S.K. Sinha
Jun 17, 2015
Civil servants have been playing upon apprehensions of political leaders of being overthrown by the man on horseback. It has taken the government 68 years to accept the need for a CDS.
Manohar Parrikar, the defence minister, and Rao Inderjit Singh, the minister of state for defence, both issued statements in February 2015 that India will soon have a Chief of Defence Staff. At long last the government has taken a decision on this issue. A CDS would remove the stifling control of the civil bureaucracy over the military on the plea of the superiority of the civil. This concept applies to the political executive, and not to civil servants. The latter have been playing upon the apprehensions of the political leadership of being overthrown by the man on horseback. It has taken the government 68 long years to accept the need for a CDS, as obtains in democracies.
India has a long history of measures meant to give the military its due role in decision-making being cleverly derailed. This started soon after 1947. The various committees introduced by Lord Ismay providing for direct interaction between the political and the military executives were done away with. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet, at which Service Chiefs could interact directly with the Prime Minister, was reconstituted, denying them this opportunity. The defence minister’s committee, at which Service Chiefs could closely interact with the defence minister and have direct working relations, was wound up. The military wing in the Cabinet Secretariat provided secretarial support for various committees in which political and military leaders participated. This duty was taken over by the civil bureaucracy.
On March 25, 1955, Jawaharlal Nehru announced in Parliament that we would have Chiefs of Staff like other democracies. The designation of Service Chiefs was no doubt changed to Chiefs of Staff but, in the absence of changing their role, this has been meaningless. Service Chiefs continue to function like Cs-in-C. They are heads of subordinate offices attached to the ministry, virtually working under the defence secretary, though they may have higher protocol status.
In 1962, the Prime Minister’s order to throw the Chinese out of the Himalayas was conveyed to the Army Chief by a joint secretary. This showed that this vital military decision was taken without any discussion with the Army Chief. One of the important reasons for the debacle in that war was the marginalisation of the military from the process of decision-making. Despite this, no effort was made to rectify defence functioning at the top. During the 1965 and 1971 wars, the then Army Chiefs, Generals Chaudhuri and Manekshaw, respectively, established personal equations with the then Prime Ministers, Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi. This needs to be institutionalised. Defence minister Jagjivan Ram felt marginalised in 1971.
He opposed Manekshaw being made field marshal but Indira Gandhi overruled him. She wanted to appoint Manekshaw CDS. Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal, the then Air Chief, was opposed to this and threatened to resign on this issue. Unfortunately, the Air Force had always been opposed to India having a CDS for spurious reasons. This provided a good handle to the bureaucracy to ensure continuance of the present unsatisfactory arrangement. The Air Force is now on board on this issue. After the Kargil war, a review committee was set up to examine higher defence organisation. This committee recommended the appointment of the CDS and the integration of the Services Headquarters with the ministry of defence. The group of ministers under the deputy prime minister endorsed this. Yet on the plea of getting political consensus and due to the NDA government soon falling, these two vital proposals were cleverly nullified.
A headless Integrated Defence Staff and a meaningless integration of Service Headquarters with the ministry of defence on subjects of no consequence, have served no purpose. This was only window-dressing like the change of nomenclature of the Service Chiefs in 1955. The Naresh Chandra Committee’s recommendation of having a permanent Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, may provide an extra four-star rank for the services but will be of little use.
There should be no ambiguity about the role, functioning and the infrastructure required for a Chief of Defence Staff, otherwise it may become only a cosmetic change. Modern wars are no longer one-service wars. Two and often three services are required to operate jointly. Defence plans should not be an amalgam of the three plans made separately by the three services and then compromises made. It should be a joint plan, evolved by the highest military authority in conjunction with the political leadership, and within that framework individual service plans should be made. There should also be joint theatre commands to execute the joint plans. The same approach should apply to weapons acquisitions. CDS should render military advice to the government without this being filtered by the civil bureaucracy. He should have the status of Cabinet Secretary and be of five-star rank. A serving Chief should be appointed CDS and given a minimum two-year tenure, irrespective of age.
The nucleus staff for the CDS is already in situ in the Integrated Defence Staff. There should, however, be a vice-chief of defence staff of four-star rank. The Service Chiefs will continue to advise on operational matters in the Chiefs of Staff Committee and be responsible for training, logistics and personnel matters of their respective services. As in the UK, the Service Chiefs should also have the right of direct access to the Prime Minister and defence minister. The civil bureaucracy should continue to play an important role in the higher defence set-up, as in the UK. The defence secretary should perform the same function as his counterpart, the permanent under-secretary for defence in the UK.
The appointment of CDS should not be the monopoly of any single service. The government should select one of the serving Chiefs to be CDS depending on his seniority and suitability. Mountbatten was the first CDS of the UK. In his lecture at Joint Services Staff College in the UK in 1961, he told us the difficulties he had in streamlining the higher defence organisation in the UK. He said that in spite of his experience as Supreme Commander, and the fact that as Chief of Combined Operations he was participating in Chiefs of Staff meetings in 1940, when the then Service Chiefs were of Lt. Col. or equivalent rank, he found it not easy to bring the three on one page. The Navy talked of the Battle of Trafalgar, the Army, the Battle of Waterloo, and the Air Force, not to be left out, the Battle of Britain. He would tell them to forget the old battles and think of the Battle of Tomorrow.
The first incumbent of the appointment of CDS in India will, no doubt, face difficulties, but I am confident that provided we have the right person in the job, and he has the confidence of the government and the co-operation of the civil bureaucracy, he would ensure maximum defence preparedness to meet the nation’s vital interests. Let there be no further delay in instituting the CDS system, otherwise the whole project may get stymied by the bureaucracy, like the OROP decision.
The writer, a retired lieutenant-general, was Vice-Chief of Army Staff and has served as governor of Assam and Jammu and Kashmir
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