Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty
The author is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi, and former secretary in the ministry of external affairs. He has served as a diplomat in West Asia and North Africa
Within a span of less than two months earlier this year, India had to launch rescue operations in Yemen and Nepal. In Yemen, the operations focused on rescuing Indian citizens and others caught up in a civil war and in aerial bombardment by a coalition of countries, led by Saudi Arabia. In Nepal, the operations were for both rescue and relief in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake. In both cases, the Indian effort was a well-oiled one, with complete synergy between various agencies of the government. The Indian air force and navy played stellar roles in these operations.
In normal times, the Indian government is known to operate in silos, with its constituent ministries and agencies guarding their turf zealously and generally following their own path. But in times of crisis, when push comes to shove from the prime minister himself, the same Indian government gets its act together to mount operations in Yemen and Nepal that attract the attention of the world for the planning, coordination and high-level international diplomacy that included direct telephonic contact between the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, and Salman bin Abdul Aziz, the new king of Saudi Arabia.
Beginning March 26, 2015, the Saudi-led coalition, comprising nine other Arab countries, backed by the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom, launched air strikes in Yemen against the Houthis and army units loyal to the former Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saleh. The coalition put together by Saudi Arabia includes all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (except Oman) and forces from Morocco, Jordan, Egypt and Sudan. The US is providing intelligence support by pinpointing targets. Saudi Arabia has a history of conflict with Yemen with which it shares a long border of 1750 kilometres and "Operation Decisive Storm", as the current military campaign is named, has sought to degrade the military capabilities of the Houthis.
Saudi-Yemen relations have a long history of both conflict and cooperation as neighbours. A fairly large area with ethnic Yemeni population was incorporated into the Saudi kingdom. Kinship ties on both side ensured that the border was porous and difficult to control. Side letters exchanged between the leaders of the two countries were interpreted by the Yemeni side as giving unrestricted right of entry to Yemenis into Saudi Arabia.
The oil boom in the 1960s and 1970s, led to a very large migration of Yemenis to work in Saudi Arabia. Yemenis from the north were allowed entry fairly easily compared to other nationals. Yemeni migrants were allowed to own their business. Thus many important business families, like the bin Ladens and Al Rajhis, sprang from Yemeni ranks. At its height, the Yemeni expatriate population in Saudi Arabia grew to over two million. This had a debilitating effect on northern Yemen as able-bodied males migrated and the traditional economy, based on agriculture, went into decline. Before the unification of north and south Yemen in 1990, the Saudis made the two Yemens keep each other busy. Saudi meddling in both parts of Yemen has been a constant feature. North Yemen profited financially from Saudi support but it created a huge dependency, since remittances from Yemeni workers in Saudi Arabia became the main income for North Yemen. Yemen is the poorest among all Arab countries and is a neighbour of the richest Arab country - Saudi Arabia.
The Yemeni Houthis, mainly from the Zaidi sect of Shi'ite Islam, form the majority among the population in the northern highlands of Yemen and comprise a third of the population of Yemen as a whole. Almost a quarter of Yemen's population comprises the Zaidi Shia whose main population is concentrated in the north of the country. Once ruled by the Hashemite Zaidis (those claiming to have descended from the family of the Prophet Mohammad) for more than 1,000 years. In 1962, they were overthrown by a group of nationalist military officers. This group founded the Yemen Arab Republic. Zaidi Muslims are nominally categorized as Shia Muslims although they are actually closer to the Sunni schools of jurisprudence.
The Zaidi cleric, Hussein Badreddin Al-Houthi, was the first leader of the rebels and the Houthis get their name from him. The Houthis have consistently alleged that their community was being subjected to systemic political discrimination and socio-economic marginalization. They also opposed the rise of the Salafi/Wahabi ideology that had encouraged the al Qaida, both of which has spread in Yemen. Badreddin channelized the grievances of the Houthis by founding the Shabab al-Momineen in 1992 in their home province of Saada. They began their struggle against the government led by President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The dispute started when Saleh, then supported by Saudi Arabia, charged the Houthis with sedition. Saleh alleged that the Houthis wanted to re-establish the Zaidi Shia Imamate rule which was deposed four decades earlier. Saleh felt threatened by the rise of the Houthis and he sent the army to attack them in 2004. Badreddin was killed in this assault and the Houthi militia, under the name of Ansarullah, took root to carry on the fight under the leadership of Badreddin's younger brother, Abdelmalik Al Houthi. Since 2004, the Houthis have confronted Saleh's army and fought six major battles launched by Saleh to decimate them as a military and political force. Spooked by the consolidation of the Houthis, the Saudis had earlier launched attacks against them with their sophisticated American weaponry in 2009. The Yemeni government had launched an offensive against the Houthi rebels in 2009. The Saudi regime had amassed troops along the Saudi-Yemeni border and shelled the northern province of Saada, the stronghold of the Houthis. But the Houthis gave the Saudis a bloody nose and did not give up their struggle for an equitable stake in Yemen's governance. The Saudi regime is not known for fighting wars. Its preferred tool has been "cheque book diplomacy", buying influence using its vast cache of petrodollars.
The Houthi militia's successes attracted more recruits and its ranks swelled to over a lakh as it consolidated its control over the Northern provinces and even reached the sea. The Houthis have taken advantage of the political chaos and the civil war to capture Sanaa, the capital city, moving further south over the past year. Ironically, they have received support and backing of the former president, Saleh. The civil war in Yemen led to the Gulf Cooperation Council taking the initiative, led by the Saudis mainly, to force Saleh to hand over power to his deputy, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi in early 2012.
Saudis injected the sectarian issue into this civil war by stoking fears that the Houthis were acting as a proxy for Iran, the main Shi'ite country and a regional rival of mainly Sunni Saudi Arabia. The Saudi regime believes that the Houthi thrust into southern Yemen will undermine Saudi security, sharpen the sectarian chasm and add heft to al Qaida group operating in Yemen. In early 2015, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, a Saudi appointee, resigned as president when the Houthis reached Sanaa and surrounded the presidential palace, took control of the Parliament building and dissolved the government. In February 2015, Hadi fled to the port city of Aden, withdrew his resignation and denounced the Houthi takeover as a coup d'état. The Houthis advanced southwards relentlessly, reaching Aden without facing any serious resistance. On March 25, Hadi fled to Riyadh, which launched "Operation Decisive Storm" the very next day.
The Houthis are putting up considerable resistance to the coalition of Arab states that is attacking them. The current assault by the Saudi-led coalition came at a time when the political dialogue was on the verge of yielding a compromise on power sharing. The Saudis raised the issue of Iranian meddling in Yemen as the immediate provocation. The Saudi assault has taken a massive humanitarian toll and international human rights organizations have accused the Saudis of using banned cluster munitions. The Saudis have bombed the international airport at Sanaa and also blockaded the port at Aden. This has prevented humanitarian supplies from reaching civilians. Iran has strongly denied any involvement in training and arming the Houthis and criticized the Saudi-led air strikes as illegal and against international law. Iran has attempted to provide humanitarian assistance which has led to a stand-off between Iranian ships carrying humanitarian material and the US and Saudi naval ships which have mounted a virtual naval blockade of the main port of Aden. The Saudis have been unable to halt the Houthi advance.
The Saudi-led assault on Yemen has been severely criticized by the United Nations for targeting schools and hospitals. The Saudis have admitted doing that but say that these places are being used for storing arms and Houthi leaders are taking shelter in such buildings. The Saudis have claimed that they have given advance warning to civilians to vacate certain areas before the air strikes and blamed the Houthis for using civilians as human shields, all familiar excuses in such situations.
The Saudis have also pleaded with their trusted brotherly country Pakistan for help in providing ground troops. Pakistan's response has been a classic case of public prevarication, ending with the Pakistani Parliament voting on a resolution to reject the Saudi request for help. The Saudis reacted with fury publicly. Many believe that the public response was choreographed and the Pakistanis have quietly agreed to let the Saudis recruit retired Pakistani soldiers and officers for putting "boots on the ground" in Yemen. The Pakistanis have long been at Saudi Arabia's beck and call and have been rewarded handsomely with funds. Pakistan's prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, spent 10 years in exile in Saudi Arabia when Pervez Musharraf, then the president, agreed to a deal to let him out of prison. There are rumours being floated that the Pakistanis will provide nuclear weapons to the Saudis in gratitude for the funding the latter has provided to Pakistan for its nuclear weapons programme, following the nuclear deal being negotiated with Iran.
The civil war in Yemen can only be ended if there is a political settlement. It is not going to end if the issue is framed as a struggle for influence between the Saudis and the Iranians or a sectarian struggle between the Sunnis and Shias. The Saudis are building a narrative of a rising threat from Iran which is interfering in the affairs of its neighbours and must be stopped from doing so to preserve Arab security and solidarity. The Houthis do have some contacts with Iran, though it is unclear if these links have any substantial financial and military components. The Houthis are being painted as an Iranian proxy.
The changes in the Saudi regime with the appointment of young new defence and interior ministers from among the grandsons of Abdul Aziz Al Saud, have also brought about a more muscular Saudi response. The Saudis believe that the Arab countries must secure their own destiny and fight to deter Iran and not depend upon the US as the primary security provider. They also do not want Yemen to follow an independent foreign policy and have a democratic polity which is seen as a threat to the hegemony of the Saudi ruling family.
Attempts to find a political solution led to talks in Geneva last week but ended without any resolution. The Saudis have resorted to more indiscriminate bombing that has taken 3,000 lives so far. The Saudis and Hadi have fallen back on implementing UN security council resolution 2216 which the Houthis have rejected, on the grounds that it calls for their withdrawal from all cities, surrender of all arms and return of the Hadi government. The Houthis remain in control in large parts of Yemen and have increased attacks on Saudi positions. The humanitarian situation is quite desperate. The Saudis are hoping that the humanitarian situation will force the Houthis to capitulate. There are no signs that this will happen soon.
The Saudis are already facing some blowback. There have been two suicide bombings of Shia mosques in Saudi Arabia's eastern province where the majority of Saudi Arabia's Shias live and where the country's oil resources are located. The Saudi regime may be embroiled in the Yemeni conflict for several years without any exit strategy, leading to greater interference of other regional countries and more humanitarian distress. The Saudi regime is unhappy with the US, its godfather for several decades, for engaging Iran via the nuclear deal. The escalation in Yemen is the Saudi regime's way of warning the US to back off from the Iranian nuclear deal. That is unlikely to happen. There are other complicating factors like what happens in Syria and Iraq where the Islamic State, a fanatic Sunni body, is still managing to survive.
The Arab world is in turmoil mainly because of undemocratic regimes, lack of institutions, the absence of a spirit of scientific enquiry and societies that have yet to adjust to the 21st century. While the Arabs tend to blame the West for their troubles with some reason, much of the blame they have to shoulder themselves.
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