphering the patterns and by the time the dots are added and the dashes are drawn, the event is generally over. Deficiencies in net assessments and predictive scenario building, which is based on extensive fieldwork and co-relating actions based on predictive models require creative fusion of research and fieldwork, and it is where the weakness lies. This needs correction as suggested by the committee and analysis and predictive models prepared by research teams working as per the requirements of a rejuvenated and empowered JIC must be part of an overarching intelligence and security structure with an institutionalised role in the security planning of the nation.
More important is the requirement of building confidence in running of Intelligence operations – both for keeping a finger on the pulse of the adversary and for being in a position to create situations on his turf and the situation in Af-Pak, Gilgit-Baltistan, Baluchistan and Sind are tailor made for ‘cooperative’ running of intelligence operations. At the same time India needs to ensure that she has adequate assets in neighbouring countries so that neither China nor Pakistan can exploit their territory without India coming to know and be in a position to take timely actions. Robust intelligence capabilities on the part of India being the dominant power in South Asia, will not only reduce the threat to India but also to her neighbours; this should be ‘mutually beneficial,’ and done in a subtle manner.
The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)
India’s defence structure suffers from a major colonial hangover when the English ruled India through her military – the clogging of channels and obscuration of plans even in the current dispensation is a legacy from the past. It is vital that modern India has a ‘National Defence HQ’ for synergising the three Services and for providing a single point expert advice for matters military. As pointed out by the committee; “India is perhaps the only major democracy where the Armed Forces HQ are kept outside the apex governmental structure. The Chiefs of Staff have assumed the role of being operational commanders of their respective forces rather than the more important task of being Chiefs of Staff to the Prime Minister and Defence Minister. They simultaneously discharge the roles of operational commanders and national security planners/managers. Most of their time, is, however, devoted to the operational role, as is bound to happen. This has led to negative results and futuristic planning has invariably suffered. ”[9] While the modalities of a workable model can be debated, what is beyond discussion is the fact that the weaknesses are overcome and synergy in civil-military actions is ensured in an institutional manner.
In view of the emerging ‘multi-dimensional’ threat from China and Pakistan, the Army’s Northern and Eastern Commands along with the Navy’s Eastern and Western Naval Commands need to be made tri-service.
Force Structuring and Inter-Service Priorities
Lack of synergy between the services is a familiar story that has been highlighted in all the wars thus far. Though this did not manifest in 1999 due to the limited nature of operations, yet the lack of synergy was discernible. The services fighting their own wars in 1965 and even 1971 is well known, and could have been obviated with the creation of a CDS structure. However, even if this gets resolved, the problem remains at the theatres or at the command level and below. The creation of India’s first and only Tri-Service Andaman and Nicobar (ANC) Command was supposed to be a trendsetter and after its success, this experiment is required to be taken further. In view of the emerging ‘multi-dimensional’ threat from China and Pakistan, the Army’s Northern and Eastern Commands along with the Navy’s Eastern and Western Naval Commands need to be made tri-service. In addition, the Strategic, Space and Cyber Commands must not only follow the Tri-Service model but must also involve technical experts, making these commands truly ‘Integrated.’ This will go a long way in synergising the services and lead to better combat power generation and in the application of forces.
The army, by its very role, structure and size is not the ideal service for effecting deterrence and for ensuring speedy punitive response(s). Pragmatically speaking, only the air force and the navy have the inherent capability of initiating ‘Cold Start’ in the Indian context and hence their ‘multi-dimensional’ capabilities for doing so need to be built up. At the same time, the army must be re-structured, tailored and equipped for making punitive territorial gains, and the practice of tying down of the bulk of the force in defensive tasks need to be re-visited.
In the era of downsizing, this throws up the larger question of the operational role of Border Defence forces like the BSF, ITBP, Assam Rifles and the like. These forces who operate under the Ministry of Home Affairs, need to be empowered and must be given the ware withal for being able to undertake ‘defensive’ (military) operations, and by so doing so, free the regular army for offensive operations. This is the practice followed by both of India’s adversaries and the world over, and if effected, will make a significant change to the forces ratios, at no/ little additional costs and requires serious debate which is able to transcend turf wars.
CI-CT Force Structures
There is no gainsaying that the prolonged employment of the army in combating insurgency and fighting terrorists can only be at the cost of its primary task of war fighting. The Kashmir insurgency had been going on for a decade when the Kargil War erupted and the surprise and initial reactions was a result of the army’s pre-occupation with combating insurgency. While there was no visible dilution in the combat capabilities of the troops, it was their continued employment to block routes of infiltration and being used to fight the insurgency within, that ‘was’ and to an extent ‘remains’ a problem. By default, preparations for war fighting suffer since even surveillance devices are biased on keeping infiltration routes under observation, and not on the major attack approaches.
The inherent flaw in the J&K model is that since the PMF function under the Home Ministry and the army under the MoD, there are functional problems that even the Unified Command has not been able to mitigate.
In any case, rehearsals and preparations for fighting a conventional battle were relegated in priority and rarely was there time for practicing reinforcements and counter-attacks, which are an integral part of the battle, especially in mountains. Importantly, with the bias on combating insurgency, combat skills of soldiers like firing of missiles, mortars and directing artillery fire etc. had suffered – this needs to be corrected.
Effectiveness of the Unified Command
“The history of counterinsurgency warfare shows that the full integration of all government agencies under unified control (and preferable unified command) is the only way to synchronise all elements of power.”[10] The inherent flaw in the J&K model is that since the PMF function under the Home Ministry and the army under the MoD, there are functional problems that even the Unified Command has not been able to mitigate. Adding to the functional problems are that both the premier Intelligence Agencies R&AW and the IB report directly to New Delhi, and more times than not, bypass the state and the Unified Command, thereby, intelligence when it is received by the forces on the ground is generally outdated.
Another hurdle is the subordination of the police force. While being the largest and the most potent force combating insurgency in Kashmir, it is axiomatic that the army is an important stakeholder in the functioning of the Unified Command. It is equally important that no counterinsurgency operations can be successful without the willing cooperation of the police. This is linked to another factor. When the Kargil conflict required the full time attention of GOC 15 Corps, the DG RR was moved to take up the role of the advisor and oversee the CI and CT tasks.
In a way, this was a welcome move, as for the first time, CI-CT operations could be overseen by a full time commander, and not a ‘double hatter.’ Unfortunately, once the war was over, the original tasking was revived, and the DG returned to Delhi. What was also seen that once the military intelligence changed her focus on the war, operations for insurgency suffered and this became yet another reason for insurgency to be able to rear its head again; though debatable, this issue requires a revisit. As and when the role of the army is taken over by the state, as it should be, this task can be carried out by a senior police/PMF officer on ‘full time’ basis. The full time is underlined and the existing practice of both GsOC 15 and 16 Corps remaining as advisors needs review.
Development of infrastructure will not only ensure managing the security of the region in a more meaningful manner, but will also usher in prosperity and result in their closer integration of the state with the nation.
Infrastructure Development in Kashmir
The Indian reliance on the Zoji La axis has been the bane of Ladakh in all the wars thus far. In 1948, Ladakh remained isolated and was cut off after Pakistan launched Op Sledge and India’s strategic and operational weakness was exposed. In 1962, even though the axis had been upgraded from a mule track to a black topped road, the fact is that it remained closed for the better part of the year. The vulnerability of the road was again highlighted in the 1965 and the 1971 wars. Yet, even when Kargil happened in 1999, there were still no alternative axes for India to move additional forces and to sustain them. Supply lines were based on these temperamental roads, and even the railway line beyond Udhampur was to be operationalised. This vulnerability exists even today and alternatives to these roads and making them fit for all weather operations has still not been realised due to familiar bureaucratic delays.
While, Kargil was manageable with forces from within Northern Command, yet if a similar situation re-occurs, or a greater threat from China or a collusive Pakistan-China threat manifests, Ladakh and even the Kashmir Valley remains vulnerable as despite ambitious plans, construction/improvements etc. are running past completion dates and the situation is reminiscent to the situation before 1962. While this has been known to strategic planners since long, adequate steps in a time bound fashion have not been taken to open up Ladakh and even to the Kashmir Valley. Development of infrastructure will not only ensure managing the security of the region in a more meaningful manner, but will also usher in prosperity and result in their closer integration of the state with the nation.
Conclusion
As the nation celebrates the victory as the ‘Kargil Vijay’ Diwas, it is time to reflect on some fundamental issues. Firstly, was it really the resounding victory Indians would like to believe it was – could it have spiralled? Secondly, and more importantly, did India as a nation learn the right lessons from the bitterly fought conflict? If she did, it certainly is not reflected in any new doctrine nor enhanced capabilities – Pakistan remains as belligerent as she was, despite the transition of leadership to a democracy. This reality of Pakistan has to be realized – irrespective of being the seat of democracy, it is not Islamabad but the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi that calls the shots.
The fundamental question also remains that ‘has the nation created the (right) structures required to prioritise capabilities for meeting future security challenges?
Within house, has the civil leadership realised the human and military cost of its binding instructions of not crossing the LC? Not only did it make victory that much more difficult military terms, this gave the impression that India has accepted of the finality of the LC and acquiesced to Pakistan’s aggression in 1947-48.
The military remains as confused as ever – no direction for selective capability building. Each Service and Force being on a self-enhancing trip, more for Empire Building than with the aim of providing holistic security. The Army aspires to create offensive capability in the mountains in the form of a Strike Corps without ensuring development of the corresponding support of the Air Force; the Air Force aspires to be a dominant Aero-Space Power with no obligations to further the land battle, while the Navy wants to become a Multi-dimensional Maritime Force – all of them are right in their own ways, though their actions lack synergy and a pre-defined operational goal.
The fundamental question also remains that ‘has the nation created the (right) structures required to prioritise capabilities for meeting future security challenges? Has the leadership developed understanding of military requirements of the forces – how guns remain useless without shells and submarines defunct without batteries?’ These are fundamental questions, and more important than inducting a new submarine, combat aircraft or gun – the fact that the leadership does not have accountability, is the immediate cause of concern, a hollowness that should concern well-meaning Indians across the board, especially after a decade and a half after Kargil.
End Notes
[1]Khan Feroz Hassan, Lavoy Peter R, Clary Christopher, p-64, Chapter-3, Pakistan’s Motivations and Calculations for the Kargil Conflict, Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil war, Cambridge University Press, New Delhi, 2009
[2] Ibid, Preface
[3] A commonly acceptable definition of ‘Limited War’ has been given by Christopher M Gacek in his book ‘The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy. He has defined this as being “one in which the belligerents ‘restrict the purpose’ for which they fight to concrete ‘well defined objectives,’ that do not demand the utmost military effort of which the belligerents are capable and that can be accommodated in a negotiated settlement…The battle is confined to a ‘local geographical area’ and ‘directed against selected targets’ –primary those of direct military importance.”
[4]Kargil Committee Report.
[5]Behera Navnita Chadha, p-30, Demystifying Kashmir, Pearson-Longman, New Delhi, 2006
[6]Malik VP, General (Retd), Indo-Pakistan Security Relations in the coming decade: Lessons from Kargil for the Future, as available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publications/idrvol_17(1)VPMalik.htm
[7]As quoted by Basrur Rajesh M, The Lessons of Kargil as learned by India, Asymmetrical warfare in South Asia: the Causes and Consequences of the Kargil war, Ed, Lavoy Peter R, Cambridge University Press, New Delhi, 2009
[8]As quoted by Jones W Rodney, India’s Security Culture, A paper prepared for The Defence Threat Reduction Agency, SAIC, A United States Government Agency, 31 Oct, 2006.
[9]Kargil Committee Report: National Security Management and Apex Decision – Making.
[10] Walia Kaajal, J & K: A Strategy for Counterinsurgency Operations, as available on the net.
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