Apr 13,2015
There are both good and bad precedents for the Korean talks if they were to resume.
The interim agreement on Iran’s nuclear program is shaping up as one of the defining foreign policy battles of Obama’s presidency. The problems are not only with Iran but on the home front as Congress decides what to do about the deal. Will it have implications for the long-stalled six-party talks?
The Iran negotiations show both similarities and differences to the Korean talks. The similarities start with a history of deception. The second nuclear crisis with North Korea was triggered by revelations about its clandestine efforts to enrich uranium. In Iran, the discovery of a previously unknown enrichment facility at Fodrow and continued suspicions about a weapons program set off alarms. In both cases, trust is extremely low and intrusive inspections will be key.
The Iranian negotiations have also been multilateral, and with six parties as well: the five permanent members of the Security Council - the U.S., China, Russia, France and Britain - as well as Germany. In the U.S., Congressional critics have talked as if the negotiations with Iran are bilateral, with the U.S. calling the shots. But on the Korean Peninsula, keeping Russia and China on the same page has been challenging.
As on the Korean Peninsula, the grand bargain ultimately rests on trading constraints on Iran’s nuclear program for a lifting of sanctions and a re-engagement with the international community. And in both cases, the question of how much of a nuclear program will remain intact is key
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