FEB 23, 2015
The Burke Chair has previously circulated a report on the Transition in Afghanistan. It covers the civil and military lessons of the war, the trends at the time of transition, and the risks inherent in the current approach to supporting Afghanistan in 2015. We have since received further comments on the revised edition, and an update is being circulated in final draft form before becoming a CSIS E-book. This report is entitled Transition in Afghanistan: Losing the Forgotten War? It is available on the CSIS web site athttp://csis.org/files/publication/150223_Losing_Forgotten_War.pdf.
The report focuses on the lessons that need to be learned from the US experience in Afghanistan to date, and the problems Afghanistan faces now that most US and allied combat forces have left. It builds on more than a decade’s worth of reporting and analysis of the Afghan war. It examines the recent trends and problems in Afghan governance, the trends in the fighting, progress in the Afghan security forces, and what may be a growing crisis in the Afghan economy.
It supports the analysis with extensive metrics on every major military and civil aspect of the war, a detailed analysis of the fighting, and the lack of political unity of the country and the problems in the effectiveness of its government. It provides a detailed analysis of the problems resulting from the recent election, a growing Afghan budget crisis, and critical problems with power brokers and corruption.
The report draws on new UN data issued in mid-February that indicates that the military situation is far worse than the US Department of Defense and ISAF have reported, and provides detailed graphs and maps showing the real risks in the current security situation.
It raises serious questions about the integrity of some of the reporting issued by ISAF and the Department of Defense, and the lack of meaningful reporting by the State department and USAID. It strongly supports the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) objection to the growing lack of transparency in US reporting on the war, and the over classification of the data needed to assess US efforts and strategy.
It also provides a detailed analysis of the problems in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the limits in their capability, as well as the weaknesses in past and planned US and allied force development and training efforts.
The report suggests that President Obama’s insistence on rapid cuts in the US advisory presence and its near elimination by the end of 2016 could cripple the Transition effort, and that a large and longer conditions-based effort may be critical to success.
A similar analysis is made of the Afghan economy and what seems to be a developing crisis as aid and military spending are cut, narcotics become an even more critical part of the economy, and the Afghan government takes on roles formerly managed and funded by foreign donors. Detailed graphs and tables show the scale of the problem drawing extensively on work by the World Bank, IMF, and SIGAR.
The final chapters broaden the analysis to examine the challenges posed by Pakistan and Afghanistan’s other neighbors, and the need for new US strategies in dealing with Central Asia and South Asia. Key charts and tables illustrate the rising level of violence in Pakistan, the problems in dealing with Central Asian states, and US policy priorities in South Asia. In the process, the report raises key questions about the need for strategic triage, and US priorities in Afghanistan and the region relative to other US strategic interests and requirements.
Taken together, these analyses strongly indicate that if the US feels that Afghanistan has the necessary strategic importance for US efforts to ensure that Transition can succeed, the US needs to take a far more realistic approach to military and civil aid and support the Afghan government. The current deadlines, manpower levels, and aid levels have been set without a realistic assessment of Afghan needs and the risks Transition could fail. Success requires a conditions-based approach to manning the advisory and combat support levels, a more extended period of aid, and far better plans for funding and managing the aid.
These conclusions, and the analyses in the report, are supported by six detailed annexes providing additional metrics and supporting data. These include:
The Civil Transition: in Afghanistan: The Metrics of Crisis? which is available on the CSIS web site athttp://csis.org/publication/civil-transition-afghanistan-metrics-crisis
Afghan Forces on the Edge of Transition– I: Introduction, US Policy, and Cuts in US Forces and Spending, which is available on the CSIS web site athttp://csis.org/publication/afghan-forces-edge-transition-i
Afghan Forces on the Edge of Transition– II: Sharply Contradictory Data on Levels of Violence, which is available on the CSIS web site athttp://csis.org/publication/afghan-forces-edge-transition-ii
Afghan Forces on the Edge of Transition– III: Measuring the Transition from ISAF to ANSF, which is available on the CSIS web site at http://csis.org/publication/afghan-forces-edge-transition-iii
Afghan Forces on the Edge of Transition– IV: Progress in Afghan Force Development, which is available on the CSIS web site at http://csis.org/publication/afghan-forces-edge-transition-iv
The Metrics of Terrorism and Instability in Pakistan, which is available on the CSIS web site athttp://csis.org/publication/metrics-terrorism-and-instability-pakistan
BURKE CHAIR IN STRATEGY, BURKE CHAIR ON AFGHANISTAN, BURKE CHAIR ON TERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY, BURKE CHAIR ON U.S. STRATEGIC AND DEFENSE EFFORTS
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