How Israel Could Be Drawn into Syria's War

By Tony Badran

February 23, 2015

President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are at loggerheads. Why? Following the White House's lead, many observers have focused on the personal enmity between the two. Some commentators go further and analyze the growing strategic rift over how best to handle Iran's nuclear program. In truth, however, the rift is far larger still.

In addition to all of the other issues, Obama and Netanyahu entertain contradictory views of Iran's role in region, and Syria stands at the heart of their disagreement. Whereas Obama is comfortable with the rise of Iranian power in Syria, Netanyahu and, to be sure, the Israeli security elite are deeply discomfited by it.

the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and Hezbollah launched an integrated assault in the Quneitra and Daraa countrysides in southern Syria. Importantly, they are advertising their lead role; underscoring that southern Syria is now an operations theater for Tehran. Thus, they are also confirming what has long been obvious: the Assad regime and its forces are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Iran.

These developments are impossible for Israel to ignore. Indeed, Iran and Hezbollah are calling their joint campaign "Operation Martyrs of Quneitra" - a direct reference to the Iranian-Hezbollah convoy that Israel destroyed on 18 January. The appearance of the Iranians in force in the Golan foists difficult choices on Israel, not just regarding its posture in Syria, but also about how to manage the growing chasm with the Obama administration.

Until now, Israeli policy in Syria has been, as one former official put it, "to wait and see" - to stand back and respond to any breach at the border, but not to intervene directly in the course of the war, even as Israeli activity in Syria has targeted Iranian assets exclusively. For all the talk about the supposedly impending threat of the Islamic State (ISIS), the January strike against the Iranian convoy and the current Iranian-led drive in southern Syria have emphasized the fact that the strategic and present threat comes, first and foremost, from Iran.

The Iranian determination to push into southern Syria reveals the weakness of the "wait and see" approach. Even if Israel desired to stay out of the Syrian war, the Iranians, seeing a green light from Washington, have ideas of their own. These dynamics are pushing Israel to reconsider its options.

In this context, a couple of recent articles by two prominent Israeli scholars, Efraim Inbar and former Ambassador Itamar Rabinovich, offer important insights on what those options are. The authors reach similar conclusions: to push back against Iran's designs and provocations in the Golan, Israel should go after Assad. The "best option," Rabinovich argued, is to signal to Tehran that the Israeli response would be against Assad, "thus affecting the course of the Syrian civil war." "This," Rabinovich adds, "is a call the Israeli leadership will have to make if the trends observed last January continue."The trends will certainly continue, and Israel will have to reach a decision. But as Rabinovich and Inbar recognize, this call will have important repercussions on the already frayed relationship with Washington. The White House wants everyone focused on ISIS. Its policy is predicated on cooperating with Iran and accommodating its interests.

The White House has made no secret of its opposition to any targeting of the Assad regime. President Obama even sent a letter to the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reassuring him that America and its coalition allies would not touch Assad. What's more, Israel sees that Obama has recognized Iranian spheres of influence in the region. And since the Iranian plan to set up a military presence on the Golan has been brought to light, there's not been even a statement by the US administration declaring Tehran's actions unacceptable.

On the contrary, the administration has called on Israel to avoid escalation. The White House, in effect, has already recognized Syria as an Iranian sphere of interest. Which is why it will prove impossible for Israel to coordinate its decision with Washington, so as, in Rabinovich's words, to "dovetail it with US policy in Syria and Iraq." The fact is, US policy in Syria runs counter to Israel's national security interests.

Perhaps nothing drives this home more than the comments of an unnamed senior US military official earlier this week. The official revealed that as the administration deliberates equipping some Syrian rebels to help in the campaign against ISIS, it is worried that any move by those rebels against Assad would result in Iran's Iraqi assets targeting US soldiers in that country. "You cross a red line in Syria, you start to infringe on what Iran sees as its long-term interest and those Shia militias could turn in the other direction," the official said.

This remarkable respect for Iranian interests in Syria leads to very disturbing questions. Do principles that apply to the Syrian rebels also extend to Israel? Would Netanyahu be wrong to assume that Obama would consider any Israeli action that crosses Iran's red lines in Syria as a reckless endangerment of US soldiers? After all, the White House has made clear that it regards Israeli support for congressional sanctions on Iran as an effort to goad the US into war with Iran. Would it be a stretch, then, for Israel to assume that Obama would similarly regard any Israeli military action against Iran, Hezbollah, or Assad in Syria?

Whatever the truth of these speculations, what is certain is that Iran will look to test the limits of tacit American support. By advertising its leading role in the campaign in southern Syria, Iran is pressing its advantage in the full knowledge that Syria, to quote Inbar, is "another issue of divergence" between Israel and the US.

While the White House now sees Iran as a de facto partner against ISIS, Israel continues to see Iran as an existential threat. In order to deter Iran, Israel may well decide to go after Assad. That will also mean going against Washington, which stands on the opposite side in Syria. This is the reality now dawning on Israel. When Netanyahu speaks before Congress on 3 March, he will be protesting much more than just a misguided American attitude toward the Iranian nuclear program.