8 Jun, 2015
The land boundary agreement between India and Bangladesh is a milestone in bilateral ties between them, writes Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty
A rally by Indo Bangladesh Chhitmahal Binimoy Sammanay Committee, Coochbehar, 2013
The author is former secretary in the ministry of external affairs and a former High Commissioner to Bangladesh. He is currently a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi
The recent successful passage of the Constitution amendment bill through both houses of Parliament has cleared the way for the implementation of the land boundary agreement between Bangladesh and India. This is clearly a landmark development and a momentous achievement for the government of the prime minister, Narendra Modi, showing a clear and unambiguous preference for re-energizing India's neighbourhood policy. It not only removes all hurdles for the final settlement of India's longest border with any neighbour, but also paves the way for the exchange of enclaves and the merger of adverse possessions by re-drawing the international boundary, also known as the Radcliffe Line. This line was drawn in much haste by a British civil servant, as the date for India's Independence and Partition approached. Radcliffe had never travelled to India and consequently had no experience of serving in India. The British brought him with a purpose - to do this hatchet job which left enclaves, adverse possessions and undemarcated boundaries on the ground. The Radcliffe line passed through villages, dividing communities and villages and in some cases putting the kitchen area on different sides of the line from the rest of a village hut. Radcliffe drew the line based on maps, making no effort to relate it to ground realities. India has struggled with this legacy during the days of East Pakistan and thereafter, Bangladesh. It is this legacy of Partition that has been finally put to rest.
The unanimous passage of the LBA bill through both houses of Parliament also underlines the growing maturity of the political discourse on foreign policy in India. In particular, the larger political parties have shown that building consensus on India's foreign policy, towards its neighbours, can increasingly be a bipartisan affair and parties can set aside politics as usual for the larger national interest. While the Bharatiya Janata Party may have opposed the LBA while in Opposition, it has moved away from its earlier position, after assuming the reins of government. It is true that there has been considerable opposition from states which stand to lose territory. Thus the chief ministers of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and West Bengal had to be convinced about going forward with the LBA. In fact, till the last moment it was touch-and-go whether Assam will be left out of the ambit of the LBA. The handling of the LBA's passage required considerable back-room work and political cajoling, particularly of the states affected by the potential land swap. With the implementation of the LBA with Bangladesh, India would have settled all its boundary issues, including the maritime boundary with Bangladesh. The maritime boundary was settled last year with the award by an international tribunal. India had accepted international arbitration, in sharp contrast to China rejecting any form of international arbitration in its disputes with littoral states in the South China Sea. In fact, China is now in the process of reclaiming land and building airports on some of the islands under its occupation. This seeks to expand China's claim of its Exclusive Economic Zone in the South China Sea and is a certain source of conflict with other nations, claiming sovereignty over some of these islands. The world is not inattentive to this gulf between how China and India deal with disputes.
Taking recourse to telephone diplomacy, Modi spoke to his Bangladesh counterpart, Sheikh Hasina, soon after the bill was passed. Modi labelled this development as the collective will of the nation to build constructive relations with neighbours. Modi also thanked leaders of all Opposition parties in India as well as the allies for their support, and said that a "historic milestone" has been reached in India-Bangladesh ties. He also spoke to the chief ministers of all bordering states to thank them for supporting the bill that provides for the exchange of territories with Bangladesh. The external affairs minister, Sushma Swaraj, has also weighed in, by asserting that India will resolve the other main issue of water-sharing with Bangladesh, including the Teesta agreement that has been stalled by the chief minister, Mamata Banerjee. Swaraj dismissed allegations about India's "big brotherly" attitude and said that "one is 'big brother', which symbolizes arrogance, but there is also the 'elder brother' who is caring. Ours is a caring attitude". "India will maintain the attitude of the 'elder brother' with our neighbours," she added. Modi's recent visit to West Bengal may lead to an understanding to implement the Teesta agreement.
Sheikh Hasina, too, expressed satisfaction and claimed that the passing of the bill was a huge diplomatic success, and thanked everyone involved in the process. In Bangladesh, there is a palpable feeling that Hasina and her party are more comfortable with the Congress in power. This feeling is based on the close ties that developed between the Gandhi and the Sheikh family since the liberation war that led to Bangladesh's independence. Both Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had developed close personal ties, and after the assassination of Mujibur Rahman in August, 1975, the two surviving daughters of the family, Sheikh Hasina and Rehana, and their families found refuge in India. Indira Gandhi personally made sure that they were looked after well. This also contributed to this bond of friendship. In Bangladesh, the passing of the LBA bill has also garnered bipartisan support in Bangladesh where the Opposition, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, is currently locked in a bitter power struggle with the ruling Awami League. There is a lurking belief in Bangladesh that the BJP, as a right-wing party, leans towards the BNP, which is also regarded as right-wing in Bangladesh. There is clearly no substance to this belief. For instance, Atal Bihari Vajpayee flagged off, as prime minister, the first direct bus service between Dhaka and Calcutta in 1999 during his visit in July of that year, in the presence of Hasina. Later, during Manmohan Singh's tenure as prime minister, the first ever "Maitri Express" train service was also flagged off in 2008.
There is a long and tortuous history to the LBA. Several attempts have been made to arrive at a comprehensive settlement of the land boundary between India and Bangladesh (the erstwhile East Pakistan) since 1947. The Nehru-Noon agreement of 1958 and the agreement concerning the demarcation of the land boundary between India and Bangladesh and related matters of 1974, also called the Indira-Mujib agreement, sought to find a solution to border related issues. Three outstanding issues - an undemarcated land boundary of approximately 6.1 km, the exchange of enclaves and adverse possessions - remained unsettled. The assassination of Mujibur Rahman left Bangladesh in political turmoil. Military strongmen who came to power eagerly embraced Islamism and Bangladesh-India relations went downhill, as Bangladesh jockeyed for leverage with India by adopting anti-Indian policies that Pakistan adopted when Bangladesh was East Pakistan. Consequently, any political appetite in India to implement the LBA quickly dissipated and the whole issue languished in the freezer of Bangladesh-India ties.
The current LBA's principal guiding philosophy is the recognition of ground realities, particularly the wishes and livelihood opportunities of the people living in these areas. The issue, therefore, was to tweak the original LBA to maintain status quo of adverse possessions and change the international border to accommodate the wishes of the settled population. Effectively, a de facto situation will be converted into a de jure reality. The 2011 LBA protocol will result in a fixed demarcated boundary in all the undemarcated segments, the exchange of 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh with 51 Bangladesh enclaves in India, and a resolution of all adversely possessed areas. In the exchange of enclaves, India will transfer 111 enclaves with a total area of 17,160.63 acres to Bangladesh, while Bangladesh would transfer 51 enclaves with an area of 7,110.02 acres to India. While the exchange of enclaves between India and Bangladesh may seem like a loss of Indian land to Bangladesh, the fact is that these enclaves are islands inside the territory of both countries and neither side has any physical access to them from either country. Hence, the loss of land for India is notional. As for adverse possessions, India will receive 2777.038 acres of land and will transfer 2267.682 acres to Bangladesh. As in the case of enclaves, this too is a switch from a de facto situation into a de jure one since such adverse possessions are already occupied by both sides. The exchange of enclaves and redrawing of the international boundary, to maintain status quo of adverse possessions requires a constitutional amendment according to Article 368 of the Constitution. No constitutional amendment procedure is required for undemarcated sectors, as this falls within the competence of executive action.
The implementation of the LBA will surely set an upward trajectory for the future of bilateral ties with Bangladesh. The geostrategic location of Bangladesh makes it an important player in India's Act East policy. More importantly, the economic development of India's northeastern states can be facilitated by Bangladesh's cooperation in providing seamless connectivity in the eastern region of the sub-continent. Railway connectivity between Akhaura and Agartala will enable trains to move from Agartala to Calcutta via Dhaka, easing travel for millions of Bangladeshi and Indian travellers, and provide a cost effective freight transportation route. Similar cross-border railway connectivity in the north on the Bangladesh-West-Bengal border will provide connectivity that will help Bhutan and Nepal as well. There is a strong case for sub-regional cooperation and development involving Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal. When Myanmar is brought into this equation, these five countries can forge various sub-regional structures for cooperation that can include energy transmission corridors that will benefit all countries. The LBA, therefore, is an enabling step towards another giant leap for strategic integration of the eastern region of the sub-continent that will ultimately provide the propellant for India's Act East policy.
In expanding maritime connectivity and cooperation with Dhaka, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has begun to devote the kind of strategic attention the Bay of Bengal has long deserved. While the waters to India’s east have steadily gained salience in China’s calculus, New Delhi’s interest in the bay has tended to be limited and episodic. For China, the Bay of Bengal is significant for both economic and geopolitical reasons. As China sought to develop its southwestern regions, including Tibet and Yunnan, gaining access to the bay became an important objective.
The Bay of Bengal also funnels China’s growing volumes of sea-borne trade with the Middle East, Africa and Europe, in and out of the narrow Straits of Malacca that connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The fear of potential threats to its vital sea lines of communication has encouraged Beijing to develop alternative overland transport corridors between the bay and southwestern China through Myanmar. China is also raising its maritime profile in the bay to secure its growing interests in the Indian Ocean.
India’s inward economic orientation and preoccupation with the troubled land borders in the north and northwest resulted in Delhi neglecting its maritime frontiers. The Look East policy of the 1990s resulted in Delhi taking a fresh look at the Bay of Bengal. The rapid growth of China’s maritime influence in the Indian Ocean has reinforced Delhi’s strategic interest in the bay. But there was a problem that persisted — a lot of handwringing over the new geopolitical trends, but too few sensible economic actions. Modi has begun to change that.
Blue Economy
In Dhaka, Modi unveiled a number of steps that seek to build on India’s natural economic advantages in the Bay of Bengal. One was the agreement to initiate coastal shipping between the two countries. This should help reduce the time and costs involved in moving goods between the two, which currently reach their destination through distant third-country ports.
The agreement is also expected to improve the throughput of the trans-shipment ports in the two countries and reduce the burden on the heavily congested road transportation between India and Bangladesh. If coastal shipping was long overdue, Delhi and Dhaka have agreed to develop a forward-looking agenda for maritime cooperation.
Expressing satisfaction at the resolution of the maritime boundary dispute between the two countries last year, Modi and his counterpart Sheikh Hasina “agreed to work closely on the development of ocean-based Blue Economy and Maritime Cooperation in the Bay of Bengal and chart out ways for future cooperation”. India has also agreed to assist Bangladesh in developing its maritime research capabilities through an agreement for collaboration between the National Institute of Oceanography in Goa and the University of Dhaka. Maritime cooperation could be extended eventually to other countries in the littoral, including Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia and Sri Lanka.
Beijing’s Banks
Delhi had no reason to frame its cooperation with Dhaka on overland and maritime connectivity in opposition to China. While India has opposed the China-Pakistan economic corridor through PoK, it has been talking to Beijing about …continued »
When India’s national mood pays a tribute to its war dead by calling them “martyrs”, it perhaps perpetuates an unintentional disservice. The term “martyrs” is misplaced in the context of Indian soldiers, because by training and inclination, the Indian Army is not passive “martyr material”. If and when their time comes, they do not passively accept their fate, but go down fighting, “Last Man, Last Round” and try and take as many of their enemies with them as they can.
Captain Saurabh Kalia of 4 Jat Regiment is a case in point. An officer of the Indian Army, he was taken prisoner on May 15, 1999, during the very initial stages of the Kargil War of 1999, after his five-man reconnaissance patrol probing Pakistani intrusions in the Kaksar sector of Kargil was ambushed by Pakistani paramilitary troops.
He and his troops were undoubtedly surprised, but were able to inflict as many casualties as they could, before being physically overpowered after their ammunition ran out. The survivors remained in Pakistani custody from May 15 to June 7, during which they were tortured. Thereafter, they were shot dead and their grossly mutilated bodies were handed over to India.
No action was taken by India beyond an almost pro forma complaint lodged with the deputy high commissioner of Pakistan in India regarding breach of Geneva Conventions by the Pakistan Army — a charge which was perfunctorily shrugged off by Pakistan in routine diplomatese.
N.K. Kalia, the grieving father of the deceased officer, took up the crusade to bring the murderers of his dead son to justice and arraign them before the war crimes tribunal in the International Court of Justice at The Hague, Netherlands.
While there was considerable public sympathy for Mr Kalia, an iota of official support from successive governments was amiss. It was only until 2015 that the Supreme Court of India took suo moto cognisance of the case that was filed in the lower courts by Mr Kalia. The court demanded an explanation from the Government of India for their prolonged bureaucratic inaction in pursuing the matter. There were none. The best argument the minister for external affairs could come up with was a laboured submission about the necessity for exercising restraint on the issue of India’s dead soldiers in order to improve tattered relations with Pakistan.
In the eagerness to “forgive and forget” and begin a new era of India-Pakistan friendship, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee had readily accepted the glib assurances of Nawaz Sharif, his Pakistani counterpart, that Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the then Chief of Army Staff of the Pakistan Army, had kept his own Prime Minister in the dark about the Kargil offensive. Resultantly, perhaps, India was deflected from approaching the United Nations and the ICJ.
Capt. Kalia’s case highlights the well-known propensity of the Pakistan Army to torture and murder “kafir” prisoners of war. This was also highlighted by the now forgotten tragedy of Second Lieutenant Sam Chandravarkar, and the ambush at Kushtia during the closing days of war in Bangladesh in 1971.
For the record, 22 Rajput Regiment together with a squadron (14 tanks) of light amphibious PT-76 tanks had entered the township of Kushtia in Bangladesh in hot pursuit of a withdrawing column of the Pakistan Army.
The lead elements of the pursuing Indian forces were ambushed as they were negotiating through the town, and suffered fairly substantial casualties.
Lt. Chandravarkar, the leading tank troop leader, was wounded and captured along with some other members of his crew as also some wounded troops of 22 Rajput. The Indian prisoners were bayoneted to death by their captors, who were later identified as soldiers from 18 Punjab Regiment of the Pakistan Army.
The Indian unit arrived on the scene immediately thereafter and the stage seemed set for summary “battlefield justice” by the Indian soldiers, who were inflamed by the mutilated bodies of their comrades, and had to be restrained by their officers with great difficulty.
Whether in the context of Capt. Kalia or 2/Lt. Chandravarkar, mutilation and murder of prisoners of war by the Pakistan Army is nothing new. So the suggestions by Pakistani interior minister Rehman Malik when he visited India in December 2012 about the likely cause of death of Capt. Kalia as being from a fall, and the gruesome mutilation of the bodies possibly by birds or wild animals are disingenuous to say the least. These are probably attempts at deliberate obfuscation.
Peace with Pakistan is a chimera, which India has wasted enough time and effort in pursuing. Even at this inexcusably belated stage, India must find the time and make the effort of lodging charges of war crimes against Pakistan at the International Court of Justice. This will be the best way to pay tribute to Capt. Kalia and five other soldiers.
The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former member of Parliament
More than just a cyber “whodunnit.” Lee Jae Won/Reuters
In the ever-escalating compendium of cyber incidents and intrusions, an enormous US government breach – perhaps the largest ever – came to light last week with news of a federal hack affecting “nearly every government agency.”
This incident, which exploited a zero-day vulnerability (a flaw in software unknown to the public), exposed and puts at risk the personal information of four million federal employees. Keep in mind, the Wall Street Journal has pointed out, that there are only 4.2 million federal workers in total.
Details of the breach are still emerging, but the hack has been traced to China – although it is not yet clear whether or to what extent the government of China was involved.
However, military officers in China are increasingly known to moonlight as cybersecurity consultants and hackers for hire when off the clock. At the same time, as a matter of strategy, countries are increasingly turning to proxies to do their bidding in order to provide plausible deniability in the event they get caught with their hands in the cookie jar.
First reports are not always accurate, though, and the wisest course is to permit the investigation and the forensics to play out. Further, even if attribution in the fullest sense of the term is established, that will not necessarily elucidate intent.
Was the hack state-sponsored or supported, or did the Chinese government simply turn a blind eye and allow the attack to occur?
Even if state involvement is ultimately not proven, the question of whether and to what extent the information finds its way into the hands of the Chinese security services will remain unresolved.
Intelligence trove
What is known is that the perpetrators are the same as those in the breach of health insurers Anthem and Premera Blue Cross, which affected 11 million and 80-plus million individuals respectively, according to the New York Times.
Of particular interest in the current case is whether sensitive data including social security numbers were encrypted.
Undoubtedly there will be plenty of time spent examining whether this data theft was the result of sub-par government practices. In this regard, it is not as if another wakeup call was needed. This was, after all, the fourth hack of US government employee information since March 2014.
On the other hand, US government officials are saying that ever-more breaches will come to light moving forward, due to increased US detection capabilities. And US authorities are also emphasizing the bright side of the present case, noting that at least the intrusion was detected.
On the perpetrator’s side of the equation, one wonders about the motivation. If in fact a state actor was involved here, it would seem a bit incongruous (at least at first glance) since the type of information pilfered is the sort that would generally be of greater interest to cybercriminals who seek to profit from identity theft.
The apparent inconsistency resolves itself quickly, however, if one conceives of the case as an exercise in espionage and in particular one of profiling – especially individuals holding security clearances.
Amassing personal information, including a diversity of details about medical and financial histories and performance evaluations, for example, could generate a genuine trove for foreign intelligence services and their proxies to use for their own ends in future — ends such as blackmail, spear-phishing and recruitment.
How to react?
To be clear, there is still much that we do not yet know, and it is crucial that hypothetical scenarios not be dressed up as fact.
Having said that, the possibility of a cyberattack with Chinese state involvement is a disconcerting one, and it should not be dismissed at this stage, especially given the value of the information compromised.
The diplomatic aspect of the incident is as fascinating as it is complex. US-China relations in the cyberdomain operate on many different levels and intersect with the broader military, political and economic spheres.
The present case also comes to light just as the Pentagon has released its latest cyberstrategy, with a particular focus on cyberdeterrence, and just as China has released a new military strategy paper that includes special emphasis on the development and use of cybercapabilities.
So where does this leave us? Assuredly with more questions than answers.
For instance on the US government side, irrespective of “whodunit,” one wonders whether the fundamentals of cybersecurity hygiene, such as encrypted social security numbers, were in place at the time of the breach. Such elements are not in the category of rocket science and, in the event that they may have gone unimplemented, it makes the case for greater public-private partnership and cooperation for the purposes of cybersecurity a tougher sell. Demonstrating poor practices at government agencies diminishes the credibility and perceived capability of the public sector as a reliable partner.
Yet the answer cannot be simply to throw up our arms in frustration and to complacently accept the status quo as the new normal. To the contrary, the US can and should make full use of some of the newest instruments of statecraft that it has added to its toolkit, including this April’s Executive Order entitled “Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activity,” which opens the doors for levying economic sanctions against cyberperpetrators.
Complementarily, the country should invoke some of the older, more traditional diplomatic means and methods of advancing US interests. This means working through bilateral and multilateral forums to elaborate and articulate international norms and standards of behavior that will apply to all actors.
Litmus test
From a bilateral perspective, perhaps ironically, later this month, from June 22-24, a high-level delegation from China is scheduled to visit Washington, DC, for the annual US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. If both sides are genuinely serious about addressing cybersecurity, this would be a timely and appropriate opportunity to demonstrate their commitment by skipping the pomp and circumstance to address the tough issues.
In short, if indeed this massive hack is the work of a criminal enterprise, then this is China’s opportunity to show that it is serious by conducting a joint investigation with the United States and by prosecuting wherever the facts and evidence lead.
Should China be reluctant to proceed in this manner, then the United States should look to its own legal instruments and invoke and apply them.
In that sense, the case is a litmus test for this country’s policies and practices as well.
http://scroll.in/article/733067/massive-government-employee-data-theft-further-complicates-us-china-relations
Massive government employee data theft further complicates US-China relations
Many questions remain about the hack on government employee data, but the US has to treat the data theft as a high-level diplomatic incident.
In the ever-escalating compendium of cyber incidents and intrusions, an enormous US government breach – perhaps the largest ever – came to light last week with news of a federal hack affecting “nearly every government agency.”
This incident, which exploited a zero-day vulnerability (a flaw in software unknown to the public), exposed and puts at risk the personal information of four million federal employees. Keep in mind, the Wall Street Journal has pointed out, that there are only 4.2 million federal workers in total.
Details of the breach are still emerging, but the hack has been traced to China – although it is not yet clear whether or to what extent the government of China was involved.
However, military officers in China are increasingly known to moonlight as cybersecurity consultants and hackers for hire when off the clock. At the same time, as a matter of strategy, countries are increasingly turning to proxies to do their bidding in order to provide plausible deniability in the event they get caught with their hands in the cookie jar.
First reports are not always accurate, though, and the wisest course is to permit the investigation and the forensics to play out. Further, even if attribution in the fullest sense of the term is established, that will not necessarily elucidate intent.
Was the hack state-sponsored or supported, or did the Chinese government simply turn a blind eye and allow the attack to occur?
Even if state involvement is ultimately not proven, the question of whether and to what extent the information finds its way into the hands of the Chinese security services will remain unresolved.
Intelligence trove
What is known is that the perpetrators are the same as those in the breach of health insurers Anthem and Premera Blue Cross, which affected 11 million and 80-plus million individuals respectively, according to the New York Times.
Of particular interest in the current case is whether sensitive data including social security numbers were encrypted.
Undoubtedly there will be plenty of time spent examining whether this data theft was the result of sub-par government practices. In this regard, it is not as if another wakeup call was needed. This was, after all, the fourth hack of US government employee information since March 2014.
On the other hand, US government officials are saying that ever-more breaches will come to light moving forward, due to increased US detection capabilities. And US authorities are also emphasizing the bright side of the present case, noting that at least the intrusion was detected.
On the perpetrator’s side of the equation, one wonders about the motivation. If in fact a state actor was involved here, it would seem a bit incongruous (at least at first glance) since the type of information pilfered is the sort that would generally be of greater interest to cybercriminals who seek to profit from identity theft.
The apparent inconsistency resolves itself quickly, however, if one conceives of the case as an exercise in espionage and in particular one of profiling – especially individuals holding security clearances.
Amassing personal information, including a diversity of details about medical and financial histories and performance evaluations, for example, could generate a genuine trove for foreign intelligence services and their proxies to use for their own ends in future – ends such as blackmail, spear-phishing and recruitment.
How to react?
To be clear, there is still much that we do not yet know, and it is crucial that hypothetical scenarios not be dressed up as fact.
Having said that, the possibility of a cyberattack with Chinese state involvement is a disconcerting one, and it should not be dismissed at this stage, especially given the value of the information compromised.
The diplomatic aspect of the incident is as fascinating as it is complex. US-China relations in the cyberdomain operate on many different levels and intersect with the broader military, political and economic spheres.
The present case also comes to light just as the Pentagon has released its latest cyberstrategy, with a particular focus on cyberdeterrence, and just as China has released a new military strategy paper that includes special emphasis on the development and use of cybercapabilities.
So where does this leave us? Assuredly with more questions than answers.
For instance on the US government side, irrespective of “whodunit,” one wonders whether the fundamentals of cybersecurity hygiene, such as encrypted social security numbers, were in place at the time of the breach. Such elements are not in the category of rocket science and, in the event that they may have gone unimplemented, it makes the case for greater public-private partnership and cooperation for the purposes of cybersecurity a tougher sell. Demonstrating poor practices at government agencies diminishes the credibility and perceived capability of the public sector as a reliable partner.
Yet the answer cannot be simply to throw up our arms in frustration and to complacently accept the status quo as the new normal. To the contrary, the US can and should make full use of some of the newest instruments of statecraft that it has added to its toolkit, including this April’s Executive Orderentitled “Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activity,” which opens the doors for levying economic sanctions against cyberperpetrators.
Complementarily, the country should invoke some of the older, more traditional diplomatic means and methods of advancing US interests. This means working through bilateral and multilateral forums to elaborate and articulate international norms and standards of behavior that will apply to all actors.
Litmus test
From a bilateral perspective, perhaps ironically, later this month, from June 22-24, a high-level delegation from China is scheduled to visit Washington, DC, for the annual US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. If both sides are genuinely serious about addressing cybersecurity, this would be a timely and appropriate opportunity to demonstrate their commitment by skipping the pomp and circumstance to address the tough issues.
In short, if indeed this massive hack is the work of a criminal enterprise, then this is China’s opportunity to show that it is serious by conducting a joint investigation with the United States and by prosecuting wherever the facts and evidence lead.
Should China be reluctant to proceed in this manner, then the United States should look to its own legal instruments and invoke and apply them.
In that sense, the case is a litmus test for this country’s policies and practices as well.
This article was originally published on The Conversation.
When India’s national mood pays a tribute to its war dead by calling them “martyrs”, it perhaps perpetuates an unintentional disservice. The term “martyrs” is misplaced in the context of Indian soldiers, because by training and inclination, the Indian Army is not passive “martyr material”. If and when their time comes, they do not passively accept their fate, but go down fighting, “Last Man, Last Round” and try and take as many of their enemies with them as they can.
Captain Saurabh Kalia of 4 Jat Regiment is a case in point. An officer of the Indian Army, he was taken prisoner on May 15, 1999, during the very initial stages of the Kargil War of 1999, after his five-man reconnaissance patrol probing Pakistani intrusions in the Kaksar sector of Kargil was ambushed by Pakistani paramilitary troops.
He and his troops were undoubtedly surprised, but were able to inflict as many casualties as they could, before being physically overpowered after their ammunition ran out. The survivors remained in Pakistani custody from May 15 to June 7, during which they were tortured. Thereafter, they were shot dead and their grossly mutilated bodies were handed over to India.
No action was taken by India beyond an almost pro forma complaint lodged with the deputy high commissioner of Pakistan in India regarding breach of Geneva Conventions by the Pakistan Army — a charge which was perfunctorily shrugged off by Pakistan in routine diplomatese.
N.K. Kalia, the grieving father of the deceased officer, took up the crusade to bring the murderers of his dead son to justice and arraign them before the war crimes tribunal in the International Court of Justice at The Hague, Netherlands.
While there was considerable public sympathy for Mr Kalia, an iota of official support from successive governments was amiss. It was only until 2015 that the Supreme Court of India took suo moto cognisance of the case that was filed in the lower courts by Mr Kalia. The court demanded an explanation from the Government of India for their prolonged bureaucratic inaction in pursuing the matter. There were none. The best argument the minister for external affairs could come up with was a laboured submission about the necessity for exercising restraint on the issue of India’s dead soldiers in order to improve tattered relations with Pakistan.
In the eagerness to “forgive and forget” and begin a new era of India-Pakistan friendship, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee had readily accepted the glib assurances of Nawaz Sharif, his Pakistani counterpart, that Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the then Chief of Army Staff of the Pakistan Army, had kept his own Prime Minister in the dark about the Kargil offensive. Resultantly, perhaps, India was deflected from approaching the United Nations and the ICJ.
Capt. Kalia’s case highlights the well-known propensity of the Pakistan Army to torture and murder “kafir” prisoners of war. This was also highlighted by the now forgotten tragedy of Second Lieutenant Sam Chandravarkar, and the ambush at Kushtia during the closing days of war in Bangladesh in 1971.
For the record, 22 Rajput Regiment together with a squadron (14 tanks) of light amphibious PT-76 tanks had entered the township of Kushtia in Bangladesh in hot pursuit of a withdrawing column of the Pakistan Army.
The lead elements of the pursuing Indian forces were ambushed as they were negotiating through the town, and suffered fairly substantial casualties.
Lt. Chandravarkar, the leading tank troop leader, was wounded and captured along with some other members of his crew as also some wounded troops of 22 Rajput. The Indian prisoners were bayoneted to death by their captors, who were later identified as soldiers from 18 Punjab Regiment of the Pakistan Army.
The Indian unit arrived on the scene immediately thereafter and the stage seemed set for summary “battlefield justice” by the Indian soldiers, who were inflamed by the mutilated bodies of their comrades, and had to be restrained by their officers with great difficulty.
Whether in the context of Capt. Kalia or 2/Lt. Chandravarkar, mutilation and murder of prisoners of war by the Pakistan Army is nothing new. So the suggestions by Pakistani interior minister Rehman Malik when he visited India in December 2012 about the likely cause of death of Capt. Kalia as being from a fall, and the gruesome mutilation of the bodies possibly by birds or wild animals are disingenuous to say the least. These are probably attempts at deliberate obfuscation.
Peace with Pakistan is a chimera, which India has wasted enough time and effort in pursuing. Even at this inexcusably belated stage, India must find the time and make the effort of lodging charges of war crimes against Pakistan at the International Court of Justice. This will be the best way to pay tribute to Capt. Kalia and five other soldiers.
The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former member of Parliament
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