What Went Wrong in Afghanistan? Oh, let me count the ways…

Hindu Kush

Last week, Best Defense’s Jim Gourley issued a daunting challenge: explain what went wrong in the United States’ venture into Afghanistan in 500 words or less. That’s like asking someone to drink two gallons of milk in five minutes while doing handstand push-ups. Still, the gauntlet was thrown, and a challenge cannot go unanswered. Chris Zeitz outlined his points in an excellent piece that articulates some of the key issues: resilient enemy, divided population, and “one size fits all” policies.

The ever-articulate Doctrine Man gave the most succinct answer: “Never get involved in a land war in Asia.” Sound advice.

My take is slightly different and, like Afghanistan itself, frustrating. The US went to war in 2001 with the goal to drive Al Qaeda terrorists out of Afghanistan, deny the country as a safe-haven for terrorists, and bring Osama bin Laden, the 9/11 mastermind, to justice. By 2003, two out of three goals had been nominally met. Sadly, 2003 was also the year that the US turned its focus to Iraq. The Global War on Terror became a two-front war. Operation Iraqi Freedom overshadowed Afghanistan, where complacency and mission creep set in. Assets were focused on Iraq, allowing Taliban fighters, leadership, and other hostiles to infiltrate the country again.

Secondly, we began the policy of “we broke it, we bought it” in Afghanistan, that we would also use in Iraq. This involved, for lack of a better term, nation building. Military goals and political goals became confused and tangled. The endstate for Afghanistan turned into a democratic, self-sufficient Afghan government, predicated by the notion that this was the only way to deny terrorists safe-haven. Simply put, the mission for US forces became protecting the Afghan people.

Next, we embarked on fighting the war in Afghanistan one troop-rotation at a time. Instead of fighting one fourteen year war, we fought fourteen one year wars. Security varied from region to region and year to year, depending on the policies and tactics of the units assigned. This prevented long-term gains.

Lastly, Counter Insurgency (COIN) doctrine states that it takes ten to twenty to fifty years to secure and build an effective government in a host nation. Historically, militaries are not designed for prolonged, low-intensity conflict. Military strategy dictates swift and overwhelming force to end a conflict as quickly as possible. The Napoleonic strategy of the decisive battle, Clausewitz’s notion of “Center of Gravity,” the von Schlieffen Plan in World War I, German Blitzkrieg doctrine in World War II, and NATO Cold War plans all hold this tenet in common. While COIN allows for violent tactical force, it inherently violates this strategy. Operating under COIN doctrine reduces the military to a slow-moving bureaucratic police force that cannot use its dominant principles of mass (mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time) and maneuver.

The US military was given a war with changing goals, shifting priorities, and parameters that eliminated the essential effects of combat power. It’s a wonder it turned out as well as it did.