By V. Balasubramaniyan
23 Jun , 2015
India’s tryst with contemporary terrorism started with the birth of the Khalistani movement in Punjab, which was followed by insurgency in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. On the other hand, Maoist insurgency with a pan-Indian presence and insurgency in India’s north-east has been one of the teething issues seen as an impediment to the peace and tranquillity in these regions. While the Maoists have been in existence since the 1970s, insurgency in the North East, such as the Naga insurgency, is a direct legacy of the British rule. Most of the other insurgent groups, like the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), are at least three decades old and have survived repeated government onslaughts and internecine conflicts.1
The
prolonged existence of these terror and insurgent groups has been possible inter alia because of their financial strength, which feeds the organisations as well as their operational requirements. Often, these groups need finances to underwrite costs associated not only with conducting terrorist attacks (operational costs) but also with developing and maintaining a terrorist organisation and its ideology (organisational costs).2 Funds are required to promote militant ideology, pay operatives and their families, arrange for travel, train new members, forge documents, pay bribes, acquire weapons and stage attacks. For instance, it is estimated that 10 per cent of the annual income of al-Qaeda went to operational planning and execution while 90 per cent was mainly used for the network infrastructure, facilities, organisation, communication and protection.3
prolonged existence of these terror and insurgent groups has been possible inter alia because of their financial strength, which feeds the organisations as well as their operational requirements. Often, these groups need finances to underwrite costs associated not only with conducting terrorist attacks (operational costs) but also with developing and maintaining a terrorist organisation and its ideology (organisational costs).2 Funds are required to promote militant ideology, pay operatives and their families, arrange for travel, train new members, forge documents, pay bribes, acquire weapons and stage attacks. For instance, it is estimated that 10 per cent of the annual income of al-Qaeda went to operational planning and execution while 90 per cent was mainly used for the network infrastructure, facilities, organisation, communication and protection.3
…in line with their new financial objectives, financial portfolios of these groups have relied more on nontraditional and criminal revenue streams, from kidnap for ransom and extortion…
Terror groups in India and some of the bigger known groups, like ULFA and the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), have relied upon traditional sources of finances, like state sponsorship and narcotics trade, in the 1980s.4 However, recent trends point to increased incidence of reliance on internal activities with an aim to achieve selfsufficiency in their funding activity. Hence, in line with their new financial objectives, financial portfolios of these groups have relied more on nontraditional and criminal revenue streams, from kidnap for ransom (KFR) and extortion, recently. However, it has to be mentioned that KFR and extortion are not new revenue streams but have been in usage by groups such as the NSCN since the late 1980s concomitantly, with their revenue streams from state sponsorship and narcotics.5 This increasing reliance on KFR and extortion by all these groups to augur their group economics has placed a huge burden on the common man and his economics, especially in the north-east region. This paper would attempt to highlight the KFR operations adopted by the Indian terror and insurgent groups to finance their illegal activities.
Organised criminal groups in India have been involved in KFR and extortion activities. However, this research would limit its focus and scope only to the KFR operations by larger terror and insurgent groups, like the Maoists and other north-east groups. However, any meaningful research has to be supported by credible evidentiary data, which is not available in India. The only available database related to KFR incidents in India is provided by the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), which provides data differentiating between KFR operations based on motives like revenge, ransom and sex. It, however, does not give granular information on KFR operations conducted individually by criminal gangs and terror groups. Moreover, the information supplied is not in its entirety as ransom payment details are not available in the open domain. Absence of complete information on KFR operations pertaining to terror groups adds to the existing complexities and is one of the challenges in conducting this analysis in the Indian context. However, information from other multiple open source databases, like South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP),15 which could to some extent assist in assessing the ground realities, have been used to study the KFR operations pertaining primarily to the groups in the North East.
India has had its share of high-profile KFR episodes in the past with political objectives. Rubaiya Sayeed, daughter of Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, the Indian home minister in 1989, was kidnapped by militants belonging to the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front. They demanded the release of five militants, namely Abdul Hamid Sheikh, Sher Khan and three other extremists facing charges of anti-national activities – Noor Mohammad Kalwal, Altaf Ahmed and Javed Ahmed Jargar – who were later released by the Indian government.16 The capitulation of the Indian government became a trigger for insurgency ascent in Jammu & Kashmir and set a precedent for other episodes in the future.17
From 2008 to 2011, a total of 1,554 persons were kidnapped by the Maoists in different parts of India…
On 24 December 1999, five Pakistani terrorists associated with Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) hijacked an Indian Airlines flight from Kathmandu to Kandahar, demanding the release of three Pakistani terrorists held in Indian jails. After prolonged negotiations with the Taliban, India’s minister of external affairs, Jaswant Singh, personally accompanied three terrorists to the Taliban in Kandahar in exchange for the surviving passengers. These kidnapping episodes represent the kidnapping-for-swap typology consistent with or similar to the trends prevalent among religiondriven terror groups during their KFS operations observed elsewhere globally.
The insurgent groups, on the other hand, also use KFR operations and extortion widely to extract both political and financial gains. The Maoists, in particular, have kidnapped government officials, private individuals and contractors in areas where they had presence. From 2008 to 2011, a total of 1,554 persons were kidnapped by the Maoists in different parts of India (see Table 1). Out of these, 328 persons were killed by the Maoists and the rest released.
It is imperative to mention at this juncture that not all Maoist kidnappings pertain to ransom demands as Maoists are known to abduct and kill informers who act against them. However, considering the high release percentage (79 per cent of the hostages are released) of the hostages kidnapped by the Maoists, it would be logical to assume that the government or the concerned stakeholders would have met the demands either fully or partially. However, past experience and prudence dictate that not all political demands can be met on all occasions, perceptibly pointing to the presence of financial ransom or demands in some of the cases if not all.
…the only fundraising activities with minimum investment, minimum exposure and maximum returns were KFR and extortion operations.
However, post 9/11, with their traditional sources of funding drying up due to the war on terrorism, Indian terror groups took to KFR, which was again consistent with the similar operations of other groups, like al- Qaeda and its affiliates. The period post 9/11 witnessed the obliteration of traditional hierarchical terror groups around the world, which led to the emergence of a new phenomenon, called ‘new terrorism’. Groups under this new phenomenon were characterised by flat structures and autonomous modules with indigenous membership. Hence, these small groups had to necessarily diversify into local sources of funding in the areas of their operations using local resources. Given these constraints, the only fundraising activities with minimum investment, minimum exposure and maximum returns were KFR and extortion operations. For instance, the Indian Mujahedeen (IM), which closely resembles the characteristics associated with ‘new terrorism’ in India, uses KFR operations to fund its operations.19
The IM’s foray into criminal activities began when one of its key members, Riyaz Bhatkal, came in contact with Asif Raza Khan through another gangster, Aftab Ansari.20 Asif Raza Khan was, however, killed in a shootout with the Gujarat police in 2002. His brother, Amir Raza Khan, set up the Asif Raza Commando Force, a fundamentalist group. Amir Raza Khan, who is linked to terror operations, including an attack on the US cultural centre in Kolkata, allegedly provided passports and funds to facilitate the movement and training of several IM members in Pakistan through Riyaz Bhatkal.21 Amir Raza Khan is now an important member of IM after merging with IM (possibly part of the core leadership).
Aftab Ansari, who is part of the Asif Raza Commando Force and the operational mastermind behind the attack on the US cultural centre in Kolkata in 2002, was instrumental in raising around Rs. 60 crore from abduction, extortion and kidnapping of Indian businessmen. For instance, the 2001 abduction of Kolkata business baron Partha Roy Burman and Rajkot-based jeweller Bhaskar Parekh yielded Rs. 7 crore in total for the Ansari gang.22 It is now known that Ansari paid USD 1,00,000 out of the Partha Roy ransom amount23 to Omar Sheikh (the prime accused in the Daniel Pearl killing case and one of the terrorists released by the Indian government in the IC 814 hijacking case). This money, however, ended up with Mohammed Atta, the leader of 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001.24 Given the linkages and influence, it would not come as a surprise for the erudite to assess the IM’s involvement in extortion operations.
A few years back, Assam became the kidnap capital of India. The state recorded 3,250 abductions in 2010; 3,785 cases in 2011; 3,812 cases in 2012 and 4,113 abductions in 2013.
In 2002, Mumbai police records show criminal proceedings were first initiated against Riyaz for an extortion-related attempt to murder Kurla-based businessman Deepak Farsanwalla.25 There have been only isolated incidents of KFR operations by terror groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the IM that have been documented. However, recent open source reports indicate that an arrested LeT operative Abdul Subhan had planned to kidnap corporate leaders in India to finance their activities.26
On the other hand, insurgent groups in the North East use KFR operations solely to finance their campaigns. Groups like ULFA, NSCN factions, and other smaller groups have adopted KFR operations.
A few years back, Assam became the kidnap capital of India. The state recorded 3,250 abductions in 2010; 3,785 cases in 2011; 3,812 cases in 2012 and 4,113 abductions in 2013. However, not all kidnappings pertain to terror and insurgent groups. According to SATP, Assam’s forest minister Rockybul Hussain has stated that, altogether, 191 persons were abducted by different insurgent outfits in Assam from 2011 to 2013. Mr. Hussain further disclosed that between 2006 and 2011, there were 456 cases of abduction in the state. In 2012, the state police arrested 620 members of various insurgent outfits for indulging in kidnapping and extortion.
Insurgent groups like the ULFA anti-talk faction, or ULFA (Independent); the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) antitalk faction; Karbi People’s Liberation Tiger (KPLT) and the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) are all known to indulge in KFR operations. The most prominent among them was ULFA.
One of ULFA’s high-profile KFR operations was the kidnapping of the executive director of Food Corporation of India (FCI, a public-sector undertaking in India) P. C. Ram in 2007 in Assam. ULFA demanded a ransom of Rs. 21 crore. P. C. Ram was eventually killed in the crossfire during a rescue attempt. However, investigations later revealed that another group, the NDFB pro-talk faction, was also involved in this KFR episode in planning and sharing the ransom.27 Surprisingly, P. C. Ram, FCI executive director, had earlier escaped from his captors when he was kidnapped by Naga rebels while he was posted in Dimapur in Nagaland in 2002.
ULFA’s funding mainstay is kidnapping and extortion from individuals, businessmen and industries.
ULFA’s funding mainstay is kidnapping and extortion from individuals, businessmen and industries. There existed two conflicting views about ULFA, one as a ‘revolutionary organisation’ and the other as an ‘extortionary criminal enterprise’.28 However, after the arrest of its chairman, Arabinda Rajkhowa, and subsequent talks in 2011, ULFA splintered into a pro-talk faction and an anti-talk faction, or ULFA (I). The legacy of kidnapping is now shouldered by ULFA (I), which is active now.
Similarly, insurgent outfits in other parts of the north-east region, like Nagaland, Tripura and Manipur, used KFR operations to finance their operations. Nagaland-based groups, like NSCN (Isak Muivah) and NSCN (Khaplang); Tripura-based National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFTBiswamohan Debbarma faction); and Manipur-based People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) and People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), have been actively involved in KFR operations. However, non-availability of insurgent group–wise granular data creates an imperative to compile the KFR data state-wise from SATP, which would clearly indicate the trends in the above-mentioned states (Table 2). This exercise could create a counterargument questioning the data as ‘not insurgent-specific’. However, non-existence of other dominant players, like criminal gangs, apart from the groups mentioned above in KFR operations in these states would render support to and further strengthen the argument that indicated abductions necessarily reveal insurgent links.
The number of incidents of abduction has been steadily growing in Assam, Manipur and Nagaland. However, incidents in Tripura have decreased. This could be attributed to the fact that the number of active groups in Manipur and Nagaland are higher compared to those in Tripura.30
Figures on release percentage of insurgent abductions in the North East are not available in the open domain. Hence, a narrower approach to this study and further defining the ultimate motive for this phenomenon may not be possible. However, given the above spate of repeated kidnappings every year by different groups points to a high success rate of this phenomenon.
The gravity of the KFR operations by terror groups could be more intense and deep as most of the incidents, particularly in India’s northeast, go unreported due to fear or full compliance with the ransom conditions.
A highly successful terrorist modus operandi would make other similar groups gravitate towards such a model, which is what is exactly unfolding in the North East. Another factor that could buttress the financial gains theory of KFR operations in the North East is the repeated participation, which signifies a higher success rate in terms of eliciting a ransom payment response either fully or partially. Hence, the above signifies the intent of the north-east insurgent groups in KFR operations as purely ‘financial’ to fund their operations. This is another reason for the premiums of KFR insurance cover for companies operating in the North East to go up.31 This could be testimony to the fact that the secondary victims are chosen from companies that could reciprocate only with a financial ransom instead of a political one.
Conclusions
KFR operations in India closely resemble the typologies associated with other terrorist movements, namely political, political & financial and purely financial. While the north-east groups indulge primarily due to financial gains, others, such as the Maoists, have both political and financial demands to fund their operations.
The gravity of the KFR operations by terror groups could be more intense and deep as most of the incidents, particularly in India’s northeast, go unreported due to fear or full compliance with the ransom conditions. The recorded incidents are likely to be a fraction of actual incidents, most of which go unreported. The government does not have a central database for all KFR operations related to terror groups and insurgents. This could act as a major deterrent, and the greatest challenge for any scholarly research in the future to further demystify this KFR phenomenon in India.
KFR operations in India have revealed that the notions of terror groups and the north-east insurgent groups are evolving and fluctuating from secession to predation.
Groups that have entered into ceasefire agreements with the government have taken to KFR operations to fund their sustenance. For instance, ULFA earlier used to send demand notices to the targeted entities. However, to bypass the legal provisions under the ceasefire agreement during the mid-2000s, ULFA started issuing receipts, which makes the contribution technically voluntary instead of coerced extortion, which is prohibited under the ceasefire rules. Similarly, NSCN factions have also adopted this tactic as they are in talks with the government. NSCN factions and ULFA are the only organisations in the world that issues receipts for extortion payments to evade ceasefire protocols. Similarly, the NDFB, which was the brain behind the 2007 P. C. Ram KFR operation, partnered with ULFA as they were in talks with the government. These actions actually are a translation of a thought process with the core motive being funding for their illegal activities.
Except for the Maoists, other terror and insurgent groups strongly resemble the characteristics and functioning of criminal enterprises with respect to KFR operations. KFR operations in India have revealed that the notions of terror groups and the north-east insurgent groups are evolving and fluctuating from secession to predation.
Notes and References
1. Though, technically, terrorism and insurgency are defined as two different forms of armed political violence by traditional terrorism literature, this paper would consider insurgent groups as also one form of terror group as their recent violent actions have mimicked actions of terror groups, like targeting non-combatants.
2. Rachel Ehrenfeld. Funding Evil. Chicago, IL: Bonus Books, 2003, p. 1.
3. Jean C. Brissard. ‘Terrorist Financing.’ Written Testimony for the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, US Government, 2003. .
4. Vivek Chadha. ‘Terrorism Finance: Sources and Trends in India.’ Journal of Defence Studies 8, no. 3, 2014, pp. 57–100.
15. The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) is an open source project conceived, executed and maintained by the Institute for Conflict Management, an autonomous, non-governmental, non-profit society set up in 1997 and based in New Delhi, India. The Institute is committed to the task of evaluating terrorist and violent movements that threaten the fabric of modern states in South Asia and recommend solutions.
16. Pankaj Pachauri. ‘Rubaiya Sayeed: Abduction Anguish.’ India Today, 31 December 1989.
17. Chindu Sreedharan. ‘Blood in the Snow: Ten Years of Conflict in Kashmir.’ Rediff.Com. 1 January 1999. .
18. The details were shared by the then minister of state for home affairs Shri Jitendra Singh with the Indian Parliament in 2011, ‘Data of Extent on Naxal Violence.’ .
19. For more on new terrorism in India, see V. Balasubramaniyan, ‘Indian Mujahideen: The Face of “New Terrorism” in India?’ Geopoliticalmonitor.com, 4 October 2013. .
20. Praveen Swami. ‘Riyaz Bhatkal and the Origins of the Indian Mujahidin.’ Combating Terrorism Center, 2010. .
21. Ibid.
22. Satyantan Chakravarty. ‘The Dons of Terror: Aftab Ansari and Omar Sheikh.’ India Today, 14 December 2011.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Op cit, n. 20.
26. KR Magazine. ‘Arrested LeT Operative Planned to Kidnap Corporate Honchos.’ 31 July 2014. .
27. Telegraph. ‘Bail for Sarania in Kidnap Case.’ 16 December 2012. < h t t p : / / w w w . t e l e g r a p h i n d i a . c o m / 1 1 2 1 2 1 6 / j s p / n o r t h e a s t / story_16323709.jsp#.U_RninTYQRo>.
28. Jaideep Saikia. ‘Revolutionaries or Warlords ULFA’s Organizational Profile.’ Faultlines 9, 2001. .
29. The table has been compiled from information taken from South Asia Terrorism Portal. N.A.: Statistics not available. www.satp.org. SATP has indicated that these numbers are underestimates as an overwhelming proportion of incidents, particularly in the remote areas of the states, go unreported.
30. Many of the bigger groups, like the NSCN (IM) and the NSCN (K) in Nagaland, are in talks with the government technically. However, cadres of these groups still indulge in KFR activities. Manipur has active groups like PLA, KYKL, PREPAK, and KCP, while Tripura has only NLFT (BM) in the active state.
31. Shilpy Sinha. ‘Insurance: Kidnap Cover Sales Double.’ Rediff.com, 24 June 2010. .
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