Divine Eagle: A Chinese Airborne Early Warning and Surface Surveillance UAV?

June 18, 2015

http://www.informationdissemination.net/2015/06/divine-eagle-chinese-airborne-early.html

I came across an interesting post at Popular Science’s Eastern Arsenal blog about a developmental PLA UAV equipped with UHF and X-band radars for detection of very low observable aircraft, naval surface forces, and possibly land-based mobile forces as well. Aprevious Eastern Arsenal post contains additional information including the UAV’s assumed maximum operating speed and altitude; the latter is suggested to be an impressive 25km (~82,000 feet). That makes for a pretty sizable line-of-sight radar horizon. 

The UHF radar is likely the primary Airborne Early Warning system and the X-band radar would likely be used for surface/ground surveillance. Unlike our AEW and E-8 JSTARS aircraft, however, the battle management and command and control functions made possible by the radars would be “outsourced” to a command post somewhere else. The operational geometry of the associated networkwould do much to dictate whether this scheme could be effective in combat.

In theory, the UAV’s transmission of its radar data to “shooter” platforms could also enable Distributed Fire Control (DFC); the latter could use the former’s targeting-quality data to cue the launch of a weapon and guide it to the point that its onboard homing sensors could take over. This is how the Navy Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air concept works. DFC provides a tremendous advantage for survival in a contested zone where use of one’s onboard radar would tell any nearby adversary units with the necessary electronic warfare capabilities where to aim their own weapons.

I’m skeptical of such a UAV’s utility in performing surveillance or reconnaissance beyond the effective protection of PLA fighters or land-based/shipboard air defenses. In the presence of those platforms, though, it could be quite effective—assuming the radar worked as advertised and its data pathways were based on “interior lines of networking.” This provides further evidence low observability alone is insufficient for “stealth;” supportive electronic and/or physical attacks against a sensor like this would be crucial.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.