May 19, 2015
China’s Military Power: A Net Assessment By Maj. Gen. (Dr) G.D. Bakshi, SM, VSM Knowledge World and CLAWS, pp. 376, Rs 980
Following the massive earthquake in China’s Sichuan region in 2008, thousands of radiation technicians were reportedly sent there. When visuals on TV showed oddly collapsed hills across the province, officials eventually admitted there was a network of tunnels underneath, dubbing it their ‘Underground Great Wall’.
A study conducted by a Georgetown University student translating secret military documents and blogs revealed that China could have as many as 3,000 nuclear warheads, a lot more than current estimates of between 80 and 400. The as-yet-unpublished 363-page study has been discussed in Congress and circulated among officials.
Researchers concentrated on a 3,000-mile network of tunnels dug largely in Sichuan province by the Chinese Second Artillery, a secretive unit responsible for protecting the country’s nuclear weapons.
While the reported assessment of nuclear weapon stockpiles of the US and Russia is 5,000 and 8,000 respectively, China’s holdings are known only to the concerned Chinese military/civil personnel and political leaders.
China’s Military Power: A Net Assessment, by Maj. Gen. G.D. Bakshi, SM, VSM (Knowledge World and Centre for Land Warfare Studies [CLAWS]), compiles a mind-boggling mix of China’s hegemonic military aims, policies, weaponry, etc, which the author claims has already raised hackles amongst the many apologists for China in India’s political, academic and some media circles.
This book is about the one threat that is gnawing the minds of security planners the world over — the looming threat from a rising and increasingly assertive China. The book has been done by a combat soldier of great experience and a hands on and no-nonsense approach that puts aside all peace slogans and tells us to get ready to face a very aggressive and increasingly hostile China in the years ahead. China’s grant of $46 billion to Pakistan for its energy and infrastructure gives away its hostile intent and strong commitment to build up Pakistan as a major check on India and to keep it confined to South Asia. What is a far more direct message is China’s proposed sale of eight Yuan class Air Independent Propulsion Submarines and 100 JF-17 Jet fighters to Pakistan. The Yuan submarines are to provide a nuclear second strike capability to Pakistan. China is also building three more Plutonium plants in Pakistan to further enhance its nuclear arsenal. Could China be more hostile than this? Where China is concerned, Maj. Gen. Bakshi advises, we should not go by its convoluted white paper language of peaceful intentions etc., but by what it does on ground, air, sea, and even more menacing, underwater.
Emerging as a global superpower and a regional hegemon, China’s economy grew at a scorching, double-digit pace for two decades and is now slowing down. What does the current phase of Chinese aggression against all its neighbours signify? Will China engage in conflict?
If so, when and where could that conflict occur? Will the main weight of any future Chinese attack be in Arunachal Pradesh or Tawang? China keeps talking of Tawang, but a careful analysis of China’s orbat (order of battle) against India by the author indicates that the Lanzhou Military Region (MR) opposite Ladakh is far stronger than the Chengdu MR opposite Arunachal. Besides, in Ladakh both China and Pakistan can attack India jointly. This is the most pertinent revelation of this book.
Examining the growth of Chinese military power in an Indo-centric context with emphasis on how it primarily affects India, the book analyses how India must respond. It has an exhaustively researched section on how the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has performed in actual combat since 1949. This book also provides deep insight into the 1962 Sino-Indian war. There is a detailed analysis of the evolution of China’s military doctrines and strategic culture. With this as a backdrop, there are elaborated chapters each on the structure and modernisation of the PLA, PLAN (PLA Navy) and PLAAF (PLA Air Force).
What is most dangerous for India is the exponential growth in PLAAF’s airpower. China has already changed Asia’s balance of power. The Gulf War in 1990 had made China realise how backward it was in terms of military technology and weaponry. What followed was a radical transformation in Chinese military thought and practice. This has been accompanied by what appears to be a great reduction in manpower — from over four million to about 1.6 million. Such an actual reduction is too good to be true. The reduced manpower of PLA has most likely been converted into border police. The dynamic unleashed by the Chinese has prompted the biggest military build-up in Asia since World War II.
The crux of this book is in the concluding chapters on Alternative Economic and Military Futures for China that could emerge. Whether China will engage in conflict seems not so much a question of “if” but “when”. It will largely be dictated by the performance of the Chinese economy. A sudden disruption may result in an earlier choice of conflict. However, if the Chinese economy continues to boom, it will fuel the military modernisation.
This book is a must read for military professionals and laymen alike. The chorus of protests and laments this book has raised amongst apologists for China is a clear indication of its very practical and operational analysis of China’s growing military capabilities. The growing air power of China should be the most worrying factor – especially when seen in the light of the steep decline in India’s squadron strength. This book is another wake-up call – and a most urgent one – for India’s defence.
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