JAYADEVA RANADE
June 24, 2015
On May 26, 2015, China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) issued its ninth White Paper entitled ‘China’s Military Strategy’. This 9000-character (in Chinese or 6,393 words in English), 6-chapter long White Paper is the first ever to have been issued which solely discusses China’s military strategy. Reflecting Beijing’s self-confidence, the White Paper spells out China’s expanded ‘national interests’ and role envisaged for its armed forces which, it asserted, must “effectively secure China’s overseas interests”. Outlining the PLA’s role, the White Paper says “national security is more vulnerable to international and regional turmoil, terrorism, piracy, serious natural disasters and epidemics, and the security of overseas interests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), as well as institutions, personnel and assets abroad, has become an imminent issue”.
Important is the White Paper’s assessment of China’s domestic security situation. Unlike in 2013, this White Paper makes specific mention of Tibet indicating the upgraded importance of the Tibet issue to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. The toughly-worded paragraph in the White Paper emphasises that “China faces a formidable task to maintain political security and social stability. Separatist forces for “East Turkistan independence” and “Tibet independence” have inflicted serious damage, particularly with escalating violent terrorist activities by “East Turkistan independence” forces. Besides, anti-China forces have never given up their attempt to instigate a “color revolution” in this country. Consequently, China faces more challenges in terms of national security and social stability”.
The PLA is predictably enjoined to “firmly follow the goals of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)”, “resolutely safeguard China’s sovereignty, security and development interests”, and provide a “strong guarantee for realising the Chinese Dream of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. Unlike those issued earlier, this White Paper includes none of the purportedly conciliatory references to the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ or ‘harmonious world’.
China’s first officially described White Paper was issued nearly 20 years ago in November 1998, and was simply called “China’s National Defense.” Thereafter, in a bid to build its credentials as a ‘responsible’ major power which is transparent on defence issues, China has issued defence-related White Papers almost every two years. The series of white papers are official statements of Chinese government policy and usually provide Beijing’s official view of the contemporary international and regional situation, relations with Taiwan and a statement of the major elements of China’s defense policy. Most of the White Papers contained only general information regarding China’s military policies or the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), except for those issued in 2011 and 2013, which included new details of China’s force structure and strength, organization, doctrine and the national defense mobilization system.
China’s White Papers of 2011, 2013 and the current White Paper of 2015, all reveal that efforts continue to formalise the identities of the different services and distinguish between the PLA’s ground forces and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), PLA Navy (PLAN) and the PLA Second Artillery (PLASAF). The White Paper of 2011, in fact, for the first time referred to the ground forces as the PLA Army (PLAA) and this practice is continued in the subsequent White Papers. The White Paper of 2013, titled “Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” also for the first time ever officially provided details of the force strengths of the PLAA, PLAAF, PLAN and PLASAF.
The latest White Paper reflects Beijing’s continuing concern about its periphery and, while acknowledging that the international environment is generally peaceful, dwells on the likelihood of “immediate” and “potential threats of local wars”. It notes that “small-scale wars, conflicts and crises” continue to recur in some regions. It identified the “international competition for the redistribution of power, rights and interests” as a new threat confronting China. Others were listed as including increased terrorist activities and complex and volatile “hotspot issues, such as ethnic, religious, border and territorial disputes”.
Pertinent is the assessment in Chapter I of the White Paper which, while reiterating China’s maritime territorial claims, conveys a thinly veiled warning to countries in the region. It observes that “as the world economic and strategic center of gravity is shifting ever more rapidly to the Asia-Pacific region, the US carries on its “rebalancing” strategy and enhances its military presence and its military alliances in this region. Japan is sparing no effort to dodge the post-war mechanism, overhauling its military and security policies….On the issues concerning China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some of its offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce their military presence on China’s reefs and islands that they have illegally occupied. Some external countries are also busy meddling in South China Sea affairs; a tiny few maintain constant close-in air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance against China. It is thus a long-standing task for China to safeguard its maritime rights and interests. Certain disputes over land territory are still smoldering. The Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia are shrouded in instability and uncertainty. Regional terrorism, separatism and extremism are rampant. All these have a negative impact on the security and stability along China’s periphery”.
Declaring that “without a strong military a country can be neither safe nor strong”, the White Paper focused on the Preparations for Military Struggle (PMS) and directed the armed forces to accelerate efforts to raise combat capability. Modifying the guidelines for PMS which had last been revised in 2004, it said emphasis would now be placed on “winning informationized local wars, highlighting maritime military struggle and maritime PMS”. China’s armed forces were mandated to conduct live-setting training, IT-based simulated training, and face-on-face confrontation training in line with real-combat criteria. Training in complex electro-magnetic environments, complex and unfamiliar terrains, and complex weather conditions are to be intensified. It said the PLAA will improve combat readiness with combined arms and ensure agile maneuvers and effective response. The PLAN will continue to perform regular combat readiness patrols and maintain a military presence in relevant sea areas. The PLAAF will maintain vigilant and efficient combat readiness with all-dimensional response and full territorial reach while observing the principles applicable in peacetime and wartime. It disclosed that the PLASAF will maintain an appropriate level of vigilance in peacetime and remain action-ready.
The White Paper listed the strategic tasks for China’s armed forces. These include to:
(i) deal with a wide range of emergencies and military threats, and effectively safeguard the sovereignty and security of China’s territorial land, air and sea;
(ii) resolutely safeguard the unification of the motherland;
(iii) safeguard China’s security and interests in new domains;
(iv) safeguard the security of China’s overseas interests;
(v) maintain strategic deterrence and carry out nuclear counterattack; and
(vi) strengthen efforts in operations against infiltration, separatism and terrorism so as to maintain China’s political security and social stability.
The White Paper additionally detailed some of the enhanced capabilities that China’s armed forces will acquire in the coming years. This includes aero-space and cyber capabilities. Stating that the new tasks of the PLA ground forces require “mobile operations” and “multi-dimensional offense and defense”, it said the PLA Army (PLAA) will “continue to reorient from theater defense to trans-theater mobility”, build small, multi-functional and modular units and “elevate its capabilities for precise, multi-dimensional, trans-theater, multi-functional and sustainable operations”. The importance of integrated joint operations (IJO) was underscored.
The PLA Navy (PLAN)’s role has been considerably expanded from one of “offshore waters defense” as at present to the combination of “offshore waters defense” with “open seas protection.” The PLAN has accordingly been tasked to build a “combined, multi-functional” marine combat force structure. Earmarked for enhancement is the PLAN’s “strategic deterrence and counterattack” capability.
The White Paper similarly added a definitive offensive role for the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). It said the PLAAF will “endeavor to shift its focus from territorial air defense to both defense and offense, and build an air-space defense force structure”. The PLAAF will also boost its capabilities for “strategic early warning, air strike, air and missile defense, information countermeasures, airborne operations, strategic projection and comprehensive support”.
The PLASAF, it said, will continue to have nuclear and conventional missiles in its inventory and accelerate development of independent innovations in weaponry and equipment. It was tasked to improve the force structure by combining nuclear and conventional capabilities. The White Paper said the PLASAF will strengthen its capabilities for strategic deterrence and nuclear counterattack, and medium- and long-range precision strikes.
The People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) came in for mention with the White Paper highlighting its role in effectively maintaining social stability and contingency response, counter-terrorism operations etc. The indication is that the PAPF will acquire more and modern equipment and that the domestic security apparatus will continue to receive high budgetary allocations.
While the PLAN already receives a proportionately larger share of the defence budget, this latest White Paper highlights the importance of the maritime domain and goes well beyond the White Paper of 2013 in emphasising the importance of naval power. Appearing to set the stage for the next round of military reforms, it unambiguously declared: “The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests”. China, it said, must “develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests, safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, protect the security of strategic SLOCs and overseas interests….so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power”.
The importance accorded to these issues by China’s leadership was immediately visible when Beijing deputed Admiral Sun Jiangguo, PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff and a potential successor to Admiral Wu Shengli as Commander of the PLAN, to lead a large Chinese delegation to the Shangri La Dialogue held in Singapore just three days later on May 29-30, 2015. Though Admiral Sun Jiangguo delivered a mildly worded speech from a prepared text, he declined to respond to any questions regarding the South China Sea disputes from representatives of other participating nations and requested them to separately discuss issues bilaterally with the PLA delegation.
China’s effort to build the PLAN’s maritime capability has accelerated after the 18th Party Congress and articulation by Chinese President Xi Jinping of the muscular ‘China’s Dream’. Just months earlier in May 2012, Beijing had begun to issue new Chinese passports sparking protests internationally. The passports appeared to be a re-statement of China’s perceived territorial limits and mirror the extent of the Chinese nation as envisioned in the maps published by Beijing in 1954, and which continue to be taught in China till today. The map, which is part of a textbook titled “A Brief History of Modern China”, claims to show nineteen of “the Chinese territories taken by the Imperialists in the old Democratic Revolutionary Era (1840-1919)”. These include Nepal, Bhutan, Burma (Myanmar) and in India the state of Sikkim and territories in the north-east comprising the former states of Assam, NEFA and Nagaland, as well as the Andaman Islands.
The latest White Paper also removes the ambiguity in the previous White Paper regarding use of nuclear weapons. It categorically states “China has always pursued the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons” and “China will unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or in nuclear-weapon-free zones, and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country”. It did, however, say China “will optimize its nuclear force structure….and survivability and protection, and deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China”.
The White Paper makes clear that China perceives this as "an important period of strategic opportunity" during which it can realize "the Chinese Dream of great national rejuvenation". Its focus and tone have undoubtedly aroused concern among China’s neighbours and especially the countries which have unresolved territorial, including maritime, disputes with China.
China’s insistent push for its strategic geo-economic initiative of ‘One Road, One Belt’ (New Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Route) strongly suggests it is intent on becoming a global maritime power. A US estimate claims that China has plans to increase its Navy to 351 ships by 2020. Release of the White Paper, 2015 also coincides with the growing tensions in the South China Sea and Beijing’s testy relations with the US.
The White Paper is of direct relevance to India. It comes in the backdrop of the appreciably and recently visibly upgraded Sino-Pakistan strategic relationship which has impinged on India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and Beijing’s continuing intransigence on tackling the issue of the disputed border or intrusion by PLA troops.
It confirms that the PLA continues to rapidly build capability to win local wars. The focus is on acquiring the capability to rapidly move, by land or air, units of well-armed and well-equipped troops from locations across China to the borders. The White Paper additionally states that the PLAA and PLAAF will increase patrolling along the borders and the PLAN will enhance force projection activities in the South China Seas and increase its visibility in the oceans.
Of particular importance is the apparent upgradation of the Tibet issue and references to the “separatist forces” of “Tibet independence”, “serious damage” they have inflicted and “formidable task” of maintaining security. Relevant are the observations that among the new threats that China confronts, are the “international competition for the redistribution of power, rights and interests”; that “certain disputes over land territory are still smoldering”; the existence of “hotspot issues, such as ethnic, religious, border and territorial disputes”; and the likelihood of “immediate” and “potential threats of local wars”. These highlight Beijing’s continuing concern of the situation on its periphery. The reference to “international competition for the redistribution of power…”, however, hints that Beijing views India as a longer term challenge.
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