What’s it like to win? The Paradox of the American Soldier amidst Strategic Uncertainty

What’s it like to win?

The Paradox of the American Soldier amidst Strategic Uncertainty

Sisyphus: Punished by the Greek Gods to roll a giant boulder up a steep mountain, and upon reaching the top, watch it roll down to the bottom again… and again… and again. 

The following guest post was provided by Major Ed Arntson, an active duty Infantry officer currently stationed at Fort Hood, Texas. He is a graduate of Concordia College in Moorhead, MN, the Command and General Staff College, and the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). The views contained within this article are his own and do not reflect the views of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. 

“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” — Carl von Clausewitz 

What’s it like to win? Sure with I knew…

As Super Bowl 49 drew to a close a couple of weeks ago and the New England Patriots began to celebrate their fourth Super Bowl championship in the last fourteen years, an interesting thought occurred to me — ‘so that’s what it’s like to win, and win big.’ The Patriots have won three of those Super Bowls since I've been on active duty in the Army, and in that time, I've deployed to combat four times — but I never celebrated a victory — and there’s a chance that I never will.

During the Super Bowl, the commentators extolled the work ethic of Tom Brady, Julian Edelman, and Russell Wilson, among others, on both teams. “Julian Edelman shows up to the facility at 5 a.m. every day during the season,” commented NBC’s Chris Collinsworth. That’s great. I show up for work at 5 a.m. 330 days out of the year. So do a lot of other hard working people in the Army. The intent here isn't to compare professional sports to the work we do in the U.S. Army, it is meant to demonstrate how frustrating it is to work hard at something for a long time, and not experience a lasting, irreversible victory.

Edelman and his teammates worked diligently towards their goal of winning a Super Bowl championship — and won. Reporters always ask players how they feel in those moments, with players seemingly grasping for the right words to say on national television. They usually settle on, “I can’t even describe it — it’s so awesome.” That joy — absolute, pure joy will remain with those players forever. It cannot be taken away. Conversely, my generation of officers and NCOs may never experience that joy. Despite grinding work hours, tragic losses on the battlefield, and broken families — there will be little to look back on — no pure joy from an irreversible victory to recall fondly later in life.

What is an irreversible victory? If Iraq sits as a prime example of a reversible victory, what constitutes an irreversible strategic victory? War, viewed as a means to a political end, should create a better, lasting peace than the state at which war began. A critical component to generating the right formula for a strategic victory is defining the strategic end state or set of conditions that armed conflict will help bring about. Without a clearly defined strategic end state, tactical and operational successes will not add up to their intended result and American Soldiers will be doomed — as Sisyphus was by the Greek gods — to come ever so close to victory without actually achieving it.

The last group of U.S. Soldiers to experience an irreversible victory was those who fought in Panama during Operation Just Cause. Yes, the first Gulf War was a victory at the time — there is no denying that. Soldiers, Sailors, Marines and Airmen who participated in that campaign undoubtedly felt extreme pride about what they accomplished. But one has to think that perhaps some of that chest-swelling pride faded over time as U.S. Forces invaded Iraq in 2003, and certainly in light of recent events in Iraq. Is Operation Just Cause the last true American military triumph? Perhaps.

Imagine for a moment if you will, a member of 1st Ranger Battalion jumping into Rio Hato Airfield, fighting like hell to seize the airfield, and then moving on to secure other important objectives that enabled U.S. military to win. Or imagine a young tank commander in the first Gulf War. How many Iraqi tanks did he destroy? Imagine having the knowledge that deep down you made a difference — that your actions contributed to victory — irreversible victory.

Now imagine if you will, a young Company Commander serving in Iraq or Afghanistan. He was responsible for a Combat Outpost (COP) in his Battalion’s area of operations (AO). He conducted missions with the local host-nation security force, won firefights against the enemy, met with the village elder on numerous occasions, built a well or a school, and generally displayed a yeoman’s like work ethic to make “his” area a better place. It’s also very likely that he lost good men or women while working to improve his AO. Men were blown up, shot by snipers, and on and on. When he left, it’s likely that the area was safer, and furthermore it’s likely that the commander who replaced him also helped improve that area.

Did those Company or Battalion Commanders celebrate victory when they left theater? Unlikely. Were they excited to go home? Certainly. For most, however, a return home was a brief respite until their next return to theater — and the next, and the next. It’s entirely possible, and in fact likely in many cases, that a Company, Battalion, or Brigade did everything within its power to improve whatever it was they were charged to improve — security, governance, local education — just to name a few. Did it matter?

On a local level — sure — those actions made a difference. But if they didn't add up to contribute to a strategic victory — then did those actions really make a difference? Can tactical actions — even if executed with passion and precision — lead to strategic victory? I suppose what I’m asking here is this: What if you — the Soldier — at whatever level — did everything right, but victory still proved elusive?

What if wars in the 21st century are simply unwinnable, as James Fallows suggested in his recent article The Atlantic, “The Tragedy of the American Military?” Or is that inaccurate? Did we win in Iraq by linking our tactical actions appropriately to our strategic objectives — but then handed the game off in the fourth quarter to our bumbling back-up running back [read: Iraqi Security Forces] and a Wade Phillips-esque dither of a coach [read: Maliki]? Did we win and then blow it? Are we going to win in Afghanistan? It is possible? It feels like it may be — especially with President Ghani in charge — but it also feels like we may not…and that we may have another ‘L’ tagged on the U.S. military’s record.

The Army’s new operating concept — Win in a Complex World — states that “one of our most important duties as Army professionals is to think clearly about the problem of future armed conflict.” I wholeheartedly agree. And while it is clear that the environment where Army forces operate will be complex, complexity does not excuse inaction. Complexity does however, require careful, considered action.

Following ISIL’s most recent acts of sheer brutality — burning a Muslim Jordanian pilot alive inside of a cage and beheading 21 Egyptian Christians — some of our leaders in Congress are calling for U.S. ground troops inside of Syria. Sounds good doesn't it? Infantrymen from the Army and U.S. Marine Corps taking it to the enemy on their home turf — that’ll show ‘em. Show the enemy what? That they were able to lure the United States into yet another bitterly protracted land-based conflict?

Last Friday, President Obama released his National Security Strategy. Before the document was a few hours old, the critics poured in. This isn't new! Strategic patience and persistence — what is that!? In his introduction to the document, the President urged us to “always resist the over-reach that comes when we make decisions based on fear.” Sending ground troops into Syria and parts of Iraq following ISIL’s most recent barbaric act would qualify as a decision made overwhelmingly out of fear. It would not be measured, careful action against a complex enemy in a complex environment.

Carl von Clausewitz, in Book Three of On War, stated that it “takes a much greater strength of will to make an important decision in strategy than in tactics.” While there may be short-term benefits to sending U.S. ground troops into Syria and Iraq, what is the end state? Clausewitz challenged military commanders to think about a “coherent end” to a conflict. I certainly would encourage our political and senior military leaders to do the same.

Is there something wrong with strategic patience? Is it not prudent to carefully weigh military action against risk and the potential rewards of sending more young men and women into harm’s way? I have been in the Army for 13 years. We have been at war for all of that time and there is no end in sight. I have seen war’s true nature up close and personal, as have many of my peers and superiors. I have been wounded. I have delivered casualty notifications after men in my Battalion died in a foreign land. War’s true nature is violent, unrelenting and terrifying.

Clausewitz said that war “is a special activity, different than any other pursued by man.” It should be treated as such. Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster cautioned us in an article last year about the lure of the “easy war.” War never has, nor ever will be, easy. If we send ground troops into Syria and Iraq, we must be prepared for what goes along with it. And by “we” I don’t mean the rest of the country. I mean American Soldiers and their families. We are the ones who bear the brunt of these conflicts.

So what can be done? If complexity is not an excuse for inaction, then what is the way ahead? To both of those questions, I would answer — is there something fundamentally wrong with what we’re doing now? As we still work conscientiously in Afghanistan in an attempt to set the conditions for an irreversible strategic win, should we dive headlong into another bloody, extended conflict? We must look at developing a strategy that seeks, as Dr. Everett Dolman would say, a continuing advantage. Is our current plan of enabling the Iraqis and using a significant air power advantage detracting from the quest for a continuing advantage? I don’t believe it is.

This article began discussing Super Bowl 49 and the dramatic victory by the New England Patriots. Perhaps it’s appropriate that it concludes with another football analogy. One of the things that a good coach does is put his players in situations where they can be successful — where they can best utilize their talents and abilities. Following the Patriots’ victory, there was an abundance of media coverage about Seattle Seahawks’ head coach Pete Carroll’s decision to throw on second down on the New England 2-yard line with time winding down in the fourth quarter. Coach Carroll’s decision was especially confounding when you consider that Seattle’s star running back, Marshawn Lynch, is one of the best in the NFL at finishing at the goal line. Coach Carroll, by many people’s estimation, did not use his best offensive weapon appropriately at the end of the game in a critical situation.

In the 2015 National Security Strategy, the President stated that, “we possess a military whose might, technology, and geostrategic reach is unrivaled in human history.” As a member of that military — I agree. However, our military might must be applied carefully, especially in the increasingly complex environment that is the Middle East. I would urge caution, not short-sighted knee-jerk action, in Syria and Iraq. The President and Congress have a tremendous asset at their disposal in the U.S. military. Just like Marshawn Lynch at the goal line though, the asset must be utilized properly in a situation where it has a chance to win.

As an American Soldier, I want to win. I want to fight and win. My peers want to do the same. So do my bosses. I do not want to be doomed to toil, as Sisyphus did, in unwinnable conflicts no matter how well I perform on the battlefield. I do not want to get close to winning and then watch it slip away. While there may be a time in the near future where the employment of ground troops in combat in Iraq and Syria may prove prudent, that time is not now. The United States becoming involved in another war among the populace — an environment where civilians and combatants will be intertwined, and the rules of engagement will be overly restrictive in an attempt to rightly avoid civilian casualties — is not a wise strategic choice.