Ashok K Mehta
18 February 2015
Afghanistan has become an open field for countries such as China, Pakistan, the US and even Russia to exert their influence in the building of that country’s post-Western troops’ withdrawal future
I met President Ashraf Ghani in Kathmandu at a seminar on the sidelines of the Saarc summit last November. He spoke passionately about how Afghanistan had changed and attributed the transformation to its youthful demography: The young are teaching the old. I stood up to ask a question on Afghanistan’s leaning towards China but dropped a brick in addressing him as President Karzai. Unfazed, and even before I could complete my apology, he said, “You are not the only one who confuses me with my predecessor. We are both bald!” While he admitted his new initiative towards China and Pakistan, there was little strategic mention of India. Earlier President Hamid Karzai was periodically dropping in on New Delhi, advancing arms lists, and his wife bore his third child in New Delhi. So great was his admiration for India that he called it a true friend.
Ever since US President Barack Obama declared his country’s war in Afghanistan as over, Afghanistan has all but disappeared from the radar and the threat of the Islamic State taken over. To fight the new war, Mr Obama has sought a three-year war authorisation from the House to intensify the battle against the IS. Though Afghanistan has completed two of its three transitions — political and security, with the economy stagnating — a two-year window of US residual commitment of 1,0800 Op Resolute Force and 2,000 Nato trainers is too small for establishing a sound foundation for the decade-long transformation. No one — Pakistan, India and especially China — wants the US to quit Afghanistan. A new President in the White House, especially a Republican might wish to finish the task of stabilisation in Afghanistan to better withstand the external assault on its sovereignty.
The political transition is patchy with an artificial arrangement of a national unity Government of North and South, consisting of a President and a CEO, that was thrown up, according to the European Union, by “extremely fraudulent elections”. Given the limited Cabinet — only eight of 27 Ministers announced eight months after elections — no independent Election Commission and a skewed voters’ list, the parliamentary elections later in the year may also lack constitutional veracity. The extra-constitutional appointment of a CEO has to be ratified by Parliament and a Loya Jirgah in two years. Experts sarcastically refer to the power-sharing arrangement as a division of power. And, do not expect the full Cabinet to materialise anytime soon.
A strategic shift accompanies President Ghani’s approach towards reconciliation. Unlike his predecessor, Mr Ghani is exploring a new line led by China and Pakistan to bring the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table. He too has referred to them as “Pashtun brothers” who have been misguided. In contrast, the Abdullah Abdullah camp (former Northern Alliance) consider the Talibs as enemies and terrorists. Pakistan chaperoned to Beijing last year, a Talib delegation but as in the past, it produced no outcome. Besides trying out China, President Ghani has made a concerted effort to mend fences with Pakistan, especially with the Army Chief, General Raheel Sharif. After the Peshawar tragedy, this approach has borne some fruit in terms of improved levels of trust, information sharing and military cooperation on the border.
The security transition is as delicately poised as the internal political equation. National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar, who is a veteran of Afghan wars, was addressing a seminar in New Delhi recentlyvia video. He described the security situation getting exacerbated by new terrorist networks including IS/Daesh. He lamented the failure of the region to deal with common threats through a common strategy. Despite mounting casualties, and despite gaps in logistics, air and artillery support and casualty evacuation, the Afghan National Security Forces has withstood multiple challenges independently. No district headquarter has been lost that was not taken back. Still, there are many ungoverned spaces in the South and East. A 120 per cent increase of attacks was registered in 2014, compared with 2013.
The ANSF motivational levels are holding out, though loyalties are divided between North and South. At Kathmandu, President Ghani stated that he had a commitment from the US that it would bankroll the ANSF till 2024, though the EU and Chicago commitments quote “upto 2016”. Withholding salaries of the ANSF will invite disaster as the Taliban are known to be recruiting university students paying a $100 monthly wage. The ultimate test will arrive when the Taliban mount the summer offensive to try and seize district and provincial headquarters. It is no secret that the Taliban are seriously divided between hardliners who will not share power and others who believe that it is not feasible to capture power militarily.
A still bigger problem confronting Kabul is the meltdown of the economy. The country’s GDP is pegged at around $20 billion. The growth rate recorded in 2012 was 14.4 per cent, which has shrunk dramatically to just 1.5 per cent in 2014. The flight of capital has been a recurring problem, with an estimated four billion dollars taken out recently. Afghanistan requires on an average, five to six billion dollars from external sources to sustain the economy. The London Conference 2014 had recommitted upto $16 billion to drive the economy till 2016. Alternatives are being considered to generate funds, one of which is to reduce the size of the ANSF from the present 3,52,000 to 2,28,000 by end 2016. This is a typical resource, not threat and capability-driven, approach to construct a viable ANSF.
The ANSF has been trained along Nato standards but with mainly counter-terrorism capabilities. Conventional war-fighting skills have been deliberately omitted because Pakistan does not want a strong and capable military on its western front. The post-2014 Afghanistan with the US Resolute Force assistance in training and advising and undertaking limited counter-terrorism operations, has political, security and economic deficits. The Americans, who abandoned state-building to leaving Afghanistan “good enough”, have a serious responsibility to ensure that the impressive gains of the last decade are not frittered away and that the Resolute Force has the flexibility to enlarge to stem the tide of any adversity.
India, for the moment, is a bit player, notwithstanding its enormous popularity as a true friend, earned through its two billion dollar economic assistance package. Unfortunately, popularity has not converted into political influence as New Delhi has allowed itself to be viewed from the prism of Pakistan. India can offer deploying a field hospital and a training team in Kabul when required. New Delhi needs to wait and watch and let Kabul come to it.
No comments:
Post a Comment