Michael Elleman
June 3, 2015
From Under the Sea: North Korea’s Latest Missile Test
On May 9, 2015, North Korea’s state-run media, KCNA, aired a series of still images of a ballistic missile bursting through the ocean’s surface and igniting its main engine, all under the attentive eyes of Kim Jong Un. The authenticity of the images initially released by KCNA is unknown, as is the date of the test. The precise nature of the test is still unclear, as is the type of missile used. What is clear, however, is that a video summarizing the test produced and posted on North Korea’s propaganda website, Uriminzokkiri, included inauthentic footage of a missile launched from underwater in an attempt to exaggerate Pyongyang’s progress in developing a sea-based capability. The footage shows a solid-propellant missile being ejected from a submarine-launch tube, breaking through the sea surface and accelerating upward. The “missile” captured in the still photos of the North Korean test clearly depict a liquid-propellant engine. Photo analysis by Dave Schmerler highlights the sloppy editing job by the North Koreas, and the similarities to a known US underwater launch, most likely of a dated Trident missile launch.
Despite the doctored video, the test captured by still photographs indicates Pyongyang’s determination to create additional capacity-real or imaginary-to threaten its regional rivals, US interests in Asia and possibly the US mainland with ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons. In the regional context, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) offer North Korea a deployment option that is less vulnerable to preemptive strikes. Perhaps of greater importance, SLBMs can be fired from positions north, east, south and west of Japan, South Korea, Guam and other East Asian countries, a capability that greatly complicates missile defense planning and, if realized, could compromise defenses across the region. From a global perspective, an operational fleet of submarines armed with ballistic missiles, if developed successfully, could extend North Korea’s strategic reach, a capacity Pyongyang might view as a viable alternative to the difficult task of developing an arsenal of operational intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
Testing at Sea
The missile appearing the still photographs released by KCNA is named “Bukgeungsong-1,” as indicated by the Korean characters on the airframe. Ironically, the name translates to “Polar Star” or “Polaris,” the latter parroting the name of the US Navy’s first-generation SLBM, initially deployed in the early-1960s. The Bukgeungsong-1 has a diameter-to-length ratio similar to that of the Soviet R-27 (4K10; SS-N-6), a sea-launched ballistic missile first deployed during the 1960s. The R-27 has a maximum range of about 2400 kilometers when delivering a 650-kilogram warhead. Persistent rumors suggest that R-27 missiles, or key components, were transferred to North Korea from Russian sources in the early- to mid-2000s, though direct evidence is sketchy. The rumors also allege that 18 or 19 R-27 kits were delivered to Iran. Steering engines similar to those found on the R-27 have appeared on the Iranian Safir satellite-carrier rocket, and the uppermost stage of North Korea’s Unha-2/-3 satellite launch vehicle may also be powered by similar steering engines. Mock-ups of a modified R-27-commonly referred to as the Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)-have been featured during military parades in Pyongyang for several years. However, neither North Korea nor Iran has, to date, flight-tested the missile or one resembling the R-27. It remains unclear if the transfers took place.
Nonetheless, the geometry of the missile tested by North Korea is consistent with the R-27. One, therefore, cannot dismiss the possibility that North Korea acquired at least a few prototypes of the R-27 SLBM, if not a few dozen operational missiles. Yet, it is important to note that the recently tested missile did not include a few key features prominently visible on the Soviet version of the R-27, such as the instrumentation raceway and the apparatus that links the separable warhead to the missile’s main body. Further, the absolute length and diameter cannot be determined with confidence, a fact that prevents confirmation that the tested missile is based on the R-27.
It is difficult to determine the success of the limited test from a series of photographs, though some preliminary conclusions can be derived…Read on
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