By Nicolas Groffman
14 May , 2015
China can control its media to a great extent and should be in a position to put a lid on any populist nationalism shrieking about not giving an inch of territory away in Arunachal Pradesh. India, however, cannot muzzle its press. Its media, especially opposition media, might well try to portray any release of territory in Aksai Chin as a craven surrender to Chinese bullying, even though India has exerted no control in the area since 1962 and has no population there. Yet gradually, the obvious benefits of security on its Northern border would become apparent, as would the economic benefits of private investment in the Northeast that would follow the lifting of the Chinese threat.
on march 24, 2015, the leaders of India and China sat down to discuss the border between their countries. More than a million Indians live in the territory claimed by China while India claims an area of Chinese controlled-land which is larger than Belgium. The two countries, which together constitute a third of the world’s population and a tenth of the world’s economy, must get along. Yet their land dispute has the potential to escalate into an armed conflict (as it did in 1962) and has received too little attention from the rest of the world. It’s easy to see why. In the oceans, China competes with the navies of Japan, the United States, South Korea, and many other countries. But it is time for the world to look harder at the problem on India’s Northern borders.
China could do murderous damage to India simply by refusing to trade with it…
The solution is two-fold: an exchange of territory, and a show of resolve by India. India’s military reinforcement in the Northeast will actually help the political leaders in Beijing negotiate a settlement along the border that will be beneficial to both countries. Only if India appears militarily weak will the hawks in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) be able to obstruct a deal on the demarcation of the frontier. The exchange of territory we’re talking about is simple: India must achieve recognition that Arunachal Pradesh is India’s and the people who live there are Indian. China already gave in on the Sikkim question in 2003 and is ready to do so again. In return, India must stop pretending it has a viable claim over Aksai Chin, which China already controls and needs for its supply route between Tibet and Xinjiang.
The summit meeting in late March 2015 is part of a positive change in relations. On January 01, military delegations from the two countries exchanged greetings. Then on January 26, this year India’s Republic Day, Chinese and Indian troops exchanged gifts1. On the Chinese New Year, February 18, the Chinese put on displays and performances to amuse the Indian solders invited. The appreciative statements by Colonel SD Goswami, the Indian Army’s spokesman, were also translated into Chinese and quoted in full in China’s press.2 These Border Personnel Meetings (BPMs) are particularly important when the opposing sides are as culturally different as India and China. Pakistan shares languages, ethnicities, and history with India. China does not.
Yet China has shown no signs of reversing its position on the contested areas of the border, and for as long as it perceives India as militarily weak, its army will continue to press for aggressive patrols beyond the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de facto border between the two countries. Even amid the jovial handshaking its soldiers and the Indian Army in the mountains in February 2015, China made its position clear with an angry summons of the Indian ambassador in Beijing, who was told that the visit by Narendra Modi to Arunachal Pradesh was a provocative act. Mr Modi’s visit did not go further North than the state capital, Itanagar but that was enough to annoy the Chinese. Contrary to popular belief, China does not claim all of Arunachal Pradesh but it does claim the 70 per cent of it that lies along the Northern border of Assam – and that includes Itanagar.
Certain aspects of Indian military development do have the potential to cause the PLA to rethink its strategy…
Until recently, China has been very confident of its ability to deal with India. Part of China’s self-confidence stems not only from its belief in its military superiority but also in its belief that India is economically weak, and that it relies on China’s cooperation for water security in the Northeast. River Brahmaputra, one of the most important sources of fresh water in the region, flows (under different names) from China through India into Bangladesh. China is the upper riparian country and thus sees itself as having the power to divert or control its flow3. China deliberately keeps India guessing as to its intentions, for example by such means as only selectively providing hydrological data and flood information on the River Brahmaputra to India4.
Economically, there is a huge trade imbalance between the two countries, with China exporting far more to India than vice versa. From China’s point of view, India needs China more than the latter needs the former. China could do murderous damage to India simply by refusing to trade with it. China is a deep believer in the ability of economics to end political conflict and has applied this policy with apparent success in its domestic affairs and also in its relations with various foreign countries, including Britain. India will, one hopes, take advantage of any opportunity to adjust the imbalance in trade deficit with China, but will not sacrifice its political aims in order to do so. China, however, hopes that economic cooperation is a means to prevail.5
Given India’s weaknesses, both topographical and economic, it is not surprising that many have suggested that it should simply mollify its larger neighbour. China’s current behaviour in international relations, however, shows that conciliatory policies alone do not help a country negotiating with her. Border conflicts have only been solved successfully by countries that have shown strength or determination. Russia finally settled its borders with China in 2004 and 2008, and was able to confine the discussion to the lines of demarcation along rivers, and the possession of islets therein, despite popular opinion in China that the “unequal treaties” that had granted vast tracts of land to Tsarist Russia should be re-examined. Even when Russian civilians opposed the settlement around an 18 sq km area in the River Argun, China compromised by granting them fishing rights in Chinese territory.
Chinese military bulletin boards are often very dismissive of Indian military capability…
Similarly, in 2000, China and Vietnam concluded the demarcation of their land borders. Although the two countries are still in fierce dispute over their respective rights in the South China Sea, the land border was settled peacefully. Vietnam has always adopted a rugged approach to China and left its larger neighbour in no doubt as to its military capabilities when the two sides came to armed blows in 1979, and again in the 1980s. A pattern does emerge in Chinese foreign affairs that shows a willingness to negotiate fairly with a country that is in a position of strength, and China’s approach to negotiation typically involves the making of concessions by both sides. It is, therefore, vital for each side to have something to concede, be it retreat to a less forward geographical position, partial disarmament, or the offer of economic cooperation. While China can offer all three, India can only realistically offer the first. In other respects, China is ahead of India.
Mutual Respect on the Ground
The Chinese and Indian armies on the ground display a respect for each other that is absent from China’s exchanges with the Japanese or with other Pacific countries. India already has a two hundred year history of military courtesy and fraternisation, and this is now extended to China. Chinese and Indian commanders shook hands when the month-long stand-off in the Daulat Beg Oldi Sector finally ended. Chinese media also published a flattering biography of General Dalbir Singh Suhag, India’s Chief of the Army Staff. It was noted that his “excessive emphasis on ‘threats from neighbours’ was political short-termism”, but otherwise portrayed him as an accomplished officer capable of handling difficult tasks.6 The confrontations at the LAC follow clear rules, written and unwritten, showing that the two great armies are starting to share some understanding. In contrast to the hectoring tone of Chinese coast guard warnings to Japanese and Philippine adversaries, the troops on the Indian frontier held up signs in English saying, “Please go back” – a direct message but a relatively polite one. The ability to keep calm is going to be very important if these clashes continue.
Timeline of Recent Incursions and Meetings
15 April 2013
| Daulat Beg Oldi stand-off near Aksai Chin. |
| 5 May 2013 | DBO standoff ends |
| 9 May 2013 | Salman Khurshid visits China |
| 18 May 2013 | Li Keqiang visit to India |
| October 2013 | India China joint statement to create crisis control mechanisms |
| November 2013 | Sino-Indian Joint Military Exercises in Miaoergang, China. The Chinese side was led by General Yang Jinshan who unfortunately was sacked for corruption in 2014 |
| 7 September 2014 | Pro-Chinese nomads enter Demchok (Aksai Chin) with PLA support, when Indian workers began constructing a canal in the border village of Demchok. |
| 14 September 2014 | PLA enters Chumar (near Aksai Chin) |
| 17 September 2014 | Xi Jinping visits India and meets Modi |
| 18 September 2014 | PLA withdraws from Chumar |
| 19 September 2014 | Xi Jinping leaves India |
| 20 September 2014 | Chinese back to Chumar |
| 21 September 2014 | Chinese withdraw from Demchok |
| 25 September 2014 | Sushma Swaraj met Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in New York to agree withdrawal |
| 26 September 2014 | Chinese begin withdrawing and finish by Tuesday |
| November 2014 | Sino-Indian Joint Military Exercises in Pune, India. |
| 20 February 2015 | Modi’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh. |
| 22 February 2015 | India criticised by China for this visit and Indian ambassador summoned |
| 24 March 2015 | India and China meet to discuss border demarcation |
If we look at recent history, an encouraging pattern emerges. In 2003, the BJP bid for a settlement of the border and achieved Chinese recognition of Indian sovereignty over Sikkim. It was not appreciated at the time what a step this was for China, as the focus eventually shifted to the relatively insignificant but nevertheless irritating decision to issue special visas to Indians from Arunachal Pradesh and Kashmir7. Nevertheless, the gradual improvement continued. The next breakthrough came in Beijing on October 23, 2013, when Manmohan Singh and Chinese Prime Minister, Li Keqiang, oversaw the signing of the Border Defence Co-operation Agreement (BDCA), a sensible arrangement that provides rules of engagement in case of confrontation between the two sides, thus accepting that such confrontations might still happen. The BDCA also provided for a hotline to be set up between the two heads of government.
Thus, while the last three years have seen more friendly exchanges between the two sides, they have also seen more confrontations, viewed by India as being Chinese incursions across the LAC. There have been two significant incidents in 2013 and 2014, although no shots were fired. It is unlikely that 2015 will be different, even though it has started well.
Chinese overconfidence also shows itself in discussions on Aksai Chin…
In each case, the incursions happened around the time China’s leaders were meeting their Indian counterparts at top-level summits. It is still unclear if the 2013 and 2014 incursions into Indian territory were deliberate statements of intent by the Chinese government or gigantic errors of judgment by the PLA commanders on the ground. Chinese estimates claim that their troops are outnumbered five to one along the border, with 60,000 troops against India’s 300,000, with another 89,000 Indian troops to come.8 If this is true, it should be weighed against China’s ability to bring troops up rapidly along the expressways that extend to the frontlines on Southern and Western Tibet. India does not yet have the capability to bring up supplies so easily but this has improved.
India plans to double its forces in Arunachal Pradesh, much to the annoyance of the Chinese media9. It also plans to resettle people in the border areas and since there is no infrastructure, local residents have been pushed as far as 50 kilometres from the border, which in itself makes the region vulnerable to Chinese forces. A key problem has been cash, according to the Daily Mail of India10, the ITBP was sanctioned Rs 2.6 billion for the period between 2012 and 2017, but the Home Ministry is yet to release this money. India has also sought to pad out its deployment in both Western and Eastern Arunachal Pradesh by moving troops around.
Re-ordering the Indian Army’s ORBAT itself does not intimidate the PLA, but certain aspects of Indian military development do have the potential to cause the PLA to rethink its strategy. India’s border force has upgraded the road to Tawang11, and a new rail link to Itanagar was opened in 2015.
The demarcation process between India and China should mirror the carefully constructed solution to the Sino-Vietnamese border question…
What is the PLA’s strategy? To read international media one would not think so, but the traditional core missions of the PLA are predominantly defensive. China’s military is geared towards various ‘missions’, among which the relevant ‘mission’ from India’s standpoint is that of “border and coastal safeguarding”, which is characteristically defensive but does include one key offensive element, the “joint border counter attack campaign” which is an “offensive campaign against local invading armies… to destroy and expel the invaded enemy and restore territorial sovereignty”12. The PLA can use active defense to preempt an opponent’s impending attack13. This was the strategic concept that was demonstrated against the Indian Army in 1962. Chillingly for India, the “joint border counter attack campaign” is still the likely type of campaign to be used along its border.
The PLAAF does not, however, have capacity to conduct missions away from its borders against India proper. To do so it would need sufficient in-flight refueling capabilities, which it probably does not yet have,14 and a much greater strategic airlift facility15. However, it maintains a significant quantitative (and qualitative advantage) over India in tanks. However, the PLAAF does not have a significant advantage. Although India’s air fleet is not up-to-date, China suffers from multiple aircraft generations and insufficient special mission aircraft which could result in a high risk of failure of any mission against India. Meanwhile, India has improved its air bases in Assam and has deployed Sukhoi Su-30MKIs there, posing a threat to China’s logistics operations in Tibet.
PLA strategic thinking is at its most aggressive when it perceives Indian resolve as wavering…
The governments of both India and China have a shared problem in that while they have shown admirable restraint over the decades, they both have volatile and impassioned nationalism among the ordinary populace. For example, many Chinese believe that Sikkim should never have been recognised as part of India, let alone the disputed areas along the actual border.16,17 And many in India, where there is a free press, are more than happy to demand a much more aggressive response from the Indian Army than its capabilities would allow.
In addition, there are those in the military on both sides who benefit from the prolonging of the dispute. William Egerton of Aegis Advisory points out that to solve the border question, there needs to be actual commitment from both sides to do so, and at present, there are advantages to factions in each country in keeping the dispute unresolved.
Aggressive exhortations to act against India litter Chinese commentary on these issues, and Chinese military bulletin boards are often very dismissive of Indian military capability18. The nature of China’s media – with the bulk of online articles being anonymous – mean that it is very difficult to identify whether the writer is in a position of authority or is simply a teenager letting off steam. However, it is generally accepted that any article that stays online for more than a month has at least some form of official approval. Articles that offend one of a myriad, written and unwritten rules are that they are generally removed quickly, and yet these articles are kept online. In these pieces, India is warned that it “has to face a China that might strike at any minute”19 and that “India seems to be asking for war.”20 It is also argued that China must go to war with India because that would ensure the territory is disputed for the purposes of the so-called “fifty year rule”, which requires that any territory in respect of which there is no dispute is deemed to belong to the actual holder.21 War with India is considered advisable because if China ‘gives in’ to India, Japan (viewed by China as a stronger enemy) will push back harder against China.
Chinese strategic thinking has for decades subscribed to the belief that countries gauge each other’s strength by the extent to which they behave aggressively. Following this line of thinking, a country that does not bully must be weaker than one that does. This view examines only the practicalities of projection of force, not the desirability of doing so.
Chinese overconfidence also shows itself in discussions on Aksai Chin…
Another problem for China’s military is that it has seen so little action. The soldiers of the 1962 generation have retired or died. Yet that generation of soldiery respected their Indian adversaries. In Aksai Chin, Chinese soldiers admired the tenacity of the Indian soldiers who held out against great odds even when there was no hope of relief, and gave them an honourable burial. The present generation of Chinese soldiery has little or no experience of combat and is much more casual about the risks of provoking other nations – and thinks the 1962 War was a walkover.
Many in China seem unaware that Arunachal Pradesh is settled by an Indian population and continue to use the phrase “Take back”22 when discussing it, as if there is a downtrodden population there yearning to be Chinese.
Chinese overconfidence also shows itself in discussions on Aksai Chin. Some claim that because China controls Aksai Chin, its army needs only to descend the other side of the Himalayas to find itself in the Gangetic plains and thus able to threaten Delhi itself.23 In fact, hundreds of kilometres of high mountains separate Aksai Chin from the Indo-Gangetic plain, mountains where it would be easy to lose an army of 100,000 men. Even Arunachal Pradesh offers an easier route to Delhi than Aksai Chin – but there, it is the Indian Army that is in control. The logistical advantage the PLA might gain from its ability to receive reinforcements from the cross-Tibet supply lines would be lost as soon as they found themselves on the border with Assam – assuming they could even penetrate the larger state to the North.
A more thoughtful Chinese paper on the subject appeared in the South Asian Studies Quarterly in 2013. Taking the opposite tack to the fiery rhetoric of China’s online commentators, this report was so cautious that it almost denied the existence of hostility, instead referring in detail to the various agreements between the Indian and Chinese governments and military, expressing confidence that these would defuse tensions.24 Yet this has not happened. Indeed the Chumar and Demchok crises happened more than a year after the joint statements, proving that treaties of that kind are not sufficient to end incursions. They did establish protocols for patrol conflicts, and it is worth noting that no solider died or was injured in either the 2013 or the 2014 stand-offs, but the point of establishing rules for conflicts on the ground is not to give soldiers free reign to carry out ever more aggressive patrols. It is thus more important for the politicians to come to an agreement on the borders.
The demarcation process between India and China should mirror the carefully constructed solution to the Sino-Vietnamese border question. First, the methods of deciding on the border should be agreed upon, after which those methods should be applied, preferably by international observers acting with the two interested countries, in order to demarcate the border. A basic principle must be to follow approximately the Line of Actual Control, which would at least solve the question of tens of thousands of square kilometres. The resolution of the dispute regarding the remaining dispute, which rests largely on different interpretations of where the LAC runs, covers a much smaller area and should not – indeed cannot – be solved until there is an agreement on the basic principle set out above.
In this respect, each country would have the opposite problem. China can control its media, and should be able to suppress populist demands not to give away an inch of territory in Arunachal Pradesh. India, however, cannot muzzle its press. Its media, especially opposition media, might well try to portray any release of territory in Aksai Chin as a craven surrender to Chinese bullying, even though India has exerted no control in the area since 1962 and has no population there. Yet gradually, the obvious benefits of security on its Northern border would become apparent, as would the economic benefits of private investment in the Northeast that would follow the lifting of the Chinese threat.
Until such resolution, both countries, unfortunately, need to maintain their strength on their own sides of the border. In particular, a show of weakness by India would make negotiations much more difficult, because nearly all Chinese sources on the subject show that PLA strategic thinking is at its most aggressive when it perceives Indian resolve as wavering. In this context, India’s current strategy of economic development in Arunachal Pradesh, military reinforcement, and most importantly, development of an efficient logistical chain to the region, is one that will help Beijing face down the hawkish element in the PLA, as well as improving security for the Indian population in the region.
No comments:
Post a Comment