09 Feb , 2015
Up till mid-2009, for basic training, the IAF was using the HPT-32, a piston-engine aircraft produced indigenously by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). This aircraft was in service with the IAF since 1987 and had progressively become unreliable. On account of 17 hull losses and 19 pilots’ lives lost, the IAF had steadily lost confidence about the safety and performance of the aircraft. The HPT-32 served the IAF for close to two decades and the service had been very keen to have them back in the air. This is due to the large numbers (over 100) and significant residual life still left in the fleet. Rather surprisingly, HAL was unable to solve the issues related to the fuel system of the aircraft.
One area where this obfuscation has diluted the IAF’s preparation for war is that of availability of suitable aircraft for training of pilots…
Quantitatively speaking, the Training Command of the Indian Air Force (IAF) flies about a third of the total flying hours logged by the service thus underscoring the significance of the old adage about hoping for the best and preparing for the worst. As a professional Air Force, proud to be the fourth largest in the world, the IAF is constantly preparing for the worst, i.e. for a two-front war imposed on the nation through combined action by China and Pakistan. In the pursuit of an operational capability that can deal effectively with either or both of these inimical neighbours in a possible future war, the IAF has a vision and matching ambitious plans which include induction of modern fourth and fifth generation combat aircraft, strategic and tactical transport aircraft, a variety of force multipliers and the means for the exploitation of space for warfare.
However, the IAF has not been bestowed with the wherewithal to consummate this vision, primarily on account of lack of comprehension and response on the part of the government, bureaucratic inefficiency and an inefficient indigenous aerospace industry. Somehow, the IAF’s needs for ensuring national security have been misperceived as wants for self-glorification. One of the areas where this obfuscation has diluted the IAF’s preparation for war is that of availability of suitable aircraft for the ab initio training of pilots into frontline ‘air warriors’.
The Requirement
The IAF selects and trains its own pilots. Training requirements have been refined through years of dedicated application to flying training by the finest bunch of trainers in the world whom the IAF addresses as Qualified Flying Instructors (QFIs). Every IAF pilot unabashedly dreams of becoming a QFI and to train greenhorn pilots to become operational in the IAF; a process which has been developed to a three-stage progression. The three stages, as in the case of most modern air forces, involve a basic stage on a turboprop aircraft, an intermediate stage on a jet aircraft of modest performance and an advanced stage which employs an advanced jet trainer. This process is the rough outline for the training of a fighter pilot, the cutting edge of a modern air force.
The transport and helicopter stream training is fairly well established…
Like most air forces, the IAF conducts the basic stage training on turboprop aircraft over 24 weeks as a common denominator for all trainee pilots, trifurcating thereafter into the fighter, transport and helicopter streams. This depends on the policy in vogue which in turn is dependent on the requirements of the three streams. The intermediate stage training lasting another 24 weeks is carried out at separate training establishments for the three streams. After completing this stage, successful pilot trainees are commissioned as Officers in the IAF and then move on to the advanced stage for specialisation in their streams.
For the fighter stream, intermediate stage training is conducted at Hakimpet (Secunderabad) and advanced stage at Bidar (Karnataka). For the transport stream, both are conducted at Yelahanka in Bangalore while for the helicopter stream, the intermediate and advanced stages are conducted at Hakimpet and Yelahanka respectively. On completion of the three stages, pilots are assigned to operational squadrons for further training and utilisation.
The transport and helicopter stream training is fairly well established and as long as a trainee pilot arrives at the threshold of intermediate stage with a modest amount of flying experience on a basic trainer, his progression is fairly well ensured with the present training platforms. However, for the fighter stream, the training aircraft is more crucial to the quality of the end product – the fighter pilot. This article focuses on the progression of the fighter stream trainee pilot.
The IAF currently requires 181 Basic Trainer Aircraft (BTA), 85 Intermediate Jet Trainers (IJT) and 106 Advanced Jet Trainers (AJT)…
Despite a stringent battery of tests in the selection process, there is an attrition that afflicts fresh trainees as they progress through the three stages outlined above. As a thumb rule, the attrition rates are about 15, 10 and 5 per cent during the three stages respectively. Based on this attrition rate and other considerations (including projected aircraft inventories), the IAF has worked out its current requirement to be 181 Basic Trainer Aircraft (BTA), 85 Intermediate Jet Trainers (IJT) and 106 Advanced Jet Trainers (AJT). So how is this requirement being met quantitatively and qualitatively?
Absence of Basic Trainer Aircraft
Up till mid-2009, for basic training, the IAF was using the HPT-32, a piston-engine aircraft produced indigenously by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). This aircraft was in service with the IAF since 1987 and had progressively become unreliable. On account of 17 hull losses and 19 pilots’ lives lost, the IAF had steadily lost confidence about the safety and performance of the aircraft. The HPT-32 served the IAF for close to two decades and the service had been very keen to have them back in the air. This is due to the large numbers (over 100) and significant residual life still left in the fleet. Rather surprisingly, HAL was unable to solve the issues related to the fuel system of the aircraft.
In 2009, the HPT-32 was grounded and despite the warning signs for the preceding months, the IAF was suddenly left with no basic trainer. The problem, as with all acquisition for the IAF, was home-grown. HAL was lobbying hard to sell a replacement (as yet untested) to the IAF which the IAF found unsuitable for the task. In any case, there were much better and proven machines available in the global market at a life-cycle cost lower than that of the HTT-40 proposed by HAL.
With considerable delays and consequent impairment of the IAF’s pilot training dispensation and almost three years after the grounding of the HPT-32, on May 10, 2012, the government finally cleared the proposal to procure the first batch of 75 Pilatus PC 7 Mk II aircraft from Switzerland. The Rs 2,800 crore contract between the Government of India and the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) Pilatus Aircraft of Switzerland, was concluded on May 24, 2012. Normally, the process of signing a contract from the time the Cabinet Committee on Security clears the proposal is about two months but the IAF had pressed for urgent action as there had already been inordinate delay in the finalisation of the deal.
In 2009, the HPT-32 was grounded; the IAF was suddenly left with no basic trainer…
First introduced by the OEM in 1994, the Pilatus PC-7 Mk II is a low-wing, tandem-seat fully aerobatic turboprop trainer employed for basic training for military aviators. In all, there are over 900 of these machines, along with the Mk I version, in operation in the air forces of 18 different countries around the world. India is the 19th. Beyond the 75 aircraft being procured directly from Pilatus, there is an option for another 106 to be license-built by HAL in India. It has a Pratt & Whitney engine and a four-bladed aluminium propeller which, Pilatus claims as having the lowest engine operating costs among all comparable turboprop trainer aircraft. The aircraft has a modern glass cockpit, ejection seats and an oxygen generating system.
The Pilatus contract provides for extension of scope of the contract within three years from initial signing. HAL’s HTT-40 is still far from operationalisation and is likely to be ready to enter service only by 2018. By then, Pilatus would have transferred technology to HAL and a substantial amount of investment would have been made to set up maintenance facilities adequate to support the three decades of the aircraft’s service life. In short, the HTT 40 would not be of use to the IAF. On May 31, 2013, the Pilatus was inducted into the IAF which is delighted with the choice. The much needed revamp of the basic trainer is done and, barring a miraculous return of the HPT 32 (with some major modifications by HAL to the 100-odd aircraft still with the IAF), the Pilatus 7 Mk II will continue to be the basic trainer for the IAF up to 2043. Even if the HPT-32 returns, it may be used only as a stepping stone to the Pilatus.
Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT)
In the absence of a basic trainer, the pilot training for the first two stages was being carried out in the HJT-16 or Kiran, a HAL product which first flew in 1964 and entered service in 1968. The first IAF pilot was trained on it in June 1970. Nearly 250 Kiran variants were produced but HAL is finding it difficult to maintain the diminishing fleet (around 80 now) due to paucity of spares. The Kiran Mk II was inducted in 1989, but the Mark I and IA are much older airframes with questionable safety and airworthiness status. Flying the Kiran beyond 2015 could be hazardous. There is also the incongruity that pilots now fly the Pilatus at the basic stage and use modern sophisticated avionics in a glass cockpit and then graduate to the Kiran which is a last generation design. The IAF is constrained to continue in this ridiculous state despite having projected the need for a replacement well in time.
HAL’s HTT-40 is still far from operationalisation and is likely to be ready to enter service only by 2018…
In 1997, HAL did indeed begin work on designing an IJT to be called HJT-36 (Sitara). Two prototypes were manufactured, the first of which flew on March 07, 2003, and was christened “Sitara”. Unfortunately, the basic aircraft design weight increased, therefore, the initially selected French Larzac engine thrust was found inadequate. HAL decided to replace it with the Russian AL-55I engine. The IJT development cost was now revised to Rs 467 crore from the initial Rs 180 crore. The date for Initial Operational Clearance, earlier scheduled for March 2004, was revised to March 2007. Contract for initial 12 aircraft was signed in March 2006 at a total cost of Rs 486.82 crore. The value of the order for 73 IJT aircraft with associated spares and equipment was around Rs 6,200 crore. The heavier Russian engine has more than neutralised the additional thrust and final performance may remain in question.
There is a school of thought that it may end up close to the performance of Pilatus PC7 Mk II. IJT deliveries were to be completed by March 2010. The IAF orders were to grow in the years to come. However, to date, not a single aircraft has actually been delivered to the IAF. The project has been dogged by delays due to engine selection, flight test accidents and flying control problems. The latest news is that the IJT is afflicted with a number of serious aerodynamic problems and is overweight. Hence it would have to be redesigned. The time frame for availability of HAL’s IJT has now become uncertain. This implies that the IAF will now have to explore other options for an IJT as the Kiran fleet will run out of life in the near future and need replacement.
Besides extending the life of the Kiran beyond safe limits, another option could be the use of Pilatus PC-7 for basic and intermediate stages until HAL ultimately produces the Sitara. A variation of this option could be use of PC-9 for the intermediate stage. The PC-9 is essentially the same as PC-7 except that it has under-wing hard points for armament training. This interim measure would ensure that the substantial amount of investment made by HAL would not be wasted. However, both these options are based on the premise that the Sitara would meet the IAF’s requirements satisfactorily. Going by HAL’s track record, the probability of that happening is very low. Thus the only option that ensures that the IAF is not deprived of a safe and efficient aircraft to produce professional pilots worthy of its stature and dimension is to get a modern IJT to fill the gap between the Pilatus PC-7 and the Hawk which are already part of the training system.
The IJT development cost has now been revised to Rs 467 crore from the initial Rs 180 crore…
In this context, it may be mentioned that the Defence Consultative Committee of the Parliament has, on many occasions, raised the issue of delays in the Sitara programme and the resultant bearing on IAF’s flying training. According to a Press Release by the Defence Ministry on August 05, the Defence Minister Arun Jaitley has informed the Parliament in a written reply to a member’s question that, “HAL, which has been developing the Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT), as a replacement for the Kiran aircraft, has not so far been able to resolve critical wing and airframe design and development issues related to stall and spin. In order to meet the emergent situation created due to inordinate delay in the IJT project, the IAF has already initiated the process for extending the technical life of the Kiran aircraft. The IAF has also initiated action to look for alternatives for the Sitara IJT.”
Indeed a Request for Information (RFI) for an IJT was issued by the Defence Ministry in February 2014. It is hoped that the interest of the IAF is kept above that of HAL and a suitable IJT is selected and inducted at the earliest hopefully before the Kiran fleet runs out of steam or their accident statistics assumes alarming proportions as in the case of the HPT-32.
Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT)
The British Aerospace (BAe) Hawk 132 was the choice for the IAF as its AJT and the order was placed in 2004 for two batches of 66 and 57 aircraft respectively. Of the total 123 Hawks, 106 are for the IAF and 17 to the Indian Navy. The first 24 aircraft were delivered directly by BAE Systems, while HAL produced the remaining 42 aircraft from the first tranche. There have been problems with spares and there was a time when the serviceability figure dropped below 75 per cent, an unusually low figure for a new machine. However, as far as the performance for its role is concerned, the aircraft has proved to be a good choice and the IAF is satisfied with it.
The time frame for availability of HAL’s IJT has now become uncertain…
Indeed, the aircraft was also selected for the IAF’s formation team, the Surya Kirans which was using the Kiran Mark II since its inception. The Hawk is also the aircraft operated since 1979 by the British Royal Air Force aerobatics team, the Red Arrows. The IAF has placed orders to 20 Hawk aircraft to equip the aerobatic team of the IAF.
Conclusion
The gap between the Pilatus PC 7 and the Hawk needs to be filled by a suitable replacement for the Kiran which is anachronistic and in any case on its last legs. Ideally, all the three types of trainers for the fighter stream (BTA, IJT and AJT) should have been selected keeping in mind commonality in cockpit and avionics design so that the progressive ascension through the three stages only represented incremental performance while retaining similar (if not identical) cockpit displays. However, the IAF does not have the luxury of such choices being hemmed in by a lobbying HAL and an interminable bureaucratic procurement process. Perhaps the selection of the IJT could keep this factor in mind as a desirable criterion if not an essential one.
The gap between the Pilatus PC 7 and the Hawk needs to be filled by a suitable replacement for the Kiran…
One area in which the IAF has been lethargic is the use of simulators. Modern flight simulator industry has elevated the look and feel of flight simulators to unimaginable proximity to the real. The latest CAE-built 737-800 simulator takes reality to a new level. The visual display wraps around the cockpit for 200 degrees, is 48 inches high and the high resolution visuals very close to the real thing. It is heartening to note that the IAF has ordered four simulators for the Hawk. It is to be hoped that the IJT deal also comes with an adequate number of simulators to enhance training standards, improve safety, and reduce cost on actual flying by substituting for it.
There is also a need to look at the option of the IAF assuming the role of production of the Pilatus PC 7 at one of its Base Repair Depots. A Pilatus team that inspected the facility at one of the IAF’s BRDs is confident that it will be able to produce the aircraft. The South African Air Force is already producing Pilatus trainer on its own and as per knowledgeable sources, the IAF’s facility is considered to be even better. Not only would this eliminate the constant griping about HAL’s performance but it would also reduce the cost of production considerably. One estimate pegs the cost at half that of HAL.
Flying training is the bedrock of the IAF’s professional capability and any compromise therein is a recipe for future ailments. More importantly, the frailties resulting from enervated flying training could lead to ignominious performance in the face of either of our two neighbours, never too far from the possibility of a limited skirmish, if not a large scale conflagration on our borders with them.
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